REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL: National security restriction

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Wednesday - March 5, 1975
9:17 - 10:02 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

President: The Iranian deal played well.

Kissinger: It was so screwed up -- but it did appear well.

State thinks it is a mistake, on the ground that the risk is out of proportion to gain. I don't see a hell of a lot to gain. We could wind up with the worst possible situation. Colby indicated he wouldn't spend it. What do you think, Brent?

Scowcroft: The advantage is the press is Communist-controlled and the press of the moderate party is asking for the money.

President: How can any one object to helping a democratic press?

Kissinger: That is what we did in Chile.

President: If it is defensible, why shouldn't we?

Kissinger: It will leak and hurt the parties.

President: That is a different case.
Kissinger: I would tell Colby to do what he can in the package without spending the money.

President: Should I talk to Church?

Kissinger: I would tell him the dangers are that our intelligence will be paralysed; we have to protect sensitive data. Colby is now blackmailing me on the assassination stories. Nixon and I asked Helms to look into possibilities of a coup in Chile in 1970. Helms said it wouldn't work. Then later the people who it was discussed with tried to kidnap Schneider and killed him.

The OPEC summit came out interestingly. He said OPEC had to behave responsibly and Algeria would agree to a price cut if its development budget was protected. Our policy is working. They are no longer jumping at the consumer-producer conference.

President: What is happening in IEA?

Kissinger: We are telling the British and Dutch we won't accept an invitation to a preparatory conference until we get alternative sources nailed down. I think the OPEC evolution is very encouraging.

President: Some of the smart people in Europe must see we are making the producers need income.

Kissinger: That is right. One way would be raise the price. But to do that, they would have to cut production. They can't agree on how to allocate the cuts. If we were free with the Saudis, we could get at least a deal not to cut production. That is why this discrimination campaign of the Jews is outrageous.

Ethiopia: My recommendation is to send them $7 million and encourage negotiations. Kenya has asked for military assistance.

President: What do they want? What kind of attitude do they have to us?

Kissinger: I favor it. They are friendly and they have some neighbors who are disturbing.

I am uneasy about the Israelis. They haven't asked for compensation for the oil fields, but there has not been even a study group.
If necessary, I would like a letter from you saying you can't accept a stalemate, and if we go to Geneva you will put forward a modification of the Rogers Plan -- which means the 1967 borders. I think we just can't go to Geneva as the lawyer for Israel.

President: The toughest position needed to get them to act is what I favor.

Kissinger: Asad has even indicated he would take a limited agreement and would sign a peace treaty; he was willing to dump the PLO. Now he is enlisting the PLO to stymie things. We can't bring Asad in -- even though if I tried, he would be so obnoxious that it would go slower than Egypt -- and then we could move it to Geneva after Egypt settled. But that is too tricky. I would rather tell him the truth privately -- that we would make an effort as soon as an Egypt-Israel deal is finished.

President: That is my preference.

Kissinger: The big issue is will you take on Israel for another Syrian move.

President: If we are honest with him and go through Geneva -- which will fail -- then Asad would come to us.

Kissinger: I think Asad will want something before Geneva. The other would be ideal.

President: Can't you tell him we will try to get something before Geneva?

Kissinger: Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody with the Israelis. If we could get five or ten kilometers on the Golan, we would be in good shape. Israel will claim it destroys their defensive capability.

It is important whether I can tell Asad we will make a major effort. We will have to move into open opposition to the Israelis.

President: If you think that is the best way to get progress, I am for it.

Kissinger: We will be driven to a Syrian move, either before or after.

President: Suppose the Israelis say let's go to Geneva, the Soviet Union does...
Kissinger: We can go to Geneva. What happens will depend on Syria. Sadat won't want Geneva. He will want to rest, and come here for a big triumph. Israel will want to avoid a Syrian negotiation so Syria won't want to. So only Israel and the Soviet Union will want to go to Geneva.

President: Can't we commit ourselves to a good faith effort?

Kissinger: A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even get off the ground. Israel won't look at it.

President: A good faith effort to me is one where we put the screws on.

Kissinger: Okay. If I see an opening to get us to Geneva -- maybe the Soviet Union will carry the can to get everyone to Geneva -- that would be fine.

I have given you the Schmidt letter.
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . National security restriction
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DECLASSIFIED with portions redacted

By date

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{P} & \text{The Fennec client played well.} \\
\text{K} & \text{It was no surprise but it did confirm the}
\end{align*} \]

\[ \text{We could have}
\]

\[ \text{up as a sure thing positive side, Cathy included in}
\]

\[ \text{wouldn't spend it. What do you think, Bert?}
\]

\[ \text{The advantage is the price is $\text{xxx} less and}
\]

\[ \text{c. moderate, just you're doing for money}
\]

\[ \text{P How can anyone object to helping claims process?}
\]

\[ \text{K That is what we did in Child}
\]

\[ \text{P Is it deplorable, why shouldn't we?}
\]

\[ \text{K It will hurt to hurt parties.}
\]

\[ \text{I That is a difficult.}
\]

\[ \text{K I would tell Cathy to do what he can in Child}
\]

\[ \text{W/O spending any money.}
\]

\[ \text{P Should I talk to Child?}
\]

\[ \text{K I would tell him you expect one that will}
\]

\[ \text{be good and how to protect sensitive data.}
\]

\[ \text{Cathy was challenging me on a particular task}
\]

\[ \text{I asked Belin to look into possibility for any}
\]

\[ \text{in Child in [redacted]. Belin said it wouldn't work}
\]

\[ \text{The other summit went well interesting. He and}
\]

\[ \text{other head to head say. \text{[redacted] had just}
\]

\[ \text{point of its alleged lawsuit was settled. Our}
\]

\[ \text{party is interested. They are no longer pursuing it}
\]

\[ \text{W/O easy.}
\]

\[ \text{P What happenin in FBN?}
\]

\[ \text{K We didn't hear. What we want is a negotiation}
\]
From reading of yesterday - Ccosat
5th April (maated and (nice can))

Think OXOXO nothing is very encouraging.
P Somwee most people in Ecos won't see us
and making a permanent union.

K: That's right. One way would be to raise price, but then
that they would have to cut people. They can't afford
or stores & allocate goods. If we were free as Indians,
we could get at relief did not to eat people. That is
why this discriminative campaign of a few is antithetic
E thinking. My recem. is to send them 7 mill
+ remaining urgent. Always need work for
and most urgent. K.

P: What the count. What that partible & co.
K: Plot. They friendly and have some neighbors
who are disturbing.

D: Doing about it. They haven't asked for anything
for a court fable - whatever a study pump.
D: Anyway, I would like better from you saying
you cant accept a statement & if we got some
again will put forward Motif, etc. Keep plan (?
belles)

K: I think we just can't go to Geneva. — Longer sit
P: The tension problem k get time to set is what
I fear.

K: We can't bring Aveel in - unless if I tied
it would be more than E and then
we could move to Geneva. When E settled - but
can be too tricky. I would rather do it with a truth
priority that we would make an effort as soon
as E - I finish.
K That is my preference
K The big issue is will you take me in for another
K Syrian move.
K I think Assad will want something bigger. Give him
K the option would be ideal.
K Could you please tell him we would try to get especially
K larger. Can we?
K Yes, but you have to know that would be bloody
K with us. If we could get 5-10 then in total
K we would be in good shape. I will claim it today
K in defence cap.
K It is important whether I can take and we will make
K a major effort. We will have to move into Damascus
K if I.
K If you think that is the best bring the project, I
K am for it.
K We will be coming to a Syrian move, either before or
K after
K Suppose if I say let go to Lebanon, c 60-80.
K We can go to Lebanon, what happens will depend on
K Syria. What we want is Lebanon - he will want
K to react, come here for big things. I will want
K to travel to Riyadh, Irak want west, so Syria want west.
K So only c 60-80 will want to go in here.
K Can we commit to good faith effort?
K A good faith effort is bound to fail. It won't even
K last a week - I won't bother it.
K A good faith effort is one where we just
K listen on
K OK. If I see opening to get into 6, consider bringing
SC would enjoy a car to get around in, since that
would be fine.
K & I have given up. Schmidt helped.