MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 24, 1975
11:37 a.m. - 12:47 p.m.

PLACE:
The White House
The Oval Office

SUBJECTS:
Middle East; Murphy Commission

Kissinger: I think they [the Israelis] have decided on a confrontation. [He shows the President a ticker item.] I am lunching with Sol Linowitz. Max Fisher said that if we can get Linowitz and Ziffren on our side, it would help him -- also Lew Wasserman.

Vice President: I am having dinner with Percy, Jackson and some liberal Senators.

Kissinger: How should we conduct this meeting?

President: I scanned the paper, but I need to study it over the weekend.

Kissinger: Why don't I brief the paper to you? [He outlines the paper.] We decided in late '73 to try to break up the Arab coalition and put the U.S. in the role of negotiator, to avoid discussion of a final settlement and insulate Israel from European and Japanese pressure by showing some progress. The basis of the strategy is that Israel would buy time by giving some territory. So each step was slightly inequitable to Israel. One of the greatest benefits has been that now even Asad is willing to
have separate peace talks. That may be what collapsed things, because
Israel wasn't ready. You will recall Hussein was willing to accept half
of the Alon plan - which they rejected. This led to Rabat. Suspension
of the Egyptian negotiations now means that the step-by-step approach
is in serious difficulty - to put it mildly.

Basically, we now have three choices: (1) to go for an interim agree-
ment like the one in March; (2) to go for a larger interim agreement,
or (3) to go for an overall settlement, with one or all the countries.
The present situation is deceptively calm because the Arabs and the
Soviet Union think we will pull something out. If the Arabs are convinced
there is no progress, and that our aid to Israel is an obstacle, then we
are in trouble. The Saudis are saying if there is no progress within a
year they would not accept the '67 borders.

Vice President: That's right. But they are willing to accept the
existence of Israel. If there is no progress, they would bring whatever
arms they could to destroy Israel.

Kissinger: The Arabs have a series of steps they can take to increase the
tension - they can call for the removal of the UN force, or threaten an
embargo. This would bring the Europeans to put pressure on us, and
the Soviet Union would get more belligerent. In this climate, if there is
a war, you would have trouble behaving provocatively to prevent Soviet
intervention. I told Muskie that if there is a war we would have to move
the Sixth Fleet close in and put Marines on board. He said there is no
way the Democrats could buy that. I said, "Why don't you tell the Jews
that?" He said he couldn't do it alone. The Jews in Maine would mobil-
ize against him.

The Arabs are coalescing again. You saw that Asad and Sadat formed
a committee.

Sadat needs the passes and the oil and an unbroken line to the oil. Rabin
I think can't do that without you bringing massive pressure - and you
would have to do the same within six months on Syria.

[Scowcroft left to get the maps and returned. Secretary Kissinger
described the only possible line through the passes for an interim
settlement.]

The West Bank and Syrian problems are not solved by any interim agree-
ment in the Sinai, unless they would agree on follow-on moves.
Our choices are two forms of an interim and two forms of an overall agreement. I think if they would give us an interim essentially free, we should take it. If we have to pay, I think it's not worth it.

No Arab is willing to give more than the '67 borders. You shouldn't go this route. Tactically you don't have to announce at the outset, but your decision is the same. Our option is to announce before Geneva that it should be the '67 borders, and set out all that the Arabs have to give.

[He described the pros and cons of announcing before or after Geneva.]

You don't have to decide now. We could talk it over with Sadat. In the context of an overall plan, we could propose interim steps taking seven years or so to get there. This avoids the Israeli argument on an interim that they give up more than the Arabs, because they don't get equivalent security.

President: In the final settlement, isn't there more for Israel than the Arabs?

Kissinger: I have to give you their argument: The final borders are so dangerous that they would rather have the present borders and no peace.

Vice President: Would an overall settlement be jointly guaranteed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: I am in favor of offering American guarantees. Congress is skittish, but put it on them.

Vice President: This is the greatest deal for Israel. They could get into the Arab money. The ordinary Arab will think this is a fair deal.

President: Even some Jews will.

Kissinger: Rostow will part with you on the basis that the borders must be secure.

We could have played the interim deal three more years before we would have to face this.

President: If we laid all this out, no Jew who was fair could say this wasn't a good deal.
Kissinger: Four-fifths of the Jews will oppose you.

President: The non-Jewish community would raise questions about the $2 billion economic guarantee.

Vice President: Wouldn't a Presidential statement include something about American interests? We have a stake in this. Not only the oil embargo, but a capital embargo. If all this money went to the Communist bloc.

Kissinger: If the Arabs stop recycling to the U.S. and go to Europe, or even worse -- if they hold it or give it to the Communists, we are in trouble.

President: I must say I tilt toward a final settlement.

Kissinger: We don't need a decision now. But we must maintain coolness and discipline in the meantime. Our coolness is one of our assets.

President: To start all the torture we went through over the past months....

Kissinger: You will still need interim steps to keep the movement going under an overall settlement.

Vice President: Let me discuss the Murphy Commission. Mansfield came to me to object to Goodpaster sitting in, that the whole exercise is a waste of time.

President: Mike thought it would be loaded. It didn't come out that way and he is better. He wants Andy out?

Vice President: Yes. I said, "How about me out?" But he said it's too late to change that.

President: What shape are the papers in?

Vice President: I am doing the best I can, and the NSC and Captain Howe have done very well, but it is not a good effort and I may have to file a minority report. Even Abshire and Casey are not too helpful. They were both in the State Department under Rogers. They want to separate State and NSC and strengthen State. I told them this is providing the President with a strong State.

President: Talk to Abshire. He is a good friend of mine. Casey I don't know that well. He is not well-organized or effective. Really work on Dave.
I think they were born during a war period (what
Terrorists) and
I believe we should have got bin Laden in
Capture on our side, I could help him....
We should not conduct a meeting.

P Share your views with Tony, in short and
summary point.

How should we conduct the meeting.

I discussed in late 1993, to try to bring a solution.

If US in so as we continue to demand the settlement

I don't feel there is any pressure by knowing you.

The idea of the strategy is I would be like being

triangular. So much story was chipped and pointless.

One of the best strategies I have seen that Angel, will it
be very simple to follow. That may have ignored
things because I can't make it. You will all
Assassin will try to accept an offer to them, which they
accept. This led to United States to reject

I was opposed to him, he's skips. He's a part of it. He's
very able to have schemes.

1. sincerity

2. Space

3. Overall settlement (without all countries)

I present it is clearly will be because Arab is
thinks that will fall somewhere and. Also are

involved in my story and to I am watching as
in trouble. I am doing my job of no job again.
If they would not accept a truce.

VP: That might be, but they won't do a covert operation.

If so, pay, they would be sabotaging their own for a dummy.

1. Arab have a series of steps they can take to narrow a

removal of UN force, Churchill's request. This

would bring Iran to just pressure, and to C.S. would

get belligerent. In this climate of war, the

you would have been working, preventing it

prevent, for intervention. It still that, unless if

a war we would have to move the Fleet earlier in

just February on board. He said no way, they could

say that. I said you don't want to join. He said

wouldn't alone, you in Iran would match up against

The Arabs are nothing again. Just same as the

Sahab, with formal.

Sahab made steps, said I am interested in Kohn.

I think it isn't that I agree bringing massive

pressure, and you would have to the Army of

a month by-

(He kept of your maps)

(Describes the possible determination in

written settlement)

The World is going to be cast by

any written agreement in Syria, until they

would agree on follow on wars.

One, Chairman of India, a form of agreement, a form

of overall agreement.
I think if they would give us an interim, essentially free, we should take it. I would not spend a day, you should take it, I don't think. I think it is not worth it. The next writing again, another 6-7 weeks. We should not go to the court. I think you don't have to announce it yet. If you do announce that, it's a decision is made.

Our option isannonce before June 6th. Total price at 40, we need to agree on an offer.

During the process, we should have our hands on the status. We don't have to decide now. We can talk about that.

In the event of no deal, we would propose arbitration. Taking 7 years to enact that. This avoid I argument an interim that they give you more than 20 days. Can they not get a permanent remedy?

P. I'm afraid settlement isn't there more for this.

And it.

K. Should we put on this agreement. For each deal, we should present that they settle time.

We should not engage before this final agreement. Be 9 5th.

K. Same for all of any. US guarantees, any is better, and put them there.

US. This sounds a little for it. They need it sooner. Actual money.
VP: The advisory area will think this is a fair deal.

P: Even from Japan.

K: Restaur will part of your on basis that inside would be better.

We could have played a mutual deal & some years before we be would have to face this.

P: If we both call this out, we fair Japan will keep this wasn't agreed deal.

K: If Japan will find you.

P: Jpn. Japan truth world would still participating.

2 will even guaranteed.

VP: Understand agreement includes something about interest.

We know to stick in this

I was only 25 decades & the capital someone. If

all this money went in ruin, then boom.

K: A male stop would do it. It's to now, a reason of some had a gain to come, are in trouble.

P: I must say it is 25 year find settlement

K: We don't like Japan's view. But we must

stick together a discipline in settlement. One

VP: To start all together we want then ever a just

K: 

VP: Unnecessary comes to me to adjust to Good partner, getting

in, that our whole opinion is a waste of time.
I didn't think it would be helpful. It didn't matter why it is better. How can we change?

What changes are necessary?

I don't know. I can send NSC a brief summary but it won't spell out everything. From Albright and Colin, it may be helpful. They were both in State during Reagan. They want to separate NSC and Stavridis. I think this is providing a real story.

Talk to Albright. He is a good friend of mine. Can you talk to Tom Stavridis? He is not well organized. Effective really works on staff.

Every thing which cannot be accomplished has been given to the purpose.