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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:
Monday, July 7, 1975
9:15 a.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office

Kissinger: In Milwaukee I will speak toughly about the UN. It may cause a flurry in the UN.

President: That's all right. That's the way I feel. That should put us on the side of the Israelis on this issue. Didn't they kick Israel out of one of the specialized agencies?

Kissinger: I think the Israelis are getting ready to cave, but I have been wrong before. But we have to hang tough. If we make it, it will be your letter and the fact that the two of us are together. Dinitz as much as said so -- that they could handle me but not both of us together. If we make it, it could be significant and maybe better than March, because we have gained four or five months. If they make some unilateral concessions to Syria, we have a chance of holding it until '77.

President: The more I thought over the weekend, the more I think the decision is not to use American combat troops there but only warning stations was good. We can sell it to the Congress, and if it's turned down we have a good case to take it to the people.

How about the Morgan [the US soldier kidnapped in Beirut] and what should we do?

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Kissinger: It is a State-Defense foulup that he was allowed to pass through Beirut during a civil war. The group is not PLO but an unknown terrorist group. They have made three demands. The Lebanese Government is trying to effect the release without payment. I think we will recommend that we don’t meet the demands. I think that giving in would proliferate kidnappings like this and jeopardize far more American lives.

We will know today whether the Lebanese can free him. He is black, so they will be cautious about killing him.

On Panama, we have a number of choices. I don’t think we have any choice about going ahead with a treaty. I think Defense has behaved very badly on this. I think they have really been behind the Snyder Amendment. Clements said that if we delayed the treaty ratification, maybe he could give us a little help on the Snyder Amendment. I think we have to fight it on Constitutional grounds, not on the merits. I think that is a very important issue.

The only choice of getting through 1976 is with the cooperation of the Panamanians. For that, we need a serious negotiation. My idea is to delay the initialing until December 1976. If we could get some sort of conceptual understanding. We need a united Administration and no leak that this is the way we are going.

President: I agree we can’t have a leak, but as soon as you bring in people, you risk leaks by the opponents.

Kissinger: We could have a small NSC meeting.

President: Do we need that? A small, closely controlled meeting with Schlesinger, Clements, etc., would be better.

Kissinger: I think we should leave Colby out of everything we can.

President: Let’s do it that way. Let’s set it up for next week. Congressman Gene Snyder was at the airport in Kentucky. He had the gall to say he wanted to be a Federal Judge. I bit my tongue.

Kissinger: I am seeing Gromyko and will have to stall on CSCE. I will tell him you and Brezhnev can discuss it. We will have a little trouble wrapping it up. Waiting until around the 10th of August, until after Miki, is a long time to let it lag. That could be dangerous.
President: I read in the CIA brief that the Turks and Romanians are still holding out on CSCE.

Kissinger: That shows what the CIA brief is -- just a distillation of State cables. I have told our CSCE people to force the pace just a little; there really are no issues left. I have passed the word that you are not available in August.

President: Right.

Kissinger: Regarding Angola -- there are three options: If this is worth doing, we should do it right. I would suggest a 40 Committee meeting Monday, and I will get a paper to you by Tuesday.

President: I agree. Cross off the at least. I think it should be .

I read that the Chinese are supporting Savimbi and the Soviets are behind Neto. We would be supporting Roberto and Savimbi. You steer it so we come up with a minimum of .

Kissinger: I have no view between We will have a working group meeting to refine the package and maybe put some in it.

Dinitz is coming back today and I will see him.

President: We have that Turk meeting on Wednesday. I noticed that the Democratic Congressional group on Cyprus...

Kissinger: We think it is a put-up job.

President: That is what I think. I don't know just how we should deal with it. It looks like a Brademas game. Rostow wants to be helpful. He called Rumsfeld over the weekend. He shouldn't be perceived as working with the White House. I think he should talk directly to the Speaker, O'Neill and others with his Democratic group. Don says Gene is very concerned. He says Brademas is being very mischievous.

Kissinger: I think it is better if Brent handles this, so we won't have too many different cooks in the broth. If we could get them activated fast that would be good.
President: Brademas is saying we want all or nothing and we are not pressuring the Turks.

Brent should tell Rostow we are willing to lift just sales, and point out we have been trying to pressure the Turks.

Kissinger: I have a heavy Congressional schedule tomorrow. [He describes it.]

President: The freshman have a new Chairman. The new one, I don't think is quite as responsible as Hubbard was.
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