MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, March 27, 1975
9:30 - 10:32 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: I have the uneasy feeling Egypt is ready to cave and we don't want that. Israel would get out of control.

The President: They would claim they were right.

Kissinger: We plan to say the maps Dinitz is putting out are inaccurate.

The President: If it is the truth.

Kissinger: I am glad I read the text of your Hearst interview. You blame them for being inflexible. You should tilt a little against Israel.

The President: That is not hard.

Kissinger: Here are two cables I want to show you. King Hussein despair of the U.S. and the Middle East -- we aren't even prepared publicly to say Israel is to blame. War is inevitable.

In one way our withdrawal is good, because everyone now sees the important role we play.
I think we need psychological warfare against Israel. We may yet get an agreement.

The President: I have had it in the back of my mind that if we play brinkmanship, we may get something. But we shouldn't talk about it. I thought you were too unhappy to entertain it.

Kissinger: Not so much that as the unravelling of our Middle East policy, and Israel has treated us as no other country could.

The President: Should we tell Max that?

Kissinger: Max must know. It is not just a friendly misunderstanding. If the Jewish Community comes after us, we will have to go public with the whole record.

Tell the NSC that Israel behaved recklessly. You are trying to create a state of mind in Israel that if we have to run the risks of war for them, they have to run the risks of peace for us.

The President: Did the interview go too far?

Kissinger: Nope. It was a good, strong interview. They will put heat on you anyway, so there is little to lose.

We may yet get an agreement within a couple of months, and it may be a lesson -- even to the Arabs.

Tell Max Fisher that Israel misled us. Moynihan said Israel really let the President down, didn't they? They attempted to blow up our Middle East strategy. Now they are dumping on Geneva.

On the Chinese song incident. We cancelled the visit. It was a silly issue, but once we made it an issue, your instinct was right, we couldn't cave.

On the Clements/Brown thing. [He explained the situation re their proposed visit to Riyadh.] This never was my project -- it was Clements. I backed it when the Saudis were so enthusiastic.

The President: I think you can make the case that with the new government, it is important to go. I think Brown should go.
Kissinger: We got a Turkish vote yesterday. Now they want a resolution letting you use the waiver.

The President: How about if we could get both bills through the Senate?

Kissinger: That would be fine. But I don't think we can get Turkish concessions which Sarbanes will accept -- because I think it will be a package deal mostly for the whole thing. The constant intervention by Congressmen in our ongoing negotiation when they don't know what is going on.

The President: How much aid was shipped to Israel? I will ask for a list at the NSC meeting.

Kissinger: On Vietnam, I think we are on the wrong wicket. They seem to have lost four divisions, except for the people themselves, who are now a rabble. They have lost massive amounts of materiel. Talking $300 million in these circumstances is nonsense. A three-year program is nonsense -- three years to what?

Subject to Weyand's views, it looks like they have lost virtually everything and North Vietnam has suffered very little. You may wind up with this option: to pour in massive amounts of equipment, or to go for a one-year appropriation and see what happens. I say this with a bleeding heart -- but maybe you must put Vietnam behind you and not tear the country apart again.

The Vietnam agreements were based on two things: our threat of military support and the continuation of aid. In July '73 we stopped our support, and we also cut the aid below the minimum they needed. Now we are faced with a desperate situation. I think -- I defended a three-year program -- but I think it is beyond that.

[There was some discussion of personnel matters. HEW, Defense, CIA.]

Brandt -- it depends on his mental state. He may just sit. He has Portugal on his mind. He says the Portuguese need some money. We would give it to the Ava Foundation. They would like $100,000. The Europeans have set themselves two objectives: elections, and no Communist takeover. I think we could get both those and still lose the country --
because they will rule through the AFM. What do we do if this kind of government wants to stay in NATO? What does this do to Italy? France? We probably have to attack Portugal whatever the outcome and drive them from NATO.
K. I don't see any reason why E is ready to come. We don't want that. I wouldn't start a fight.

P. They would claim they were right.

K. We keep saying we may still be putting out any innocents.

P. Of it a twist.

K. I should. I need them near to stop them from doing something. You should talk to him against it.

P. That is not bad.

K. Because I could, if no one else was in the US or NLF area.

P. I am not sure we can do it.

K. I think we need just an agreement now. I want to get an agreement.

P. I don't think it's in anyone's mind that we play showdowns and say put something, but we shouldn't talk about it. It's not good to argue.

K. To understand it.

P. But to reach that as a conclusion of our NLF

K. I think it to be the only one.

P. Should get the idea that

K. Don't get friendly misunderstanding. If you're

P. I would that maybe the

K. Still SC I believe.

P. I would that maybe the

K. I would be good to me.

P. That would be quite a little stuck.

K. Hope it can still be continued.

P. Did continue go to far.

K. Hope it won't be quite so continued.
They will just deal on your anyway so there is
will to him.
We may get an agreement of a couple
months and it may be a long undertaking.
Tell Frank I think it was surprising that we
let a few days, didn't they? They attempted to
allow my own free thinking. And they bringing in
Canada.
On a like thing, we have a visit from
a newly risen. But once we made a decision,
your meeting was right, we couldn't come.
On a Clement/Brown thing (explained a bit)
This wasn't a project, it Clement. I decided it
when Sand's came in enthusiastic
P I think you can make a case that it's a new part
it important to us. I think from that point
K We just have to yesterday - have they want
a provision letting your view survive
P How about if we could get both Billy Then Smith
K That is fine - but I don't think we can get

Turin where numbers will accept because I think
it will be a package deal some sort of a whole thing.
The constant interim by the person in our ongoing
negotiation when they said it's what is going on,
(Aud & Israel, some sound was thumped)

On UN, I think we are the union content. They
seem to have lost 4 days except for a possibly
whether. They have lost massive count
of material.
Talking to said in their union is nonsense.
At the press is nonsense, I see to what?
Subject to way and what. It looks like they have lost virtually everything. UN has suffered very little, except your medical staff. This is from the matrix and of course, a huge relief against... I see what happens. I say this as I'm1
calling from - but maybe you want just UN behind you? And then it is entirely decided.

UN troops based on 7 things: own support and commanding gains. In July 75 we told our own support and losses of a 35% and failure. How we are found of a separate action, I think - I defended a 35% they - but I think it longer.

Discussion of period -

P.R.

Rice

Rusk

Schlesinger

Brewer. It depends on the current state. We very just.

The key factors, on the other, the more the more. Brewer for our foundation. They would like 100% of the East. Taiwan, I think we could get both there. I think there is a country because they will work there. HFM. What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO? What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO? What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO? What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO? What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO? What do we do of this kind of sort want of staying in NATO?