MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, May 24, 1975
10:40 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: It makes me mad the way we have procrastinated on uranium
enrichment.

Scowcroft: Lynn has held it up.

Kissinger: We are missing a chance to get a stranglehold like OPEC has
on oil.

President: We will be ready to go by June 30.

Kissinger: There is another of these economic deals coming to you. I am
not reliable on economic matters. But these issues are not basically
economic. My role is to project an image of the U.S. which is progressive.
Greenspan is a theoretician. He wants to vindicate a system which no one
will support. Schmidt told me that unless we pull ourselves together on
raw materials, he will go it alone. I want to fuzz it up. I don't want to
accept a New Economic Order but I don't want to confront Boumedienne.
I want to fuzz the ground. On substance I agree with Simon. I am not
against Simon - only Schlesinger. [Laughter]

President: Let them work out commodity agreements -- they won't work.

Kissinger: We made points with Giscard and Schmidt with my Kansas City
speech, and we said nothing.
President: When does this come up?

Kissinger: I think perhaps we can work it out. Perhaps Monday. I just want to be able to say "we have heard you and we are willing to discuss raw materials" -- but not agree to indexing.

President: Let me look at the language. But I see no reason to talk theory when we can in a practical way just screw up the negotiations.

Kissinger: I don't think we should buy the New Economic Order or say the present system is great with just a little tinkering.

President: I agree.

Kissinger: Take the Brits. If we could say, "They have come out with proposals. We don't agree on all the points but think they have asked the right questions." I think we should be tough on the substance, but not on the theory.

President: If it comes up, I will express it in my way because that's the way I feel.

Kissinger: On the Mideast - we are facing a massive onslaught by Israel. You had approved that we must handle Rabin like we did for Hussein. Now they are running amok. They are pressuring us on the dinner, and now his wife is coming. I just don't think we can cave on this.

[Reads from Allon briefing to the National War College.]

President: We will have a working dinner and Betty, Happy or Nancy can also give one.

Kissinger: Their way is to pressure us to normalize relations and then they can have their way. [Talked about the Golan book.] My press said that war veterans are being sent to American Jewish committees to talk against you and me.

I think this letter of the 76 is one of the most unpatriotic, outrageous things I have seen.

President: This kind of pressure is not the way to get decisions from me. They maybe can scare someone else, but that doesn't work with me.
Kissinger: We shouldn't take on the substance of the letter. But I note now their press is dropping nonbelligerency and stressing the length of the agreement and UNEF. I wouldn't tip your hand to Sadat -- he will leak -- but you should lay out the two alternatives. Step-by-step is easy, but partial; comprehensive gets them what they want but may cause such a brawl they won't get anything.

You might ask Sadat if he would agree to a two-year renewal of UNEF the first time, and maybe lift the boycott for ten firms.

[Scowcroft goes out for a map, and returns. The Secretary described the agreement.]

But for that you can't promise not to advance something at Geneva or not to propose something on Syria. I think you would have a chance to get this, with an agreement by June.

Anything Sadat can give you, you could say you will put it as a U.S. proposal -- to protect him. You could promise him the principle of the '67 frontiers for Egypt and, with minor modifications, for the other frontiers.

For the talks, we could have Eilts in, maybe Sisco. I would see him ten minutes alone to say I am determined to make progress and the only question is how.

[Rumsfeld was called in.]

President: Did you get comments on my interview?

Kissinger: No, but I read it and it is good. Schlesinger's comments on detente were very bad. We have got to get them under control.

There is great concern in Europe about the United States, Vietnam and a heavy impact. I acted as if Vietnam had never happened. The Mayaguez had a tremendous impact -- not the ship itself, but the act, Schmidt said it had helped him greatly -- he is up to 68%. Even Genscher has gone up 40% -- to 8% of the total.

[He discussed the history of the German Socialist Party, especially the coalitions, how Brandt left, what Schmidt inherited.]

Schmidt's course is very similar to yours.
President: He certainly is more capable than Brandt.

Rumsfeld: How about Bahr?

Kissinger: He is soft-headed -- a pro-Communist.

You have money in the bank with the European leaders who have met you. Schmidt thinks we have underestimated the depth of our economic difficulties. He thinks we have no one who knows what he is talking about in economics. He likes Shultz.

President: That's interesting, because Shultz is like Alan [Greenspan.]

Kissinger: Yes, but Shultz knows foreign policy and he doesn't push the theory. Shultz wasn't too different than Connally -- whom the economists hated -- but he gave them a feeling of participation.

Schmidt will separate from us on raw materials if we insist on theoretical positions, because he can't afford a depression. That is what he is most interested in. I would like to send him a speech draft.

He will not follow us on a confrontation course with the LDC's. If he won't, neither will France, Great Britain or Japan. He wants to work with us. If you can reassure him on the economic facts.... If we will work with him on the economy, he will support us on everything else.

President: What does he want?

Kissinger: He likes the idea internationally of doing what you did domestically -- an economic conference. To see how we can build in growth. There will be opposition -- but internationally you don't have to agree to anything but talk.

The second thing -- if you got some world leading economists over here for a meeting -- private people.

Rumsfeld: It is a spectacular idea.

Kissinger: I would announce it when you got back, but tell him when you have lunch.

Rumsfeld: Goldwin could start on it now.
Kissinger: The trick in the world now is to use economics to build a world political structure.

President: How would Alan react?

Kissinger: He wouldn't oppose it but he would want to discuss theory. We should not raise the theoretical system but will support whatever works. We can object to individual ideas on many grounds but not on grounds of a theory that no one will buy.

Schmidt is pathological on a few points -- one is offset agreements. He will not agree to another one. Our Treasury group want to push it. If we insist, he will pull money out and put it back in.

You should confirm your close cooperation with him. He is your closest ally. You have done wonders with Giscard, but you can't rely on France.

President: How about Portugal?

Kissinger: They are all against you on this, but what you said was exactly right.

We have to keep this position or we will be faced with the same situation in Italy and France. European governments have left-wing socialist elements whose tradition is "no enemies on the left." That is why they oppose Spain, which is no threat to anyone. They are bitterly opposed. Their stand on Portugal shows their moral weakness. You think you are right but won't object to what they do, but how do you help moderates by aiding the radicals? You will be proved right.

I met with Antunes in Bonn. He is more similar to Kaunda than anyone else. The Portuguese Army is not Portuguese; they are African. They spent their whole lives in Africa. He is not a Communist; he is a primitive. He said the Armed Forces Movement reflected the national will. I asked about elections and he said none of the parties represent more than a small slice.

There are two choices in Portugal: an Algeria-like regime or a Yugoslavia-like regime. Either one is unacceptable to have in NATO. The demoralization this would produce in Europe would be disastrous. You can't do much about it on your trip. In Portugal, the Socialists, who would be left-wing Socialists elsewhere, are on the right of the spectrum.
You must see Goncalves. Listen, and say we won't meddle in their internal affairs, but a neutralist government is an odd phenomenon and to have one in five cabinet posts filled by Communists is even more of an anomaly. He shouldn't come out being able to say either you threatened or supported him.

All Europe will be against you. I would be relaxed about Portugal if we could get them kicked out of NATO.

Rumsfeld: It is not understood the degree to which the Marxists are taking over the universities and the media. Vietnam, multi-national corporations, CIA, etc. -- these issues are pervasive in European TV.

Kissinger: You will start the day with Thorn. He's a good guy. Listen to him. What they want is the impression of strength, that you can rally this country. Get him on Atlantic unity, be good on that. He is on our side. He's a useful decent man. The Dane is like the Dutchman -- vapid, sappy.

The previous evening will be Tindemans, a former student of mine. You can say to him what we are trying in the consumer-producer field, trying to keep aid going in the world, etc.

Tell Tindemans we have no objection to a European defense industry, but if it is done as a means of competing with the U.S., it is not really possible. You can't discourage a European defense industry, but if it is done on the basis of French organization, you will lose American support for NATO.

Luns is very upset that Giscard is coming only to the dinner. Giscard is putting out that you invited him, so he is coming to dinner. We should make clear he is coming to the NATO dinner and therefore you are going to see him. You can't confront France, but we really can't cooperate with them on this.

[The President leaves for a minute and then returns.]

On Spain, I have talked with the Ambassador about the wisdom of getting together private people of a wide spectrum. Ordinarily I would oppose it, but this would show you weren't propping up Franco. We could have them in about 6:00. But the Ambassador would have to ask the Spanish and you couldn't do it if they seriously objected. I propose it only because Franco can't last more than a year or so.

President: How do the people like this existence?
Kissinger: Spain really isn't very oppressive.

President: I would like to do it.

Kissinger: The Greek-Turk situation: Karamanlis is a powerful person -- very vain and clever. The Greeks are 50% ahead of Turkey in quickness. Demirel looks like a linebacker for the Lions. They are no match in suaveness and subtlety for the Greeks. Bitsios is very suave and clever.

I think the next candidate for a Portuguese situation is Greece. The military is sick of us for our anti-junta attitude and not supporting them. The Greek left is viciously anti-American.

Karamanlis is ready to settle because at best it will be a lousy deal for Greece, so it is all very relative.

The main issues are a bizonal federation, the size of the territory, the strength of the central government, and the number of refugees who can return.

Your attitude with Karamanlis should be general. He would like to stick us with the tactics. You shouldn't get into any details.

The tragedy is if Congress had kept its hands off, it would be settled. Ecevit won't take it and he can give it up -- but if someone else gives it away, Ecevit has a great issue. Any good settlement helps Demirel. Flatter Karamanlis, but stay away from the percentage of the island. But tell him we can't tolerate meddling in our domestic affairs. But we want to keep things going in Cyprus and settle it. Ecevit is the strong man in Turkey, but the parliament can be dissolved only by voting itself out. The present coalition has only their self-preservation in common. Ecevit's game is that he will help Demirel on Cyprus only in return for having elections now. Demirel wants to wait until next year so he can get an economic program under way.

If the Turks went to 30-31 percent and part of Famagusta... If Ecevit were in office, Cyprus would be solved in a month.

If Demirel could get the aid restored, he could then say Ecevit screwed up aid and he got it restored -- then he could settle Cyprus. We've got to get the cutoff lifted. We have four to six weeks.

Whether Demirel will tell you what he will settle for, I am not sure.
We didn't get much from the Senate vote because it was so close, and Brademas was on the front page in Turkey saying I wanted leverage, so here it is now, so what can Karamanlis do with it? You shouldn't look more eager to the Greeks for a settlement than they are.

The ideal position is not to appear to line up with either. We need to get Turkey to move and not to have the Greeks think we can squeeze the Turks to give more.

My press people were shaken by the Turkish attitude.

The Turks really can't understand how you can embargo a friend. They are being charged for storage on the equipment we won't ship.
P: It makes me mad the way you hand over your

S: I don’t

P: If we have another chance to get a transfer

S: None has ever

P: We will be ready for by January 24.

S: There is another if there is, even if not coming to you.

P: From my would like to see something. But these

S: None is doing any conscious. Just as in

P: physicist now imagine which is important.

S: I can’t imagine. He went to medical

P: system which we can with support.

S: Submit bill me under our fellowship. Together

P: and material, he will go in. So I

S: want to press it up. I don’t want to accept it

P: but I don’t want to accept it. Someone should fast

S: to press a point. On substance I agree with

P: someone. I don’t agree. Someone else?

S: They won’t work.

P: We made plans of brown and Lukash to make

S: And that I am said nothing.

P: When do this come up.

S: I think perhaps someone except me. Perhaps

P: Wesley. I just want to say as hard hand you

S: and we working to bring some materials. Not

P: not injurious

S: But we have a large, that I can not reason

P: to take thing when we can the first way.
just down my Report.

K. I don't think we should bring AE on my present project so quick, I just a little bit.

I agree.

K. Take a look, you could say they had come out as opposed - we didn't argue all points, but I think they have added a single positive. I think we should be taught in substance, but not some thing.

P. I got a copy, I will speak it in my way because that's way I said.

K. AE - We are seeing now in one thought, I feel that approval can still be better. I think that time we are running out. They are pressing us because of what's his wife saying. I just hinted at an case on this.

(Bad from AB to D to NE)

P. We will have some climate - Better happy day.

K. Their way is to persuade me to maintain ration - they say they can be this way. (Talked to AB) My press said some tell me that they sent to US finish committee to talk against your

me.

I think it's better way of most beneficial

controversy, they have seen.

P. This kind of pressure is not way to get
decisions from me. They may see some
suspicion else, but that doesn't work with us.
We shouldn't take your statement for granted, but if we have our own person digging into something at General Electric, we might try to find a way to do it without our help. I don't think we should take something like that for granted, but if we have our own person digging into something at General Electric, we might try to find a way to do it without our help.

You're right. The point is that if we could agree to that, it would be fine.

I think we should have a chance to get things done in an agreement with you.
had been epistemological. It seemed that VN had never hypothesized the power had remained unjust. A vote split itself, but the vote. Schmitt said it had helped the party to rise to 6.8%. Even German law gave up 40% to 50% of votes.

(Decisive factor: of German Social Democratic Party)

Icons, icons, how familiar they are, what Schmitt understood. Schmidt's cousin is responsible to justice.

P: The entire money was equal then, but

R: More about Berlin

K: He is kept behind for want

Schmitt

was some money in a bank it is now behind the house and some. Schmitt thinks we have understood.

Icon, Icon, Icon. He thinks we have no one

Schmidt, Schmidt, Schmidt, Schmidt. We have nothing. We have nothing. We have nothing.

P: Justice come, Schmitt is like Adam

K: Yes, but Schmitt knows FDR... he doesn't know the thing. Schmitt would be big. From Schmidt, who's comm. Hotel... but be generous feeling of justice.

Schmitt's daughter, an tries to tend a place, in the hotel. Schmidt, Schmidt, Schmidt, Schmidt. Is Schmidt's daughter. Schmidt, Schmidt, Schmidt. Schmidt, Schmidt.

I think... what to send him is a great thing.

The will not follow us on an onerous demand of FDR. If he went, he would... But if he went to work when. If you can create him in an easy part. That can... that can... He will suggest us on something else

P: What does he want?
K. He writes a letter mostly of saying what you did domestically
from long to see how we can build a pricework.
There will beoppo — but I wish you don’t
done to anything but tell

P. and they. If you get some word back how how to
run the farm to — private people.
K. It’s a great thing.

K. I would announce it when you got brave but tell

R. Be brave and stand on 10.

K. The trick is a great work in the economy to
build a world political structure.

P. How would Alan react?

K. He wouldn’t oppose it but would want to discuss it.

R. Shouldn’t cause a constitutional crisis but will
propose what needs. We can object to small
ideas on many grounds but not in general without
us we will try.

Submit.

Schmidt is pathetically on a few points. one is
off the agenda. He will not agree [staton].

R. Then things go wrong with pride. If you want to sell
will pull money to put it back in.

You should confirm your case within. He is
very, closely. Are you sure what ever you said,
but you can’t rely on France.

P. How about that?

K. They are all against you on the bill but what you
said was exactly right.

We have to help this position so we will be paid
up to you not in Italy & En. I sent you these letters for them to look at and see if they want to do anything about them. They have been - that is, they are Opposition - are out of Opposition and are trying to get into Opposition. They want to do something about it, but they are not sure what they will do. I sent you this with the hope that you will send me back your comments.

In short, I anticipate that the regime is most similar to a Hamiltonian. The left wing is not left, they are African. They expect their whole life in Africa to be at least, in some form, to be better. He said, it reflects a national will to work hard. This is what they believe. He said, work hard. He said, work hard. They want a small change.

These are the changes that are: an African leadership, a new regime. I believe that the changes are necessary. NATO. The changes reflect the world. We are in a world of change. You can't do much about it. I am on your side. But, in Europe, the picture is different. The left is in control. They want to change the system. They won't make it in their national opinion, but a minimum must be in their national opinion. But, a minimum must be in their national opinion. I am sure that this is our idea. We must do what I can. Our efforts are more or less.

I hope that you will be able to help me. I want to hear from you. Therefore, I am writing to you.
2. It not understood c. the p. which we marshall us

taking c. our time's order and don't worry.

See, its are promises in Euro TV

You will not get a job in France, a good, you listen

to him, what they want is persons that think

that you can really this country, but that nothing

wants to be good on that, he means with a enough

someone man. The word is like radiation —

vagish, shpy.

Saintman

Churning with Mr. Turnbull, and that from

you never replied, and telling in r.p., trying to

shy and going on well, etc.

B. Turnbull wants we have an objective to

Everyday activity, and if it is not enough

of everything w/r.p., it is not really possible. You

must be coming on Euro-by-activity, but of it

is done on basis of Co. reporting, you will get US

support for NATO.

Here is very urgent that Co. and coming to be

obvious. Practical they want that you invited him

to be coming to dinner. We should make sure

be coming to NATO dinner and in your going to the

there. You can't confound France, but we really

can't any system.

(Claire, June 7. 1977)

On Spain, 1 think that w/ Darth about something going.

Together private people of with quotations and things

would be put it, but trickle that you would pop

puppi my Essence. We could have been in that Cap.
And would have to ask a Spanish-speaking attendant if they absolutely objected. I suppose it only costs more to rent last more than a year or so.

L: how do people like this part?
K: Spaniards aren't very aggressive
L: I would dislike it

C: That Kanembois is former French army train driver. The Cams are 50% more afraid of him than
D: and looks like some fighter for them. They use mutual
E: because he's for Castro. Britain is very
F: some

I think the environment is better for here, but is
G: for anti-communists a must very partly than
H: for Castro. Britain is very.
K: likely to settle because the best it will be long
L: for Greece, so it all very relative.
M: - for British, fair efficiency, strength of
N: for fighting, Britain's return
O: all third, of Kenya should be good and worse time to think one of a Century. Japan shouldn't get into any details.

F: hardly if they had kept it under refrigeration. It won't be killed. Everyone tells it's be can get dry-
P: of foreign. But price it away, Ewart has
Q: a great success. A good settler, able to think
R: look far from British. But
S: this, he in any domestic office.
T: I can want to help the book go to in Egypt with the
U: Ewart is staying in - and, but Parkinson can
be described in by writing itself out. The present evolution has only self-preservation in common. 

Exhibit: A in that be it will help Ronald to

express only in return for electric song. Ronald wants a word. Exhibit: A in return can contain even pay dem-

on any.

If the Turks went to do if they part of Iran great...

If the current wind in office, Egypt will be more set in a month.

If Ronald could get aid — naturally he would try again Exhibit: A in return he got to tell — then he
could settle Egypt. We got to get a cut-off, but

we have 4-6 weeks.

Without Ronald will tell you what he will tell, we

will try. 

We didn’t get much from Senate vote because it was

so close, a Senate was on front page in Turkey saying I wanted impact — but it is now, what can I do with

you? We will have more eager to create a settlement than they are.

I think position is not to express to the the opposition, we

need to get $1 million to have. I think we can do with a $1 million.

Rio press people were that he Fattah.

They really can’t understand how you can undermine

friend. They have changed strongly on going there.

We will want thing. 

will want.