MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:
Thursday - June 12, 1975
4:30 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

President: That was an interesting session last night.
Schlesinger: Very. It was quite a performance.

President: I made the point of no linkage.
Scowcroft: Henry has given Jim a readout.

President: Good.

Schlesinger: You have done well on the DOD votes. On Diego Garcia, we have problems. Vest says there is only a 50-50 chance but I think we will win.

President: If you need my phone calls, let me know.

Schlesinger: The first subject I want to discuss is critical military writing. Admiral Moorer's Public Affairs Officer, still on active duty, has written an article critical of the Vietnam war. I favor having the military speak out responsibly, but criticism even of past policy, is a problem. I wanted to get your judgment.

President: How is his article critical?
Schlesinger: He criticizes the fact that there was no mobilization of the Reserve, that we tried to have both guns and butter, etc. I think there is some merit in letting the military do things like this, when you consider there are no wraps on civil service in this regard.

President: What do you think Brent?

Scowcroft: I think there is a line between thoughtful, analytical articles, which I favor, and articles critical of the Commander in Chief or the Secretary which I think cannot be tolerated.

President: I tend to agree, if it is analytical and non-polemical, I think it is fine.

Schlesinger: I am inclined to go along, but this is not a particularly good article, and I wanted to warn you that it will open the flood gates.

President: Let's try it.

Scowcroft: It will make it tough for you to screen.

Schlesinger: That is true. But the military need to get out responsibly into print.

I will not go with Callaway and you on Saturday unless you want. It's his show.

President: Okay.

Schlesinger: I wanted to talk about ASW. There are two Soviet developments in ASW which we have found out about:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.3(b)(1)</th>
<th>One development relates to submarine tracking</th>
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<tr>
<td>3.3(b)(4)</td>
<td>These developments show the major effort they are making in ASW, directed primarily toward our FBM forces</td>
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President: 

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
Schlesinger: Yes.

President: That is unbelievable.

Schlesinger: We have been working on the aspects of this ASW phenomenology. We don't know what causes it.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>3.3(b)(4)</th>
<th>We were very lucky</th>
<th>3.3(b)(1)</th>
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These programs show Soviet interest in reducing U.S. strategic capabilities. One conclusion I come to is that with development of their growing counterforce capability against our Minuteman silos and this possibility of growing submarine vulnerability, we should be careful about writing off mobile missiles in SALT negotiations. The arms controllers oppose mobile missiles because it is a new system and they take the position that anything not deployed shouldn't be.

Scowcroft: There is also the verification problem.

President: I remember the old railroad Minuteman.

Schlesinger: Laird killed that when the Air Force showed him a mockup of it going through the Chicago rail yards.

All this ASW is very sensitive. There is much phenomenology we are exploring and we don't know what it is we have. There are some approaches based on sampling of sea water, for example. But that depends on such small traces that practical development is in doubt. The Trident is more secure in this regard because it has such a great station keeping latitude.

President: Maybe we should go back to conventional submarines.

Schlesinger: That is an interesting thought -- but not while Rickover is still alive. Along those lines, we have sent to OMB our recommendations on nuclear versus conventionally powered ships. Mel Price is indignant we are not proposing all nuclear. OMB wants to go entirely conventional.

President: Without talking the merits I want to warn you I am a nuclear man.
I told OMB that.

The Newport News Shipyard says they won't even bid on nuclear ships for the Navy while Rickover is around.

The next item I want to discuss is intelligence. I would hope you would focus on legislative issues which will arise from the CIA investigation. You have two alternatives. You can take the initiative or you can let Church do it.

As you probably know by now I have written a memorandum to the relevant agencies asking everyone for comments and recommendations.

Ordinarily no.

Now, some troublesome questions. First, on nuclear weapons deployments. I sent over a memo on April 16 with my recommendations. As yet we have heard nothing. We do have to be careful in Europe with MBFR Option III and we realize that there are political factors, and not just military efficiency factors which may govern.
then political factors should prevail on that, I agree. Last summer I spent much time worrying about the nuclear weapons.

Walker has indicated you wanted to approve Schedule C appointments here. I suggest that is not a good idea. It was done under Johnson and there was a fuss about politicizing DOD. Laird got it changed. My judgment is you don't get much out of it and there are political drawbacks.

President: Let me check.

Schlesinger: You will overload your system. The first one under your new system was a systems test and evaluation man. He came over here for interview -- but no one here knows technical capabilities he should have.

Scowcroft: I will check it with our personnel people.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ........ National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL ............ Note
DESCRIPTION ................. Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for memcon
CREATION DATE ............... 06/12/1975
VOLUME ....................... 5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400552
COLLECTION TITLE ............ National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations
BOX NUMBER ................... 12
FOLDER TITLE ................. June 12, 1975 - Ford, Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN ............. 05/28/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST ...... GG

REDACTED
P/S Schueller
12 June 75

P 1st meeting again last night
S Very critical on performance
P I made point re RAS linkage
S Nancy's request given a nod.
P Good.
S Your handing call on the 200 vote
P On Digs, we must get a fast agenda so we don't think we will win.
S For now send any phone call, but no longer.
P Critical meeting tonight, Methodist about 7 with RAS.
S Monday meeting, draft.
P I want meeting to be urgent, but maintain
S If joint policy is any, I cannot get
P What then, more critical?
S The next meeting, a 200, not sure
P Don't like involvement, some in it, when there are
S No way can civil service
P What do you think, that?
S See: I think there is a blank sheet, to which, as a joint
P Don't do any way, if it is a joint.
P 2: now meeting, either way. It will not
S In particular good controls, and it will go ahead
P But to try it.
S See if it will make it work.
S That is fine. But a joint could work.

DECLASSIFIED with portions exempted
CLASSIFIED (as amended) SEC 33
DATE: 12-91
Date: 12-91
S: I will not push you or give you any trouble unless you want it your way.

P: That settles it.

S: I want to talk about AS W.

P: Yes.

S: We have been working on this phenomenon. We don't know what comes after.

P: We will come back.
This shows interest in reducing US threat capabilities. One conclusion is that part of US arms might become more vulnerable. This possibility of going out of action, we should be careful about. If some missiles are not controlled, they can become a new system, a new threat not disposed at all that is.

So, also in terms of justice.

P: As we said in the previous miss.
S: Handwritten that after AF structural elevation of its going from Chicago and some.

All this is very sensitive. There is much pharmacology we are discussing we don't know that.

I have some water I can sample from, for example. This is done some because it was such a great station keeping

P: I hope we should go back to the environmental setup.
S: Interesting that — but not what baskets elitist along those lines, we have some of OMB's current on some we can from. With those concepts we are preparing all over. OMB wants to work send must keep.

P: We telling news, I can see news.
S: OMB's told.

P: Hope to have a great day. That work more and some there while pictures is enough.
S: Recall goes. I would hope you would from our city some which will assist you can.
Take initiative on this Chapman.

1. We have already discussed this scenario.
2. We should review current progress and planning.
3. Regular meetings are necessary. This week's update.
4. Chapman space may be infeasible.

Indirect navigation in Chapman scenario.

5. Let's get started, but do it in traditional

For some understanding process. Need agenda.

Deployments. Sunday open 16. Have 3 teams...

yet. We do have to consider this in any of...

Re open 147 + we realize political factors...

not just military, political in Europe.
Walter has terminated your contract & appeared
suitable & appreciable. I suggest that we find
this error. Mr. Martin & Mr. Johnson - your
executive assistant - I have
an issue about publicizing. We have got
it figured. Your judgment is firm but
got much aid & that there are yet, fortunately,
he got me check

I will present your signature. I am
sure an signature but where he can sign
here for instance. These have known
what the capability to seek.

See whoever think it will, personal people.