MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, May 14, 1975
11:45 a.m.

PLACE:
Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECT:
Mayaguez

Kissinger: I think you will have to be clear you want a strong effort. I think you should take out the port. The airfields aren't so significant. You will take as much heat for a big strike as for a small strike.

President: As I recall, I asked Jones to come up with targets, planes, and strike plans.

Kissinger: But I have the sense the McNamara syndrome is so important that they will not be so ferocious. It may be the B-52 strike is too much. The Coral Sea may be better if they do it with vigor. It depends on the pilot's instructions. I think Gayler is disastrous -- McCain wouldn't give us these problems.

A pep talk by you to the Chairman in front of his DOD superiors will help get what we need.

Using B-52's may be paying too much of a price.
President: We won't have carrier strikes unless they can convince me they are meaningful.

Kissinger: Luckily they have taken a Swedish ship.

President: I am disturbed at the lack of carrying out orders. I can give all the orders, but if they don't carry them out.... I was mad yesterday.

Kissinger: This is your first crisis. You should establish a reputation for being too tough to tackle. This is a replay of the EC-121. I see the argument against the B-52's.

President: I think I should say I favor the B-52's unless they can show they can do as much with tacair.

Kissinger: That is a good way to get at the problem. The price will be the same. If you use force it should be ferociously.

We have learned our naval deployments aren't very good.

President: Another thing we have learned is that the Naval forces aren't in as good condition as they should be.

Kissinger: On the world economic scene, I think we shouldn't push so hard on the philosophic "free market" pitch. We should deal pragmatically.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 14, 1975
9:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: The sponsors of my [Kansas City] speech included NAACP, Labor, and so on, so it just wasn't conservatives. They were up in arms over the CIA, and worried over Vietnam.

President: On the Middle East?

Kissinger: There was no great support for Israel. No great opposition either. But it is obvious that Israel is after me. [He discussed the Matti Golan book incident.] They must have known about the manuscript but they never told us. How did the documents leak?

President: As I read the articles, I thought we should demand a copy of the book.

Kissinger: Then we would have to confirm or deny it. We should demand a report of the issue. But not even the Soviets have leaked the substance of our discussions, however much it might have been to their advantage.

There is a total lack of confidentiality and Rabin should be told that. Also that they are proselytizing.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
President: Sid Yates was in. He was reasonable but he is totally pro-Israel. He had obviously been briefed. He ticked off a number of things, including the Clements/Brown trip.

Kissinger: There is no massive support in the Midwest for either Israel or the Arabs.

The Greek and Turk Foreign Ministers are now going to meet.

President: Can we tell Mansfield and Scott?

Kissinger: Yes. Don't promise them too much in results from the negotiations. I would stress the threat to NATO and the danger of radicalizing the Turks.

The Syria-Iraq tension is serious.

I think the Israelis are after me. If they can get me, that will induce, they think, several months of confusion, and then we will be into the elections and they will be free until '77.

President: I told Sid Yates we would probably have to go to Geneva, and we have warned both of them about making military moves.

Kissinger: I think I have to tell Gromyko we are prepared to go to Geneva.

President: He asked about Jordan. I showed him what we have given Israel and I said we have no apologies.

Kissinger: Asad replied to your letter of six weeks ago. I'll send it in with my MemCon. It is very friendly. You flattered them out of their minds by offering to meet him in connection with CSCE. He will send the Foreign Minister here after Rabin's visit. We should hear him the end of June and announce the 1st of July.

I would tell Gromyko we wouldn't have any separate maneuvers before Geneva, but we are not ready to discuss the impact of it before your consultations. Geneva wouldn't be before late July or August.

President: Would that interfere with the Brezhnev summit?

Kissinger: Brezhnev seems in some trouble again. According to Congressman Bennett, he's going into the hospital again.
You can't cooperate with the Soviet Union on the Middle East beforehand or they will preempt us.

On SALT, we have to be careful not to drive the Soviets beyond a certain point. We are better off in coordinating a tough policy by keeping detente.

We would be better off if there was a right wing. Jackson is hurting us badly by going left. I think you are strong now -- once you get off the Eastern seaboard you are in good shape. There were 5,000 people standing in front of the Statehouse. These people want to be proud of their President. They want the Republican convention in Kansas City.

President: That's not a bad idea.

Kissinger: I will have a rocky session with Gromyko because he will want a commitment on the Middle East.

On den Uyl, there is no question of our commitment, but the Alliance needs to think about joint actions, not just words, like how to consult on energy, Middle East, etc. He has domestic problems.

There is one bilateral problem -- KLM. We haven't formally agreed.
I think you will have to be clear you want a strong effect. I think you should take out a part. The appendix isn’t as big; you will take a much lead for a big as a small shot.

As I recall, I asked you to see some of the graphs, plans, et cetera.

But the reason this looks good and bad is so important that it will be feared.

At any rate, B-52s, at least in the North the local Skin will be better if they are used. I think on parts’ motivations, B-52s. I think maybe it is obvious.

The Skin would require three pots.

A pot talk by you to China in front of the big guns will help get what we need.

Using B-52s may be paying too much of a price.

We must have certain states unless they can convince me they are meaningful.

I hardly think I have taken a suicide trip.

I am disturbed at the lack of considering circuits.

I can give all this, but if they don’t enjoy them out I was struck yesterday.

This your first visit, you should static a system for being too tough to tackle. This a reply of EC-101.

I see your argument against B-52s.

I think I should try the B-52s in order they can do as much without facing.

I think a good way to get at a jet. The price will be a come, if you are sure it should be favorably.
Wajacs - Berliner Bräte.

1. We have learned our travel deployments aren't easy.
2. Another thing we learned: that hand fans aren't in as good condition as they should be.
3. One could learn to use, I think we should not push so hard on the philosophical free market pitch and deal pragmatically.
K. The prospect of any quick military intervention in the Middle East, or whatever else it might be called, is not as clear as we might wish. The problems are complex and the stakes are high. How do we ensure that our actions are not seen as precipitant or detrimental to our interests?

P. As far as I understand, we should demand a clear explanation from the parties involved.

K. Then we would have to consider a strong, clear, and consistent position. We should demand a report of all relevant facts, and that all involved parties provide evidence to support their claims. This might help us to determine their advantage.

P. I think that a lack of confidence and sincerity should be noted - this is very crucial in our strategy.

K. There is no question that we must take into account the interests of all involved. As for the tanks...

P. Yes, we must focus on the tanks, but we should also consider the wider implications of our actions.

K. The French are going to meet....
I think I am going to the States. If they can get me there my health will improve. A month of rest and recuperation will be the best thing for me. I shall have a week or two to see the country and then I shall return. I have not heard from you for some time. I hope you are well and that your health is improving. Please write and let me know how you are.

P.S. I am writing to you because I have seen you a few times and you have been kind to me. I hope you will write soon.

K.

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Buy some in samaritaman again. Camp behind, go into town again. You can't cross-over on M.E. - depend on the day.

On 4th, we have to work out - drive some way and at a certain point, we have to make a decision. I think it is a tough policy by keeping silent.
We will be with George if they were at the meeting.
Jackson is meeting us both by fax at 9.
Think you are going now - can you get to the Earth Cup and you are in good shape too.
We need a part of the States, These people want to be proud of their Pete. They want a KRC.

Let's talk later.

I know a good session at Cymacs. Can we
will want a meeting.
On Monday, we meeting帐篷 but Althea
thought that just action not just words.
like how to implement new energy, etc, etc. He has
a debate topic.

One devoted - R HM, We haven't finally
agreed