

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT FORD
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to President Ford
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to President Ford


DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, June 18, 1975
 9:45 - 10:24 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

Kissinger: Simon has said publicly that not enough is being done to bring down OPEC prices down. I have never seen any proposal from him. The only possible thing would be to cut aid.-- we see how that works in Turkey.

The President: I talked to Alan [Greenspan][about Iranian deal]. I also told him to talk to Frank Zarb and no one else. He will get back to you. He thinks we should sit down and lay out precisely to set out how we could implement it.

Kissinger: I will have them to lunch. We must keep it quiet. We could tell the Saudis we could do the same for them -- that would remove another 700,000 barrels.



The President: Alan is enthusiastic.

Kissinger: I think it is one of the best things to happen. But Simon will have to keep his head down.

Eilts originally thought we should present an Israeli proposal to Sadat Now -- and this is Brent's view -- then we should not present it. It will make us look to impotent. He thinks we should say we got an unsatisfactory proposal and tell them we will present an American proposal either for an interim or overall. We can see what the map they send shows. But this group I don't understand. Before we put something forward, we have to get assurance from the Arabs they will stay quiet through '76. That argues for an interim. The overall would be difficult to implement without the severest pressure on aid.

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The President: How about modifying their proposal to make it acceptable, and present it to both. Then if Israel rejects it, they know what will happen.

Kissinger: That is another way. If you go the interim route like this, you would need a commitment from Sadat to hold things through '76. If you come out with an interim and then go for a comprehensive plan next year, you will be accused of whetting Arab appetites.

If you ram an agreement down Israel's throat, then the Syrians will demand something.

If you go for a comprehensive, you will have to be prepared to be severe on aid.

The President: I think it is no better than 50-50 that an interim agreement will work. Then we have laid the basis for a comprehensive plan.

Kissinger: If we knew they would reject it, that is fine. My worry is they might accept it. But you may need to do it to establish the pre-conditions for a comprehensive.

Let's wait to see what the Israeli map shows. I will have it by Friday morning and we can discuss it.

My Japan Society speech on the 18th discusses the differences between American and Japanese cultures and reaffirms our security commitment.

On the Congo, Mobutu has developed an intense dislike for Deane Hinton. Developments there are worrisom.

The President: Young, in this breakfast group, brought up Nat Davis and Hinton.

Kissinger: The Davis thing is an outrage [the OAU protest against Davis' nomination as Assistant Secretary]. I don't personally like him but we can't be pushed around like this. But Hinton is a disaster.

The President: Let's pull him out. How long has he been there?

Kissinger: I am so frustrated. It may be too late. But we can't get any agency to come in with a tough option.

Maybe we could send Ingersoll there to try to hold Mobutu down.

The President: Get him out there.



Kissinger: We will have a meeting tomorrow and maybe we need an NSC meeting. We may have to put forward an NSC option, which is a bad way to do it.

We really have the Kennedy attention on these assassinations.

[Discussion of Kennedys, Kopechne, etc.]

The President: Isn't my posture the right one?

Kissinger: I think everyone should keep quiet. What the Kennedys want is to force us into a denial. We don't want to deny it; that gets them off the hook. I think we ought to stay quiet.

The President: I think a skillful reporter can take the evidence and write a story which ties in the Kennedys.

Kissinger: There is no question about the tie-in. The CIA would not be that reckless. There is more on this now than there was on Watergate until the tapes came out. There is no question about the involvement. But you should not dump on a former President.


Kissinger: Ron could say that Rockefeller pulled together all the documents he could find, and interviews. We pulled together all other documents from whatever sources. We have not evaluated them, and will turn them over to the Church Committee. We will no comment.



✓ P/K 18 June 75

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- K Jimin has said publicly not to expect any law to bring O per prices down. I have never seen any proposal from him. Only possible thing would be to cut aid - We see how that works in T.
- P I talked to Alan. I also told him to talk to Zerk & me one else. He will get back to you. He thinks we should sit down & lay out precisely what to set out how we would implement it.
- K Jewell has chosen to handle. We must keep it quiet. We could tell - Sanders we would do some for them - that would show another way, use bank.
- P ~~But~~ Alan is enthusiastic.
- K I think is one of a best thing to happen. But Jimin ^{will} would have to keep his head down. Felt to say - that we should present a proposal. Now - and this ~~is~~ ^{isn't} ~~isn't~~ - that we should not present it. It will make us look too impotent. He thinks we should say we got our ^{emertio} ~~proposal~~ proposal & tell them we would ~~present~~ present our own proposal either for interim or overall. We can see what - may they send them. But this jump is I don't understand. Before we put something forward, we have to get assurance from Arabs they will stay quiet thru 76. That argues for interim. The overall would be try to implement w/ o a fastest possible on aid.
- P How about modifying their proposal to make it



everybody, present it to both. I know if I reject it, they know what will happen.

K That another way. If you go a interim route like this, you would need a contract from Sadat to hold things there 26. If you come out of interim + then a Congress plan next year, you will be accused of whitening Arab's appetites

If you come an agreement down the I threat, then Syria's will demand something,

If you go for Congress, you will have to be prepared to be sworn on and.

P I think it no better than 50-50 that an interim agreement will work. There are hard lines for Congress plan

K If we knew they would reject it, that fine. My worry is they might accept it. But you must need to do it to establish a precedent for a Congress.

Let's wait to see what a I may show. I will have it by Friday AM + we can discuss.

My Japan Security speech discusses big talk US + Jap. Cultural + reaffirm our security contract. On Congo, Whitman has done an intense dislike for Hunter. Dispute there are unresolved.

P Young, in this breakfast group, brought up Davis + Hunter.

K Davis thing is strange. I don't personally like him but he can't be pushed around like this. But Hunter is a cheater.

P. Let's pull him out. How long has he been there

K. I am so frustrated. It may be too late. But we can't get any agency to come in w/a. Tough option.

* * *
Tough we send Jorgensen there to try to hold Yambert down.

P. Get him out there

K. We will have a mtg tomorrow + maybe we need an NSC mtg. We may have to put forward an NSC option which is best way to do it.

We really have the Kennedy attention on these assassinations.

(Discussion of Kennedys, Kopeckne, etc)

P. Don't my posture irritate you?

K. I think everyone should keep quiet. What a Kennedy want is to force us into a denial. We don't want to deny it, that gets them off a hook. I think we ought to stay quiet.

P. I think a skilled reporter can take a headline & write a story which ties in a Kennedy.

K. There is no question about the tie in. The CIA would not be that reckless. There is more on this now than there was on Watergate. We have consent. No question of involvement, but you should not pump on or favor us.

~~we have consent~~
K. Keep pulled together all else could find & intrusions. We pulled together all other docs. for whatever reason. We have not unraveled & will turn

due to Chuck We will not comment.

