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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Senator Jacob K. Javits (Republican - New York)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Friday - June 27, 1975
10:23 - 10:45 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: Are you going both to Moscow and China?

Senator Javits: Yes. With the first group. Under Henry's tutelage, I
have been wooing them and got invited.

I have been studying the Jackson Amendment. It hurts my heart that it
was fumbled -- it would have been a great achievement.

Kissinger: I think had he kept it quiet...

Senator Javits: I agree. And if we had kept the Ex Im limit off. That
did it. I voted against that.

President: We didn't focus on it enough.

Senator Javits: It's water over the dam. I think the Romanian agreement
has an excellent chance. We are working on it. They have stepped up the
number in June and July. The Jewish group in July is going over and I
think then it will fly.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Div. cov 3/10/04

BY: [redacted] NARA, DATE 5/20/04

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President: I hear Scoop was almost discourteous with Ceausescu.

Senator Javits: I poured oil on the waters. It was calling a spade a spade, but you don't do that to foreigners. Ceausescu was very surprised, but took it very well. Jackson wasn't rude, but it was very uncomfortable. Jackson thought it would help to call a spade a spade.

I told Henry I wanted five minutes to give you the feeling of the American Jewish Community. It is deeply devoted to Israel. Consistent with that, it is deeply devoted to America. If the President would lay it on the line and say this is in the American interest, it would be agonizing. If there is no doubt that we will provide Israel with military equipment immediately. Their worry is we will use military equipment as leverage and undermine what they think they need for their defense. If that is laid to rest, I think the rest is manageable.

At least 15 years ago I was in the office of Chief of Protocol in Israel and they began to talk sensitive matters. I reminded him I was an American Congressman and they shouldn't discuss anything in front of me they wouldn't say before any other Congressman.


President: I think you know the way I have voted and spoken. I am a firm friend of Israel.

Senator Javits: I know.

President: I have hundreds of Jewish friends. I am deeply convinced an interim agreement is the best. But it may fail. The odds are not good because of the problem of the passes. To make certain that Israel is strong unilaterally and secure, I was far more generous than my advisors recommended. The result is that Israel is far more secure than before the war or at any other time. They will tell you that. There has to be flexibility on the passes. Without them, they will be more secure than they were before. There is no question about their military security. I don't understand their lack of flexibility. I don't want to have to go to Geneva but we can't have a stalemate.

I hope our good friends here and in Israel know we think it is in their and our best interests. It is in our mutual interest to get an interim settlement.

Senator Javits: Are the Egyptians just sweetening us for the eastern end of the passes?



President: They want our friendship and help. They want to show independence. If they don't get it, they will be forced to go elsewhere.

Kissinger: Remember that Egypt isn't asking for the passes for themselves. They would be UN.

Javits: I assume that all the variables are within your command.

Kissinger: I think we can find a solution. Sadat made some additional concessions at Salzburg to get Israel out of the passes -- including electronic surveillance. He now thinks Israel has just pocketed these concessions and not moved.

Javits: The American Jews think Israel is so exposed that they would fall on the Israeli side on anything that Israel thought it needed for its security. You have to be thoughtful on this point. American Jews have thought that Israel was being asked to be given up ground for paper. Israel must be in harmony with the U.S. and American Jews haven't grasped that. They fear that our interest in the Arabs will lead us to ask Israel to make concessions in exchange for an American moral commitment. So there is no pressure from American Jews to push Israel to make concessions relating to security.

President: If we don't get some movement, I have to lay the record out -- that is not good.

Javits: Rabin said they would have to reconstruct their whole defense line. Would we help them -- give them enough to do that?

President: They would still have their main line.

Kissinger: The side issues have all been sorted out. Their mines, forward lines and logistic installations would have to be moved -- but we would support a jog in the line so the logistic installations wouldn't have to move. We would support a six-month transition in the north to give them time to reconstruct the line.

Javits: How long would it last?

Kissinger: There are two aspects. The first is that the agreement would last until it is superseded by another agreement. That Israel knocks aside -- and shouldn't. The other is UNEF. We can get three years there.



Javits: The crisis for Israel is the United States. It is extremely desirable to have a settlement and not to go to Geneva. Those are the two real points for American Jews.

Kissinger: Geneva is a lousy way to have to go. You know, it brings all the Arabs together, brings the Soviet Union in, and forces a consideration of all issues comprehensively.



✓ P/ Jamits/K

27 June 75

P Are you going back to London + PRC

J Yes. WFC 1st group. Under K tutelage, I have been covering them + got involved.

I have studying Jackson around. It breaks my heart that was possible - it would have been a great achievement.

K I think had no kept it private - - -

J I agree. And if we had kept X in egg. I bet I did it. I would agree that.

P We didn't focus on it long.

J Watson was down. I think I remain against ^{was working at} no special chance. I try to stay up

in June + July Smith group in July gangster + I think then it will fly.

P I have some was about directions etc /
Casson

J I found oil in water. It was getting spade spade, but you don't do that in foreign. Casson was very surprised, but took it very well. Jackson went inside, but it was very important. Jackson that it would help to call spade a spade.

I told K I wanted to see you U.S. group only packing. It is largely devoted to F. I insisted w/ that, it largely devoted to U.S. If you would buy it on time + say this in U.S. interests, it would be organizing. If there was doubt we would provide I'd say would. The

?

way is we will use mail again as leverage + manipulation what they think they would prefer. It that is kind to not, I think not is necessary.

at least 15 yrs ago I was in office of Chief of protocol in ~~the~~ (?) + they began to talk sensitive matters. I reminded him

I was an Am. Congressman they shouldn't discuss anything in front of me they would let my representative express. I think you know a way I have written a letter to you from friend of I

I know

I have 100's of Jewish friends. I always emailed them expressed best.

But it may fail. Odds not good because of lack of power - to make within I strong substantially + sure I was far more powerful than my advisors now. Recently I is far more powerful

than before a week or at any other time. They will tell you that. There has to be flex in power. W's than they will do more powerful than ever before. Then no question about their mail security.

I don't understand their lack of flex. I don't want to have to go to Germany but we can't have statements.

I hope are good friends love not know us think it in their care

but instead. It is an independent
interest to get an independent settlement
J Are E just sweating us for E end of
passes?

P They want an independent + help. They
~~want~~ want A show in Jordan - If they don't get
it they will be forced elsewhere

K E doesn't ask for passes for themselves. They ^{wanted} _{the UN}
J I would like independent in your hand.

K I think we can find a solution. I don't make
a deliberate invasion at Sidra to get I out of
passes - and also surveillance. He now
thinks I have forfeited this + not more.

J Our Jms think I is to expect they would
fall on I side on anything I don't need
for its security. You have not helped
on this point. US Jms have that I
being asked to be given my ground for
paper. I must be in hurry w/ US.
US Jms haven't pushed that. They fear
our interests in Arabs will ask I to make
concessions for US moral interest. So
there is pressure from US Jms to push
I to make concessions relating to
security.

P If we don't get movement, I have to
lay a word out - that not good.

J Rabin said they would have to reconstruct
their whole def line. Would we help them

give them money & do that.

P They would still have their own line

K The same issues have ~~all~~ all been sorted out. Their mines, forward lines & logistic instal would have to be moved, but we would support a forward line to a log instal would not have to move. We would support a new transition in north & give them time to reconstitute line.

J How long would it last

K 2 weeks. 1st is it would last till agreed that I handover - & should. Other is ONE F. We can get 3 gas there

J The crisis for I is a US. It extremely desirable to have settlement & not go to Geneva. There are 2 red points for US fun.

K Geneva is long ~~approach~~ way to have to go. (Described the hazards briefly)