MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
NATO Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning
and Policy Colin Humphreys
Ambassador Andre de Staercke, Belgium
Ambassador Arthur Menzies, Canada
Ambassador Ankar Svarth, Denmark
Ambassador Francois de Rose, France
Ambassador Franz Kräpfl, Germany
Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, Greece
Ambassador Tomas Tomasson, Iceland
Ambassador Felice Catalano, Italy
Ambassador Marcel Flachback, Luxembourg
Ambassador A. K. F. (Karel) Hartogh, Netherlands
Ambassador Rolf Busch, Norway
Ambassador João de Freitas Cruz, Portugal
Ambassador Orhan Eralp, Turkey
Ambassador Sir Edward Peck, United Kingdom
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, United States

The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Goldwin, Special Consultant to the President
H. Allan Holmes, Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic
Political-Military Affairs, Department of State
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security
Council

DATE AND TIME:

June 19, 1975
4:05 - 5:02 p.m.

PLACE:

The Cabinet Room
The White House
President: (Having gone around the table to greet each participant individually) Won't you all please sit down. We have to have our traditional press photograph.

(The press was admitted for photographs and then left.)

President: Let me welcome each and every one of you to the White House. I am delighted to meet those of you I haven't met before and to get reacquainted with old friends, Frans Krapf. Frans Krapf and I and our wives got well acquainted many years ago. How long ago was it Frans?

Krapf: 1958 or 1959, Mr. President.

President: Well, it's good to see you. I had no idea that the invitation for this meeting that I issued in February would be referreered with by the Brussels summit, however, I felt that the summit was very successful, that it was very good to have the representatives of the various countries of the Alliance together. The reaction to the summit in the United States has been very good, and I hope it has been the same in each of your countries.

I think that the reaction to the trip here is best reflected by the action of the United States Senate following my return -- the actions they have taken with regard to Secretary Schlesinger and the Military Authorization Bill. A year ago, when we had action on this bill, there were numerous cuts, and numerous amendments that were very harmful to our defense effort. This year, the atmosphere was entirely different. We won every amendment that would have reduced our weapons systems or cut back on our defense program, and we won by a good margin!

On the occasion of this meeting I would like to state my continuing interest in the six points that I raised during the Brussels meeting. I know you are familiar with them and so I will go through them quickly. First, we have a continuing interest in the strength of the Alliance, strength in a military sense. This is of foremost importance, and the United States will play a full role. Second, we are interested in the Alliance broadening its interests in areas relating to the strength of our countries, in areas that we face as industrialized
countries. Third, I believe we have to be realistic about the US-Spanish defense agreements, and that we have to recognize the contribution that they make to military arrangements in Europe. I also think that we, the United States, should continue detente with the Soviet Union. This can be helpful in areas of importance to the Alliance. We are extending our negotiations in SALT II; there is no resolution as yet but we are building on the Vladivostok meeting of last December. The MBFR negotiations, the negotiations in Geneva -- without consideration of Phase III -- have shown progress in Phase I. What are the numbers, Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: In MBFR or CSCE -- in MBFR there are some 28 to 32 thousand on our side to 68 thousand on their side, together with equipment.

President: The point I am making is that in Phase I we are on dead center. I know that consultations have gone forward on the nuclear element and that we are now looking at the question of including Pershings and some of our aircraft. Is it the F-104s?

Secretary Schlesinger: F-4s, sir.

President: We are also interested in the European security negotiations. I understand that there is now some movement, and if there is an acceptable compromise I would assume there will be something in Helsinki in the latter part of July. These are among the principal issues that we see of interest to the Alliance, together with standardization, rationalization, and other matters of present concern.

Turning to the Middle East, following my visit to Europe I had two very full days with Prime Minister Rabin. These followed my conferences with President Sadat in Salzburg. I am convinced that if we permit a stalemate to continue it inevitably will result in military conflict in the Middle East. If that happens, you can write out the next part of the scenario -- an oil embargo. Third, if we don't get movement we will have war in the Middle East, an oil embargo and the development of serious anti-Americanism among the Arab states. Fourth, these efforts would bring back into the Middle East the Soviet Union in a strong way. They've been somewhat crowded out, in fact, substantially crowded out in the negotiations following the Yom Kippur War. But, if these things take place, the Soviet Union will be back in the Middle East.

We're working along two tracks. The suspended talks could be resumed and an interim settlement agreed to. Differences have been narrowed, but there is still insufficient give by the parties. If that give doesn't develop, there will be no alternative but to pursue a comprehensive settlement with all issues going to
Geneva. We prefer the former, but the latter would have to be the alternative if an interim agreement is not possible. I can't at this point forecast an interim agreement, because we still have not resolved the differences but if we don't have such an agreement a comprehensive plan will have to be introduced. It will be inevitable, although not a good choice.

Well, with those comments I would like to turn to you and to have any questions you may wish to ask.

Secretary General Luns: Mr. President, allow me on behalf of the Council to warmly thank you for taking time in your very heavy schedule to fit in this visit by the Council to the White House. We are very grateful. This strong evidence of your interest in the Alliance and in the affairs of Europe has been crowned by the summit in Brussels. In Europe, the governments, the parties, the public and the media have recognised the importance of the summit and see it as a great success. Far from having this visit inconvenienced by the summit, we feel that our meeting with you today brings new energy and new importance to the work of the Alliance.

Mr. President, we have listened with interest to your remarks, to your statements on the six points of your address and your views on the world situation -- especially the Middle East. You and your Secretary of State are very active in this area. The Council shares the pre-occupations of you and your government on what might happen if there is no agreement between Israel and the Arab states. We do hope your talks with Rabin and your meetings with Sadat in Austria will lead to a new step.

The Council has had a very useful schedule here in the United States. The Nuclear Planning Group has had the privilege to be on the other side of the United States, and now we are attending the SACLANT Symposium in Annapolis. Our meeting in Monterey was very successful.

President: It is a beautiful place isn't it?

Secretary General Luns: Yes, Mr. President, but it's cold! It was only 45 to 50 degrees. We had heard that the sun shines out there, but we didn't believe it (laughter). Flying over your country we were again impressed by its enormity, by the size of the strongest member of the Alliance. It made us very proud to think that our cousins, our brothers and our sisters have all come here to contribute to its growth.
President: They are the bulwark of our population.

Secretary General Luns: We also had the opportunity to visit your huge base at Vandenburgh. We were extremely impressed of how dedicated and how well trained all the men there were, and how very modern your technology. Now, we appreciate your kind invitation to put questions to you, and I will ask the Dean to begin this. First, however, I want to stress our very warm thanks.

President: Did you have a good evening last night?

Secretary General Luns: Yes, oh yes. Several of the ambassadors and I decided that if we had such a marvelous yacht, we would do a lot less than you if we were President. Mr. Rumsfeld and his wife are very good hosts, and it was a lovely evening.

Ambassador de Staercke: Thank you Mr. President. As Dean, I would first like to underline the importance of this meeting. It not only has a symbolic importance but also an effective importance as it completes the success of your trip to Brussels and it underlines the solidarity expressed during the meetings in Brussels. I, too, wish to express our gratitude.

The first question I would like to ask relates to the Middle East question. We are aware of the importance of an interim settlement. Is there a chance for step-by-step diplomacy again, for the Secretary of State to become involved again?

President: There is a possibility of working with Egypt and Israel toward this end. However, at this point, it would not be wise to send the Secretary of State on another two-to-three week shuttle operation. There would have to be an agreement already agreed to, but one which might be consumated during such a visit. It would not be wise now to plan another three week trip. It would be impractical. We have narrowed differences, but there are still differences. We would have to have them further narrowed.

Ambassador de Staercke: Turning to another situation, Mr. President, I would like to discuss Europe, the situation in the Alliance. I won't talk about recent elections and recent events with which we are all familiar, but rather about the whole situation and its precarious effect on the solidarity on the Alliance. Especially, there is the problem of Turkish-Greek-US relations. Mr. President, we would like to help you. Realistically, as Dean, I believe there are no great chances for such assistance, but we would like to put all chances possible on your side. We have heard of the 30-day move by the Turks. We have heard of...
the possibility of a settlement with the Greeks in the autumn. But the United States should not have to work alone. We are grateful, but the Secretary General, with the considerable powers of his office, could do more. The Secretary General with our consensus could, for example, write the three parties to urge the governments of Greece and Turkey to work as friends and to work with patience -- and to urge the United States to greater speed in dealing with the delivery of arms to Turkey. If we could help, I think it would be of enormous assistance. The danger is, that while we have unity, these problems run the risk of being misinterpreted by outsiders. Our internal differences are seen as a weakening of our resolve. Thank you Mr. President. I wanted you to know of this interest on our part.

President: Our concern about Cyprus and the differences between Greece and Turkey have had the highest priority of this Administration. We are anxious to help as best we can to resolve these problems. I met -- two fine meetings -- with Caramanlis and Demirel in Brussels. The Secretary of State has been meeting with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers. Unfortunately, we also have the problem in the United States of the Congress which has taken a very unwise action in the arms cut-off. I have fought that action since I have been in office. The Senate, as you know, took positive action before we left for Brussels. I met this morning with members of the House Committee on International Affairs to see if it is possible to get some action in the House. However, the problem is more difficult in the House than in the Senate. We will continue to try to get the Congress to take affirmative action, and to take this problem out of the Turkish-Greek negotiations. On the other hand, once that has been done it is essential that the negotiations between Greece and Turkey bring some resolution of the Cyprus problem. Secondly, in the interim, it is my hope that there will be restraint in that part of the Mediterranean. Resumption of any military activity would be counterproductive.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I think Ambassador de Staercke has raised an interesting point in suggesting that NATO's views might be made known at some point in the House debate.

Secretary Kissinger might wish to keep this in mind, and we might get in touch with Secretary General Luns at the appropriate time.

President: There is now the realization in the House that something has to be done, and I believe that anything from this group would be welcomed.
Secretary General Luns: As you know, I have a watching brief inherited from my predecessor, but special circumstances have prevented me from acting. The Greek Government has felt that now that it has a democratic government and has done away with the colonels it is burdened with a problem not of its making and does not have enough support of NATO. Turkey, as you have pointed out, is dismayed by the interference of the House and Senate. I had a very good meeting with the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey, after an international meeting in Izmir. I also met with Demirel in Brussels. If the Secretary General could be of use, I believe it would have to be without conditions and without publicity. Forces at work, I think we would agree, would jump at the pretext to condemn such a role. If the U.S. Government feels it would be useful to have its views brought to one government or to two governments, I will do it. I touched on this subject at the SACLANT Symposium.

Ambassador Theodoropoulos: Mr. President, speaking for Greece, I wish to express our great appreciation for the spirit in which the United States is trying to help both in the framework of the Alliance and in our bilateral relations in the restoring of democratic institutions. I would note that today we have a new President.

President: I saw that, congratulations.

Ambassador Theodoropoulos: He is a very distinguished man. Mr. President, as my Prime Minister may have told you, our situation is that of a very fragile flower, and we need all the help we can from our allies if we are to have the situation stabilized. I believe the meeting of the Prime Ministers in Brussels was helpful. My Prime Minister spoke to you and to other Prime Ministers, and these discussions shaped his mind in a constructive way. You will also have witnessed the first and second stages of our bilateral negotiations in which I believe we arrived at a happy solution in a positive way which will preserve the interests of both sides. I am confident that the NATO negotiations will also be concluded in this spirit. We are aware of our geographic position, and we belong to the West. As to the suggestion that the watching brief might be reactivated, there is one essential element and the Secretary General is very wise in stressing the need for confidentiality. We must avoid a great splash.

Ambassador Eralp: Mr. President, I would like to reiterate the appreciation of my government for what your Administration is doing to set right the injustice of the arms cut-off. Considering the pressures of public opinion and the press in Turkey under the present circumstances, I think the measures that we have taken are mild. We are in a period of expectation, and we are relying on you in the meantime to set the record straight.
As to the Secretary General's watching brief, we have enormous confidence and we do not think he has failed. This brief concerns Greek-Turkish relations not Cyprus. We in Turkey feel that Cyprus should not be related to the arms cut-off issue.

Ambassador Svart: Mr. President, returning to the Middle East, do you feel that Western Europe can play a useful role? Could we play a role, and if so, at what stage?

President: At this point, I have reservations on the suggestion that any additional pressure might be useful. There is clear recognition that Europe continues to have a huge stake. I remember vividly the oil embargo of 1973 running into 1974, and the parties trying to resolve their differences can't be oblivious to this. My general impression is that we presently have such delicate circumstances that any additional pressure would be counterproductive. Both are proud countries. If we can get them together, we will have better protection. If we have, to go to Geneva, however, I think the point of view of our various countries would have impact.

Secretary Kissinger: Now the issues are so complex that any deal by a party not intimately involved would only add a new element of confusion. If we have failure and if we move in the direction of an overall settlement, it will be highly desirable that Europe and the United States not try to outbid each other.

Ambassador Svart: In Geneva?

President: Right.

Ambassador Krapf: Mr. President, I would like to discuss Syria's place in this. I believe you are expecting a visitor?

President: Yes, we will be meeting tomorrow morning.

Secretary Kissinger: He is here now.

Ambassador Krapf: I wonder if there is a realization on Israel's part of the need to give somewhat on the Syrian side?

President: In our discussions, the question of Syria and Israel making a subsequent step has been discussed. We have, however, tried to focus initially to isolate the Israel-Egypt step. There are those who say if you have a first step you will have to have a second. There are also those who say the second
Ambassador Menzies: Mr. President, there were many of us who were surprised and pleased that the mandate of the UN forces was extended for six years.

Secretary Kissinger: Six months.

Ambassador Menzies: Yes, six months.

President: We wish it had been for six years (laughter).

Ambassador Menzies: Would it be correct to assume that the extension of this mandate would be one way to get the Israelis off the hook on the matter of a guarantee of non-belligerency?

President: The duration of any agreement is a matter of importance. The extension of the UN forces has been helpful. If we hadn't had it, it would have been a disaster. The fact that the UN force has continued and the continued UN presence is an important element in the efforts toward a settlement. I should say that both parties have emphasized to us the excellent manner in which the UN force has performed its responsibilities. The UN force has performed in outstanding fashion and both parties have excellent relations.

Secretary General Luns: On one other matter, Mr. President, until the day before yesterday my impression was that the Helsinki meeting would not be held in the near future because of the lack of progress in the Conference and because the Finns need a month to prepare for the meeting. This morning I heard that the Soviet Union had been in touch with several governments -- I don't know if the United States was one -- concerning a July 22 starting date for the meeting. I was surprised since it was my impression that the feeling is in Geneva that it wouldn't be held earlier than the end of September. How do you view this?

President: We haven't been pushing this. We have continued to feel that our Western Alliance partners should be the main parties involved in directing the pace of the negotiations. I must admit that I have been concentrating so heavily on other matters -- the Greek-Turkish question with the Congress, for example -- that I haven't taken a fresh look at this with Henry. Henry?
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a July 22 date. Our position continues to be that we are prepared to meet whenever the second stage is completed satisfactorily. We haven't accepted or rejected the Soviet proposal, and we won't agree to a date before the second stage of the Conference is finished. You should all know this so that we won't be whipsawed by the Soviet Government contacting each of our governments and saying that one or the other of us has agreed to this or that. Our instructions, to be completely frank to you, to our Ambassador in Geneva are to stay a half a step behind the Europeans-- and to let you drag us into the Conference. We aren't pressing, and we aren't holding back. Until the Soviet Union makes a concession on the question of three hundred kilometers, Basket I will not be completed.

President: If there are no other questions, I want to thank you very much for being here. I hope that you find your meetings in California, in Washington and in Annapolis very productive.

Secretary General Luns: We are going back to Annapolis now, and most of us will return to Europe on Saturday.

President: This has been a most productive meeting. It has been a pleasure for me and I look forward to seeing you here again or in Brussels in the near future. (The President then shook hands with several of the participants and departed.)

Secretary General Luns: (To his NAC colleagues) I have been asked to say a few words to the press. I'll do that and be back in a jiffy.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: President's Meeting With NATO PermReps:
1) Memcon
2) Reporting Cable For Ambassador Bruce

The memorandum of conversation at Tab A of the President's meeting with the North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives on Thursday, June 19, 1975, is forwarded for your review and approval, and onward delivery to the President's Files.

Prior to the meeting it was agreed among Secretary General Luns, Ambassador Bruce and yourself that the White House staff would be responsible for the official note-taking and that we would provide Luns and Bruce with a record of the meeting. The telegram for your approval at Tab B, with cover memorandum for Jeanne Davis to State, would do this.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the memcon at Tab A for the President's Files.

   APPROVE ☑  DISAPPROVE

2. That you approve the telegram at Tab B for Jeanne Davis' forwarding to State.

   APPROVE ☑  DISAPPROVE

E.O. 12868, SEC. 3.5