MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: 
Wednesday, February 19, 1975
4:10 - 5:40 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECT: 
Secretary Kissinger's Report on His Trip
to the Middle East and Europe

[The press was in briefly, and then dismissed.]

Kissinger: Gromyko was very reluctant to talk about his trip. Something is funny. I think Congress has ripped it, and it was the reaction here to Vladivostok which did it. They had thought they were doing you a favor.

Wilson said they said they wonder whether there is anyone in the U.S. who can make a binding commitment.

[The group moved to seats at the President's desk.]

The President: I appreciate being kept up to date.

Kissinger: It is almost too much -- Israeli obstructionism, and Syrian, Saudi, and Soviet as well.

Everybody abroad appreciates what you said in your speech. You are coming on as a strong courageous leader.
I talked to Giscard about it. He started high, fell off and now is recovering some (to 59 percent) now. He is a tremendous supporter of yours -- as is Wilson. Sauvagnargues said after dinner, "This is the spirit of Martinique. They are really strong now for the new spirit."

My travelling press are scared to death about what is happening to the U.S. They even said Anderson should be replaced -- that shows they are worried. We have to be careful what I tell the leaders because this could blow up.

The Israeli Government is weak. Rabin is okay but he is afraid to move and he is afraid of Peres. Allon wants to move in the right direction.

I had a two-hour lunch with Golda. She is a peasant and hates to give up the land. I could get her though, if she was the Prime Minister. The Cabinet is unbelievable. Rabin's weakness is shown by the fact that I had to have lunch with the Cabinet to win them over.

Sadat is a big man. If we pull this off, we should get him right over here. He is very worried -- but he didn't complain about his troubles.

We had a two-hour talk alone and I said we had to have something for Israel.

If we will give them a letter that Israel won't attack Syria or any of its neighbors, he won't attack Israel.

The President: Would that include Lebanon?

Kissinger: That is a problem -- I have to think of that.

On duration, he will extend UNIF about a year and agree beforehand to an extension. The Soviet Union could veto it. But he will agree to joint Egyptian-Israeli inspection teams.

The Israelis have agreed to the oil fields but not yet the passes.

The President: Do they want an indemnity?

Kissinger: It will cost us.
You can't imagine the monomania, the hysteria in Israel. There is no sense of gratitude. They demand we put our whole policy in hock to them.

The President: Did they raise MATMON B?

Kissinger: I said I wouldn't discuss until we saw what happened. I said we would go to Geneva but we would have to make proposals -- that cooled them.

If we go to Geneva with a failure, we must consider whether not to make an end of it.

The President: Did you see Dayan?

Kissinger: No. The whole Cabinet is opposed. They are vultures. You have to sympathize though, because they have seen their world position deteriorate to just us.

Sadat pleaded for some sort of arms just so he could show his military.

[There was discussion of a list and C-130s.]

The President: Asad?

Kissinger: If Asad could get something on the Golan, you would never hear of Geneva again.

You would like Asad. The Syrians and the Israelis are much alike. Asad's basic problem is he has lost 15,000 men in the war and hasn't gotten an inch. If Egypt makes big progress, he will look like a sucker to his people.

[When Asad and Nixon had their conversation last year, Nixon finally agreed to the '67 borders.]

I asked Asad what he needed. He said "Everything." I said, "What will you give for it?" He said, "Good will." I said you don't get good will for services already rendered.

It is almost impossible to move because of the Israeli villages, but if we could, we would have Geneva off our back for a year. That is what the
Soviets are afraid of. I made noises about a simultaneous step, but Asad knew.

Faisal also supported a simultaneous step. If he sticks to it, we can't pull it off. We may have to promise Sadat a follow-on step with Syria.

If Israel had a great leader, they would move jointly with Egypt and Syria and get the PLO off their back. Syria didn't mention the PLO.

If Faisal gets exercised, we have a problem. At a minimum he would need a letter that you would make an effort with Syria. As a duplicitous move, we could go to Geneva for a Syrian move and have it fail.

The President: You had been concerned whether Israel was setting us up.

Kissinger: I changed my mind. I think Rabin wants a move. Our made a good statement that Israeli security didn't depend on any particular topography.

But they are in such a difficult domestic situation they could even prefer to go to Geneva and be raped.

The President: How about Likud?

Kissinger: They just want us to be tough. This is where the Jewish leaders are hurting us. They are leading to anti-Semitism.

The President: Javits told me we should make some statement about discrimination in banking.

Kissinger: That we should do.

The Likud is sort of Fascist. Like Perle. That reminds me-- Jackson is making an issue about Romania. He is insisting no MFN without a specific number on emigration. I think we shouldn't buy it -- let him kill it.

If I told the Soviet Union we favored a step with both Egypt and Syria, but would only do Egypt separately and do Syria at Geneva, that would get Faisal off our back. To do it ourselves would be a horrible negotiation and a confrontation with Israel.
The President: I don't think we can divert you that long.

Kissinger: Schmidt said he could not have a depression, and if there was a Middle East war which threatened it, he would have to oppose us. (He (when he recovers) will make a speech of support for your energy policy. Also a statement of support for the necessity for your strong leadership.

[Javits calls. The President promises a statement against banking discrimination.]

[Discussion of tilt toward gasoline.]

The President: Javits asked for a little more tilt than was talked about last night. We can go to 6.5 or 6.6. Make a note of this, Brent. I have a feeling we will lose Sparkman.

Kissinger: Maybe not on a veto.

The President: They told me Pastore had a program and Wright had a program. They don't -- it is a mishmash and the House and Senate version don't match.

Kissinger: The Senate is perceived around the world as a menace. We look like the Fourth Republic. The Legislative Branch can't run detartrd policy.

The President: You remember Case saying we would switch if the New York Times did? He hadn't seen it. I won it. I want it sent to him and Sparkman.

Kissinger: On the Soviets. They have noticeably cooled. They didn't give us a date for the Brezhnev visit. We gave a little on CSCE and they merchandized it in their tawdry way. We have hooks to keep them on the reservation with CSCE and the summit, but the Europeans are going to move to pal up with them. Wilson was floating on air -- he is a pal. They are giving the Soviets $2.5 billion in credits; the French are too. And none of it is tied to projects.

The President: Can you mention it tomorrow?

Kissinger: They are also worried about the Chinese. Gromyko asked me if we would sign a security treaty with the Chinese. The change in our relations is just a nuance -- they are still good.
We could have gotten 38,000 Jews out, but now Gromyko won't promise any figure at all.

On Vladivostok, we are still okay. I also gave him Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only one plane is removed.

I thought maybe we should avoid two meetings close together and have CSCE in July and the summit in September.

**The President:** That may give us more time on MBFR.

**Kissinger:** We can work that out as things develop.

On energy, I wasn't aware of Treasury objections. Anyway, I don't care about the floor price -- just protected prices however it is done.

I talked with Yamani. The Saudis suggested a barter deal -- oil for aircraft -- so there is no overt decrease in price. He said, "If you go to a consumer-producer conference with a deal with a producer, you don't care if the Europeans double-cross you, because you will have a deal."

**The President:** How about the European reaction?

**Kissinger:** The British have really already done the same. The Europeans will act just like at the Washington Energy Conference. We will be making a deal, aside from oil, of about $10 billion with Iran. We could make a barter deal with him. Treasury would be a problem -- they are against it.

This is playing it rough. But if we aren't tough, we will be paying for alternative sources and the Europeans and Japanese will get the benefits.

Clements and Brown should go to Saudi Arabia. Schlesinger will be a problem but he is not trustworthy.

**The President:** Won't Schlesinger talk about a conflict of interest?

**Kissinger:** Schmidt is furious about Schlesinger talking to the CDU Parliamentarians. He is sending you a letter.
The President: This Aid amendment. I will do it, but don't you think we should go to Passman and say he has to go along on Indochina?

If this comes down with Israel and not Vietnam, I will veto.

Kissinger: What shall I do at the breakfast?

The President: I would just give a review.

Kissinger: I will also hit the Turkish thing.

We shouldn't mention oil deals. For that, get Passman down here after the Leadership meeting.
in fact that I had lunch ... could to win them over.

Said he will come. If he studied the bill, we should get him up and me too. He is very unwise - didn't complain about the trouble.

We had a big talk about it. He had to have some 

thing for.

If we will pass them on, he does not want all the sugar and that we will have to go with everything, he won't attach it.

P. Would that includeahlen?

What a pity - have to think about it.

One time he said I got VPE a year ago, 

performed on every occasion. So sought to divide it.

They will agree to quiet E-I, suspension times.

If I had appeal to oil fields but not oil gas fields.

P. Do they want stability?

K. It will last so.

You can imagine a meteorizing-tipique in it, no sense of justice. They demand another day 

in which to PASS.

P. Did they raise questions?

K. I wish we had no chance until the war what happened.

I am of the view we go in Canada but we would have to make return - that will help.

If we go in Canada we must consider what we have made an end of it.

P. Did you see Demon? They are returning.

K. I think the Cabinet said I have to say that, etc., because they have seen those could profit adequately to give us.
I asked Aram what he needed. Funnily enough, what he needed was getting used to the new world. His friends had been at it for a year now, and he was having a hard time. He felt like he was losing his identity, and he was struggling to adjust to the changes. I asked him if he had any plans for the future, and he said he was considering a career change. I asked him if he had any ideas for what he wanted to do, and he said he was still in the process of deciding. I encouraged him to think about his interests and passions, and to explore different options. He said he appreciated my advice, but he wasn't sure what he wanted to do. I told him that it was okay to take his time, and that he should do what feels right for him. He said he would keep thinking about it, and we said goodbye. I left feeling a bit nervous, but also hopeful. I knew that Aram was a smart and capable person, and I was confident that he would find his way.
depend on any particular topography.

But by and by such a life, domestic existence,
they could under pressure get canned & be canned.

P

How about blood?

K

They just went with interest, this is where Jewish
characters and domestic events they are living in and
activities.

P

Jewish, tell me one should make some statement
about discrimination in banking.

K

That we should do.

The behind of stuff Fascist, like Hitler, that
with me - Jackson is making an issue about
postwar. He is arresting six officers & I think
we shouldn’t do it - but him and hold it.


If I told, J. D. and framed a step as with E & S, but until
then, if E separately do Egypt and some. That will
just force our hand. To do it ourselves would
be a horrible accomplishment - a very difficult/ I

P

I don’t think we can twist upon that long.

K

Schmitt said he would not have a depression in
if a man comes which thanks it he would have
to appeal for. He (when he retired) will make a
stronger support for your theory. Also a
Jewish, called, I promise a statement against
banking discrimination.

Discussed his part for great foreign leadership
(Section of tilt toward Britain).

P

Jewish activist for a little more lent Thursday
talked about best light. We came to
6 or 6.4. Where a note. If you know,
I have a feeling we will be Spanish.
K. Wester met on note.
P. They told me: Forest had a guy + Wright both pay. They said it a mismatch & House Senate version don't match.
K. The Senate is finished around 1:00 until 2:00.
I missed it at 4:45 yesterday. The guy can't come detailed policy.
P. You remember I was saying for example on this.
K. No, I didn't. I hadn't seen it. I'm sorry.
P. I want it sent then & Spectrum.
K. On 5:00. They have another court. Didn't give us a date for it yet, we gave a tithe.
K. Senate & they remand it in their hands.
We have here to buy them our estimates of the CSEC summit, but Euros are going to move to pick up of them. We know more funding on domestic Alaska. They say we need 25 kid. F Sends -- not told.

K. Everyone mention in tomorrow.
K. They are trying about 50C. Tengo is asking if we would sign a security treaty with China.
The change in our relations is just a nuisance -- they are still good.
K. We could have gotten it, but now Google won't promise any funds at all.

K. What was that? I didn't quite him explain the deed that everything. I pointed that the effect would be in a bilateral economic only.
K. This means not that should consider 2 BLG.
K. We must have CSEC in July & summit in August.
I called you once. The clouds suggested a line below each, yet for a part of time we must discern in face, the sound of your step and your voice. One of many voices, echo, and you will know a debt.

I. How about Enco material?

K. That is really a close one. The Enco will not just like it. Wash energy back.

We will be making a deal aside from oil. I want to let you know, we could make a better deal with Enco. This would be a pot history of the.

This is playing it tough. Part of the capital.

You will be paying for the etcetera. etcetera.

Element 57. S.B. Sands will report but he is not technically.

P. Won't Scholle talk explicit interest?

K. Schollen is passing that Scholle with C.D.U.

Schenkshausen. It is standing for a decision.

P. This will come about. If we do it, but later from the time we should go to Pennsylvania and the north.

Ferber being done. If it will he, I will not.

K. What should I do at breakfast?

P. I would just give a news summary.