MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12358 Sec. 3.8

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
The President for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 18, 1975
9:12 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: The Vice President really does follow his instructions. He is
exuberant but he doesn't free-wheel.

President: To have him available to do this thing is a tremendous asset.

Kissinger: Scottie Reston said don't mobilize the silent majority against
us in the East. But I think that is just what we should do.

President: I agree. I think the mood is changing.

Kissinger: Nancy went to a tea. She said the ladies who were from outside
the Eastern Seaboard were very supportive and liked your speech.

We hold the Soviets responsible for what they did and they can't feed arms
into areas where they will create trouble. On the other hand, we have a
heavy responsibility for reducing the ability of our side to cope with the sit­-
tuation.

Iran is now supplying spares to the Turkish Air Force.

The Indians are getting troublesome. There is an election next year and she
may be running on an anti-American platform. She is talking about a feverish
Pakistani arms build-up and a vague threat of invasion from the sea.
By that she apparently means Diego Garcia.

President: I wonder about going to India.

Kissinger: I agree -- and even to China. Unless they give a very clear signal it would be successful.

On NATO, we will have a paper next week. I think we should limit the social functions. There will be many large affairs.

President: I would rather stay out of that.

Kissinger: The French are being obnoxious. We do need to have something significant to come out of it, or it may be counterproductive.

I will tell Kosciusko-Morizet you wouldn't believe Giscard wouldn't come. They're mad because of the failure of his consumer-producer conference.

In Cambodia, the despair continues. Long Boret, Matak, and Lon Nol have been captured.

President: What about Sihanouk?

Kissinger: He is still in Peking. You will announce Dean Brown today?

President: What about China and the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: I think we should send them a message. Say they have responsibility for what they put in. We have responsibility because if we had held our end up, what they sent wouldn't have mattered.

I think we should go to them and say we are interested in getting our people and some Vietnamese out and we are prepared to discuss the situation.

President: How about Thieu?

Kissinger: I think we should keep Thieu there until we get a response from the Chinese and the Soviets. Thieu will go in any event, but it may be followed by chaos.

We could approach the Chinese and Russians tomorrow and then see about Thieu. We could have a three to four week holdout, but the fear in South Vietnam could mean three to four days.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Friday - April 18, 1975
9:12 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: I thought we should have a meeting this afternoon to decide what to do on a vote.

Kissinger: I am testifying tomorrow before Doc Morgan's Committee.

President: One of the weakest members is Peter DuPont. He should be good.

Kissinger: Broomfield is good.

President: But he is not a leader. There is no leader on that Committee. Phil Burton wants to see me about evacuation.

Kissinger: I would be careful. Those bastards want to hang you. They are just waiting to pin it on you.

President: That is what he wants to tell us, I am sure. That we get out.

Kissinger: Graham Martin is a noble American. He is trying to hold things together and get people out.
They are sticking me with the figure of 1,250. I meant official ones; that thought it meant total.

All the Pentagon wants is to evacuate. It is a tough problem. Whatever you do there will be some Americans left. We are planning a WSAG. It might be better to have your meeting after the WSAG.

President: [Changes meeting time.]

Kissinger: Javits called last night. He says we are not moving out fast enough. He asked what we objected to in the bill. I said the amount and the conditions. He asked if we would compromise. I said I would talk to you. I don't see what we gain by compromise.

President: I think we should say we made an honest evaluation of the needs and we have the figures to back it up. They are an equal branch and can exercise their judgment. It has worried me that we can show progress every day on evacuation.

Kissinger: I send Martin a cable a day.

I wonder if we should call Dean Brown back to coordinate the refugees. It would be good public relations. He gets things done.

President: Go ahead. Let's get an announcement out.

Kissinger: I will need to get Dean Brown first.

I am afraid that Egypt thinks we will still pull off the interim agreement. I sent Fahmy a report of my talk with Dobrynin -- he sent back word that Egypt's policy is to depend on Kissinger.

Tensions are building between Syria and Iraq -- the result of the Kurdish settlement.

President: What is the issue now?

Kissinger: The Iraqis think the whole Euphrates really should belong to it. If it wasn't for Israel, the Arabs would be at each other's throats. We can't move Iraq away from the Soviet Union until we restore a little authority in foreign policy.
The NATO summit is pretty well set. I suggest going to Spain late afternoon on the 30th. Plan on Sadat June 1st. You may want them to see Rabin in May. Whatever we do, you should go through the process of talking to both.

I had planned to meet Gromyko on the 21st, go to CENTO on the 22-23, and the OECD in Paris. I could cut my attendance at OECD so we could have some time together.

President: I think it would be better if we went together.
Kissinger: I will make sure to be here at least two days.

President: What is the specific agenda?
Kissinger: I will give you something next week. There will be a general meeting and specific meetings. I think you should give a strong speech of leadership.

President: Giscard won't go?
Kissinger: It is a disgrace. To think he can meet with the Communists but not the Allies. I can point out to the Ambassador that you would not take it lightly.

President: I personally resent it.
Kissinger: It is not limited against you. He did the same thing last year.

President: Would you start speech preparations.
Kissinger: Yes, I will get a communiqué started.

Dean Rusk will be in town next Monday.

President: Let me check. He is a fine American.
Kissinger: Lew Wasserman is coming to dinner on Saturday.

President: I will see him on Saturday.
Kissinger: I think we can get him to put a group together to build some backfire. He will never support you but he could calm down the Democrats. He is the chief fund raiser.

President: He probably supports Jackson.

Kissinger: He is backing off because he thinks Jackson screwed up the Trade Bill.

President: I had a reception for ASNE. They were friendly.
The UP really does follow his instructions; he is inhabitants but he doesn't face what
I'll have him available to do this thing in hundreds
next.
Scott and Clark had the silent majority against
me in the East. But I think that is [partly]
we should.
I agree. I think a man is changing.
You went to the East. And I think East
are my opinions. I heard from you.
We told them something about what they did.
they can't find some of those Americans.
will be very trouble. On other hand we have
a knowing very particular ability from
side to copy up c bit.

From so the way to Japan to Turkey NK.
The armies are getting trouble. Further west
were the map must on anti-UK position.
I'm talking about French. Both axes would up
more-thank foreignism from the Crimea.

I see. Now going to India.
I agree. And down to Peking. Unless they give
no illegal subject it would be successful.
In NKPO, we will have a paper next week. It
that we that limit a social function. There
will be many large affairs.
It will matter they and that.
In our line of action, we also need to have it
appears [partly] something may be come out of it.
OK at maybe counterproductive.
Saw Met N. We couldn’t believe how well they came. They went because of the party.
In Cambodia, we expect continued help from
Vietnam, have been captured.

P: What about-ish?
K: I will be taking

P: PAC +50?

K: I think we should send our forces may be
They have very limited time, we have:
They because if we had done some today,
but they just wouldn’t matter.
I think we should get them +50 if we should do
Getting even faster to save Lives out of and today

K: How are things?

K: I think we should keep them there. To me yes a
response from PAC +50. Their will be any more, but it may be followed by chaos.
We could approach PAC +50 tomorrow. They can’t
off them. We could have 3-4 weeks without it
It was in 500 could last 3-4 days.

K: How is war coming?
Declared by

DECLAIRMED
E.O. 12665, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/20/89, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY [Redacted], NARA, DATE 11/20/89
I would maintain a tight line.

Remember if we should call them from back to front.

A press release. It would be good public relations.

We get their advice.

P: Good idea. Let's get an announcement out.
K: I would need to get from Rome by 1st.

I think we will still pull off. I think we can.

I don't know if my talk is on Aug. 1st. I want

bundled with that. I am off to adjust it.

The war is not settled yet. Syria, Iran, North Korea,

settlement.

P: What is Russia.

K: I mean. The role of the European really should belong to it.

If it wasn't France, it would be a stronger threat.

We won't move away from the U.N. until we notice

a little activity in Iraq.

NATO summit is pretty well set. I suggest going
to Spain late afternoon or so. Plan on Salute
June 1st. You may want to see Khadim in

Iraq. Whatever else you should go then press.

I had planned to meet Gorbachev, GEC, ECO in Paris. I would cut my attendance at

ECO so we would have some time together.

P: I think better if we want together.

K: I will make sure to be here at least 1 day.

P: What specific agenda.

K: I can see you sit something next week. There will

be plenty of specific issues. I think you—
should give a strong speech of leadership.

K: It is disagreeable to think on such matters, but it is a business. I am not afraid to think that you would not take it lightly.

P: I personally don’t think it.

K: It must not depend upon you. I think it best.

P: Would you think much upon it?

K: Yes, I will get a certain pledge.

[Underlined]

(Will see Bulldog)

K: Can you lend me some money?

P: I have heard, I have heard.

K: The money is coming from Mr. Shy.

P: I will see him soon.

K: I think we can get him to put a good opinion of you and some inside. He will make support you but he will not clam down a demand. He’s a chief person.

P: He gets much support.

K: He is busy off here to think Jackson couldn’t get the bill.

P: I hold everything against them, but they were fairly.