THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Congressional Leadership

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 20, 1975
7:28 - 9:30 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE: First Floor Private Dining Room
The White House

The President: I am happy to have you here.
[He introduced new people.]

I thought the leaders would like to have Secretary Kissinger's observations
of his trip to the Middle East. We talked for two hours last night. We face
the problem of sorting out the difficulties of a most difficult area of the
world. I want to thank you, Henry. The country is very lucky to have you.
Would you make some observations?

Kissinger: Let me talk in several categories: (1) The trip; (2) The Soviet
Union; (3) The Europeans and energy.

What are we trying to do? Many say that Geneva is an alternative to the
step-by-step approach and also that we should cooperate with the Soviet
Union. We don't consider either accurate.

Our problem is how to go to Geneva so that it doesn't lead to confrontation,
and how to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a way that the Soviet Union does
not act as the lawyer for radical Arabs.
We know we must go to Geneva soon, but it makes an enormous difference under what conditions we go. If we go under circumstances where the chief moderate -- Sadat -- has achieved something, it will be known that moderation pays and that only the U.S. can achieve progress. Then we will have some control. But if we go there with Egypt having failed, with pressure from the Soviet Union and the radicals, and the Europeans would be nervous. So it is not a trivial matter how we get to Geneva. And we have to prove to the Soviet Union that if it wants to get into the game it must be on our rules. So the issue is, will Geneva be the prelude to a confrontation or a negotiation?

We are talking now about a withdrawal which is not just token -- so it is painful for Israel. So they want reciprocal measures that are hard for Egypt to make publicly. It is even difficult for Egypt to make a separate move at all. So we have to get a quid pro quo in a way that doesn't serve to overthrow Sadat. We are making progress.

Israel's domestic situation is difficult. Also, compared to Israel, American standards of secrecy are extraordinary.

We have a long way to go, but you can see where with luck and perseverance we might make progress on an agreement. The next problem is Syria. Earlier Syria said she wouldn't participate in another partial move. She now wants to, but Israeli settlements are placed so close to the line that any withdrawal is impossible without moving them. So how we manage this is the problem. Egypt wanted us to do this negotiation in one trip because she wanted it done quickly. I wanted two because the Israelis said they needed time. Faisal is now supporting Asad but we don't know how seriously.

The next issue is the Soviet Union. They are like a football team with only one play, which they keep running.

However, they want in but they don't want to contribute. Israel and Egypt don't want them in, nor would Syria if they could get three kilometers withdrawal. We don't want to antagonize them; they could create massive problems -- with the radical Arabs and thus with the Europeans and Japanese. Maybe even an embargo.

So we will attempt another stage, then Geneva. I will go back in March and it will be hairy. The Soviets will oppose, but not actively, so long as
they think it may succeed. We should keep this quiet because much is
riding on this. If we go to Geneva and the Soviet Union puts forward a
proposal, we will have to do so. It will be a constant crisis where the
Soviet Union, the Europeans, the Japanese beat on us constantly with
threats of economic disaster and an embargo.

I think the leaders of Israel understand but they have a massive domestic
problem.

Our other discussion with the Soviet Union went well. There is a certain
cooling because of uncertainty about the results of agreements they reach
with us, which seem to create a vast American debate and may be re-
versed. Their trade action resulted from the reaction here to Vladivostok.

They are playing up to the Europeans. The Europeans are now lending
billions to the Soviet Union untied to any projects. This is being done
by countries who haven't the power to tie it to political progress. So the
argument is not only that the agreement is lost, but the loss of the
leverage we could get if these big deals were ours. So long as we had
an active sense of detente, the Europeans were afraid to move with the
Soviet Union, now that there seemed to be dangers. After a few months
we may wish to talk to Congress about this. Our European relations have
never been better. We have an agreement on a minimum oil price -- and
on everything else except alternative sources. We will be ready next
month for preparation of a consumer-producer meeting.

If we can keep going with conservation and domestic alternative source
programs, we will be okay. A price weakening is starting. The dif-
fERENCE in atmosphere is amazing -- both in South America and Europe.
If we can just keep on.

At the risk of beating it to death, one can't but be impressed by foreign
concern over what is happening between the legislature here and the execu-
tive. Asad said last October he thought we were seeking Cyprus as a base
for intervention. He thought he had it figured out. Now he can't figure it
out!

Makarios is the only party who is interested in continued chaos. Cyprus
is a millstone to the Greeks. Only the President and the Prime Minister
in Turkey are holding things back. The President and I eight times urged
restraint on them. A meeting with Bitsios and Esenbel was screwed up
by the cutoff. A meeting with Bitsios was scrubbed by the Turkish step.
Scott: What will the Turks do?

Kissinger: They will sever, step-by-step, their contact with us, and get more active in Middle East affairs. They will soon be running out of spare parts.

McFall: Won't Karamanlis say something privately to the Greek leaders here?

Kissinger: He is a great leader. He is flanked by Papandreou and Makarios. He wants a settlement but he has to watch his flanks. The result of setting a deadline was counter productive. Makarios pushed everything against the deadline, the radicals wanted it to cut Turkish aid, and the Turks rejected the appearance of operating under pressure. We were moving on the airport and Famagusta. It is not in the American Greek's interest to have to show daily progress -- because it can't be enough to satisfy the Brademas constituents.

This has effects not only for Turkey -- although there it is approaching catastrophe. All the Europeans are worried about us and about the possibility of working usefully with us.

Albert: Wouldn't Turkey handicap operations like in the last war?

Kissinger: Yes. We have installations there which are irreplaceable. And if there is another Israeli-Syrian war and the Soviet Union behaves more intransigently, a hostile Turkey would be very dangerous.

The Clerides-Denktash talks are now suspended. Even if we reversed the situation today, it would take time.

The chief loser is Karamanlis, who wants to put it behind him, to build Greek democracy. He doesn't want Cyprus to be an issue in Greek domestic politics.

McFall: Can't Karamanlis say that?

Kissinger: No.

Rhodes: What is Iakovos' role? He just gave an anti-American speech. I think they are under Makarios.
Scott: It looks to me like the Jewish interests are being imperiled by Greek interests.

Kissinger: No question about it.

President: Just prior to Henry's departure, I had down Sarbanes, Mansfield, Brademas, and Case to see if something couldn't be worked out. If we could get some action or a waiver which would require reports rather than a cutoff, that would be extremely helpful. If we could get it reasonably soon, it would be immensely helpful. I think the environment is changing.

Sparkman: I spoke to Brademas -- I got nowhere. He is set against everything.

Mahon: We have a vehicle in the CRA, and in the appropriations bill if we have the vote.

Albert: We could get a vote; that isn't the problem -- it is the votes in the House.

Cederberg: Papandreou is the problem. He is not for Karamanlis. He wants to get back in Greece.

Kissinger: You are absolutely right. Papandreou and Makarios profit by chaos. There is now coup talk in Greece.

Byrd: Can the Jewish community help?

Kissinger: My impression is that Rosenthal is trapped. He recognizes his problem but he doesn't know how to get off it.

Burton: Ben just has to be convinced on the merits. He is not playing for votes.

Sparkman: I think Ben is trying to work out something. I have the waiver sitting on my desk because I thought it was futile.

But if we could introduce by me and Case, Mansfield...

Mansfield: I would be glad to. All the leaders in both Houses.
Sparkman: If it is introduced by the leaders in both houses, we might have a chance.

Byrd: I think it is time that the Jewish community became visible in this.

Kissinger: I will talk to Dinitz. I think they are sympathetic, but I don't know how much capital they are willing to invest.

Turkey even asked Israel for spare parts. They are getting $300 million from Libya.

Mansfield: Our position is legally correct but politically wrong. We endanger our foreign policy and NATO. I support NATO.

Cederberg: If we decide these by whether there are more Greek or Turkish votes.

Anderson: Sparkman's idea may work, but we have a huge problem. If Secretary Kissinger could make himself available to the Republican and Democratic caucuses, it would help.

Kissinger: If you want, I would be happy to.

The President: What is the best legislative way to do it? The foreign aid appropriation or a CRA?

Barton: The easiest route would be for you to declare there is progress and not to oppose it, rather than reverse the legislation.

Mansfield: Legally Brademas and the others are correct; practically they are wrong. I think Phil and Byrd are right.

Cederberg: We have said before there was not sufficient progress. How can it be reversed?

Kissinger: I have to say one thing about the law: We obeyed the law last fall. We made no new contracts, but we didn't announce it. We were obeying the law but trying to get a package of concessions. But the new law cuts off even things that were already contracted for.
Before February 5, Burton's proposal could have been possible. There was not substantial progress, and Makarios would have disrupted it. Karamanlis would have been forced to support that. Since then, there has been retrogression. I don't know how it could be managed. If it is voted down, the effect could be worse.

Scott: Couldn't we have Brademas, Sarbanes and the others down here with the leaders?

Albert: It keeps within the House, not just for those.

Broomfield: How about a special envoy of the President? Dean Rusk or someone. This might be far-fetched, but it is a way to save face.

Mansfield: You downgrade the Secretary of State.

The President: I think Hugh's idea is the most practical. And tie the waiver to the CRA.

Albert: There has been no test with the new members. I think most now lean to Rosenthal.

Rhodes: Can't Ben talk with Sarbanes, Brademas, et al? If they see they are not getting the results they thought . . .

Kissinger: I have no problem with a special envoy if it's not someone who is in business for himself. It would be no reflection on me. Rusk, Bruce would be great.

Price: Any envoy short of someone from Karamanlis won't change Brademas' mind.

The President: If this would help, we would go along with Bruce. But if it didn't pay off, we will be worse off than before.

Moss: If the others could have the vital exposure I have had, I think it would work.

Burton: You would have to break through the ethnic tie-ups: Greeks, Italians, Jews, Blacks -- and limit it to this issue.
The President: Can it be limited?

Burton: Maybe under the guise of a trip report.

Cederberg: I think you have to talk to the tough ones first. If not, the wild ones will come out of the corners and blast Henry on the TV.

The President: If that is a danger, than Henry would be going out with the rug pulled out from under him. That we can't have.

The Vice President: Combine the special envoy with a waiver while it is going on.

The President: I will talk with the leaders.

Byrd: There is no substitute for convincing the Jewish community.

The President: We will talk to Dinitz. I would not agree to a special envoy if in any way that could be construed as undercutting the Secretary of State. His authority is too important to the country to risk that.

Albert: I will endorse putting in a resolution. But we shouldn't go out of here feeling we are on the move, because we aren't.

Kissinger: We would have to prepare the idea of a special envoy with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus beforehand or we end up with egg on our face.

I think we might be able to work out a lifting of aid ban in conjunction with a special envoy.

The President: We have to keep this discussion quiet.

Mahon: If word of a special envoy gets out, Kissinger will be discredited.

Griffin: This has been a very fruitful discussion but if it gets out it would be a disaster.

[The meeting ended.]
P. Hope to show some hope.

Considered nice people: 1.1.1.1.1.

Daniel's memo would have an effect.

Observation on Tramp. Talked to 2 of them.

Eisenhower: F.A.L. proven a most significant change.

This group is a very small group, but it may.

A line can be drawn from here to there.

Let me talk on certain things. (1) Q. (2) Q. (3) Q.

Eisenhower: What are we going to do? What is that going to mean? A. Talk to our friends who are abroad. Let us consider diplomatic.

A very poor country, but it does not have any strategic interests.

We are not going to occupy this area, but it should be considered.

We are not going to occupy this area, but it should be considered.

What conditions are inside which we go.

And go inside Europe, unless c.
We made up, I'm returning to 41st. Also, wanted to schedule a meeting on a regular basis to discuss the situation, and I'll continue to keep my open line of contact with you. Hope this helps.
In other words w/s very well.

There are certain limits because of uncertainty about the level of
agreement to any extension or cut in
US deficit and/or new initiatives. These
talks atrim resulted from certain
here to avoid.

They are playing up to Euros. Euros
more lending than K's wanted to
progress and take into consideration
to their potential loan.

See argument is not my argument
is not but it is a type of discussion
I could get in there by bringing
ones. As long as we deal with other
districts it would easier and more
US more than it does owe. Often a
few more and may wish to
truth to bring about this.

Omsms Western more been
US. Agreement in minimal
price. Every thing else except for
US

If we can keep insurance
ecological attention pays we will
back. And yet maintaining a stimulus
The big in action so amazing—both
in S & E were. France can post
lagnome.

A much of beating it a death,
and can't but be unsought
by foreign contact what it's happening but by a sees.

And wish best out of this as making
for happen least at minimum. This
in Spain... (Intelligence)
The White House
Washington

Phil[1] - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be in the State Department. I thought they might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Speaker - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Ford - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Nixon - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Rabin - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Carter - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Anderson - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Kissinger - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

P. Whitten - I think I've been trying to work out something. I have a number of people here who might be interested in the possibility of having a debate on some of these issues. If you are interested in this, perhaps we could arrange for a meeting.

Ford (for and opposite)
The White House
Washington
K. Because we put up signs saying if
you come in through the front
entrance, we will not suffer you to
enter. Unless we are there and
locked. Only one could be there.

P. Of course I would have been.

K. It would have been a total
different situation had I held it myself.

P. Of course I would have been.

K. I think we need to

P. I think we need to

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

K. I think we need to

VP. Florida affair. I think we

P. I don't think we need

VP. Florida affair. I think we

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

VP. Florida affair. I think we

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

VP. Florida affair. I think we

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

VP. Florida affair. I think we

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

VP. Florida affair. I think we

K. I think we need to

President. Maybe make some

VP. Florida affair. I think we
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This might, however, mean that if we would have to prepare a plan of open		Tapers, Tapers
enemies, I think we might save a great	on some slight of the kind, which might		be designed of some theory.

I'd have to say this phenomenon

which, if used to these enemy fort Window. This be of profound forces, the fort might win the game.