

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, April 15, 1975
9:23 - 10:04 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: I talked to Scali. It was painful, but he said "I serve at your pleasure."

Kissinger: We could give him Australia. Brad Morse wants to replace Peterson at UNDP. If we put Buffum into the Morse job, it would really be an advantage.

At ASNE, I think what you said yesterday would be good. No one wants to hear it here, but it is right; the world wants to hear it and it is good politics. These guys who are getting us out of Vietnam aren't going to rest -- they won't rest until they have dismantled us. The only thing I would add is something on the Middle East. I will prepare a paper for you of all the Middle East options so you can study it. You can't discuss them in the NSC, but with Nelson [Rockefeller] and Don [Rumsfeld] -- not Schlesinger.

President: We could do it when Nelson returns.

Kissinger: Or when I get back from Los Angeles.

I think you should totally oppose the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp To Det.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

By WJ NARA, Date 5/29/96
MR 94-4 #1; NSL 688 9/20/96

President: No question we won't endorse it. We can reiterate our previous request and say anything less is more harmful, or just let the Congress work its will. It will be even more circumscribed on the floor.

Kissinger: My experience on Vietnam is when we compromised we usually lost. We usually held tough until the last minute. The record shouldn't show we collaborated.

President: I think what we asked for makes sense. I don't think they will pass anything, so we ought to do what is right.

Kissinger: If they pass it and it doesn't collapse, you will have the same problem with the '76 appropriation. There is no longer any chance for Vietnam in the Congress.

President: I agree. It won't do any good. It would signal the worst aspect of it. We will signal we want what we ask for and let it go at that.

Kissinger: On my ASNE speech, I am summing up on Vietnam and your speech.

President: I looked at the tape of my speech. I think it was pretty good.

Kissinger: It was great. And the people will get behind you. It is what they want to hear.

[Similarity with Europe in the 30's.]

Reston says you should go to the Soviet Union and China. They can't get us anything more than marginally better than without, and why be indebted to the Soviet Union for so little?

President: What is the scenario if we don't get it? We have got to be realistic. We won't get the money. What will it do?

Kissinger: A collapse within two months. Maybe within days.

Can we issue an order to shut up about a move?



President: Absolutely.

Kissinger: CIA and DOD are leaking that it is being help up.

President: I will say something in the Cabinet meeting.

Kissinger: I talked to Mike and asked him to talk to you if he decides we don't have the vote. Then we can talk turkey to Thieu.

If we had the \$722 million, we could have gotten a negotiation. We have no chips left. If I could tell Le Duc Tho we would reenter if they didn't calm down, he might stare us down, but I think he would cave.

If they turn us down, my instinct is to do it honestly, send Martin in and say we would like to save as many South Vietnamese as possible.

President: What will Thieu's reaction be?

Kissinger: Unpredictable. People may start killing Americans to ingratiate themselves with the Communists. Whole divisions may switch.

One other thing on my speech. I sum up your approach, say we can't avoid a setback by denying its existence. Then I say we have a strong design of foreign policy -- but I can't do it without going back to the Nixon years. I don't want to go back without your knowing about it.

President: I was a strong supporter of the foreign policy. Let me look at it, but that is factual.

Kissinger: Then I say we have to pull ourselves together. But I want to be very careful about it.

The preparatory conference of consumers and producers blew up.

President: The news stories weren't bad. It looked like we were right and stood up to them.

Kissinger: I am instructing the Embassies to take firm positions on two things: I have to slap Callaghan on the wrist for Vietnam -- he was a little too snide.



On the Middle East, I will have that memo by the weekend.

President: Can you call Scali? Why don't you offer him Australia?

Kissinger: Italy is out of the question.



Handwritten initials

Cuts lot of harassment don't want you to know & pull for you - you doing a tremendous job.

Sunday 9:23-10:04 AM

JPK 15 Apr 75

P I talked to Scott. It was painful, but he said I ~~have~~ at your pleasure

K We could give him Australian. More wants to replace Peterson at UNDP. You put Buffum into more job it would really be an advantage

At ASNE, I think what you said yesterday would be good. We would want to hear it here, but it is right, & would want to hear it & it is good politics.

These guys who are getting us out of UN aren't going to rest - they won't rest until they have dismantled us.

Only thing I would add is something on NE. I will prepare a paper for you of all the NE options so you can study it. You can't discuss in NSC, but Wilkes, Doss - not Schley.

P We could do it when Wilkes returns.

K Or when I get back from RA


I think you should totally oppose - SFR

P No question we won't embrace it. We can reiterate our previous report ~~or~~ say anything less is more harmful, as just hit a long work item will. It will be even more unworkable on a floor.

K My experience on VIK is when we compromise we inevitably lose. We've essentially held things till last minute. Record shouldn't show we collaborated

I think what we asked for is ~~unrealistic~~ I don't think they will pass anything, so we ought to do what is right.

If they pass it & it doesn't collapse, you will have a name put w/c 26 approp. There is no longer



Were articles & quotes of E in in 30's about Churchill +
Roosevelt

any chance for ON in - Cong.

P I agree. It won't do any good. It would signal a
worst case of it. We will signal we want what
we ask for & let it go at that.

K O in my ASNE, I am summarizing your
VNs & your speeches

P I included a tape of your speech. I think it pretty
good.

K It's great. And the people will get behind you. It
is what they want to hear.

(Similarity in w/ E in 30's)

Reston says you should get to SU + PRK. They can't
get us anything more than marginally better than
w/o, & why be indebted to SU for so little?

P What is a scenario if we don't get it? We just to
be realistic - we won't get a money. What will
it do?

K Collapse w/in 2 mos. Maybe w/in days.

Can we issue an order to shut up about war?

P Absolutely.

K CIA & DoD are looking at it is being held up

P I would say something in a cabinet mtg.

K I talked to Wick & asked him to talk to you if he
decides about our don't have votes. Then we can talk

Tuesday to Thur

If we had c. 722 we could have gotten a request.

We have no chips left. If I could tell T who we would
reenter if they didn't come down, - he might stare
no down, but I think he would come.



If they turn us down, my instinct is to do it honestly,
send Martin in & say we would like to see as
many SCL as possible

P What is your reaction?

K Unpredictable. People may start hitting lines to
investigate w/c limits. Whole discussion may switch.
One other thing on my speech. I know by your approach,
they can't avoid a setback by denying its
existence. I mean I say we have a strong design of
FP - but I can't do it w/o going back to wipe eyes. I
don't want to go back w/o you knowing about.

P I have a strong suggestion of a FP. Let me look at
it, but that is factual.

K Then I say we have to pull out ourselves together. But
I want to be very careful about it.

The prep. may blow up.

P The news stories weren't bad. looked like we were
right & stood up to them.

K I instructing E. messengers to take from partners on 2 things.
I have to stay Callaghan as on wrist for CIA - he
was little too naive

On ME, I will have that name by weekend

P Can you call Scott? Why don't you offer him
Australia?

K Study is out of question



Scowcroft file

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
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Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, April 15, 1975
9:23 - 10:04 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: Buffum said Scali was a disgrace at the UN.

President: I hope he [Moynihan] is as obnoxious up there as he has propensity to be.

Kissinger: He will give us fits, but he will do well.

[Marsh and Friedersdorf come in. Kissinger and Schlesinger will meet Wednesday a.m. with the Committee leaders].

I am changing my speech from one summarizing your speech to one agreeing with it. I will get you a copy later.

We had a message from Demirel saying he wanted to be pro-American but there are limits. I think he will blow in about three weeks. Maybe that is a good thing.

President: I see Karamanlis blasted me for the speech.

Kissinger: Karamanlis has been okay privately but he has to say is not an American stooge.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By ut NARA, Date 11/25/00

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

The Shah was also upset we didn't mention him as a friend. We better send him a cable.

President: Can I mention it in one of my speeches?

Kissinger: Yes. That would be good to reiterate inflexibility. Dobrynin said the Politburo was very upset by your speech. He said it wasn't their fault that we cut back on our aid. It was hard for them to judge. In fact, it was our cutback which demoralized the South.

The Soviet Union is a little goosey now. I said I wouldn't go to Moscow now. I would meet in Europe with Gromyko and in Moscow six weeks before the summit -- but we didn't need a summit this year. He said they wanted a summit and would propose a date soon.

He is afraid of Geneva and the return to the step-by-step. He said if we could accept the '67 borders they would go along with everything else. I said we couldn't make a joint proposal but maybe we could do it like Berlin. If you could indicate which way you are tending....

President: I am tending toward a comprehensive if you think that is right.

Kissinger: I think we can't keep going now -- the price is too high.

Scowcroft: I agree. We couldn't pay the price after Sinai.

Kissinger: You will have a huge uproar if you say the '67 borders.

President: Let me think about it for 24 hours.

Kissinger: Now I think we could get good terms for it. You or another President will be driven to it.

If we are going that way, I need to know because if not, I need to start stonewalling the Soviet Union.

President: What have we heard from Graham Martin?

Kissinger: If he doesn't react, we may have to send Dean Brown.

President: They will hit you on evacuation.



Kissinger: On the consumer-producer conference, the French chairman has been a disgrace. The producers and LDC's are trying to turn it into a raw materials conference. I have instructed our delegation to be tough.

President: Damn right. You can tell them to come home.

Kissinger: It will break up if we don't cave. I have said we could not agree to discuss raw materials in addition to energy. Also the IEA should attend as an observer, to reward those who stuck with us. OPEC could do the same. Giscard may call you on it.

I am having lunch with Mansfield. He is hopeless on Vietnam. I thought I would focus on the Middle East.

President: What about a consolidated aid amount, if the total is adequate?

Kissinger: If it is adequate -- maybe \$750 million -- I would accept.

Scowcroft: If you have adequate flexibility.



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Kissinger: Buffum said Scali was a disgrace at the UN.

The President: I hope he is as obnoxious up there as he has the propensity to be.

Kissinger: He will give us fits, but he will do well.

[Marsh and Max came in. It was agreed that Kissinger and Schlesinger will meet Wednesday morning with the Committee Leaders.]

I am changing my speech from summarizing your speech to agreeing with it. I will get you a copy later.

We had a message from Demirel saying he wanted to be pro-American but there are limits. I think he will blow in about three weeks. Maybe that is a good thing.

The President: I see Karamanlis blasted me for the speech.

Kissinger: Karamanlis has been okay privately but he has to say he is not an American stooge.

The Shah was also upset that we didn't mention him as a friend. We better send him a cable.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidel:
By lt, NARA, Date 1/25/00



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The President: Can I mention it in one of my speeches?

Kissinger: Yes. That would be good to reiterate inflexibility.

Dobrynin said the Politburo was very upset by your [foreign policy] speech. He said it wasn't their fault we cut back on our aid. It was hard for them to judge. In fact, it was our cutback which demoralized the South.

The Soviet Union is a little goosey now. I said I wouldn't go to Moscow now. I told him I would meet in Europe with Gromyko and be in Moscow six weeks before the summit -- but we didn't need a summit this year. He said they wanted a summit and would propose a date soon.

He is afraid of Geneva and a return to the step-by-step. He said if we could accept the '67 borders, they would go along with everything else. I said we couldn't make a joint proposal but maybe could do it like Berlin. If you could indicate which way you are tending. . .

The President: I am tending toward a comprehensive proposal if you think that is right.

Kissinger: I think we can't keep going now -- the price is too high.

Scowcroft: I agree. We couldn't pay the price after Sinai.

Kissinger: You will have a huge uproar if you say the '67 borders.

The President: Let me think of it for 24 hours.

Kissinger: Now I think we could get good terms for it. You, or another President, will be driven to it.

If we are going that way, I need to know, because if not, I need to start stonewalling the Soviet Union.

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Kissinger: If he doesn't react, we may have to send Dean Brown.

The President: They will hit you on evacuation.



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The President: Damn right. You cantell them to come home.

Kissinger: It will break up if we don't cave. I have said we could not agree to a raw materials conference, but could agree to discuss raw materials in addition to energy. Also the IEA should attend as observer, to reward those who stuck with us. OPEC could do the same. Giscard may call you on it. I am having lunch with Mansfield. He is hopeless on Vietnam. I thought I would focus on the Middle East.

The President: What about a consolidated aid amount for Vietnam, if the total is adequate?

Kissinger: If it's adequate -- maybe \$750 million -- I would accept.

Scowcroft: If you have adequate flexibility.



P/K 15 Apr 75

Tuesday

K Buffum said Scali was a chgoian at a UN.
P I hope he is as dangin up there as he has personally to be.

K Newill give us fits, but he will do well.
Dan March & Max came in. K + Schlo wild meet Wed a.m. w/ Ernie Leachs)

I am changing my speech from summarizing your speech to agreeing w/ it, I will get you a copy later.
We had msg from Daniel saying wanted to do for US but there are limits. I think he will show in about 3 wks. Maybe that a good thing.

P I see Kanan blasted me for speech

K Kanan has blasted privately but he has to say he not a US stooge.

Shah was also upset we didn't mention him as a friend. We better send him a cable

P Can I mention it in one of my speeches.

K Yes. That would be good to reiterate inflexibility
Dobryn said Polithno was very upset by your speech. He said it wasn't their fault we went back on our word. It was hard for them to judge. In fact, it was our cut back which demoralized Smith.

SO is a little gassy now, I said I wouldn't go to Moscow now. Would meet in Feb w/ George + Arson 6 wks before summit - but didn't want summit this year. He said they would summit & would propose date soon

He opened of Geneva & return to step by step.



He said if we could accept 67 borders they would
go along w/ everything else. I said we couldn't make
a joint proposal but maybe could do it like Berlin.
If you could indicate which way you're trending...
P I'm trying to avoid compromise if you think that is
right.

K I think we can't keep going now - the price is too
high.

S I agree. We couldn't pay a price after Sinai.

K You will have a huge uproar if you say 67 borders.

P Let me think of it for 24 hrs.

K Now I think we could get good terms for it, you'd
another P's will be shown to it.

If we're going that way, I need to know because if
not I need to start storming - S U.

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P They will hit you on evac.

K On the e-p prep conf., a FA chairman has been a dog in
The producers & OPEC's are trying to turn it into a
raw materials conf. I have instructed our delegation
to be tough.

P Damn right. You can tell them to come home.

K It will back up if we don't care. I have said we
could not agree to raw materials conf - could agree to
discuss raw materials in addition to energy. Also
IEA should attend as observer to record those who
stick w/ us. OPEC could do same. Giscard
may call you on it.



R I having lunch w/ Mansfield. He hopeless on UN. that
I would present ME

P What about a consolidated aid amt, if total adequate

R If adequate - maybe 750 - I would accept.

S If you have adequate flex.

