MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford  
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, March 24, 1975  
9:20 - 9:52 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I think if they had heard this before I left they would have caved. They think that we are too weak to take seriously and that they can get what they want from Congress.

The President: Mike [Mansfield] and Hugh [Scott] will make a joint statement and McClellan will introduce a joint resolution.

Kissinger: I think they have made basic misjudgment. I think Nessen should announce a reassessment.

President: How about calling Dinitz in?

Kissinger: I think it would look like blackmail. The reaction was amazing.

The President: They won't get $2 billion again like the last time.

The Vice President: That is why I asked the question I did -- were they leading us along until they got arms?

Kissinger: It's the right question, but we couldn't answer.
The President: I am glad Schlesinger was there. He won’t think there is any money to make anymore.

Kissinger: The Israelis’ behavior is an outrage. To have received a letter from you and not to change one iota is an indignity to the United States.

President: What do we do?

Kissinger: We should send out a NSSM today. We should have an NSC meeting on Wednesday or Thursday. There should be no visit by Peres, no F-15 mission; we should slow up LANCE and LGB. Every Department is to be instructed to end the special relationships. We should know who they see -- they should have one special contact in each Department. 

We should work for two-three weeks on a position. We must have a comprehensive plan for Geneva.

The President: It was great when O’Neill asked where the boundary was. Let’s get the assessment.

The Vice President: Now may be a moment to pull our materials policy together.

The President: We have a bill up there. Let’s push it. It is expensive but if anything comes out of this it may be of some benefit. Let’s find out where the legislation is.

The Vice President: This is for a Materials Policy and Finance Corporation. That would give you some tools to finance these things. I would like to get together with Henry on this. If we went forward with a dynamic action program on this, it would have some impact.

The President: By all means.

[The Vice President leaves.]

Kissinger: I think you were really in charge. You never know until a crisis where the steel is. Maybe this will pay us.

The President: When you keep Burton quiet — and Cliff Case and Scott. Have we heard from anyone but Fisher?
Kissinger: They will mobilize the Jewish Community against us -- no doubt.

On Portugal, I am opposed to calling in the Soviet Ambassador.

The President: Further, if we use up all our chips on things like this . . .
Schmidt caught us by surprise. My only concern is that I indicated support.

Kissinger: I can take the responsibility with Genscher.

Anything else?

Scowcroft: Brademas.

Kissinger: Once it's through the Senate, maybe the Turks would reconsider the waiver. Show them the cables. The Turks won't hold back if we don't do anything. If we get it through the Senate, we will wait in the House.

Until there was a Turkish government, no negotiation was possible.

The President: How close are they?

Kissinger: Demirel is six votes shy, but Koruturk, the President, doesn't like him.

All the maneuvering is to prevent Ecevit from being an interim Prime Minister, and to prevent elections for the same reasons. The bitterness about the cutoff is enormous. The world's view of America is gravely disturbing. So anytime you look strong, you help, even if you lose.

Vietnam is starting to blame us -- me.

For the reassessment, you should tell Nessen: This will be a reassessment of our policy toward all the countries in the area. When progress is no longer possible along one direction, it is essential that a reevaluation take place to determine where we are and where we should go.

Don't use the word "failure." If they ask, "Does this mean a cutoff of aid to Israel?" say "Not at all."
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . . National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Note
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for memcon
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/24/1975
VOLUME . . . . . . . . . . . 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . 031400432
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations
BOX NUMBER . . . . . . . . 10
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . . March 24, 1975 - Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 05/28/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . GG