MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.)
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (R-Indiana)
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R-Ohio)
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D-Florida)
Congressman John Brademas (D-Indiana)
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Maryland)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, June 19, 1975
8:50 - 10:22 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: This meeting is even more appropriate than when we spoke last week, Ben. There have been some developments since then. There is a glimmer of hope -- the Clerides/Denktash talks have gone on, even though there has been no progress yet.

I met with Karamanlis and Demirel at Brussels. Both of them talked tough and they both realize something needs to be done. They had a good meeting together.

The Senate vote was close but it was good. Something needs to be done. But before we get into a discussion, I would like Secretary Kissinger to bring you up to date on the discussions and on the internal situation in Turkey.

I see Karamanlis nominated Zatsos as President.
Kissinger: Let me explain where the situation is and what the Turkish domestic situation is. Let me start in February, whatever our views about what happened before.

I met Btios in February. He said he would accept a bizonal solution if we could work out the territorial arrangements. Karamanlis wanted a quick solution, to minimize the impact on the Greek domestic situation. I then went on to Turkey, which had a caretaker government. They said they had no power to do anything. But I met with every Turkish leader, urging them to put forth specific proposals to resolve the situation and prevent the development of complex international situation making it more difficult to resolve. They all agreed that they wouldn't discuss it while the embargo was on. They didn't promise to move afterwards, but they certainly would not move before; it would look like they were yielding to pressure. The Greek side has been very conciliatory—we couldn't ask for a better position than they are now willing to take.

Demirel then came in, which complicated the situation. Demirel couldn't accept the deal we had been working on, for domestic reasons. If Ecevit were in office, I am convinced we would now have a solution. I went to the CENTO meeting in May—not for CENTO but to talk to the Turkish leaders. Ecevit won't take a position until the coalition does. He basically wants new elections which he feels certain—as do most of the Parliament—that he would win. He took Cyprus and he can blame the coalition for giving it away. Demirel was Prime Minister when Turkey didn't move in '67.

The President had good talks with Demirel. But Demirel is looking for some way to manage it so he doesn't get beaten to death domestically.

[He read from the message from Demirel of June 9, at Tab A]

This was followed by an intelligence report we received that our NATO bases would be closed Monday. It is the non-NATO ones that we are most concerned about. They are of major importance to us. We called in the Ambassador and we got a 30-day extension.

Demirel wants to be able to show he stood up to the U.S., or to get the embargo lifted so he can show he got something back Ecevit had lost.

We expect Turkey to make progress in the Cyprus negotiation regardless of the embargo. I think the negotiation is now mostly a matter of Greek and Turkish domestic politics. The range of the issues is reasonably clear. It is not clear whether either side can make the required movement.
The Turks spent the first 20 minutes with the President talking about the arms embargo. I know there is a difference of opinion about our strategy. But I assure you we had no other motive than to bring Turkish concessions. Even if the embargo is lifted, progress on Cyprus would be tough. But if the embargo is lifted, they would know the President's prestige is involved and they couldn't sit. There is still a gap, but it is not unbridgeable. There are only two issues: the nature of the central government and the territorial division. There is also the issue of refugees. [He describes refugee issues.] If they can break the logjam, the issues aren't too difficult. But getting started is the problem. If Greece made a move and it was turned down by Turkey, it would be disastrous for them. If Demirel moves in a way which looks weak, the coalition will break up.

Brent, will you discuss our installations.

General Scowcroft: [Described the bilateral installations.]

Fascell: If we move, won't we have Greek riots, etc.?

Kissinger: The Greeks asked the President in Brussels to warn against military action, especially in connection with the Aegean. We did so. We are preparing military assistance to Greece but we shouldn't link them.

Fascell: But you think there would be no eruption?

Kissinger: Papandreou and Mavros would complain bitterly. But we are convinced Karamanlis wants to get this behind him. If the embargo was lifted and there was no progress, there would be trouble.

Whalen: Let's get right down to cases. We are concerned and want to do something. Our way is the Hamilton Amendment which passed the Senate 41 - 40. Let's face it. You have won some victories which have made the freshmen bitter. We need to resolve it in a way to try to avoid a bitter confrontation. Maybe you have some ideas.

The President: What do you all think?

Brademas: I want to thank you for inviting us, Mr. President. One idea I would like to put forth -- we have mentioned it earlier, but maybe we could modify it some. This idea is to employ the waiver authority. We have checked the legality with the GAO. We would want some private assurance that some action was forthcoming acceptable to both sides; then
the President could waive the $50 million without Turkey publicly having
to say anything. To be sure that there is no reneging on the agreement,
you could assure them there would be another $50 million coming --
using both FY 75 and 76 -- that is more than the grant we are now giving.

If you announced a reassessment of US-Turkish relations at the
same time, it would be a gentle reminder that we don't like ultimatums
thrown at us. Another idea is to get NATO more involved to soften the
US-Turkish aspects of it. As you know, we here are NATO supporters.
We voted against NATO cuts. And I tell the Turks I want aid to Turkey.
I have 450 voting Greeks. I don't need it politically.

We know there will be no settlement as good as the Greeks had
before the crisis.

President: We discussed the waiver policy before. The lawyers can
argue whether the waiver is legal. I think the GAO argument is question­
able and I as a lawyer think it is probably not right. Suppose I waive and
we either don't get a settlement or it isn't satisfactory. Then I am out on
a limb. I don't think that is a satisfactory situation. I talked with Demirel
for an hour. He pointed out that there are arms paid for that he can't get
shipped and is even having to pay for storage. They just don't understand
this and the waiver won't answer it.

Brademas: We are trying to find a way out. I agree, let's forget last
August. But it is virtually impossible for Congress to turn around without
something happening. We must save face and I think it is fundamentally
wrong. Sure it causes you some problems. But we have the national
interest to consider. I am offended by the Turkish ultimatums. I disagree
with your waiver interpretation. I agree with Kissinger that the sides
aren't that far apart. If we could get them $50 million, get some move­
ment, another $50 million, more movement and we can end the whole thing
in 8 - 12 weeks. In the face of the Turkish ultimatum, even if we tried to
just lift the embargo, we would be hung in effigy.

President: I have spoken with some of the leaders -- Tip, for example.
Kissinger has talked to Burton. You know the Democratic freshman better
than I. I have gotten to know some of them, including Hubbard -- he
seems to want to help. It might be worth a try for Kissinger and me to
talk to them. I am not sure they understand the nature of the problem.

Whalen: I understand what you both are saying. I see you out on a limb
where you could have a problem. What if we applauded your use of the
waiver. That might help.

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Sarbanes: I think a starting premise has to be an understanding of some accommodation by the Turks. If we can get that, we can orchestrate to save their face. I don't think we can approach the problem from the view of just getting the decision changed. I think it was correct. If we just change, we would be in the position of sustaining aggression. If we know certain things will be done, there are arrangements which can be made -- commercial sales, military sales, grants, etc.

President: Let me follow up on that point. There are differences in the kinds of military deliveries and they can be legally treated differently -- especially when they have bought and paid for things.

Let me throw this out. Is there a possibility of exempting sales?

Sarbanes: There is a fundamental premise though, and that is that movement by us without moves by them.

Kissinger: What bugs the Turks is not grant aid -- that is within our sovereign rights. It is the sales, where they can't get things they have bought. So the waiver gets at what bothers them most.

On the negotiations, there isn't any minor movement on which we could report. It will be done all together, or not at all. If the Turks decide to move, it will be done in six weeks -- but I can't say when they will decide to move.

If Ecevit were in office, we could get a settlement quickly.

Brademas: That is not Clerides' view. He thinks turning the arms on lose us all our leverage. He thinks that sticking fast will put such a bite on Turkish military that they will force a movement.

There is another group in the House which feels more strongly from a different view -- Rangel.

Hamilton: I think there is a trend in the House that the ban should come off. Many who voted for the ban are looking for reasons to change and the trick is to come up with something to help them to change. Can't we explore something other than full restoration? One quirk of the law is that cutoffs are in perpetuity. Maybe we could put on a time limit. Maybe we could permit enough aid to let Turkey fulfill its NATO commitment. I don't think right now you would get the votes to lift the ban.
President: Have you got some language?

Hamilton: We have been working on some ideas.

President: Why don't we have our people work with you. I can see the need for a parliamentary maneuver to avoid a head-on collision. The situation is bound to deteriorate otherwise -- and it is not only Cyprus. Demirel did mention the Aegean and the Greek buildup on the islands. They are just off the Turkish coast. He didn't threaten, but it obviously is a concern. If this continues to unravel, with the Middle East situation nearby, we could have a holocaust. I can't sit here and do nothing.

Brademas: But we can't just turn the arms back on without some actions by the Turks. That leaves us in an indefensible legal and moral situation. That would put the aid bill in jeopardy if we turned any part of it on without any progress from Turkey. We would in that case have to modify our position on the aid bill.

President: We have to be realistic about the situation in Greece and Turkey. For either to take a public position would create an impossible situation.

Brademas: We agree. That is why we want to do it privately -- to let them save face.

Sarbanes: I would like to broaden the discussion to the nature of U.S. foreign policy and providing arms and for what purpose. Aggression has been committed and we can't back off that principle. People may differ on that principle, and the Secretary and I part company on it. But just as we can divide categories of aid, we can divide categories of Turkish response.

The other concern is Greece. Kissinger seems to assume Greece will always be there.

Kissinger: No.

Sarbanes: I don't think so and if we move without any justification, I think there would be an explosion. I know it could even be involved with Yugoslavia, with Tito's departure and a possible crisis involving Greece. So I think we must move in a way which does not antagonize Greece.

President: Can you differentiate between sales and grants?
Sarbanes: Yes, but I can't turn around on any part of it without anything on which to rest it. Because of the critical nature of our relationship to Greece. We want to restore relations with both Greece and Turkey. I think Turkey has more than it needs. I think it is in Turkey's interests to resolve this.

Kissinger: I think most of them want a resolution -- maybe even Makarios. We can't get Turkish progress by 15 July. We also can't get it if there is a linkage with aid. But the President told Demirel that if the President sticks his neck out and they don't act, they are then up against the President also.

Brademas: Then what?

Hamilton: There is another aid bill.

Brademas: We have kept quiet. But it hasn't helped getting Turkish movement when the Executive keeps making statements trying to get Congress to turn around.

Whalen: The language is "substantial progress." I think there has been some.

Kissinger: We can't in good conscience say there has been.

Whalen: Would you rule out John's suggestion on the waiver?

President: It is such a marginal question legally. It puts me out on a limb. I am not saying you would cut it off, but let's be realistic. Statements by you on the floor would be helpful.

Taking Lee's idea of making it affirmative action in support of NATO and sales versus grants, let's see what we can do.

Rosenthal: Findley has a proposal to give NATO $100 million and let them do it. But the bases problems aren't NATO, but a bilateral problem.

Brademas: Would this proposal... you are discussing be something different from a waiver?

President: Right.

Brademas: But the key part of a waiver was a private assurance from Turkey. If that would be included, I would look at it with an open mind.
President: I haven't explored this with Caramanlis and Demirel.

Bradesca: I think that would be crucial.

Sarbanes: Could we keep a couple of tracks open -- the waiver for example? We could also phase down what progress there is in line with what kinds of arms are released. We have tended to look at all this in total packages. Maybe we need to separate things out.

Whalen: I have concerns of time. It will take time. Second, what would we do about private assurances? If we start to debate on the floor....

Sarbanes: There have been peripheral ones -- to Waldheim -- for example. Straightening out some lines, maybe. Can we put together enough peripheral items to justify sales? Maybe. If we can work together.... Congress is helping Greece as against the Turks and the Executive is helping Turkey as against Greece.

President: I will reexamine the waiver, although I have grace reservations. If you could look at Lee's ideas...

Kissinger: I don't exclude that we could put something together like Paul says. The best place to do it is at the Greek-Turkish talks at the end of July.

Rosenthal: We also can't appear to give in to Turkish threats. That would be a sign to others like Portugal.

Sarbanes: Rather than crumble, maybe we should say we should reevaluate our policy.

President: But if I use a waiver, doesn't that look like buckling?

Whalen: That is right. We would have to help the President.

Rosenthal: We are all in this together. Let's explore it again.

Sarbanes: The other should be looked at, too. That puts us in the same boat.

President: We have not only the deadline of the Karamanlis-Demirel talks. There is also the August recess, the end of the fiscal year, etc. There are lots of deadlines.
Brademas: If we would put this together I can't think of anything better for the country right now.

Fascell: I want to table something here about delivering the material already paid for. There is nothing more basic than the sanctity of a contract. We have got to consider resolving that.
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ACTION NOOS-20

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FN AMBASSAD ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9517

CONSIDENTIAL ANKARA 44487

NOOS

DEPARTMENT PARS ATHENS AND NILOSIA AS DESIRED

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 115521 NOOS-2

TAGS: PMT, FROM, TUR, CY, GR

SUBJ: MEETING WITH FUNKIN CAGLAYANGIL

REF: STATE 133667

1. I MET WITH FUNKIN CAGLAYANGIL LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 9 TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE (MEFTEL). HIS DIRECTEUR DE CABINET ABDEL WAS ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. AFTER HEARING YOUR MESSAGE, FUNKIN PUNCHED A SIT AND THEN DICTIONARIED IT INTO TURKISH TO ABDEL AND THEN TURKISH ORALLY TRANSLATED IT INTO ENGLISH FOR ME AT DICTATION SPEED.

2. BEGIN UPL MESSAGE: "I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE SECRETARY OF STATE VERY MUCH, PARTICULARLY FOR HIS MESSAGE. OUR MEETING IN BRUSSELS WITH PRESIDENT FORD AND THE SECRETARY ARE ALSO VERY PRECIOUS. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP THANAS AND APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF MY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS MYSELF FOR THE FORD'S CONSTRUCTIVE AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE.

"THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DEMELAS AND CARANLIS HAS, IN OUR VIEW AS WELL, BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE. IT HAS DEEPENED EACH SIDE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER AND NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY"
PRACTICAL OUTCOMES HAVE ALSO EMERGED. IT WAS DECIDED THAT APPRECIATION OF THIS PROGRESS SHOULD BE RECORDED AND EFFORTS SHOULD BE EXERTED TO REACH SOLUTIONS THROUGH MEETINGS AT MINISTERIAL LEVELS.

"THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY SHOULD CONSTITUTE THAT PART OF THE QUESTION WHICH HAS TO BE DEALT WITH AT THE VERY FINAL STAGE. THE SOLUTION OF OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES, DESPITE THAT OF TERRITORY, THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT, WOULD ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY. I THINK THAT OUR GREEK COLLEAGUES HAVE ALSO UNDERSTOOD AND ADOPTED THIS VIEW OF OURS.

"THERE ARE TWO SUBJECTS ON WHICH I HAVE TO SPEAK CLEARLY NOW. I HOPE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ME AS LONG AS THE ARM'S EMBARGO IS IN EFFECT, THERE IS NOT REPEAT NOT MUCH WE CAN DO ON THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY, AN INCREASE TO THE EFFECT THAT TURKEY HAS FINALLY GIVEN IN TO THIS THREAT, TO THE EXPLOITATION OF SUCH A CLAIM, IN INTERNAL POLITICS, COULD IRREPARABLY DAMAGE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

"SECURITY, UNLESS THERE IS SILENCE IN THE EMERGED DECISION, THE POSSIBILITY TO PREVENT COUNTER ACTION WILL NOT REPEAT NOR BE EXHAUSTED. I HOPE THAT DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A SURPRISE, AS WE HAVE STATED TO YOU BEFORE, AS ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO REMAIN MODERATE, END OF ORAL MESSAGE.

3. FUMAN ASKED IF I HAD ANY QUESTIONS ON FOREGOING. I ASKED HIM TO EXPAND A BIT ON THE "OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES," HE MENTIONED IN HIS THIRD PARAGRAPH OF HIS ORAL MESSAGE. HE REPLIED THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REALIZED ON THE NUCLEAR AND THE FUTURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION SUCH Auxiliary ISSUES AS PROVISION FOR A UNITED ECONOMY FOR THE ISLAND, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD, A SINGLE PENAL CODE, AND THE DEFENSE OF THE FEDERAL STATE, UP TO NOW, CONTINGUENT LAOLAYANUL. THE GREEKS SAY THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A FEDERAL STATE. LAOLAYANUL FELT THIS STILL SHOULD NOT PREVENT DISCUSSION, AS TO HOW AS 'SUNLY HYPOTHETICAL' FEDERAL STATE COULD BE CONDUCTED, THE GREEKS COULD REAFFIRM THEIR POSITION CONFIDENT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ON THE PRINCIPLE WHILE SUCH DISCUSSION WERE GOING FORWARD, CAGLAYANGIL CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ANY PROGRESS ON ISSUES SUCH AS THESE WOULD DE FACILITATING FACTORS ON THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND TERRITORY. IN PRESENT CIRCUM-
STANCES, AS SOON AS THE TWO SIDES BEGIN TO DISCUSS THESE TWO LATTER ISSUES, THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY BLOCKED. THERE IS NO WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THIS FASHION, HE DECLARED.

NOTE: NOT PASSED ATHENS AND NICOSIA BY OC/T.
This was a very nice surprise when we spoke last week. You were all ready to leave then. I was a bit disappointed. K/D talked about going one way, the rest of us about going another. 

I don't know if it's part of the game or not, but before we get into discussions about the K/D split, I'm going to do a little dance and ritual sacrifice.

K left me a message encouraging from his dance, but I wasn't sure what he meant. He said it was something he was sure about what happened before.

I went over to talk to him, and he said he would accept it, but for some reason, he wanted me to ask. I accepted and asked if he would consider coming to some sort of meeting. He said he wanted to find a solution, and we could work out the details at a later date.

I asked if he would consider a meeting next week, and he said yes, that he would try to attend. Then he asked me to call him back. I didn't want to, but he had called me on it, so I did. They said they had no precise plans, but they thought they would visit the area the next day, and that he would be there. They said they would visit while waiting for a decision.
which he feels certain - or at least
of finding, which he had written.

Permit me to assure you, that certainly not
were not. I could not let the small trouble.
with the time, my infirmity - I was with
nothing positive than they have written a

Dear Miss, it comes in, which consequently
Dear Miss, I can only accept a small one and have
working for democratic reasons, when
Exhibition and commercial would have more
suffering. I must try to come, not be come, but
It takes no time, I cannot take a position
He entirely wrote to me, thinking
'T is an injury that I can, there
exception Felipe it may, Demirall. I'm with

I don't know what 1967,

I had good talks of Demiral. I left to listen to
some way to manage it. He is about
ey to write the check directly.
(Read letter from Dimitri)

This was forbidden by until agent that was
not to speak to the drain victory in the
not to speak on my account about
They are of importance, important too. We
called the Arab and put a 10-day extension
extension.

Dimitri wants to know if there be need
with us, a plane arrangements right to him
to have the part something back. Fermi's hand
that time.

We expect to make first in any
my. We met on the 3rd inst before he went to London. He spoke of the
future of the country and the necessity of continued vigilance. He
suggested that political parties should not be formed on a
party basis, but on a common interest. We agreed that it was vital
for the country to remain united.

That evening, we discussed the
situation with our friends. We
agreed that it was important
to keep the peace and to
work together for the common
good. We also talked about
the need for more
education and

F. Foreman's house, which
we visited later that
night. He talked about
his plans for the future
and the
importance
of
continuing

work.
unseen

I think we should have a meeting.

Karam's work was explained naturally.

The man in white clothes must get

this finished. He'll study. The large monk

doesn't seem to want to learn.

We need to explain this to you.

Please write a letter explaining that you

remembered.

What did you think?

Thanks for writing. Do we need money

in that part? We have material for

practical, but maybe we could modify it.

This idea is to anything serious, anything. We

have to deal with it. We would

want some private communication for the

fundraiser acceptable in both ways, or I

could write to mail us. I partly

have to say anything. To the house to

listen and equip yourself. You could

assume that will be another to mail

writing--see me, By 15 & 16--

that more than great we now seeing.
If your annual measurement of U.S.-I relations at sometime it would be your


another we don't have sublimation than none. Another idea is to get NATO more


method is to change U.S.-Terrorist bad.


away we have our Nato suggester


speed point Nato eats still 


would be to - I have 45,5 saying


gave, I don't think it practically


W 10.404.199 will be no penetration on


good at a 510 degree c linear.


8. The damaged woman just before he's


and anymore. Whether woman is legal I think


the no argument is getting. Is earlier think


it you're not right. Sorry, cost 2 minute we


without that to without is not work that. Then


learn and six inches. I don't think that no side


not what will become for an man. He


decision there are some paid and for he cant


get stopped I hope having it pay charges. They


just don't understand this woman want


answer it.


B. We trying to find a way out. Say you lets


forget that say. But it is violently against


the way to learn armed or a something happening


we meet some for fact I think it fundamentally


way. Soon is caste your some just to our


and for not mathematics the usually down


offered by Tuckles Ir. I discuss ed
some minor objection. I say it's a fact that for a great deal they won't let them go with just some comment, and then 10 mil. more comment we can send the whole thing in 8-12 weeks. In fact if I could insist even if we tried to just get 1 exchange we would be hanging in enough."

I don't understand what you talk about. Try perhaps to have a better idea of what I'm trying to say. I think that's the name of the city. I don't understand what you're talking about."

W Jacobs said what you told me sorry. I see you wrote a book about your own. What if we approached you like a writer. That might help.

So now I think a strongly prepared case to avoid some accommodation by. I've seen some data that we can substantiate to some their face. I think it was said. If we just change, we will be in a part of promoting aggression. If we know certain things and learn them and arrangements which can be made - well lists, well lists, well lists.

I have one last thing on that point. There was a boy who wanted to send the whites to the whites. And he was shot by. But when they drove him out for doing.
but we claim this not. It is a possibility of anything.

San. I have a foolish notion that a thing is

more than anything else is a means by which

R. What brings T. that great fear and that affin

on some sort of thing. It is a sphere, where they

can't get things. They have been bought. So much

got of what interests them here.

On your part, there isn't any reason to expect

to exist with it. I won't say it's not. If you ask

together, as at all. If the Tanimoto be

more, it will be more and less. But a

and together they will stand by more.

If I can't move in any, we could get without

entirely.

B. And not Chris's now. The Tanimoto arms

on will have an all our chance. I think

wouldn't put it in the date on T. nobody

that they will join movement.

This is another very nice house where

lots more plenty. As by wind. Maybe

I think there is a turn in a house that

even to some. Long who older

then house was losing luxuries to change.

the trick is to come up and something to help

when the change. Can I suppose something

than full without. One good

love in that luxury our in perpetuity.

That he can and put in a time limit things.
we could never have met and this I regret
its not conduct.
I don't think we'd ever again have met
or the left a man.
P and you got some language
It is a man born writing in some Gala.

P Why don't we drown a paper with mine I
can see a need for a partner. Is there
no one to help with another one at this
very forgery. I shall maintain a general
pattern in the end. They are just
off my mind. Perhaps transmission must
not chiefly be concerned. If this continues to
spread, w/c N.C. sits socially we must have a
hoster circuit. I can't put down the writing

B But we can't put them down because it is
more severe. One thing by one I think leaves us in
an unappreciable was how I couldn't get rid of that.
I will put out what I feel if we can do part
of it. All's any good for T it would
in that case turn to mostly from parting
on each bill.
P We have to be ambitious about putting
out T. Clarkson to take part as well
with impossible.

B we can't get that. We can want to that. They
are not there any. I mean
So, I would like to broaden the discussion.
nature of US CP + pushing mems for
what purpose. Appraiser has been invited
I note isn't helpful that prince job
many types of thing happened and
so on. I just bring you up to date put as
our own think we can choose certain.

4. Other companies C. K seem to assured A.
will always del. time.

K no
S. I don't think so. If we aren't able any further.
I think there will be an appraisal, there-
it isn't immediate not clear. In my opinion
possible some 6 months G. So I think we must
move on Company doesn't continue G.

P. Can you listen. I think it's great.
S. Yes, but I don't think it will be too difficult.
Can anything in which is not it. Because of
C. With relation to the situation C. We want
to maintain relations of both. So I think I've
now time. Let's talk. I think I'm interested
to explore this.

K. I think most want Arthur and two men.
Ruthless. We can't get it for 1st July. Let's
also can't get at thinner earlier. But I
Told D that if I trials in medium they
don't out. They are then my agent I think.

B. From what?

4. There is another one will.
B. We have kept quiet, but it made people say
    "We must not call for a demonstration of soldiers.
    We must keep quiet". I think that
    We must be careful, not do anything.

W. The language is not definite, but it is clear.
    We must keep quiet.

W. We can't make a decision on this now.

P. There is a strong need for legal action.
    If we don't act, it might be too late.
    If we do act, we have to protect it.
    The law needs to be enforced.
    We need to take action to support the
    idea of peace and justice. Let's see
    what we can do.

R. Finally, the proposal to join NATO has made
    it difficult to join. It's hard to justify.
    We need to consider something
    different from union.

P. Right.

B. But the point of union was to ensure peace.
   If that can be maintained, I would look at
   it seriously.

P. I cannot support this or allow a decision.

B. I think that would be

S. I believe we have a lot of work to do.
    We need to look at all this in total.
    We need to consider things.
I have returned from the S. It will take time. I will what would we do about joint ventures. Important to outline in plan.

There have been discussions on the Waldheim for a while. Some migration laws there have been changes in foreign and domestic laws to provide stability. Under no circumstances should we be tempted to fall into a trap."

I will examine again, the same game. How can they sustain their needs?"

I don't think we could just something together. The Poles say best place to do it is at 6 - 7 levels. I think we have been a time in it. There must be a right to write the act.

Rather than simply, may make it mandatory we should consult with the government."

But in that, I was wondering, do it not think both the time..."

That might, we could have Helga love."

We can in this matter, but explore it again."

This must be developed. I must put two in the same boat."

Not only deadline of C D talk, any more, and I should get it. Having deadline."

I would ask the question, I can't with...
