MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
President Suharto, President of Indonesia
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for NSA
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for NSA
Mr. Widodo (Indonesian Interpreter)

DATE & TIME: July 5, 1975 - Saturday
12:40 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.
(1:44 Secretary Kissinger joined)

PLACE: Laurel Cabin, Camp David, Maryland

President: Let me reiterate how pleased we are to have you visit. Secretary
Kissinger told me you were here in 1970 when President Nixon was in office.
We are just as concerned about our good relations with Indonesia as we were
earlier.

Let me say now that we are as firmly committed and interested in Southeast
Asia. The events in Indochina have in no way diminished our interest or
commitment in the area.

We are committed to detente with the Soviet Union, but it has to be a mutual
relationship. We will not let them have a bigger piece of the benefits. We
will continue it as long as it is mutually beneficial. We recognize that the
Soviet Union keeps assisting and strengthening its friends, just as we do.
But they cannot take advantage of us.

In my trip to Brussels, I told my NATO allies that we were committed to
them completely, and I want you and the countries in your area to feel the
same.
We want to continue our assistance programs. As you know, that depends on the Congress, which has been cutting our program in recent years. This Congress is interested, but it is my intention to increase aid. We are able to make available some military equipment items to help you in your situation -- four naval vessels, which may not be in tip-top condition, some tanks, aircraft such as C-47, and four C-123 transports.

Suharto: May I first convey my appreciation and gratitude, Mr. President, for your invitation to visit the United States. And on behalf of the Government and people of Indonesia, may I convey our heartfelt congratulations for the 4th of July. I would take this valuable opportunity and discuss the problems affecting not only Indonesia but all of Southeast Asia in light of recent changes which have swept the peninsula. I had already obtained valuable information from Mr. Habib and from you in respect to furthering American responsibility to its allies in the Southeast Asia region. After obtaining that information and valuable assessment, we have no fear that the United States will abandon its responsibility toward peace in the Southeast Asia region. Considering the bitter and sad experience of the American people in Vietnam, the U.S. has given such great help and to have it turn out so it is necessary to assess why it happened to come out so very badly after such American sacrifice.

If you would allow me, I will elaborate on Indonesia's problems in our struggles for independence against Communism; it will help us understand. It is not the military strength of the Communists but their fanaticism and ideology which is the principal element of their strength. To consider this, each country in the area needs an ideology of its own with which to counter the Communists. But a national ideology is not enough by itself. The well-being of the people must be improved so that it strengthens and supports the national ideology. From the experience of Laos and Vietnam in the past, they seem to have forgotten this national ideology to get the support of the people. Despite their superiority of arms in fighting the Communists, they lacked this national ideology to rally the people to fight Communism.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia has been unifying and nationalizing the people to prepare to fight the threats which eventually will be made against our independence. So we are busily engaged in encouraging and consolidating in Southeast Asia this national ideology and cooperating with others in the areas of culture, economics, and so on. This is of course to prepare for any eventuality of an Indochina eventually dominated by the Communists.

What will happen after Vietnam? There are two possibilities: Whether they will apply Communism just within their borders in order to improve the
conditions of their peoples. If so, we are okay. Ho Chi Minh has always wanted to unify all of Vietnam. We don't know yet what is going on and whether they will unify or whether there will be two separate Vietnams.

President: How long do you think it will take for them to decide this?

Suharto: I have been trying to find out from the Communists and Tito, and the judgment is that the consolidation will take five years, but by then, they will be unified.

President: How about the relations between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?

Suharto: Let me explain. As far as Cambodia, they recognize the GRUNK and Sihanouk — although he is still in exile. I asked Tito why he didn't support Sihanouk's return and he said it would take some time. Tito's reply was that due to prevailing conditions in Phnom Penh, it is not safe for Sihanouk to return. There are still some dangerous elements. But my personal opinion is that they don't want him back yet. My information is that it will take Cambodia about five years to consolidate, so it will be similar to Vietnam. Considering that the time for consolidation is so long — five years — they might want two Vietnams and one Cambodia, all three joining a non-aligned world. So they may want to stay separate but with their policies aligned.

Even if it takes some time to consolidate, events will certainly encourage similar elements in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere. Of course, this Communist ideological solidarity will take the form of encouraging these elements to step up their activities among labor, farmers and youth. When they have built up the Communist movements, the Vietnamese will be able to supply the military equipment necessary for them to undertake military activities.

President: Are all the Communists working together?

Suharto: The Soviet Union and the Chinese don't work together. They are competing to expand their own individual influence in the region.

The second possibility is they may not stay within their borders but seek to Communize the region and the world. If so, we have to find out whether they will support the Soviet Union and China. Right now, I think Vietnam won't take sides, because then it would become a target between the two. Instead it will work for independent national Communist movements. But in any case, these events will have brief impact on the neighboring countries. The question
is how to counter it. Knowing well the Communist tactics -- infiltration, fanaticism, etc., it is essential for each country to have a strong national ideology -- to strengthen itself in the political, economic and military areas.

We are fortunate we already have this national ideology -- Pantchestita(?). The question is, is it strong enough? Here it is important that we strengthen our economic development so we can support our Pantchestita(?). Therefore if we fail in economic developments, it will create a lack of confidence of our national ideology and create doubts in the people and leave them susceptible to other ideologies.

President: You have done very well in controlling inflation. We have had problems in that regard, but we are now making progress. I understand if you don't make economic progress there will be the growth of a Communist ideology in Indonesia.

Suharto: The principal factor is creating a national stability principally in the economic and monetary fields. The role of the US in her responsibility toward this area -- the U.S. won't abandon her role, but the American assistance role should be reviewed, both in relation to Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia. Particularly in assisting and supporting those countries in establishing national resilience. That would help in creating a regional resilience and help keep out Communism. But we are running against time because the Communists are working very hard in these countries to convert them to Communism.

The best way of fighting subversion is intelligence and territorial operations, so we can detect Communist activity when it first arises. In carrying these out when the people are participating, we rely heavily on communications. Therefore, communication between areas is very important to knowing when problems emerge, so we can deal with them immediately. If the danger becomes greater and the insurgency becomes greater, we will require mobile units to send to these areas to squelch subversion. To supply and maintain this mobility we will need both sea and air transport so we can put down insurgency before it becomes too big to stop. Especially in the navy field, we need to improve the conditions of the navy -- not big ships but to be able to transport men and materials to be able to carry out these operations. Particularly, ships which can fight any attempts to interfere with these operations to cope with insurgency. Indonesia has many islands so we will need many of these ships with great mobility.
Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are very important. We are in a better condition to do this than other Southeast nations. With American assistance, we have built a national resilience and we are working hard at building it further.

President: How big a Navy do you have and how big do you need?

Suharto: We have many capable navy men prepared to man the Soviet ships we have -- that were gathered to liberate West Iran. These ships are now mothballed and useless, however.

If you will agree with those principles to strengthen the national resilience -- especially in the military field, we can set up a joint committee to decide what is needed in the Navy, Army and Air Force. We don't need new equipment, just to make them serviceable.

President: I think we should set up a joint commission to decide what is needed and what we can do to supply those needs. I will talk to Secretary Kissinger.

Suharto: But the most important need is not in the military field but in the economic area. This is where we must build the nation. Indonesia can be an example to other countries of the importance of strengthening their national resilience.

President: Our Ex-Im Bank has been working with your people. I would expect we would continue to work with you on providing more credits and grants. It is important that we help with everything we can make available in order to contribute to the essential development you have described.

Suharto: In view of our efforts to accelerate developments, we have four sources: The IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia), international organizations like the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, and private banks. These four go from soft to hard terms for loans. We are already obtaining joint Ex-Im commercial loans, and terms are still lower through commercial banks. We hope to continue these loans.

President: In Fortune I saw a ten-page story urging private investment. Is the investment picture encouraging?

Suharto: The figure has now reached $5 billion. What remains is for industry which requires having capital input. Examples of these huge projects are liquefied natural gas ($800 million), nickel ($900 million), copper, and others. These will require the assistance of other countries to get the credits.
With regard to our efforts to strengthen our national resilience, I want to mention the archipelago principle. This principle has been followed by the Indonesian people for years. The purpose is to force ourselves in as a unified nation without any territorial ambition. From various countries we have gotten favorable response, but I see some hesitancy in the U.S. about this principle. Indonesia doesn't want to create difficulties with other countries in establishing this principle in its territory.

President: We were encouraged at the progress of the Law of the Sea Conference and we hope for further progress. We do understand your problem. We do have reservations, and we would be happy to meet with your people to work it out. We must have maneuverability if we are to carry out our responsibility in the world. I assure you we will work with your people to try to work out a mutual understanding.

Suharto: Talks have been conducted bilaterally between us already. The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.

President: Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their choice?

Suharto: There is no set date yet, but we are agreed in principle that the wishes of the people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. The Communist elements practically sabotaged the recent meeting in Macao. I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia. These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.

President: I greatly appreciate the chance to learn your views, especially on the events in Vietnam as they consolidate -- and the thought it would take five years to consolidate.
I would like to mention OPEC.

[Secretary Kissinger enters.]

We appreciate your not joining the embargo in '73-74. We are concerned about OPEC raising prices in the fall meeting. We are concerned about the effect on the economic recovery of the United States, the world, and the Third World. I know you feel badly about the Trade Bill's penalties against OPEC members. We are trying to get Congress to change that to make the penalties selective, not comprehensive.

Suharto: We share with the other OPEC states the view that we should not confront the consumers in this energy crisis. We are also aware that some producers have taken a tough stand. We are a small producer, but the others still listen to us. The September meeting I don't think will focus on a price increase but how to keep the purchasing power of the producers from falling. Therefore Indonesia, with the others, is studying the problem seriously so that oil revenue will benefit the people despite the inflation and recessions which have beset the world.

President: We have been through difficult times and we are now coming out of it. The oil price increase would have an injurious effect on our recovery and thus our ability to help the world's economic recovery.

In the past you have sent a special emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger on occasion. I would like that arrangement to continue under me if you agree.

Suharto: I fully share the importance of sending an emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger. I haven't done it so much recently because of the problems that both our countries have been facing recently. I would also agree to resuming these contacts so we can maintain a similarity of views on problems, like with Japan and Australia.

President: Lunch is ready.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
President Suharto of Indonesia
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (joined at 1:44)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Widodo, Indonesian Interpreter

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, July 5, 1975
12:40 - 2:00 p.m.

PLACE: Laurel Cabin
Camp David

SUBJECTS: Indochina; military assistance; economic
assistance; Law of the Sea; Timor; OPEC;
special channel

President: Let me reiterate how pleased we are to have you visit here,
Mr. President. Secretary Kissinger told me you were here in 1970
when President Nixon was in office. I want to emphasize that we are
just as concerned to maintain our good relations with Indonesia as we
were in previous administrations.

Indochina

Let me say now that we are as firmly committed and interested in
Southeast Asia as we have always been. The events in Indochina have
in no way diminished our interest or our commitment in the area.

Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5 (b) (3)
Automatically Declassified on Imp. to Det.
We are committed to detente with the Soviet Union, but it has to be a mutual relationship. We will not let them have a bigger piece of the benefits. We will continue it as long as it is mutually beneficial. We recognize that the Soviet Union keeps assisting and strengthening its friends, just as we do. But they cannot take advantage of us. On my trip to Brussels in May, I told my NATO allies that we were committed to them completely, and I want you and the countries in your area to feel the same way.

We want to continue our assistance programs. As you know, that depends on the Congress, which has been cutting our program in recent years. This Congress is difficult, but it is my intention to increase the aid to Indonesia. We are able to make available some military equipment items to help you in your situation. We can make available four naval vessels -- which may not be in tip-top condition -- plus some tanks, aircraft such as C-47's, and four C-123 transports.

Suharto: May I first convey my appreciation and gratitude, Mr. President, for your invitation to visit the United States. And on behalf of the Government and people of Indonesia, may I convey our heartfelt congratulations for the 4th of July.

I would like to take this valuable opportunity to discuss the problems that affect not only Indonesia but all of Southeast Asia in light of recent changes which have swept the peninsula. I had already obtained valuable information from Mr. Habib and from you with respect to furthering American responsibility to its allies in the Southeast Asia region. After obtaining that information and that valuable assessment, we have no fear that the United States will abandon its responsibility toward peace in the Southeast Asia region. Considering the bitter and sad experience of the American people in Vietnam, the United States has given such great help, and to have it turn out so, it is necessary to assess why it happened to come out so very badly after such American sacrifice.

If you would allow me, I will elaborate on the problems Indonesia has faced in our struggles for independence against Communism; it will help us understand. It is not the military strength of the Communists but their fanaticism and ideology which are the principal element of their strength. To counter this, each country in the area needs an ideology of its own with which to counter the Communists. But a national ideology is not enough by itself. The well-being of the people must be improved so that it strengthens and supports the national ideology. From the experience of Laos and Vietnam in the past, they seem to have forgotten this national ideology to get the support of the people. Despite their superiority of arms in fighting the Communists, the human factor was not there. They lacked this national ideology to rally the people to fight Communism.
It is in this spirit that Indonesia has been unifying and nationalizing the people to prepare to fight against the threats which eventually will be made against our independence. So we are busily engaged in encouraging and consolidating in Southeast Asia this national ideology and cooperating with others in the areas of culture, economics, and so on. This is of course to prepare for any eventuality of an Indochina eventually dominated by the Communists.

What will happen after Vietnam? There are two possibilities: Whether they will apply Communism just within their borders in order to improve the conditions of their peoples. If that is what they will do, we will be all right. Ho Chi Minh has always wanted to unify all of Vietnam. We don't know yet what is going on and whether they will unify or whether there will be two separate Vietnams.

President: How long do you think it will take for them to decide this?

Suharto: I have been trying to find out from the Communists and Tito, and the judgment is that the consolidation will take five years. But by then, they will be unified.

President: How about the relations between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?

Suharto: Let me explain. As far as Cambodia is concerned, they recognize the GRUNK and Sihanouk -- although he is still in exile. I asked Tito why he didn't support Sihanouk's return, and he said it would take some time. Tito's reply was that due to prevailing conditions in Phnom Penh, it is not safe for Sihanouk to return. There are still some dangerous elements.

But my personal opinion is that they don't want him back yet. My information is that it will take Cambodia about five years to consolidate, so it will be similar to Vietnam. Considering that the time for consolidation is so long -- five years -- they might want two Vietnams and one Cambodia, all three joining a non-aligned world. So they may want to stay separate but with their policies aligned.
Even if it takes some time to consolidate, events will certainly encourage similar elements in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere. Of course, this Communist ideological solidarity will take the form of encouraging these elements to step up their activities among labor, farmers and youth. When they have built up the Communist movements, the Vietnamese will be able to supply the military equipment necessary for them to undertake military activities.

President: Are all the Communists working together?

Suharto: The Soviet Union and the Chinese don’t work together. They are competing to expand their own individual influence in the region.

The second possibility is that the Vietnamese may not stay within their borders but will seek to Communize the region and the world. If so, we have to find out whether they will support the Soviet Union or China. Right now, I think Vietnam won’t take sides because then it would become a target between the two. Instead it will work for independent national Communist movements.

But in any case these events will have more than brief impact on the neighboring countries. The question is how to counter it. Knowing well the Communist tactics -- infiltration, fanaticism, etc. -- it is essential for each country to have a strong national ideology, to strengthen itself in the political, economic and military areas.

We are fortunate we already have this national ideology -- Panca Sila. The question is, is it strong enough? Here it is important that we strengthen economic development so we can support our Panca Sila. Therefore if we fail in economic development, this will create a lack of confidence in our national ideology and create doubts in the people and leave them susceptible to other ideologies.

President: You have done very well in controlling inflation. We have had problems in that regard, but we are now making progress. I understand that if you don’t make economic progress this will encourage the growth of a Communist ideology in Indonesia.

Suharto: The principal factor is creating national stability, principally in the economic and monetary fields. The role of the United States in her responsibility toward this is very important. The U.S. won’t
abandon her role, but the American assistance role should be reviewed, both in relation to Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia, particularly in assisting and supporting those countries in establishing national resilience. That would help in creating a regional resilience and help keep out Communism. But we are running against time, because the Communists are working very hard in these countries to convert them to Communism.

**Military Assistance**

The best way of fighting subversion in intelligence and territorial operations, so we can detect Communist activity when it first arises. In carrying these out when the people are participating, we rely heavily on communications. Therefore, communication between areas is very important to knowing when problems emerge, so we can deal with them immediately. If the danger becomes greater and the insurgency becomes greater, we will require mobile units to send to these areas to stop subversion. To supply and maintain this mobility we will need both sea and air transport so we can put down insurgency before it becomes too big to stop. Especially in the naval field. We need to improve the conditions of the Navy -- not big ships, but to be able to transport men and materials to be able to carry out these operations. Particularly, ships which can fight any attempts to interfere with these operations to cope with insurgency. Indonesia has many islands, so we will need many of these ships with great mobility. Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are very important.

We are in a better condition to do this than other Southeast Asian nations. With American assistance, we have built a national resilience and we are working hard at building it further.

**President:** How big a Navy do you have and how big a Navy do you need?

**Suharto:** We have many capable navy men prepared to man the Soviet ships we have -- that were gathered to liberate West Iran. These ships are now mothballed and useless, however.

If you will agree with those principles to strengthen the national resilience, especially in the military field, we can set up a joint committee to decide what is needed in the Navy, Army, and Air Force. We don't need new equipment -- just to make them serviceable.
President: I think we should set up a joint commission to decide what is needed and what we can do to supply those needs. I will talk to Secretary Kissinger about this and we will see what we can do.

Economic Assistance

Suharto: But the most important need is not in the military field but in the economic area. This is where we must build the nation. Indonesia can be an example to other countries of the importance of strengthening their national resilience.

President: Our export-Import Bank has been working with your people. I would expect we would continue to work with you on providing more credits and grants. It is important that we help with everything we can make available in order to contribute to the essential development you have described.

Suharto: In view of our efforts to accelerate developments, we have four sources: The IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia), international organizations like the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, and private banks. These four range from soft terms to hard terms for loans. We are already obtaining joint Ex-Im commercial loans, and the terms are still lower than commercial banks. We hope to continue these loans.

President: In Fortune I saw a ten-page story urging more private investment in developing countries. Is the investment picture encouraging in Indonesia?

Suharto: The figure has now reached $5 billion. What remains is for industry which requires heavy capital input. Examples of these huge projects are liquefied natural gas ($800 million), nickel ($900 million), copper, and others. These will require the assistance of other countries to get the credits.

Law of the Sea

With regard to our efforts to strengthen our national resilience, I want to mention the archipelago principle. This principle has been followed by the Indonesian people for years. The purpose is to fence ourselves in as a unified nation without any territorial ambition. From various countries we have gotten favorable responses, but I see some hesitancy in the US about this principle. Indonesia doesn't want to create difficulties with other countries establishing this principle in its territory.
President: We were encouraged at the progress of the Law of the Sea Conference and we hope for further progress. We do understand your problem. We do have reservations, and we would be happy to meet with your people to work it out. We must have maneuverability if we are to carry out our responsibility in the world. I assure you we will work with your people to try to work out a mutual understanding.

Suharto: Talks have been conducted bilaterally between us already.

Timor

The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.

President: Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their choice?

Suharto: There is no set date yet, but it is agreed in principle that the wishes of the people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. The Communist elements practically sabotaged the recent meeting in Macao. I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia. These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.
President: I greatly appreciate the change to learn your views, especially on the events in Vietnam as they consolidate -- and the thought it would take five years to consolidate. That is very helpful to me.

OPEC

I would like to mention OPEC

[Secretary Kissinger enters the meeting at 1:44 p.m.]

We appreciate your not joining the embargo in 1973 and 1974. We are concerned about OPEC raising prices in the fall meeting coming up. We are concerned about the effect this will have on the economic recovery of the United States, the industrial world, and the Third World. I know you feel badly about the Trade Act and its penalties against OPEC members. We are trying to get the Congress to change the Act to make the penalties selective, not comprehensive.

Suharto: We share with the other OPEC nations the view that we should not confront the consumers in this energy crisis. We are also aware that some producers have taken a tough stand. We are a small producer, but the others still listen to us. The September meeting I don't think will focus on a price increase but on how to keep the purchasing power of the producers from falling. Therefore Indonesia, with the others, is studying the problem seriously so that it's oil revenue will benefit the people despite the inflation and recessions which have beset the world.

President: We have been through difficult times and we are now coming out of it. The oil price increase would have an injurious effect on our recovery and thus our ability to help the world's economic recovery.

Special Channel

In the past you have sent a special emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger on occasion. I would like that arrangement to continue under me, if you agree.

Suharto: I fully share the importance of sending an emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger. I haven't done it so much recently because of the problems that both our countries have been facing recently. I would also agree to resuming these contacts so we can maintain a similarity of views on problems, like with Japan and Australia.
President: Lunch is ready, Mr. President. Why don't we go in?

[The party went into lunch.]
Saw it #1: 497 Let's "jump" 412.8 to complete the condensation. There is truly no reason for any of this. The beginning of folly, the middle of foolishness, the end of wisdom. The text is not clear, but it appears to be discussing a concept or idea that is not well understood.
to them. Still some dangerous element. But my personal opinion is they don't want this kind yet. My wife is D5 and take Cambodia and 5 geo to know, that will be similar to UN. Something like that, not humanitarian so long I guess they might cancel it. But I Cambodia all 3 scenario would work. So they may want to stay more. But if their future changed.

Even if I take some time to understand, experts will certainly know more. Similar scenarios in China, Madagascar, Philip, elsewhere. Of course, their logic is different, you blame and take some. Encouraging them, the idea of stop by their activities among labor, farming youth. When they have built by the West, move to the UN. We will be able to supply a real epi-vaccination force. To understand and activities.

4. Att the world is not working together.

5. The SV + 12C don't work together. They are competing to support their own. A subtle influence among regions.

The result is very much, they may set up in their own country but is very intense. We can't support them. If so, we have to find out whether they will support SV + 12C. Right now I think UN won't take this because then it would become a target. But I think it will work for sometime until next months. But in my case there won't be anything.
P. you have done very well in writing right.

We have had to write that report, but we
were never writing a letter.

If you don't write a story, you will be proud
of yourself in the end.

S. Among all factors in writing, match-making
previously in certain writing fields. Rob
of US has stepped toward this area. US
want Canada be well, but US must be
should be worked with in addition to
deeds. p. and S. in nothing in amount.

Fully some sections in justice will
resilience. Text could help in writing regional
investment. Help import issues. But we
are earning a just fine business. Let us
not write any hand in those contain
to content them to learn.
The best way of fighting submarines is still under consideration. We can detect their activity when it is too late. In carrying these out when people are particularly anxious, we rely heavily on communication. In communication, it is very important to be sure that people are well trained and that they understand each other. We will send mobile units to deal with these cases to stop submarines to supply. This mobility we will need both new and new systems to send them. For example, supplies on our ships which can fight submarines or units of three ships to stop them or of three ships, we will need units to support the system and to be able to transport more methods to be able to carry out.

In the ships, which can fight submarines, we will need units to support them or on our ships, we will need units to support the system and to be able to transport more methods to be able to carry out.

P. 4 How long have you been there long needed
S. We have many ships that were prepared to move from the quay to the sea. We have been waiting for new vessels or ships for months.

These ships are now modified and ready
However, if you will agree that Enrico
is fighting with resistance again in mid-
field, we can set up joint knots and decide
what to work with. Any way, we
don't need any one joint formation.
I think we should set up a joint move to decide
what to work. Meet me around 8 am
this week. I will talk to you.

5. But most my need is still in mid-
gull in a very clear. This is what can
must be achieved with guns. It
can be an example to other countries in important
strengths than their naval machine.

6. Our C3 is break in working with your people.
I could agree we would invent, work for you
and produce a more credits or points. It
is important that we help our country,
we can make available in effort to contribute to
an essential element you have described.

7. In view of our efforts towards objectives, we
have 4 farmers. I can't withdraw
like would break, X-M breaks, point breaks. Then
from you can get to hard times for loss. We
are already at the joint X-M and some
times are still born than land breaks. We
hope to continue these loss.

8. In future I have a 10 page story going
private interest. Do invest, future, the major
St. The figure has some leaked 5-1st. What.
Union is for mutiny which requires being raped political projects of West Bank, West Bank projects are: in N.C. (or elsewhere), Middle (for mid) Zogga & others. These will require some of other vectors to get a disease. Egypt then efforts to strengthen with machinery, want to maintain a multiparty principle. This principle broken followed by Indo people for years. This proves to have problems in or a multiparty nation with a multiparty constitution. From various countries we have gotten favorable responses that we want democracy in US about this principle. Indo doesn't want to exist with with nations in exist an jungle in its territory.

1. We once answered at jury of 60's that to bring for persons party. This is misunderstanding, you say, but do you understand? We do have evidence & here. We do have evidence & here to not let your people to work it out. We must have evidence & here to do not let your people stay in a world. I promise you we will work with your people to fight against mistrust & misunderstanding.

5. Talks have been conducted bilaterally but so sheek, I will just want to receive in Pakistan. Decolonization. Stately & our brave single for 1845. We will not not use aggression to laws or territorial claims. Good wishes. So Indo will not move pace.
against stability of certain countries. The report to Tokyo, we support carrying out decision on three powers of self-defense. In uncertain times, Japan's people must be freed from ignorance, stay off Part 2. and gain facts. We understand small territory and resisters, Mund 
where country would hardly be stable. If fact it would be a big burden on Part 3. for any. If 
they want to mitigate with funds as subject-value, that is not possible because Japan is a 
small country. So only way is to mitigate with facts.

Now Part 5. set a date first for February. Japan 
people to make their choice.

S. We set date yet but agreed on principle that 
again, states of people will be respected. What 
is that who want help to are almost explained. 
These countries like mitigation we being subject to 
many pressure by those who care about limits. 
The limit elements practically sabotaged recent 
truly in Vietnam. But it present that Japan clearly 
wouldn't consult itself with Japanese people, not 
way to hand to manage the self-defense forces 
with a national army. Within Japan, 
There are some of a parts I wanted to voice 
- This arrogance unity of you

1. I mean gravely appear again, very deep 
emotions in UN so they understand that 
that it would take yes to unsolicited, 
I would like to univate OPEC.
(K entered)

We are opposed to...<snip>

We are concerned that...<snip>

We have...<snip>

We strongly urge...<snip>

We do not believe...<snip>

We strongly urge...<snip>

We strongly urge...<snip>
both am another here been from what
recently. I would also agree to missing
thatinitiate to me can enter something
if write as parts, like W Japan, and this
2
Church is nearby