

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

**DATE AND TIME:** Monday, June 23, 1975

**PLACE:** The White House

Kissinger: I will be giving a speech in Atlanta tomorrow. Let me read you the part on the Middle East. [He reads it.]

President: There is nothing wrong with that. It may be interpreted badly by them.

Kissinger: I think by the end of the year you will have the Jews moving heaven and earth to defeat you.

President: As long as I know what I am doing is right, I will take my chances.

Kissinger: They are unspeakable. They have now published their concessions -- making it even less likely that Sadat will agree.

On your meeting with the Greek Congressman, they came away from the last one feeling you had concurred with their insistence on prior concessions. That is not possible. Some of the things promised in June we can probably get in the July meeting, but it is risky to predict it.

President: It is my feeling that if we are to get anything out of the 24 July meeting, we have to waive and they have to lift the embargo on sales.



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. memo 3/9/04

BY DW NARA DATE 5/20/04

Kissinger: You could hold the waiver until after 24 July if the embargo were lifted earlier.

President: From the Turkish point of view, that is right. But from the Congressional point of view, it should coincide with their action. How about this procedure? They agree to the idea; I would write a letter to Mansfield and Albert saying that if Congress acts on sales and credits, I will use the waiver authority. If they don't go along, we really are in trouble.

Kissinger: We would have to fight, and I don't know if we would win it.

President: I don't either.

Kissinger: I will have an Israeli-Egyptian option paper. Whichever way you go, you may want a record that they have rejected your request for reconsideration. They have written us off. I never imagined they could ignore a Presidential phone call -- they never even acknowledged it. Now they are putting out their offer of a corridor [to Abu Rudeis] designed to show they have been forthcoming.

President: When does Eilts see Sadat?

Kissinger: Later today. I would be astounded if Sadat accepted, because this will look like pressure on him. It might seriously affect Sadat's perception of our ability -- when Israel is totally dependent on us. Maybe give Dinitz a letter on Thursday. Then brief selected Congressmen on all aspects of the negotiations.

President: I think we would have to show them the maps and everything.

Kissinger: I disagree with Eilts about the road. To have an Israeli road within sight and rifle range of the Egyptian road, with the Egyptian road demilitarized and the Israel road not, and with the Egyptian road....



P/K 23 June 75

K (Discussing Atlanta Speech. Reads from ME position.)

P Nothing wrong with that. <sup>They</sup> would be interpreted badly by them.

K I think by a end of a year you will have a few more because earth is left you.

P As long as I know what I am doing is right, I will take my chances.

K They are unrepeatable. They have now published their concessions - making it even less likely that Sadat will agree.

On your meeting w/ the Arab Congressmen, they came away from a last one feeling you had concurred w/ their insistence on prior concessions. That doesn't seem possible. We may get some of the things promised in Jan we can perhaps get in a July meeting, but it is risky to predict it.

P It may be that if we do get anything out of 24 July meeting, we have to raise and they have to lift embargo on Kaks.

K You could hold a session til after 24 July if a embargo were lifted ~~later~~ earlier.

P From T point of view that is right. But from any point of view, it should convince w/ their actions.

Homer about this procedure - if they agree ~~to~~ to a deal, I would write a letter, saying if any cuts are also credits, I will rise a session authority. If they don't go along, we really are trouble.

K We would have to fight it. I don't know if we would win it.

Pictures of our full work.

P I don't either.

K I will have a I-E option paper. whichever way you go, you may want a record that they have rejected your request for recon-struction. They have written us off - I never imagined they could ignore a P phone call - they never even acknowledged. Now they putting out their offer of a caricature, designed to show they have been puttering

P When Eilts see Sadat.

K Later today. I would be astounded if Sadat accepted, because this will look like pressure on him. It might seriously affect Sadat's perception of our ability - when I is totally dependent on us. Maybe give Dinaty a letter on Thursday. Then brief selected Congressmen on all aspects of a report.

P I think we would have to show them maps and everything.

K I disagree w/ Eilts about a road. To have an I road w/ in sight & <sup>with</sup> ~~prohibit~~ range of a E road, w/ a E road demilitarized & I road not, & w/ a E road