

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

State Dept Review 3/9/04
MR 04-78 #4, CIA LEX 4/4/05

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

del NARA Date 6/28/05

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, June 16, 1975
9:22 - 10:24 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office


Kissinger: I met with Rabin yesterday in New York. He didn't change his position. He said he couldn't. He can't ignore what you have said. But I think now we shouldn't spill too much blood over an American interim plan. If you have to cram it down their throats, it may be better to go all the way.

President: When will we hear?

Kissinger: They will send someone back from Jerusalem with a map on Wednesday, after they have a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday. Even if they change, I would send the first position to Sadat, unless Eilts thinks it would cause a blowup.

We have problems with Turkey. [He describes his conversations with Esenbel and his cable to Demirel]. Esenbel says they don't listen to him anymore. I'm afraid Demirel has decided he has to gain support by some anti-American moves. I'm afraid they may do something today -- perhaps close down our five bases that we have against the Soviet Union.

President: I talked to Rosenthal. He will bring in Hamilton, Fascell, Whalen, and we will try to set up something tomorrow morning. Could I have a paper?



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Kissinger: I have an options paper. I think even if they close the bases, we ought to get the embargo lifted.

President: I think that is best. If you propose something, they immediately will start bargaining.

President: Rosenthal told me they were trying to find some way to move.

Kissinger: It is a silly thing. The Laurence Stern article in Foreign Policy....

President: It was a total distortion.

Kissinger: Yes. The Europeans were not willing to use force, and we weren't about to recognize Sampson. What we wanted to do was avoid giving a legal excuse for intervention. There were soreheads in State -- I got rid of them -- who wanted right away to pressure the Junta. Had we done that, we would now be pressuring Greece to make concessions.

[He describes the line on the Israeli map at considerable length.]

[He reads the message from Caglayangil.]


I think it is largely the domestic situation there. Ecevit is trying to push them into a corner. If Demirel settles, Erbakan will leave the coalition and Ecevit will push for elections.

I want to discuss Angola for a bit. There are three groups there. With the aid of Portugal and the Soviet Union, the MPLA is on the offensive and may even take Luanda. We have been diddling around. We have given Roberto a bit, but he needs weapons and discipline. Kaunda doesn't have the horsepower. Mobutu is a bloody bastard but he is the only hope.

We don't want to see a Communist government in Angola. It is not in our interest to knock off a white regime right now, which is what would happen with a Communist Angola. I think we should have a meeting over the next two weeks to discuss it. No agency supports doing anything -- State, JCS.

President: CIA?

Scowcroft: They haven't a position really.



Kissinger: That is another problem. Colby is a disaster. [He describes the NIE problem. Colby promised Church to give him documents which we were discussing whether to give.]

President: I think we can move quickly now that the report is in.

Kissinger: On the Scheel visit: His constitutional position is non-political, so the conversation must be in general terms. He's a good friend of the U.S. A little weak. I don't know what he will raise -- the nuclear reactor business perhaps; the unity of Europe. He will announce at the McCloy ceremony \$1 million for the Fund and then four million tonight at the toast.

President: He is speaking to a Joint Session tomorrow.

Kissinger: He will give a supportive speech. He is probably bored now. Just do a general review of American policy.

President: Where is he from? Isn't his party on the right wing?

Kissinger: I am not sure. Yes. It is right of the Socialists and used to be right of the CDU, but now I am not sure.

Let me read you the Thursday night memcon so you see how I pulled it out of them. [He reads parts of the memcon of the meeting Thursday night June 12, at Dinitz's residence.]


President: How did the lunch in New York go?

Kissinger: Extremely well. It's the best meeting with a Jewish group I have had. I told them that Jewish groups take the position that the U.S. is never right and Israel always is, and that is laying the basis for massive anti-Semitism here. I said: "You should be here as Americans, not as Israeli supporters." I think two-thirds of them were enthusiastic. I will meet with them again and maybe you should meet with them.

President: I would like to.

Kissinger: Klutznick -- the organizer -- is something of a renegade.

President: Did you see what Jackson said to Ceausescu?



Kissinger: I'm afraid he will decide that the U.S. can't be a counter-weight to the Soviet Union because we are subjected to too much pressure. I also told the group they couldn't attack American power everywhere in the world except with respect to Israel.

President: What are the chances for Romania on the Hill?

Kissinger: They can drag into September. There are only ten months left. The Soviets saved us. If we had MFN, Jackson would be holding hearings on it all year building the campaign platform.

I think we have a SALT fight brewing. The New York Times has a front page article on the cruise missile. [Discuss the cruise missile problem.] We either must count them or do away with them -- at least on ships. Maybe on bombers.

President: Who generated the story?


Kissinger: DOD. I don't know whether it's Schlesinger himself. I don't know how he feels about it. Schlesinger has Kaufman working for him. What he would really like is to move nuclears out of Europe and do that function from offshore -- the cruise missile might be good for that.

[Mrs. Ford calls.]

It is now 50-50 about CSCE. The Europeans are toughening their position for 50 kilometers. We should stay out of it. I have said if there is no SALT agreement, there is no point in having a summit.

President: I agree with that.

Kissinger: On cruise missiles, I proposed a 2500-kilometer limit on missiles carried on planes, and counting them on ships. We can't get away with keeping them free. Then there is the Backfire problem. We maybe can't solve them all -- in which case there is no point in having a summit.



✓ P/K 16 June 75

Monday
9:22-10:24

KP Rabin didn't change his position - said he wouldn't. He can't ignore what you have said. But I think now we shouldn't spill too much blood on a US interim plan. If you have to cross it down their throats, it might be better to go all the way.

P When will we hear?

K They will send someone w/a msg on Wed. after a cabinet mtg on Tues. Even if they change, I would send 1st position to Sadat unless Eilat thinks it would cause a blow up.

We have probs w/Turkey. (Described conversation ^{Estimated say they don't look thin} w/ Euzel & cabinet demand). I fear Demirel has decided he has to gain support by seem anti-US moves. I fear they may do something today - perhaps close down our 5 bases against S.U.

P ^{Talked to Rosenthal - He will bring} 2 Korotkin, Fessell, Cohen & we will try to get my something tomorrow morning. Could I hand a paper.

K I have an extra paper. I think even if they close bases we ought to get a package lifted.

P I think we should get Rosenthal extra first & see what they come up w/

K I think that is best. If you propose something ^{they} good mined, will start bargaining.

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K It is a silly thing. The Stum article--

P It was a total distortion.

K Yes. The E mos were not coming to our face. And

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BY W NARA, DATE 8/17/09



Reminded list for CIA - Oct 1968.

we weren't about to say Sampson. What we wanted to do was avoid a legal offense for intervention. There were setbacks in State - I got rid of them - who wanted to get away to pressure a Junta. Had one done that, we would now be pressuring Greece to make concessions.

(Describes line on I map at considerable length).

(K reads map from Baylambangil). I think it's largely a domestic set. E isn't trying to push them into a corner. If he settles, Eshoban will leave cabinet and E isn't will push for elections.

Wants discuss Angola for a bit. There are 3 groups. W/aid of State & SU, NUPA is an offensive & may even take Luanda. W & have been drilling down - have given Roberts a bit, but he will expect discipline. Kuanda doesn't have a horse power.

Wobster is a bloody bastard but he's only type.


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I think we should have met some next 2 weeks to discuss it. No agency supports ~~it~~ doing anything - State, JCS

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K That another prob. Colby is a disaster. (Described NIE prob - he promised Clark documents we were discussing whether to give).



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K School - his secret position is no political, so a conversation must be just. He is a good friend of a US. A little crack. I don't know what he will raise - nuclear reactor perhaps, unity of E. He will announce at a meeting by evening 1 o'clock + then 4 o'clock tonight at best

P He speaking to joint session tomorrow

K He will give a suggestive speech. He will be based on just do a good review of US policy.

P Where he from. Isn't his party right wing?

K I not sure. Yes. It is right of Sov. but used to be right of CPSU, but now I not sure.

Let me read you the things. right manner to you see how I pulled it out of them (made movement)

P How did a bunch go?

K Extremely well. Best party w/ a Jewish group I have had. I told them Jewish groups take position US was right + I always is + that laying basis for massive anti-Semitism. You should be here as Am, not I supporter. I think 2/3 of them were enthusiastic. I will meet them again + maybe you should meet w/ them.

P I would like to.

K Klutzwick is a organizer - is something of a renegade.

P Did you see what Jackson said to Comrade?

K I fear ~~that~~ he will decide that US can't be



a commitment to SV because we subjected to too much pressure. I also told a group they wouldn't attack US funds anywhere in world but w/ respect to I.

P What are chances for Reagan in Hill

K They can dig into Sept. Term only 10 mos left. SC & mid-ers. If you had MFR Jackson would be holding things all year holding the campaign platform.

I think we have a SALT treaty brewing. NYT has front page article on cruise missile. (Disposes cruise missile prob). We either must ^{commit} ~~work~~ them or do away w/ them - at least on ships. Maybe on bombers.

P Who generated - story

K DOD. I don't know whether Schles himself. I don't know how he feels about it. Schles has Kaufman working for him. What he would really like is to move him out of Em & do that function from off shore - cruise missile might be good for that. (Mrs. Ford calls).

It was 50-50 about CSC. F was are trying their position for 50 hrs. We should stay out of it. I have said if we felt agreement, not much point in having a summit.

P I agree w/ that.

K On cruise missiles, I proposed 2500 limit on planes & counting on ships. We can't get away w/ keeping them free. There is backfire prob. We maybe can't solve them all - in which case no point in a summit.

