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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  
President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:  
Friday, June 6, 1975  
9:40 - 10:21 a.m.

PLACE:  
The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: The monitoring station will be a breakthrough. We could perhaps do the same on the Golan for the hills behind Quneitra. If we could do that by November we would have the Middle East defused and might never have to go to Geneva. At some time we have to put out a comprehensive plan. If there is no progress, we will have to move. The best time to settle the Middle East is the first year of the new term. I have the instinct we really are moving. Your hanging tough is what has done it. No other President has done it.

President: I rather enjoy it.

Kissinger: We have had all our bad events in a four-week stretch. Vietnam will soon look like the Nixon pardon.

President: We can't go along with the North and South Vietnamese in the UN.

Kissinger: We would only consider it if we could get South Korea in there also.

President: That is a possibility, but let's be real firm.

Kissinger: I spoke to Mahon [Redacted] We
have made it innocuous enough.

The Syrian Foreign Minister will be here on the 20th. It would be nice if you could see him. I want you to meet Asad. He is fantastic. No other Syrian government has lasted nine months. He has lasted four years. He has talked about peace with Israel, lost a war and still survived.

If we can get this process moving, we will get the Soviets out of the Middle East.

President: What is the significance of Saudi sympathy with the oil price rise?

Kissinger: This group of leaders is not as restrained as Faisal. I think they are driven by Algeria, not Iran. I think we should get Fahd here as soon as possible.

We must stop uncontrolled talking in our government. Dobrynin said they would make the remaining concessions on CSCE. They will give Basket I and on the depth of CBM's. He -- and Gromyko -- complained bitterly about the Schlesinger statement.

Our policy is tough. If they did to us what we are doing to them in the Middle East, we would be mad. If we now publicly humiliate them they will have to strike back. Jackson is floundering around -- that doesn't hurt us. The Tad Szulc article in New Republic on supposed SALT violations: they have actually conceded on most of the points, Dobrynin said they were breaking their back on SALT, but they don't like our counting rules. I said they should come up with their own. But if we keep hitting them publicly, they must hit back. Schlesinger says detente results from American weakness, but your phraseology is correct: that it results from our strength. The change in the last five months is amazing. Dobrynin was very docile.

President: And the Chinese....

Kissinger: Successes -- and failures --feed on themselves. Our conservatives must understand that we are squeezing the Soviets like never before.
My idea is you should go to Germany, visit the troops. Invite the Western leaders to dinner the night before the Conference. Invite the Swedes and the Swiss too. Maybe go to Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland.

Maybe see Asad. The question is where? Salzburg is okay, but maybe that would upset Sadat.

We can probably plan on CSCE the week of 21 July. I think you should not go to Berlin -- but you could visit the troops.

President: That went well in Korea.

Kissinger: At the PFIAB, there was concern that NIE’s are too optimistic. I asked them to prepare a paper on it and then you could meet with them. I wondered about Gullion as a replacement for Colby.

President: I know him. He doesn’t look that strong. He is a conservative. He was for Goldwater in ’64. He would be for me but wouldn’t be unhappy with Reagan.

Kissinger: Colby isn’t bothering me, but he is a disaster.

President: We have to make a change. We would have to find out if he is a tough administrator.

Kissinger: I think the whole top echelon of CIA needs to be cleaned out.

We are having a problem with Thieu. He wants to come here in June.

President: It would be better if he could wait. All this trouble they are having with that General in Canada would be repeated here. I think it would lose sympathy for him as a whole if he comes here now.

Kissinger: Let’s see if we can keep him off. He will kill me when he comes. He accuses me of cramming the agreement down his throat.

We have made good progress on the consumer-producer conference. France is following our plan that we put forward at IEA. There will be three groups: on energy, raw materials and economic development.
I will send you a report on the evacuation from Phnom Penh. It's incredible. Phnom Penh will have a population of 50,000 -- it will be only an administrative center. Where the real capital will be is not clear.

We have to give attention to Angola. My people want to "let the democratic process" work. That is total nonsense. There is none. My instinct is we should work with Mobutu and through him with Roberto. We will have a paper with the NSC meeting. The Soviets are pushing Neto of the MPLA. Kaunda is backing Savimbi. I don't think we want the Communists there. Yesterday a Communist-dominated group took the oil fields and a Congolese-dominated group drove them out.
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