MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasile Pungan, Counsellor to the President
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Amb. Harry Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Romania
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, June 11, 1975
3:00 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

PLACE:
The White House
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS:
Bilateral economic relations; CSCE;
Middle East; Korea; Spain; Disarmament.

[The press took photographs]

Ceausescu: You had quite a trip.

President: You have just completed a trip to Brazil and Mexico.

[The press was dismissed]

President: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.
Ceauşescu: I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have this meeting on my way through and I hope there will be positive results from it.

President: I do want to thank you for sending an emissary right after I became President. It happened rather suddenly and I appreciated your gesture.

Ceauşescu: Since this is our first meeting after you became President I want to extend to you my most sincere congratulations. I hope you occupy this post for a long period of time. I have heard that you will be a candidate next year, and I hope that we will be able to continue our collaboration in the period that follows.

**Bilateral Economic Relations**

President: Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think we will win so I look forward to working with you in the future. I am most anxious that we, during my Presidency, expand the relations established by the U.S.-Romanian Declaration of 1973.

We are of course most anxious, Mr. President, to implement the Trade Agreement between Romania and the United States. I have submitted the necessary documents to the Congress to get Congress to take the action which would bring about the benefits of the Trade Agreement which are important to the United States and to Romania and to our relations.

Ceauşescu: Of course we await with great interest the entry into force of this Agreement. I can guarantee to you there will be no opposition to it in Romania, and I hope that it will be approved in the United States as well. We would want the results of our good economic collaboration over the past four years to continue, and if this agreement will come into force we would expect our two-way trade to reach a billion dollars.

Kissinger: The President is meeting with some Congressional people this afternoon and also with some Jewish leaders.

President: If I might make a suggestion, but first let me comment. We are most anxious that Congress approve this Agreement which we submitted on April 24. They have until July to take the necessary action. We do want MFN for Romania. We want Export-Import Bank credits and trade benefits for Romania. I think I have to be very frank and say that the Congressmen will probably raise difficult questions with you, as they have with our own people.
They are very interested in Jewish emigration to Israel and the United States. We of course disapprove of that requirement in the law. We think it is unnecessary, but it is the law and we must go through these procedures. The way to get favorable action by Congress is to get some evidence that there is some increase in emigration to Israel and to the United States.

Ceausescu: I will be very frank. As far as the United States is concerned, there is no problem. There are still some humanitarian cases. We will solve these as we have been solving others.

As far as Israel is concerned, there are not very many Romanian citizens left who are of Jewish nationality. The great majority of these are married to Romanians. Therefore the problem is that it is not likely that a substantial emigration will continue.

In the last four years 18,000 people applied. And there were a couple thousand more who applied in the years just before that. 18,300 have left. Right now there are still about 2,000 who have been approved, some of them as much as two years ago. But with the tension in the area and the war, although they have approval to depart in their pocket, they have given up the idea or put off their departure. Therefore, in this instance too there is no longer a major problem. We will try to solve those cases that remain favorably.

As a matter of fact we have now a fairly large number of cases of those who want to return to Israel and we haven't been able to find a solution to this situation yet.

I have discussed these questions already with Deputy Prime Minister Allon and at his time of departure he made a favorable declaration. He even met with the Chief Rabbi.

President: This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I just believe it is very important that you are able to provide this information, this factual data, to the Congressional people and to the Jewish leaders because they could hamstring and make it difficult for us to get the necessary action by Congress.

Ceausescu: I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President, and with the explanations which I will be giving we will convince the Congress to give its approval more rapidly.
Kissinger: When the President finishes, he will have convinced the Congressmen to adopt an amendment to permit free immigration into Romania.

Ceausescu: No thanks. I am not interested.

President: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that held up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations about Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

Kissinger: Macoveescu and Gromyko are the only ones who have read all the documents.

Ceausescu: First of all, I would like to come back to some bilateral questions in connection with your forthcoming visit to Romania.

Aside from the problem of this Agreement which I hope will be adopted by the Congress, perhaps it would be well on the occasion of your visit to Romania to resolve other problems also. I previously raised the question of concluding a long-term economic cooperation agreement and had also raised the matter of granting Romania the special conditions of trade given to developing countries. I do not want to get into a discussion now, and do not insist on an answer now, but in connection with your visit I would hope to be able to solve these problems, to give your visit to Romania concrete content. I had previously extended an invitation for you to visit Romania, to be sure, but I wanted to use this occasion to make the invitation personal.

President: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference Meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.

Ceausescu: Following the European Security Conference?

President: Yes.

Kissinger: Mr. President, on the question of long-term cooperation, we have discussed this previously and agreed on it in principle and we can announce it at any point you consider desirable. Our plans have been to get MFN through Congress first without any extraneous debate, so this would fit in with the schedule you are discussing.
President: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1.

Amb. Barnes: It could come out of committee by July 15, but they may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.

Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things that closely for your visit.

President: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess.

Otherwise there will be five weeks delay. So it is important to get Congress to act, preferably prior to the visit, and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.

CSCE

Geoanaescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of now many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.

In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems
are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense
to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there.
But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules
which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain
understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is
important.

Macoveescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with
continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most
dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military
blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons
as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not
the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason
we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of
this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary.
If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen,
then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months
or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of
fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing
such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up
with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically
once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one
of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on
a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?

Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.

President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch
with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania
wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to
countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

Middle East

Ceausescu: With regard to the Middle East, you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March, but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our reassessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

Ceausescu: Of course the problems, as you know even better than I, are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if any new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours.

Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria there is the Palestinian problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestinian state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved.
The PLO has in mind setting up a state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary guarantees of the UN and others. This in fact would mean the recognition of the state of Israel. The US would have a great deal to gain if it would enter into direct discussions with the PLO. For that matter the Israelis too would have something to gain.

Kissinger: What did Allon say?

Ceausescu: He took a step forward. He recognized that there exists a Palestinian people which has the right to an independent existence.

President: Did Foreign Minister Allon agree that the Palestinians should have part of the West Bank, and if so did he ask for guarantees for Israel's protection?

Ceausescu: He sees the solution of the problem through involving Jordan. The Israelis' main problem is the fact that the PLO proposes the elimination of the State of Israel, while the PLO complains that Israel will not recognize them. We think that the PLO and Israel have to begin to understand that they must discuss these things with each other. I believe that discussions with Arafat and other PLO leaders would lead to better understanding and would provide some advantages. I have talked a lot with Arafat and he has told me that he truly wants to assure independence for his people so they can live in peace and that this problem of a democratic state is something for the future, not now. In any case there is no truth in the idea that they are playing somebody else's game. What they want is independence for their people.

President: We find some increase in flexibility but I would hesitate to be optimistic about the step-by-step approach. The other possibility we are examining is a broad comprehensive one covering peace, borders, the Palestinians and so on. This of course would undoubtedly bring us to Geneva. What reaction do you have to the Geneva Conference reopening?

Ceausescu: The Geneva Conference can't be anything bad in itself but it won't be able to solve the problems. The problems have to be brought there already solved in order to receive necessary juridical sanction. Otherwise they would just start accusing each other. In any case, there will have to be ways for discussions outside the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree.
Ceausescu: We think the Conference ought to be somewhat larger and that there ought to be a larger role for the UN. The Conference has to be well prepared and has to have solutions almost ready set for it.

President: I recognize all the complexities that would take place in Geneva unless in effect all was agreed upon before we got there. But I am not optimistic, Mr. President, that we can get Israel agreeing with Egypt, Israel with Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the PLO. We would hope that some progress would be met in one area, but to expect on a bilateral basis progress in four areas, this is just being too optimistic.

Ceausescu: I agree. Of course it is not easy to reach such understandings. I think though it would be useful, besides the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, if other states could do something. I am thinking about countries which are not directly involved like some non-aligned countries. Also the UN. All in close connection with the Geneva Conference. Of course, I believe that it would be useful if the United States efforts, those of Dr. Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some understandings. Still there is room for other paths wherever possible. I don't believe Dr. Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my belief that this Spring he might have been able to make better use of the assistance of other countries.

Kissinger: I have said that on the basis of my activities I am well qualified for the job of Director of an insane asylum and will be glad to have others join me. [Laughter] I am not talking about being an inmate. I am talking about the job of Director.

No, we favor broader efforts.

President: We will continue to work on it. If we can get the step-by-step process affirmative again, we will do all we can to achieve something. But if we see no progress we will have to propose an overall settlement, with all the complications. But we would prefer the other approach. We are insisting there be no stagnation. Otherwise there will be another war, and that no one wants. We will try our best.

Korea; Spain; Disarmament

Ceausescu: I know the time is limited and I only wanted to mention other problems in passing on which we might reach some understandings or solutions in connection with your visit.
I would mention Korea, the visit of the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in Romania. I had some discussions with him. I know you have some contacts with them yourselves. He told me that he doesn't want any sort of tension in the area, that he realizes that unification can come only through peaceful paths, and that he understands that he needs a durable peace and that will take some time.

The second problem has to do with Spain. [There was an exchange between Ceausescu and Macovecescu over the question of the person with whom some discussions had been taking place in Mexico. Apparently the American Ambassador there had talked with a Spanish group to which Ceausescu was about to refer.]

During my stop in Mexico I talked with a delegation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. I know they have had some meetings with a large number of Congressmen and other political figures here. The head of this group, who is a good friend of mine, wants to get into discussions with the United States on the question of the future. They want the changes that will be taking place in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a way as not to affect relations with the United States. I just wanted to mention these things.

Finally there is the problem which I don't want to discuss now, that of disarmament. We -- and there are also tens of states situated on all continents, who think that there is no disarmament going on in the framework of the Disarmament Conference but only setting limitations on armament.

President: Do you mean SALT and MBFR?

Kissinger: I think he means the disarmament discussions in Geneva -- the 18-member conference.

Ceausescu: Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing. As far as the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, at least as far as we have an idea of the situation, it is not disarmament but talk of disarmament. I hope that we will be able to discuss some of these questions when we next meet.

Ford: I hope to discuss them with you when I come to Romania.

[The meeting ended.]
CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

Lt General Brent Scowcroft, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington

Dear Brent:

Enclosed is the final version of the June White House conversation as promised in my August 8 letter. I've also sent copies to Hal and Art.

Best regards,

Harry G. Barnes, Jr.

Encl a/s

P.S. On reviewing my notes, I've straightened our thirde party confusion about which I was concerned.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

June 11, 1975

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador - Interpreter
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
George Macoveescu, Foreign Minister
Vasile Pungan - Counselor to the President - Interpreter

DATE AND PLACE: June 11, 1975, 3:00 - 4:15 p.m., The White House

President Ford: Let me say, Mr. President, it is very nice to see you. It is particularly nice of you to stop so we could have this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest on your way back to Romania after your trip to Latin America.

President Ceausescu: I, too, am pleased, Mr. President, to have this meeting on my way through and I hope there will be positive results from it.

President Ford: I do want to thank you for sending an emissary right after I became President. It happened rather suddenly and I was grateful that he came.

President Ceausescu: Since this is our first meeting after you became President I want to extend to you my most sincere congratulations. I hope you occupy this post for a long period of time. I have heard that you will be a candidate next year and I hope that we will be able to continue our collaboration in the period that follows.

President Ford: Thank you. I will be a candidate. I think we will win so I look forward to working with you in the future. I am most anxious...
that we, during my Presidency, expand the relations established by the US-Romanian Declaration of 1973.

We are of course most anxious, Mr. President, to implement the Trade Agreement between Romania and the United States. I have submitted the necessary documents to the Congress to get Congress to take the action which would bring about the benefits of the Trade Agreement which are important to the United States and to Romania and to our relations.

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Secretary Kissinger: The President is meeting with some Congressional people this afternoon and also with some Jewish leaders.

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get some evidence that there is some increase in emigration to Israel and to the United States.

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I have discussed these questions already with Deputy Prime Minister Allon and at the time of his departure he made a favorable declaration. He even met with the Chief Rabbi.

President Ford: This is very encouraging, Mr. President. I just believe it is very important that you are able to provide this information, this factual data to the Congressional people and to the Jewish leaders because they could hamstring and make it difficult for us to get the necessary action by Congress.
President Ceausescu: I hope that with your efforts, Mr. President, and with the explanations which I will be giving, we will convince the Congress to give its approval more rapidly.

Secretary Kissinger: When the President finishes, he will have convinced the Congress to adopt an amendment to permit free immigration into Romania.

President Ceausescu: No thanks. I am not interested.

President Ford: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that are holding up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations regarding Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

President Ceausescu: First of all, I would like to come back to some bilateral questions in connection with your forthcoming visit to Romania. Aside from the problem of this Agreement which I hope will be adopted by the Congress perhaps it would be well on the occasion of your visit to Romania to resolve other problems also. I previously raised the question of concluding a long-term economic cooperation agreement and had also raised the matter of granting Romania the special conditions given to developing countries. I do not want to get into a discussion now but in connection with your visit would hope to be able to solve these problems.

I had previously extended an invitation for you to visit Romania, to be sure, but I wanted to use this occasion to make the invitation personal.

President Ford: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, on the question of long term economic cooperation we have discussed this previously and agreed on it in principle and can announce it at any point you consider desirable. Our plans have been to get MFN first, so this would fit in with the schedule you are discussing.

President Ford: If the European Security Conference is in late July and Congress would act on the Trade Agreement for Romania by August 1...

Ambassador Barnes: They may not take action until early September because they have 60 legislative days and the August recess may intervene.

Secretary Kissinger: You do not have to link these two things for your visit.

President Ford: But it would be helpful to get the Trade Agreement done and not have it complicated by any announcement. This reinforces the need to get favorable consideration and action before the Congressional recess. Otherwise there will be five weeks delay, so it is important to get Congress to act preferably prior to the visit and then we could announce we would be having a long-term agreement.

President Ceausescu: With regard to European Security, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates but of the results of this Conference. Of course if it can take place in July or August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance detente. Therefore it is not Basket III which is essential, that is the question of how many journalists or artists travel. This isn't what is so essential. As far as we are concerned let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward detente and for that matter things like cultural exchanges.
Here we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements on the renunciation of force and non-interference in internal affairs. Secondly, there is the matter which has certain military aspects. Granted these proposals will not resolve the basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in internal affairs of other states. It is a question of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore, if all these problems are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. What we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have not existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these should be mandatory and not voluntary.

One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference.

Foreign Minister Macovecu: Follow-up.

President Ceausescu: I don't know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President Ford: How often do you see it meeting, every year, every two years?
President Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

President Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don't have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Secretary Kissinger: For example, rotating ——

President Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania —

President Ford: (Smiling) Romania.

Secretary Kissinger: We have explained to Romania and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference that the very reason Romania wants this is why we would not. We are not eager to grant to other countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal but we do not want to supersede existing structures in the West with ones which could be exploited. We are sympathetic though to your concerns.

President Ceausescu: We don't think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don't want
any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position. (Both the President and the Secretary nod agreement.)

With regard to the Middle East you are now having discussions with the Israeli Prime Minister.

President Ford: We tried very hard to keep progress going last March but unfortunately the negotiations had to be suspended. We are now doing our re-assessment. We want to avoid any stagnation or stalemate. I have just finished talking with President Sadat. Today and tomorrow we will be discussing with Prime Minister Rabin his observations on the situation.

President Ceausescu: Of course the problems as you know even better than I are very complicated. We will certainly welcome it if new steps towards disengagement can be realized. There are conditions now in which agreement could be achieved. Egypt and Syria are in favor of reaching a solution. We know very well the situation can change very rapidly, that the present favorable conditions might no longer appear. I think that Israel too has understood this very well. We have told them our views.

President Ford: You met with Foreign Minister Allon recently.

President Ceausescu: Yes, I talked with him for four hours. Aside from the question affecting Egypt and Syria, there is the Palestine problem and the need to achieve the formation of an independent Palestine state. There can be no solution unless this problem is resolved. The PLO has in mind setting up a state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza with the necessary guarantees of the UN and others. This in fact would mean the recognition of
Secretary Kissinger: What did Allon say?

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Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

President Ceausescu: We think the Conference ought to be somewhat larger and that there ought to be a larger role for the UN. The Conference has to be well prepared and has to have solutions almost ready set for it.

President Ford: I recognize all the complexities that would take place in Geneva unless in effect all was agreed upon before we got there, but I am not optimistic, Mr. President, that we can get Israel agreeing with Egypt, Israel with Jordan, Israel with Syria, Israel with the PLO. We would hope that some progress would be made in one area but to expect on a bilateral basis progress in four areas, this is just being too optimistic.

President Ceausescu: I agree. I think though it would be useful, besides the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union, if other states could do something. I am thinking about countries which are not directly involved like some non-aligned countries. Also the UN. All in close connection with the Geneva Conference. Of course I believe that it would be useful if the United States' efforts, those of Dr. Kissinger, would enable the reaching of some understandings. Still there is room for other paths wherever possible. I don't believe Dr. Kissinger will be annoyed if I mention my belief that this spring he might have been able to make better use of the assistance of other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that on the basis of my activities I am well qualified for the job of Director of an insane asylum and will be
President Ford: We will continue to work. If we can get the step-by-step process affirmative again, we will do all we can to achieve something. But if we see no progress, we will have to propose an overall settlement with all the complications, but we would prefer the other approach. We are insisting there be no stagnation, otherwise there will be another war. We will try our best.

President Ceausescu: I know time is limited. I wanted to mention two problems in passing on which we might reach some understandings or solutions in connection with your visit. I would mention Korea, the visit of the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in Romania. I had some discussions with him. I know you have some contacts with them yourselves. He told me that he doesn't want any sort of tension in the area, that he realizes that unification can come only through peaceful paths and that he understands that he needs a durable peace.

The second problem has to do with Spain. (Exchange between Ceausescu and Macoveescu over the question of the person with whom some discussions had been taking place in Mexico. Apparently the American Ambassador them hadn't asked with a Spanish group to which Ceausescu was about to refer.)

During my stop in Mexico I talked with a delegation of the Democratic Junta of Spain. I know they have had some meetings with a large number of Congressmen and other political figures here. The head of this group, who is a good friend of mine, wants to get into discussions with the United States on the question of the future. They want the changes that will be taking place
in Spain to proceed peacefully and in such a way as not to affect relations with the United States. I just wanted to mention these things. Finally there is the problem which I don't want to discuss now, that of disarmament. We, and there are also tens of states situated on all continents, who think that there is no disarmament going on in the framework of the Disarmament Conference but only setting limitations on armament.

President Ford: Do you mean SALT and MBFR?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he means the disarmament discussions in Geneva.

President Ceausescu: Vienna and Geneva, it's all the same thing. As far as the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, at least as far as we have an idea of the situation, it is not disarmament but talk of disarmament. I hope that we will be able to discuss some of these questions when we next meet.

President Ford: I hope to discuss them with you when I come to Romania.
I would like to express my appreciation for your visit and the opportunity to meet you. I hope we will have further discussions.

From my perspective, the visit was very productive and I believe it will lead to positive outcomes. I hope you will have the opportunity to visit us in the future.

Thank you for your visit. I believe it will be successful. I look forward to further discussions and expect a positive outcome of this agreement.

We are working on the implementation of the agreement and I believe it will be successful. I am confident that we will achieve the desired goals.

Of course we want all present, but it is important to know that there is no reason to be concerned about your agreement with us.
time in U.S. It can achieve that agree to
our own conditions by you a person 4. Yes be
independent and reach 1 bit in future.

K. Equity of Comp going + Jew
I think this

Unfortunately.

Of course mistakes. First. We are say

This must inform that Comp agrees when they

basebit judge. We can count I can centle

for Canadian. I want to judge because that

early will find questions on your in they have

we people about Jewish immigration to U.S. It

we always now of this elements here, but

it is a new we must decide by it knowing to
got approved to the there can not prevent

in immigration to U.S. It.

C. He recommendation he mention to U.S. It

is not just. To Israel, there can only a few

number of Jewish origin. It this site one

not a big part of mass immigration of Jewish

people. In last 10 years, we have used application

for 10,000. Those already 15,000 left Communist.

There was near 20,000 application approve

from 2 years old, but no fat one can

now C90/28 applicant in this part but we could

not get with them in right solution. just

just agree with, but time are already there

important to conclude 8 remaining. I suggested

then C9 Allen return he left in and he

made a very good statement on it.
P. Frankly, I hope you will present this fact to Mr. & Mrs. Jones, who
then could submit very helpful

C. I want you to show them. I think it is

P. I have your approval in C5C. As you
are aware, I have dealt extensively on behalf of
I would be interested in your approval

K. Mr. Jones & George are only two additional

C. I would like to see some statement on behalf
of the commission at your next meeting.
In addition to this agreement it might be well
suggested to John and also.
There is question
of an agreement on same terms for $12,000
and, in any event, it would be wise
inclusion of such request in the agreement.
Please keep me informed as to what you,
will expect to have your request modified
in that respect.

I. Appreciate your help in this matter. If
there is a C5C meeting, it might be
presented next at your quarterly meeting
in California.

C. Following C5C

K. One of the reasons I am leaving town
earlier this year is because of this

P. thank you.
of any point. As we wanted for yet MN then

emp for any 2KM or 2KM below. It would

get in well fail that detail

C If CSEC held late July, C can well hope full get

on walk agreement by Aug

B C we may only get C in July, but need

get them long before Sept. Late Oct. may

be done in time to shop in that closely.

B But we would want anything to include W/MEN,

2 utility plants to get C from their proven

proven. Changed to small Arrow can become

the long term agreement.

C In meantime if CSEC can we can do what not

2 month until a delay on accute to the contract

world. Case we deal in not agreement that

but a contract. Of course July would be good but

August also good and Sept. Most important

is that delay is mun to keep from time. Can

we set deal a year contract if our related to

matter. Some objectives. Was on

front of paving agreement. The first

contract is so important our because it is that affects

details and a condition of it. Third 4 change. In

connection of it, the one main part with

acceptability level we schedule to E very we

and 4 concrete contract of R. W. not to

underpast in national opinion of it. C not

to take care of which is course we not

taking main part, but not concerned.
Some men that states will not interact in an equal manner. Equality is maintained. Maximus, for example. Now then, it is not a question of 100 to 1, but 100:100:100. Neither is it that they would be maintained at a constant rate. Their balance would not continue. It would continue until what generative aspect equaled 100. What generative aspect a year, a day, a season, a lifetime, a century, or ten centuries? That important. Or might it continue forever? We think not. A question: what is a world? Three large dimensions of time - not small - nor small. It may be 100:100:100. Because of that, we see a continuous change. We can see a continuous change. Can we see a continuous change? It is in the process of evolving. So are in favor of existing in a world - a system which will continue with its growth.
and we agree, we don't want that kind

father's game or game of tennis in a day.

But we're not sure. Of your sister.

I believe such an agreement is not

right to determine. We can determine if right

to determine. We need to know

for waiting to move a pole, which they agree.

should like you back again at such a point

your position again.

should like to win — question of MI because

have I AM live.

P. We tried my head last lunch to keep crop in

on, but my brother they won every!

We have never been at right spot.

That's a very good point.

C. You know others, not sure we are very complicated.

We combine with respect to change again. It's

cannot determine. They are really complicated. We are

to find. E & Shomir in favor of a solution. But

you have got can change very quickly. Maybe

fascist leaders won't speak tomorrow. We tell

E that

P. You mean all this?

C. What if they stay? In addition & considered

just is one of Poles. We understand join

Poles' plot, a side can be taken. The idea

of Poles is one & at some time of WW

government. Stalin will have much faster
by putting formally & PhD - about to call

1. How did Allen react?

C. He would step forward. I was there on such a just date, he should have a lameness.

D. Did Allen mention where he was or had been any place to open this if there happened

E. His stroke. Found it the way. But he another PhD wants to get together.

F. You must be very sure. He should have it in mind.

That the last to face it & come together or change. Discussion of report would help quite a lot

G. As soon as at length of August, it is possible to make a man in peace. Putting them.

H. As for future now, those who

I. Unless this PhD is anything, for anyone look PhD

J. I would hate you to make just the

K. There are ways of help. We encumber a normal approach and discuss it would take in career.

L. On your offer.

C. Whereas something is wrong but it can to accept.

D. So have a problem if a few talked, except for legal agreement. In just ask they would just direct to companies & you would have to

E. Find a very important way to do business. I found

F. Compare exp. to other greater role for UNC &

G. H. Less a mind project.

H. I was very big at some months all agreed title

I. But I not optimistic I don't get to argue
Of course it is not easy to reach such understandings. In addition to efforts of all, some@property {color: 'rgba(100,100,100,0.2)'}&nbsp;wielded in expert camps, a number of steersmen should continue. I think it would not be impossible to try a second climb.

We, we face some additional efforts.

We will continue to work on it. Some camps are optimistic as will be long the opportunity to learn it. By not, we will have to choose another alternative. We cannot use the equipment. That would lead to another war and the next war.

C

I know time to short & only want to mention some points - we can borrow when you can. To misunderstand, I am Karen, the N. Karen who lives in the United States of America. He should not write me letters in a manner that only camp—hence I want to take time to write & to write to Karen. In America, I dealt with the government of the United States of America. They have not even to the United States government with the writing of a letter to me.

For the situation, many want to understand the United States will happen to the people peacefully - not against opposition of C.1, written part of a man, which is only written.
Martini - We need more time before what is happening now is not divorced from an action for nursing care.

P: Salt or MA = 2 (events)

C: Separate coma care but MA = 2 care also.

Do not want to deviate more but would like
to discuss it in future.

P: When dinner & Remain

George ordered - formal

ed. Postbulletin is

W. Remain if you

want to read him