

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

OR 01-56, # 29, dt. ltr 9/19/01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

By dal NARA, Date 10/11/01

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
 The President for National Security Affairs.

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 18, 1975
 9:12 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: The Vice President really does follow his instructions. He is exuberant but he doesn't free-wheel.

President: To have him available to do this thing is a tremendous asset.

Kissinger: Scottie Reston said don't mobilize the silent majority against us in the East. But I think that is just what we should do.

President: I agree. I think the mood is changing.

Kissinger: Nancy went to a tea. She said the ladies who were from outside the Eastern Seaboard were very supportive and liked your speech.


We hold the Soviets responsible for what they did and they can't feed arms into areas where they will create trouble. On the other hand, we have a heavy responsibility for reducing the ability of our side to cope with the situation.

Iran is now supplying spares to the Turkish Air Force.

The Indians are getting troublesome. There is an election next year and she may be running on an anti-American platform. She is talking about a feverish Pakistani arms build-up and a vague threat of invasion from the sea.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry. A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) 1 (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

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By that she apparently means Diego Garcia.

President: I wonder about going to India.

Kissinger: I agree -- and even to China. Unless they give a very clear signal it would be successful.

On NATO, we will have a paper next week. I think we should limit the social functions. There will be many large affairs.

President: I would rather stay out of that.

Kissinger: The French are being obnoxious. We do need to have something significant to come out of it, or it may be counterproductive.

I will tell Kosciusko-Morizet you couldn't believe Giscard wouldn't come. They're mad because of the failure of his consumer-producer conference.

In Cambodia, the despair continues. Long Boret, Matak, and Lon Nol have been captured.

President: What about Sihanaouk?

Kissinger: He is still in Peking. You will announce Dean Brown today?

President: What about China and the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: I think we should send them a message. Say they have responsibility for what they put in. We have responsibility because if we had held our end up, what they sent wouldn't have mattered.

I think we should go to them and say we are interested in getting our people and some Vietnamese out and we are prepared to discuss the situation.

President: How about Thieu?

Kissinger: I think we should keep Thieu there until we get a response from the Chinese and the Soviets. Thieu will go in any event, but it may be followed by chaos.

We could approach the Chinese and Russians tomorrow and then see about Thieu. We could have a three to four week holdout, but the fear in South Vietnam could mean three to four days.



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 Assistant to the President for National
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DATE & TIME: Friday - April 18, 1975
 9:12 - 10:15 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: I thought we should have a meeting this afternoon to decide what to do on a vote.

Kissinger: I am testifying tomorrow before Doc Morgan's Committee.

President: One of the weakest members is Peter DuPont. He should be good.

Kissinger: Broomfield is good.

President: But he is not a leader. There is no leader on that Committee. Phil Burton wants to see me about evacuation.

Kissinger: I would be careful. Those bastards want to hang you. They are just waiting to pin it on you.

President: That is what he wants to tell us, I am sure. That we get out.

Kissinger: Graham Martin is a noble American. He is trying to hold things together and get people out.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

They are sticking me with the figure of 1,250. I meant official ones; that thought it meant total.

All the Pentagon wants is to evacuate. It is a tough problem. Whatever you do there will be some Americans left. We are planning a WSAG. It might be better to have your meeting after the WSAG.

President: [Changes meeting time.]

Kissinger: Javits called last night. He says we are not moving out fast enough. He asked what we objected to in the bill. I said the amount and the conditions. He asked if we would compromise. I said I would talk to you. I don't see what we gain by compromise.

President: I think we should say we made an honest evaluation of the needs and we have the figures to back it up. They are an equal branch and can exercise their judgment. It has worried me that we can show progress every day on evacuation.

Kissinger: I send Martin a cable a day.

I wonder if we should call Dean Brown back to coordinate the refugees. It would be good public relations. He gets things done.

President: Go ahead. Let's get an announcement out.

Kissinger: I will need to get Dean Brown first.

I am afraid that Egypt thinks we will still pull off the interim agreement. I sent Fahmy a report of my talk with Dobrynin -- he sent back word that Egypt's policy is to depend on Kissinger.

Tensions are building between Syria and Iraq -- the result of the Kurdish settlement.

President: What is the issue now?

Kissinger: The Iraqis think the whole Euphrates really should belong to it. If it wasn't for Israel, the Arabs would be at each others throats. We can't move Iraq away from the Soviet Union until we restore a little authority in foreign policy.



The NATO summit is pretty well set. I suggest going to Spain late afternoon on the 30th. Plan on Sadat June 1st. You may want them to see Rabin in May. Whatever we do, you should go through the process of talking to both.

I had planned to meet Gromyko on the 21st, go to CENTO on the 22-23, and the OECD in Paris. I could cut my attendance at OECD so we could have some time together.

President: I think it would be better if we went together.

Kissinger: I will make sure to be here at least two days.

President: What is the specific agenda?

Kissinger: I will give you something next week. There will be a general meeting and specific meetings. I think you should give a strong speech of leadership.

President: Giscard won't go?

Kissinger: It is a disgrace. To think he can meet with the Communists but not the Allies. I can point out to the Ambassador that you would not take it lightly.

President: I personally resent it.

Kissinger: It is not limited against you. He did the same thing last year.

President: Would you start speech preparations.


Kissinger: Yes. I will get a communique started.

Dean Rusk will be in town next Monday.

President: Let me check. He is a fine American.

Kissinger: Lew Wasserman is coming to dinner on Saturday.

President: I will see him on Saturday.



Kissinger: I think we can get him to put a group together to build some backfire. He will never support you but he could calm down the Democrats. He is the chief fund raiser.

President: He probably supports Jackson.

Kissinger: He is backing off because he thinks Jackson screwed up the Trade Bill.

President: I had a reception for ASNE. They were friendly.



PK ?
18 Apr 75

9¹² - 10¹⁵

K The UP really does follow his instructions. He is
dependent but he doesn't free wheel

P To have him available to do this thing is tremendous
asset.

K Scott's said don't mobilize a silent majority against
us in East. But I think that is just what
we should do.

V I agree. I think a moral is changing.

K Nancy went to a tea - said a lack of control - East
are very suspicious + liked your speech.

* *

We hold them very far what they did +
they can't feed arms into areas where they
will create trouble. On other ^{hand} ~~hand~~ work here
+ heavy use for reducing a obliquity of arm
side to cope w/ a sit.

Iran is now supplying spares to Turkey AF.

The factions are getting troublesome. Election next
year + she may be running on anti-Oil platform.
She talking about frontier Pak areas build up +
way to threat from invasion from sea (Dingo)


P I consider about going to India

K I agree - and even to PKC. Unless they give
a very clear signal it would be successful.

Q in NATO, we will have a paper next week. I
think we should limit a social function. There
will be many large affairs.

P I would rather stay out of that.

K For our long duration. We do need to have it
appear as if something is going to come out of it



ok it may be counterproductive.

I will tell K-M you couldn't believe we would
wouldn't come. They would because of e-p fastness.
In Cambodia, a despatch container. Long Boat,
United, has been captured.

P What about Sihanouk?

K He still in Peking
you will announce Sihanouk today?

P PRC + SU?

* K I think we should send some message. Say
they have say for what they put in, we have
say because if we had hold our side eye,
what they put wouldn't matter.

* I think we should go to them + say we interested in
getting our people + some Chinese out + we ^{paying} ^{for}
discuss - set.

P How about Thieu?

K I think we should keep Thieu there till we get a
response from PRC + SU. Thieu will go in any event,
but it may be followed by chaos.
We could approach PRC + SU tomorrow + then see
about Thieu. We could have a 3-4 week hold out, but
a few in SVN could mean 3-4 days.

P How is war coming?

~~~~~





A meeting outline of special to meet at 11:30 -  
mtg at 4:30 w/Pos

J P/R 18 Apr 75

Pres - Vice Pres.  
9:12 - 10:15 AM  
Friday

R I think we should have a mtg this afternoon & discuss  
what to do on a note

K I testified tomorrow before the Morgan Court.

P One of the contact numbers is Peter DuPont. He should be good

K Branfield good

P But he not a leader. There is no talk on that Court  
Phil Branton want to see me about case.

K I would be careful. These contacts want to hang you  
They just waiting & fire it on you

P That's what he want to tell me, I sense. Trust we get out.

K Graham is a noble Am. He trying to hold things together  
& get people out.

They are sticking me w/c figure 1250, I want  
official Amos, they that it amount total.

All c Pentagon want us to war. It is a tough part.  
Whatever you do there will be some Amos left.

We planning a WSAE. Might be better to have your  
mtg after a WSAE.

P (Changes mtg time)

K Joe's called last night. Says we not moving out  
just now. Asked what we objected to in a bill. I said  
c court c conditions. He asked if we would compromise  
I said I would talk to you. I don't think we gain  
by compromise.

P I think we should say we make an honest deal.  
we have c figures to back it up. They are used  
branch & can exercise their judgment. It does  
worry me that we can show progress way down  
line.



I send Martin a cable a day.

I wonder if we should call Dean Brown back to coordinate refugees. It would be good public relations. He gets things done.

P Go ahead, lets get an announcement out.

K I will need to get Dean Brown 1st.

I fear E thinks we will still pull off interim agreement. I sent Fahim a report of my talk w/Dog - he said he would think E policy is to depend on K. The Syrians are building bet Syria + Iraq - world of Kamil settlement.

P What is the issue

K Dog thinks whole E refugee policy should belong to it. If it wasn't for E, the Arabs would be at a nations throat. We can't move Iraq away from the SU until we notice a little activity in FP.

NATO summit is pretty well set. I am going to Spain late afternoon on 30th. Plan on Sat June 1st. You may want them to see Kabin in Army. Whatever we do you should go thru process of talking to her.

I had planned to meet Gougeon on 21, @ ENTO 22-23, OECD in Paris. I could cut my attendance at OECD so we could have some time together.

P I think better if we went together.

K I will make sure to be here at least 2 days.

P What specific agenda.

K I give you something next week. There will be general entry - specific entry. I think you



should give a strong speech of leadership

P Asgard want to?

K It a disgrace. To think he can meet w/ Cristo but not callis. I can point out to Bob that you would not take it lightly.

P I personally resent it.

K It not limited against you. Did some thing last year.

P Would you start speech preparation.

K Yes. I will get a campaign started  
(I left a minute)

(Will see Golding)

K Or on back in town next Monday.

P Let me check. He is a fine Am.

K Wasserman is coming to dinner Sat.

P I will see him Sat.

K I think we can get him to put a group together to build some backfire. He will never support you but he could calm down a demo. He a chief frank

P He prob supports Jackson.

K He backing off cause he thinks Jackson screwed up trade bill.

P I had reception for ASME, they were friendly.

