MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, February 21, 1975
9:19 - 10:10 a.m.

PLACE: The White House
The Oval Office

President: I think McCormack will help if I can tell him the story.

Kissinger: Sparkman said Mansfield would be willing to sponsor the resolution.

President: Talk with Mahon on the resolution.

Kissinger: I spoke to Rosenthal. The Vice President had spoken to Dinitz. Rosenthal is out on a limb and doesn't know how to get off. He would be willing to back off for a Turkish Concession six weeks from now.

Meanwhile the Greeks have panicked. We have a cable from Karamanlis -- that they will accept a bizonal solution and 25%. But Esenbel won't talk until the ban is lifted. The Greeks have proposed moving the talks from Nicosia. So the Greeks are really being pushed by the cut-off, not the Turks. Karamanlis told Waldheim he fears there will be a coup if the ban is not lifted.

President: Griffin wondered if it wouldn't be better to add it at the last minute rather than ahead of time to alert the opposition.
Kissinger: The Vice President must really have hit Dinitz with the McFall story.

President: He has been very good.

Kissinger: He is great as long as he knows what he is doing is for you.

President: He seems to enjoy what he is doing.

Kissinger: He is selfless and enthusiastic.

President: Bob Wilson and others want to talk about Ecuador tuna. The longshoremen now passed a resolution not to unload Ecuadorean products.

Kissinger: I will send our Ambassador in to talk and see if we can get some understanding.

I spoke to the Soviet economists. Kendall showed how 10 billion means 60 billion in business.

We met yesterday on the CIA. We need a common strategy. We can't have witnesses making decisions on a case-by-case basis. We think refusals should be on their authority and then refer to you.

President: I won't be rolled on this one.

Kissinger: I was at a dinner last night with Frank Church. I think I scared him -- I told him the Nixon material was mild compared to what went on in the Democratic Administration. He wants to be President. He won't have public hearings on anything but domestic spying. He asked that you not seek a confrontation. I have the impression that Church may be cooperative because of his ambitions.

I think we should get a list from each agency and then meet with you.

President: We are scheduled for a meeting this evening, in-house.

Kissinger: That is good.

President: Long said he couldn't clear Silberman. He said Curtis is against him and they needed someone with prestige in the business community. He asked for Fred Dent.
Kissinger: Silberman is 10 times the negotiator Dent is.

President: I am mad, but we need Long on the veto. I thought we could bring him into the White House to work on the CIA.

[More discussion of Silberman.]

Kissinger: Colby is worried about protecting names, but that is too narrow. If say we give money to some parties in Europe, those who didn't will say so.

Cambodia is getting bad. I have asked the Japanese and Indonesians for ideas. They won't have any, but I wanted to signal to them that things are grave.

On energy, I talked with Giscard. I said if he supports us on a guaranteed price and alternative sources we would agree to a preparatory meeting April 10.

On price -- we can't let prices go to $4 because our dependence would grow unmanageably -- and we would not develop alternative sources. We could protect alternative sources ourselves, but if the price breaks then, we will be subsidizing alternative sources while Europe gets the cheap oil. We should push this in the IEA, and Simon may give us problems.

An uncontrolled oil price drop would undermine alternative sources and exploration for oil. I think we should go on with the bilateral explorations with the Shah and perhaps with the Saudis.

President: Won't this undercut us with the Europeans?

Kissinger: It won't show up that way. They want the prices down and this will help that. After all, the British are doing the same. They won't lose anything except the chance to screw us. Even on a guaranteed price, the Europeans will find a way of dodging it if the price breaks.

President: As long as we are above board.

Kissinger: I think if we would unravel the French bilateral deals, we would find the same.

President: You explain it.
Kissinger: It is tough, but they are doing it.

The Shah said Sadat wants to move even though Syria opposes.

We will go with Pakistani aid on Monday.

President: I haven't heard any repercussions from the Hill.

Kissinger: Most of them support us. We get a little flak, but it doesn't make sense that India can have nuclear weapons and Pakistan can't get anything.

President: I see Gur is making good sounds.

Kissinger: Yes. But we will have a hell of a negotiation -- because Israel will ask for 18 months to withdraw. We can't give them more than six months.

You will get a letter from Schmidt. Schlesinger told us Leber would act in a Middle East crisis without reference to Schmidt. Schmidt found out about this and hit the ceiling. He said he would fire Leber on the first day and then we would see who could act on his own.
P. Griffin would like it somewhat in better to adjust to the business, which is a little different than a day to day operation.
KVP must really have got things to be helped along.
P. He has been very good.
K. He is great as long as he knows what he is doing in a more specific sense.
P. He seems to enjoy what he is doing.
K. He is refreshingly enthusiastic.
P. Bob Wilson wishes to talk about expanded terms.
We have some very loose directions but with expanded terms.
K. I will send our terms in this letter to see if we can get some understanding.
P. I spoke to Van Econom at Kendall about how to bid and we did the bidding.
We will be ready by 10 a.m. We have a common strategy and have no intentions of making decisions on case by case basis. We think we need to have

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AV NLF DATE 4/14/74
I want to sell in this one.

We are a known but mysterious Church. I think a learned man—told him—might understand was much expected to come. Wasn’t to be late. He wasn’t here; perhaps he was on any-thing but domestic affairs. A hint, that you not seek the spectacle. Have obligation that Church may be large, because of his situation.

I think we should get a list from each agency. How much is your—

P. C. H. scheduled for petty tin for two hours.

T. Their good.

L. Some think to replete with others. St. George—sent some against him. They needed someone who understood the community. He entered for Earl bent.

F. St. George 100 times c opportune Demand.

P. I made, but we need help on the site. I see we could bring them first to work on C. R.

(With St. George, A. A. R.)

K. Nobody came about protecting anyone—out that too many of the previous people in East, that who didn’t need any.

Consocket getting back. I have asked to go N. Sudan—

for ideas. They won’t have any but wanted a signal thing everyone.

Q. No energy, talked W. Council. Said if the support was on government and, well, someone we would agree to a puppetry (3 April).

O. in piano. we need but piano part, because our deficiency would grow immensely—and we wouldn’t keep all together. We would protect alt.
strains on our, but if we [illegible] them, we will be [illegible] with us and [illegible] a change, we should find this in EIR, etc. Some may find no problem.

uncertainties of our day would accumulate, etc. Should be much further.

I think we should go on to detailed application of what we've seen.

P: What this mean about use of force?

K: If we have the challenge, we want to show our determination. We can show our strength.

P: And then, or are there now?

K: We think so, but we are using it.

P: What about the enemy?

K: We will go as far as we must.
on the 2nd day of June we would see who would win the war.