

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Representative John Brademas (D-Ind)  
Representative Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD)  
Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-NY)

President Gerald Ford  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, March 21, 1975  
10:00 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

SUBJECT: Turkish Aid Cutoff

President: I appreciate your suggestion for the meeting. No one is happy with the present situation. There is a stalemate, and unless something is done, there is no hope for progress.

Henry has met with you.

Late action was the Turkish Cypriot declaration of an autonomous state. The Greek Cypriot went to UN.

Henry saw Bitsios on March 7. Then he went to Ankara on March 10. He met there with all the Government people and the political leaders. You know about the Turkish political stalemate. All the key leaders are outside the Government. Everyone seems to want to negotiate, even Makarios's stalemate is sound, but we are on dead center. I am willing to listen, but we can't let this drift. It is very harmful. With the problem with Portugal we don't need any in the East Mediterranean, and in the Middle East.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

HSC MEMO, 11/20/03, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 3/11/04  
BY dk, NARA, DATE 5/14/04




Brademas: Thank you for seeing us, Mr. President. We all want a solution. I told the Greeks we want to support aid to Turkey. We have been restrained -- we have made no statements since January. We only put the legislation in when the United States didn't condemn the occupation.

We think it is a fundamental principle that arms shouldn't be used against the purposes of the Act. We think Kissinger has focused more attention to turning Congress around than to turning Turkey around. We would give 24 hour service if we got some Turkish concessions. We react at pressure on Congress to turn around without movement by Turkey. A self-fulfilling prophesy isn't intransigence. What concessions have they made? Look at the displaced persons; there are 200,000; their plight is terrible. We want to see free passage between Nicosia and Famagusta. We want to see refugees return to Famagusta. If there is an attempt to restore the aid without any progress, there would be bad results in your relations with Congress. Also with the Greeks.

The Secretary of Defense came up with the waiver approach. We are not saying this is the right way, but it lets the Turks save face. If we knew in advance there was movement, we would agree to keep quiet and let you go ahead. We wouldn't agree to this as an ice-breaker, but there would be no public move after a pre-agreed agreement.

Sarbanes: The principle of not making arms available for aggressive purposes is fundamental. To scrap it would have very basic implications not only for Greece but for all the other countries. It would be a turning point. I am thinking especially of the second Turk move, although the first could be considered a provocation. We told Kissinger that if Turkey would make some substantial moves -- to let 40-50% of the refugees return home -- that would at least be a gesture to let things go forward. We have stayed very quiet and haven't demagogued, but the Turks couldn't get anything before 5 February, and what they proposed wouldn't have been enough. Schlesinger brought up the waiver bit; we don't know if this is the thing, but it shows constructive thought.

There are fundamental differences in conception between the State Department's view of the pressure we put on Turkey and ours. We looked at the cables; we talked to Macomber, etc., and Macomber has acted as an agent for Turkey. The United States has said the Congressional act wasn't wise -- that is understandable, but to say we are trying to get it reversed is to encourage intransigence. We object to reversing the decision -- it is a matter of principle.



We recognize the Turks hold the cards and they have to get much of what they want. They clearly hold more than they intend to keep - - particularly in Famagusta.

If they had let 25,000 refugees go back before February, we could have lifted it for 4 to 6 weeks.

If we could get some agreed movement which we could then use for the waiver, then there would be movement and then we would lift it.

Rosenthal: Everyone wants a settlement. The Greeks do. The Turks do. They don't want to rupture NATO for Cyprus. They are closer than anyone realizes. They own 40 percent -- I think they would go to 35 percent right away. The Greeks would go to 25 percent, so someone has to put it together at 29 percent. So how do we get a move? Kissinger says Turkey won't move under pressure. But if they could be brought together and agree to a first step, if we could lay out a scenario for a concession in two months, we could keep quiet for the 614 waiver. Then if there is more progress, then we would lift the cutoff.

President: I have tried to play square with the Congress. I couldn't say adequate progress has been made, because it wasn't right. There was a point where we were fairly certain on Famagusta, the airport, but with the cutoff close the Turks wouldn't do it. They have a tough problem. Anyone who makes a major agreement there just before an election would be facing that in an election. There is 614, but the cutoff supersedes it. A lawyer would argue it supersedes 614 and I would be on shaky ground.

Brademas: I am not sure of it. We have looked into it. Some say yes and some say no.


Sarbanes: I think it can be argued either way. What we feel is that if it were being done as part of a package to get a concession, we wouldn't challenge it and you can make a reasonable case.

President: Everyone is getting by on principle but me. You want explaining.

Sarbanes: But you have publicly asked for a reversal.

President: But we have abided by the law.

All: And we appreciate it.



President: But you are putting me in this weak position.

Sarbanes: Only for a week.

Rosenthal: Then we would propose lifting the act.

President: But it does put me in a bad situation. I discussed it with Kissinger. They have a bad situation. They can't form a government. They have high national pride. They will come off better than last July, but there must be a better way than for me to make a dubious legal decision. You know I had the leaders down to see if there was a way out. Scott and we came up with this waiver provision. They had hearings and have held it up -- you talked with them.

Rosenthal: We want to cooperate with you and not embarrass you. Any other way is OK.

President: I just don't think I can go that legal route.

Sarbanes: [Gets out a map] If the Turks lifted this red line, that would take care of 40 to 50 percent of the refugees. They clearly don't intend to hold it. That would be a gesture.

President: I don't think the settlement is the real problem. It is getting it started.

Here is the waiver. Is it completely unacceptable?

Rosenthal: It wipes out 8 votes in the House and 7 in the Senate.

Brademas: The basic one is this: Do you give priority to a Cyprus settlement or to your premise that Congress was wrong and should reverse itself? If it's the former, we will help; if it's the latter, we will fight. But all the pressure has been on the Congress. If a waiver isn't the right way, we will work with you.

President: Let me be frank. We have made tremendous pressure. But they have a domestic situation.

Rosenthal: Right, and they don't want to be blamed in an election.

Scowcroft: How about getting it through the Senate first and using that with the Turks? Would that be acceptable?

[Much discussion]



Sarbanes: This could put the Senate on the spot.

[More discussion]

President: Let me summarize. We do this as part of a package. As a consequence of the Senate acting, Turkey would have to make concessions, then the House would act.

Rosenthal: If there is some agreement with the Turks that this would happen.

Sarbanes: The bill would have to be modified; right now it is total reversal.

President: If they are moving to an agreement there is no sense not to. Both sides want a settlement and I don't think we need to worry.

Brademas: We would have to bring the Senate in.

Rosenthal: I think keeping the pressure on is a good idea.

President: I think you would have to have some faith in us. We will push -- we don't want this problem to fester.

Sarbanes: I think we must know what concessions the Turks will be willing to make.

President: I think Brent's suggestion is a starting point. I will consult with Kissinger.

Rosenthal: You are going to have to lean on Macomber.

Brademas: Kissinger is a little impatient with us right now.

President: We will go to work on it and Brent will keep you informed.



(Tolson)

President / Congressmen Brademas,  
Sarbanes & Rosenthal

2

10:00 am, Fri, 3/21/75

Small talk on Cherry board

P I appreciate my job for inty. We are happy  
w/ present sit. Statement + unless nothing else  
we hope for pop.

K has met w/ you

hate action was taken against demonstrators

Greek Communist event to UN.

K saw Britain on Nov 7. Then to Ankara

Nov 10. What w/ all Govt people. You know

Turk pol. statements

Everyone seems to want to negotiate, but  
we are dead center, I would like to know what  
can we do at this point. It very harmful.

Pro w/ part - we don't need any more  
+ in NE

B Thank you for saying we will want  
solution. I told Greeks we want to support  
aid to T. We have been restrained - in  
statements since Jan. We only put  
legis in when US ch. had conditions regarding  
- 225

- Special parts.

We think fundamental principle that arms  
should not be used against purposes of act.

We think R has focused more attention  
to trying long arm than to turn T

around. We would give 24 hr review  
if we get some Turk concessions.

We request as question as long to turn  
around w/o for movement by T.

Self fulfilling prophecy and  
intelligence. What concessions?



Displaced persons - 200,000, Turkish flight  
w/ want to see free passage but Evrosia  
& Fungata, refugee return to France,  
if there is attempt to restore and w/o progress  
there would be bad results in your relations  
w/ Congo, also w/ Turkey.

Sec. Def. came up w/ counter approach. We  
not saying this is a right way, but it  
lets us see face of your future in advance  
there was movement we would agree to  
keep quiet - let you go ahead - we would not  
agree to this in a treaty, but as public  
move after a pre-agreed agreement

Sarkis Principle first making access and for agreement  
purpose is fundamental. To accept it would  
have very wide implications not only for  
Greece but for all other countries. It would be  
a turning point. I thinking esp of 2nd Turk  
war, the it could be considered a  
precondition. We told K of I would make  
some substantial moves - & w/ 40-50%  
of refugees return home. That would not  
be a real return to let things go forward.  
We have stayed very quiet & haven't damaged  
but Turkey couldn't get anything before 5th  
and what they proposed would not have been any.  
Sarkis brought up a union but, we don't fear  
if this would do it, is the thing, but it shows  
Constructive that.

There fundamental of conception but State  
view of presence was put on T + ones.  
We looked at cables, talks & were another



Start

etc, + Unk... has a... agent for T,  
US has said Con for it wasn't unil - that  
understandable, but to say we try to get it  
reversed is to improve intransigence,  
as a objct to reversing a decision - it is  
a matter of principle.

We say Turks break curbs + they have to  
get much of what they want. They clearly hold  
more than they intend to buy - factor in  
Emergency.

If they had hit 25, was refused to be helped with,  
we could have lifted it for 4-6 weeks.  
If we could get some agreed measure which  
we could then use now, than measure  
than lift.

Res. Every one wants alter curbs. Greeks do. Turks  
do. They don't want to improve NATO for Greece.  
They are clear than any one else. They  
are 40% - I think they would go to 35%  
right away. Greeks would go to 25% so  
some one has to put it together at 29%.

So how more? Is any one want more  
under pressure. But if they could be  
brought together + agree to a 1<sup>st</sup> step. If we  
could lay out terms for conclusion in 2 mos,  
we would have given for 6 mos even, than  
even now, than we would lift a curfew

P I have tried to play game w/c Con. I would not say  
a game has been made, because it wasn't  
right. There was a point where we were fairly  
close on Emergency, except, but w/ curfew clear  
I would not do it. They have to pay price. Buy me





who makes a major agreement there just before  
an election would be facing that in an election.  
There is 614, but a court says no to it.  
A lawyer would argue it says 614 and  
should be on shaky ground. I

B I'm not sure of it. We have looked into it  
Some say yes & some no.

S I think it can be argued either way. What  
we feel is if it were being done as part of a  
package to get concessions we would challenge  
& you can make a reservation

V E was a getting by on principle but me, you  
want expediency.

S But you have probably asked for reversal

P But we have asked by a court

All And we are presenting it.

V But you putting me in this crucial position

S Only for a week

R Team we would propose trying a bit.

V But it does put me in bad spot. I do work  
w/K. Terry has had it. Terry can't force a  
court - have high with pride. They will  
come off better than last July, but there must  
be better way than for me to make a  
decision by a decision. You know I had  
backed down to me if there was a  
way out. Scott & no came up w/ this winter  
provision. Terry had hearings & have held up -  
you talked w/ them.

R We want to say & not embarrassed - <sup>any other way is</sup> OK? is

V I just don't think I can go that legal route.

S (Goes out map) If Terry lifted this red line

that would take care of 40-50% of projects. They  
clearly don't intend to hold it. That would be  
a problem.

P I don't think a settlement is a bad prop. It is  
getting it started.

Here is a review. Is it completely unacceptable

R It is just out of votes in House & 7 in Senate

B The main one is this: Do you give priority to  
Copper settlement or to your presence that I am  
was wrong & should withdraw itself. If James, we  
hold, if latter, we fight. But all - presence <sup>has</sup>  
shown on Cuy. If women want a right way, we  
could work with you.

P It may be possible. We have much members  
presence. But they have a domestic set

R Right, and they don't want to be blamed in on election.

S - How about getting it thru a Senate  
(Much discussion)

S This could put Senate on a spot.  
Will discuss

P Let's not summarize. We do this as part of a  
package. As a consequence of Senate action,  
I would have to make concessions, then House  
would see it.

R If there is some agreement that w/c Tarbo  
that this would happen.

S The bill would have to be modified; right now  
it is total removal.

P If they moving to agreement that is no reason  
not to. Both sides want a settlement & I

don't think we need to worry.

B We would have to bring a State in.

R I think keeping pressure on is a good idea.

P I think you would have to have some faith in us. We will push - we don't want this problem to fester.

S I think we must know what concessions a Treaty will be willing to make.

P I think Brent's suggestion is a starting point. I will consult w/K.

R You going to have to learn our Macomber

B It is a little upset w/no right now.

P We will go to <sup>work</sup> work on it & Brent will keep you informed.

