MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, April 21, 1975  
Evening

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I said how can anyone vote against it. If it does some good, it will ease human suffering; if not it won't be spent.

It wasn't an unfriendly session, but basically it didn't make any difference what I said. They must know I was right, but......

President: How do you analyze the Thieu speech?

Kissinger: The longest version I saw was reasonable. He said he warned me in '72 that leaving North Vietnamese troops in the South was dangerous. He said we said we would cut off aid if they didn't sign. Both of these are true, but to ask them to withdraw when the North had agreed not to reinforce or add equipment, would have been impossible. I don't think Congress would have stood for continued fighting under these conditions.

President: I will get a question on did we force him out.

Kissinger: Say no.

I would not get into details. I said a new government was not even formed. [Point out it happened in the evening and so nothing has happened since.]
Why give aid? The most humane solution requires as controlled a condition as possible. That requires a government with control and some self-confidence. The change of government already indicates a new situation. We should assist in this.

We are exploring with several parties. I wouldn’t want to say more in this sensitive situation.

We have reduced our numbers without panic. We are at the bare minimum now for essential functions, but we will continue to cut back as functions become superfluous.

We can’t blame the Soviet Union. This is not contradiction. We are talking two different things. The Soviet Union and the Chinese have to know when they introduce arms into dangerous areas they must assume the consequences. They know they would be used for aggressive purposes. But if we had done our part, the parties would have been balanced and the GVN wouldn’t have collapsed.

All our commitments are on the public record. It was always understood.

President Nixon’s correspondence is perfectly normal and reflects his intentions as President. Where they involve national commitments, they must go to the Congress.

The Saudi bilateral: we are working on a long-term agreement on economic relations.

On the Middle East, we said each side would study the options, stay in the dialogue and try to coordinate our positions. We were disappointed with the lack of Israeli flexibility. When the negotiation was suspended, we faced a new situation where from being the mediator we are now only one of several countries, and we change from dealing with only two of them to dealing with all the parties.

The aid issue is not "do we want to pressure Israel?" but "do we want to underwrite a stalemate or force progress to peace?"

North Vietnam has said that Thieu was the obstacle to a negotiation. If so, his departure should help.

DeGaulle turned his back on Algeria and was a hero.
P/K
3/1 Apr (Evening)
2475

I know

Dear mom,

How can anyone vote against it if it does some
good, it will have human suffering, if not
it won't be spent.

I understand some language, but honestly it
didn't make my comp what I did but knew I was
right, but...

P, I never left my study.

K, longest session I can ever remember, said to
undertake in 12 NKS types or South African.
Said we would call up and if we didn't go, both in,
that would be okay/ask when they had agreed not
to supply or sell spruce. I don't think they would have
stood for continued fighting under those conditions.

P, I will get a question which we face brain and

K, say yes.

I would not get into detail. David now got out
from France. (Don't know if happened in every-
the working biweekly...)

Why pain and?

Frank, the most humane solution requires control
solution as possible. Think against a goal of control
in persons self only. The change of goal already includes
a new set. I should assist in this.

We are doing our several parties, I would want
a program in this month.

I've been shopping and I'm going into a

new room now for essential functions, but
we will continue to cut in these functions because
permanently.
On the basis of our understanding, Turkey and Egypt should discuss a new approach to the situation in the Middle East. The aim should be to achieve a comprehensive solution through dialogue and negotiation. It is crucial to avoid any actions that could escalate tensions. A clear statement from the leaders of both countries is necessary to signal their commitment to peace.

As for the situation in Algeria, it is important to ensure that the transition process is peaceful and democratic. The involvement of regional powers should be constructive and aimed at supporting the legitimate institutions. International support is essential to maintain stability and prevent any external interference.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Kissinger: Vietnam will be off our backs in two weeks, and Congress will be on our backs to give aid to Communist Vietnam and we will be resisting.

President: I am glad you feel that way. I see no reason to give money to Waldheim to keep the bleeding hearts off our backs.

Kissinger: The Americans are down to 2,000 now. We will be able to pull the remaining out because it takes two waves to do it. We have done it well. Had you led the charge for evacuation, we would have had chaos.

Schlesinger, after a lecture to me, agreed to send the battalion in if it's for reinforcement not for a signal.

I think we should reassert our aid request to the Congress.

President: I agree. I don't think we will even get the $200 million, though.

[There was a discussion of Portugal -- Scowcroft left the room for a minute.]

Kissinger: If we do something, it would be worse to do something and fail than to do nothing.
The President: Will the April election be a signal?

Kissinger: Maybe. I depend how honestly they count. The Communists control the counting and the media. The problem is not the Portuguese regime itself but its impact elsewhere and for us.

The President: [Reads a cable from Indonesia on impact of Vietnam.]

Maybe we should go there rather than to India.

Kissinger: That's not a bad idea. Although we don't even need the trip to China, unless you do. We can focus on that later.

The President: Will I have some talking points tonight on Indochina?

Kissinger: I talked to Thurmond and quieted him for the moment on Panama. He praised us on Vietnam.

I think on the Middle east, you can say it is not sufficiently flexible. An article in the New York Times says that first we have to restore arms deliveries and U.S.- Israeli relations and then they will consider next steps. That means a blank check.

The President: They can't get a blank check now from the Congress.

Kissinger: Certainly not without you.

[Reads Rabin interview.]

I want to tell Allon they have no right to go to our public.

The President: If they want to take us on with the American public, I am ready. I would read the interview back to Allon. Tell him I have read it.

Are Lew Wasserman's reports of talks with Allon accurate?

Kissinger: Yes. Allon is not too bright. Rabin is a doer, but he is on this wicket and leading the charge. He is trying the same thing he did on Rogers, but the situation is different.

[There was a discussion of Rogers' relations with the President.]
The last Secretary of State who really ran the Department was Acheson. Dulles just ignored it -- which I would have done. But I moved my NSC people over there because I thought State needed revitalization. Rusk was a good Secretary, but he didn't really run the Department.

The President: Rusk has been good since. He hasn’t spoken out at all.

Kissinger: He has been very supportive. He and McNamara are fine men and have been really noble.

The President: I agree. After the election I have some ideas. He would be great at HEW.

Kissinger: He is great. On the World Bank, he will support us even when he disagrees -- like on loans for Chile, even though Britain is violently opposed.

The President: Betty would like to go to Europe with us. Is that okay?

Kissinger: No problem. She would have a difficult schedule and there isn’t planned much socially. But Sadat then would bring Mrs. Sadat. You have to go to NATO first, then Spain, Sadat and a brief stop in Berlin. That also has the advantage of not having Sadat the last event. You can’t go to Berlin first, because of the charge we are provoking NATO. You can go to Berlin, stay in Bonn overnight on the 24, and come back the afternoon of the third. You just can’t be in Spain on Sunday.

The President: I have to be at West Point for commencement on the 4th.

Kissinger: I will come back so we can discuss the trip on the 24th-25th.

Sadat has now given up on essentially an interim agreement. Eilts gave him several options, but he is focussing now on a comprehensive deal.

The President: Have we announced Toon?

Kissinger: I may tell Allon today -- it will show we are serious.

The President: Should we be doing anything on the Turkish thing?

Kissinger: I will have a paper for you in a day or so. There are two moves we can make in the Aegean. We come out under a treaty where Italy gave back Dodecanese and the Aegean Islands under the Treaty of Lausanne. This maybe taken to be anti-Greek. Maybe you could meet in Brussels with Karamanlis and Demirel. They maybe could give up to you.
The French were in on Friday. They saw the PRG Ambassador and had a boiler plate answer back on Saturday.

I asked Dobrynin Saturday for a two-week ceasefire and we would cooperate in the kind of government necessary.

I worried about Martin being Chinese Gordon and causing a panic to prove he had been right. So we have to treat him with care. I am afraid Martin accelerated Thieu's departure.

Scowcroft: His talk with Thieu must have been provocative because of his quick action and blast at you.

Kissinger: Then we heard from Dobrynin yesterday. The battalion was designed to strengthen Moscow's hand with Hanoi. Brown thinks we need only one lift now.

Martin should be told that our judgment is as soon as the airport comes under fire, the DAO personnel at Ton Son Nhut should immediately be taken out by C-130, not by helicopters. But reduce the non-essential personnel as soon as possible. He should not delay a move at Ton Son Nhut until it is irretrievably closed.
K. We will do our best to work, and we will
work on our back to provide a basis for us to work
in unity.

P. I think you feel that way. I see no reason to
give money to 
Bath 

K. (pass out taxes to 

P. I will think about it and come to a decision. I will give 

K. Nine out of ten of the 

P. I agree. I don't think we will even get 200,000 

K. (Discussion of 

P. We do everything, it would be wrong to 

K. Maybe depends how honestly they can. The 

P. (Check with the 

K. (What should we do with the 

P. We will find some 

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY

BY NLF, DATE 5/14/75
Get copy of TF for ALW

K. I talked to Davidson & wanted him for a moment
an evening the previous week

T. I think some guy can do it not easy either
But in NYT story it we had to stress something +
US T & relations + then they will consider out
steps. That means a hard schtick

P. They can't get a home which won't come cheap

K. Certainly not with your

(Read Latin interlude)

P. CCTV & all others. They have no right to jehawa

K. If they want to make us one of a Comunica. forum

I would need a continuance to be there. Full time
I have need to be reasonable.

Are Wassaens's reports of discussion of Allen accurate?

K. Yes. Allen not too long. Robin is a brain but

him on this wicked + lucrative + charge. He keeps
crying that she did on Roger's note a bit is bad

Discussion of Roger's relations w/ some

The last say who really runs a dept was Ackeeur.

Dallas just stopped it - which I would have done but

I would see new people another because I think that

needed intervention. Rush was a good guy but

he turned to didn't really run a dept.

P. Rush had been good since the latest statement at all

K. He has been very suggestive. He + his hommies are

five men + home & been really well.

P. Supper. After election I have some ideas. Would
be great if you
It was brought early for NATO on 24-25.

Answer on 14th,

K He is great. On Wall Bank, he will support

and director of the Security - what is it, 14th?

K I'd be absolutely appalled.

P Betty would like 9 5pm at noon. Is that all?

K I'm just. She would have a different idea with

movement around. But that then would bring

you there to NATO first, then Spain, Spain,

next step in Spain. That she had a different

from having sadistic last week. You can get

Belgium 3rd, come of America and get NATO

(George then, stay in Rome overnight 2 01.4)

come back on afternoon 7 26), just walk in Spain.

P I have to be at AP for announcement on 4th.

K We can - do we get one 14-25.

P Belles has non-join but essentially can intend

a goven. Exit question comprehensively, but

the question ran an comprehensive led

P Has been announced France.

K I'm going to take. What today - it will there are there.

P Shouldn't be doing anything can I think then?

K I will have a paper for you in a day or so. These

are 2 measures we can make in a group. We

must make sure that Betty goes back.

Docu - in Group that around. This is the last guide. 

You could work in Brussels 001.3. Actual arrival

They, maybe could give up to group.
Taking place in accordance with court processes.

We don't want to file in future.

US always had handled big.

Wanted e-mail sent when we knew.

See first Def with some others at bi-annual event.

[No written agreement yet]

[Im in a fix basis]

Just yesterday with [name]

[Handwritten notes:]

7 days ago

Brindavan

Plan to show shopping around Constantine next time.
Leadership Mtg  Cabinet Room

Karnegy/Schissel/Catherine
30/45 minutes

Finish 30 minutes
R. French were in an F-111. They took two.
R & C were in a third B-52, closer to answer.
11th & 12th, we were over him.
I told Day that, if we were X + X could 
more in a kind of fast motion.

I received a signal from Martin saying, "Chris, go with me & I will report.
As we know, tonight, dinner at the
Man, I assume he had been right. So we have to
track him up care. I from Martin a selected them.

A couple of him must have been prosperity.

1. Then we heard from Day's report. The issue was
discussed in a different manner, but.

US. From

W. (a)

Martin an office. He was, an office or agree
as expected to assume his place. I DCO
personal at TSN should receive. We
within out by 1850, that he has.

But there was essential to PP.

Do not make a move at TSN.

What is practically closed.
For integration

I've been working
today but no

response

Get more

2 will be the

ending with next

to go on.