

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Amb. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, April 12, 1975
10:45 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECT: American Strategy at the UN

President: I almost reconsidered asking you. I read in Human Events something very complimentary about you. [Laughter].

Kissinger: That Commentary article is one of the most important articles in a long time. That is why it is essential to have him at the UN.


President: I am delighted you will do it.

Moynihan: I will. I have no illusions about it. The Commentary article makes two points: we are still acting in the same posture we had in the past when we had a majority -- so we still seek a consensus. The only consensus now is screw the United States. The reputation of the US keeps eroding and that reputation is important to us.

Kissinger: We even cooperate in resolutions directed through codewords against us. This erodes our image further.

President: Your new posture will delight the Congress. The UN is not the most popular institution in the world here now.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, MARINA, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/11/04
BY: [Signature], MARINA, DATE 5/23/04

Kissinger: The public will be delighted. We have to rally the American public and show the world we are strong and determined. If we appear at the UN with Pat's wisdom, strength and toughness. How we are going to behave is important.

Moynihan: Right. Are we going to give up a fight?

President: This is our campaign now.

Moynihan: In the UN we are like the Republicans in Congress. But in doing this we will make some mistakes. But we will make some, as against the total mistake we're making now. But we can't aim only at the Third World. The Soviet Union and China make devastating charges against the US and we never respond.

President: I want strong statements and the guts to veto and vote against.

Kissinger: If you think you are under Soviet and Chinese usages -- you shouldn't initiate, but respond. With China, let's consult on a case-by-case basis.


Moynihan: I have one specific proposal. One mistake we make is acting like the General Assembly has semi-legislative powers. The Soviet Union believed it when we had a majority. Now it is being used against us. We have to go back to the Charter.

Kissinger: We need a strategy. In principle, I think we should move things from the General Assembly to the Security Council. It is important to see that we have our confidence and nerve. The Tanzanian, if he attacks the Soviet Union, is in trouble; if he attacks the US, he must know he is in equal trouble. Also we must get hold of the Specialized Agencies.

Moynihan: Should we have staff changes?

President: Do our people stay there in perpetuity?

Kissinger: The personnel is ready to rotate anyway. You can clean out both in the Mission and the delegation. We can't do much about the Congressional members. We should pick the other public members for other than pure political reasons.



Moynihan: For 25 years there have been high politics and low politics in State. High politics was security and that was where reputations work. The UN, etc., was low politics; where Mrs. Roosevelt and those who weren't up to the struggle went. If word went out that words matter, we could turn this around.

President: This coincides with what I said Thursday. What we said, we meant. That is what I hope you will do.

Moynihan: But in a conciliatory not belligerent way. We are too dangerous to be pushed around.

Kissinger: I will staff State to back you up.

Moynihan: Would this carry on the tradition of my moniinally being in in the Cabinet?

President: I plan to see Scali Monday. Is that okay?

Moynihan: There aren't six people in State who understand a Leninist argument. We have to retrain people. One thing: They will move to oust Israel. They had the chutzpah to meet in Cuba.

Kissinger: This one thing we have to hit -- for the non-aligned to meet in Cuba and claim non-alignment.

They can't throw them out but they can refuse them a seat in the General Assembly.

Bouteflika will still be chairman for the Special Session but for the regular session we will have a European. In 1976 it will be someone from the Middle East, though, and we would have a massive problem.

Moynihan: If we can head it off we can avoid a debacle in '76. It won't hurt Israel much but it will reduce American support.

Kissinger: But it is no different from South Africa. That was an outrage. We have to keep fighting that, or the Group of 77 will be deciding UN membership.

Moynihan: We should say we are not sympathetic to the regime, but it is a matter of principle.



President: I hope you can get out around the country to speak.

Moynihan: Yes. And the Congress.

UNESCO is something a lot of people care about. Israel was expelled. I would like to be firm and say you can't expel Israel and expect us to participate -- because we are getting pressure to get back in and forget the Israeli expulsion.

Kissinger: That should be considered as part of a general strategy.

President: I am delighted, Pat. We are on the same wave length.



Scowcroft's file

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Amb. Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, April 12, 1975
10:56 - 11:11 a.m. (following meeting with the President)

PLACE: The Secretary's Office
The White House

Kissinger: One major problem you will have is on Israel. We must dissociate ourselves a bit from Israel -- not to destroy them but to prevent them from becoming a Sparta, with only military solutions to every problem. They are desperately looking for a spokesman -- and they will work on you. What Israel did in the last negotiation was unconscionable. We may come out with our own ideas of the elements of a stable peace in the Middle East. We can't afford a crisis in the context of blind support of Israel.

I don't want Israel to get the idea that our UN mission is an extension of theirs. Treat them in a very friendly way, but as a foreign government. On expulsion, give them total support. On UNESCO, I am inclined to think the same. On the PLO, give them total support, at least until they recognize the existence of Israel.

We have to show Israel they don't run us and we can't support massive acquisition of territory. You can't maintain that selling out Vietnam has no impact on Israel -- as the Jewish community thinks. It can't be.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5
NSC MEMO, MARINA, STATE DEPT. CHANNELS
BY [signature] MARA, DATE 5/23/04



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

We triggered the debacle in Vietnam. [They discussed what happened.] We shouldn't kid ourselves that what we have done does not have catastrophic results. When the Japanese Foreign Minister visits here and demands to put out a statement reaffirming the Security Treaty. You know that in Japan you preserve it by never mentioning it. The President and I are going out in a Churchillian way. The UN is very important in this campaign. You have got to show that we are staying the course.

Moynihan: The American Jews have got to be Americans.

Kissinger: We will probably aim for security essentially within their borders, in total security and for total peace.

This ruthless using of a Communist threat at one moment, and Jewish immigration at another has got to stop. On expulsion we will fight to the death; on UNESCO I am inclined to agree. But Israel must be treated like Great Britain, not like the Department of Treasury.



P/Moynihan/K 12 Apr 75

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/4/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/11/04

BY NARA DATE 5/13/04



US & we never respond

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K If you think you are under SC + PRC ways - you shouldn't initiate, but respond. W/PRC it's consult early on

M One specific proposal. One mistake we made ^{acting badly} is G.A. has semi legis powers. SC behaved it when we had majority. Now it being used against us. We have to go back to charter

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
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UN membership.

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UNESCO is something a lot of people come about.
I was expelled. I would like to be free to say
you can't expect it to support us to participate -
because we're getting pressure to get back in &
forget I'm excluded

R That should be considered as part of your strategy

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✓ K/Magnifico
12 Sept 75

K Don make your own mistakes. We must discriminate ourselves a bit from I. Not to disturb them but to prevent them from being a Sparta w/ only voluntary solutions. They ^{are} desperately looking for a sponsor - they will work on you - What I did is best negot was unresolvable. We may come out w/ our ideas of elements of a stable plan in a UN. We can't afford a crisis in a context of behind support of I. I don't want I to get a idea and UN mission is an extension of theirs. Treat them very friendly, but as foreign govt. On expulsion, total support on UNESCO I. UNICEF, UN, on PHO, total support at least till they say existence of I. We have to show I they don't run us & we can't support massive acquisition of territory for cart maintain that selling out UN has no impact on I - as Jewish only thinks. It can't be.

We triggered the debate in UN (discussed what happened). We shouldn't kind ourselves with what we have done does not have catastrophic results. When a Jap FM visits here & demands to put out a statement reaffirming the Security Treaty. You know that in Japan you praise it by never mentioning it. The US & I are going out in a Churchillian way. The UN is very important in this campaign. You have got to show that we are staying a course.

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