

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 19, 1975
4:10 - 5:40 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Report on His Trip
to the Middle East and Europe

[The press was in briefly, and then dismissed.]

Kissinger: Gromyko was very reluctant to talk about his trip. Something is funny. I think Congress has ripped it, and it was the reaction here to Vladivostok which did it. They had thought they were doing you a favor.

Wilson said they said they wonder whether there is anyone in the U.S. who can make a binding commitment.

[The group moved to seats at the President's desk.]

The President: I appreciate being kept up to date.

Kissinger: It is almost too much -- Israeli obstructionism, and Syrian, Saudi, and Soviet as well.

Everybody abroad appreciates what you said in your speech. You are coming on as a strong courageous leader.



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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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BY MAA, MAA, DATE 5/13/04

I talked to Giscard about it. He started high, fell off and now is recovering some (to 59 percent) now. He is a tremendous supporter of yours -- as is Wilson. Sauvagnargues said after dinner, "This is the spirit of Martinique. They are really strong now for the new spirit."

My travelling press are scared to death about what is happening to the U.S. They even said Anderson should be replaced -- that shows they are worried. We have to be careful what I tell the leaders because this could blow up.

The Israeli Government is weak. Rabin is okay but he is afraid to move and he is afraid of Peres. Allon wants to move in the right direction.

I had a two-hour lunch with Golda. She is a peasant and hates to give up the land. I could get her though, if she was the Prime Minister. The Cabinet is unbelievable. Rabin's weakness is shown by the fact that I had to have lunch with the Cabinet to win them over.

Sadat is a big man. If we pull this off, we should get him right over here. He is very worried -- but he didn't complain about his troubles.

We had a two-hour talk alone and I said we had to have something for Israel.

If we will give them a letter that Israel won't attack Syria or any of its neighbors, he won't attack Israel.

The President: Would that include Lebanon?

Kissinger: That is a problem -- I have to think of that.

On duration, he will extend UNEF a year and agree beforehand to an extension. The Soviet Union could veto it. But he will agree to joint Egyptian-Israeli inspection teams.

The Israelis have agreed to the oil fields but not yet the passes.

The President: Do they want an indemnity?

Kissinger: It will cost us.



You can't imagine the monomania, the hysteria in Israel. There is no sense of gratitude. They demand we put our whole policy in hock to them.

The President: Did they raise MATMON B?

Kissinger: I said I wouldn't discuss until we saw what happened. I said we would go to Geneva but we would have to make proposals -- that cooled them.

If we go to Geneva with a failure, we must consider whether not to make an end of it.

The President: Did you see Dayan?

Kissinger: No. The whole Cabinet is opposed. They are vultures. You have to sympathize though, because they have seen their world position deteriorate to just us.

Sadat pleaded for some sort of arms just so he could show his military.

[There was discussion of a list and C-130s.]

The President: Asad?

Kissinger: If Asad could get something on the Golan, you would never hear of Geneva again.

You would like Asad. The Syrians and the Israelis are much alike. Asad's basic problem is he has lost 15,000 men in the war and hasn't gotten an inch. If Egypt makes big progress, he will look like a sucker to his people.

[When Asad and Nixon had their conversation last year, Nixon finally agreed to the '67 borders.]

I asked Asad what he needed. He said "Everything." I said, "What will you give for it?" He said, "Good will." I said you don't get good will for services already rendered.

It is almost impossible to move because of the Israeli villages, but if we could, we would have Geneva off our back for a year. That is what the

Soviets are afraid of. I made noises about a simultaneous step, but Asad knew.

Faisal also supported a simultaneous step. If he sticks to it, we can't pull it off. We may have to promise Sadat a follow-on step with Syria.

If Israel had a great leader, they would move jointly with Egypt and Syria and get the PLO off their back. Syria didn't mention the PLO.

If Faisal gets exercised, we have a problem. At a minimum he would need a letter that you would make an effort with Syria. As a duplicitous move, we could go to Geneva for a Syrian move and have it fail.

The President: You had been concerned whether Israel was setting us up.

Kissinger: I changed my mind. I think Rabin wants a move. Gur made a good statement that Israeli security didn't depend on any particular topography.

But they are in such a difficult domestic situation they could even prefer to go to Geneva and be raped.

The President: How about Likud?

Kissinger: They just want us to be tough. This is where the Jewish leaders are hurting us. They are leading to anti-Semitism.

The President: Javits told me we should make some statement about discrimination in banking.

Kissinger: That we should do.

The Likud is sort of Fascist. Like Perle. That reminds me-- Jackson is making an issue about Romania. He is insisting no MFN without a specific number on emigration. I think we shouldn't buy it -- let him kill it.

If I told the Soviet Union we favored a step with both Egypt and Syria, but would only do Egypt separately and do Syria at Geneva, that would get Faisal off our back. To do it ourselves would be a horrible negotiation and a confrontation with Israel.



The President: I don't think we can divert you that long.

Kissinger: Schmidt said he could not have a depression, and if there was a Middle East war which threatened it, he would have to oppose us. He (when he recovers) will make a speech of support for your energy policy. Also a statement of support for the necessity for your strong leadership.

[Javits calls. The President promises a statement against banking discrimination.]

[Discussion of tilt toward gasoline.]

The President: Javits asked for a little more tilt than was talked about last night. We can go to 6.5 or 6.6. Make a note of this, Brent. I have a feeling we will lose Sparkman.

Kissinger: Maybe not on a veto.

The President: They told me Pastore had a program and Wright had a program. They don't -- it is a mishmash and the House and Senate version don't match.

Kissinger: The Senate is perceived around the world as a menace. We look like the Fourth Republic. The Legislative Branch can't run detached policy.

The President: You remember Case saying we would switch if the New York Times did? He hadn't seen it. I won it. I want it sent to him and Sparkman.

Kissinger: On the Soviets. They have noticeably cooled. They didn't give us a date for the Brezhnev visit. We gave a little on CSCE and they merchandized it in their tawdry way. We have hooks to keep them on the reservation with CSCE and the summit, but the Europeans are going to move to pal up with them. Wilson was floating on air -- he is a pal. They are giving the Soviets \$2.5 billion in credits; the French are too. And none of it is tied to projects.

The President: Can you mention it tomorrow?

Kissinger: They are also worried about the Chinese. Gromyko asked me if we would sign a security treaty with the Chinese. The change in our relations is just a nuance -- they are still good.

We could have gotten 38,000 Jews out, but now Gromyko won't promise any figure at all.

On Vladivostok, we are still okay. I also gave him Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only one plane is removed.

I thought maybe we should avoid two meetings close together and have CSCE in July and the summit in September.

The President: That may give us more time on MBFR.

Kissinger: We can work that out as things develop.

On energy, I wasn't aware of Treasury objections. Anyway, I don't care about the floor price -- just protected prices however it is done.

I talked with Yamani. The Saudis suggested a barter deal -- oil for aircraft -- so there is no overt decrease in price. He said, "If you go to a consumer-producer conference with a deal with a producer, you don't care if the Europeans double-cross you, because you will have a deal."

The President: How about the European reaction?

Kissinger: The British have really already done the same. The Europeans will act just like at the Washington Energy Conference. We will be making a deal, aside from oil, of about \$10 billion with Iran. We could make a barter deal with him. Treasury would be a problem -- they are against it.

This is playing it rough. But if we aren't tough, we will be paying for alternative sources and the Europeans and Japanese will get the benefits.

Clements and Brown should go to Saudi Arabia. Schlesinger will be a problem but he is not trustworthy.

The President: Won't Schlesinger talk about a conflict of interest?

Kissinger: Schmidt is furious about Schlesinger talking to the CDU Parliamentarians. He is sending you a letter.



The President: This Aid amendment. I will do it, but don't you think we should go to Passman and say he has to go along on Indochina?

If this comes down with Israel and not Vietnam, I will veto.

Kissinger: What shall I do at the breakfast?

The President: I would just give a review.

Kissinger: I will also hit the Turkish thing.

We shouldn't mention oil deals. For that, get Passman down here after the Leadership meeting.



✓ P/K 19 Feb 15

Wednesday
4:10-5:40 pm

Pleasant

K Group was very reluctant to talk about his trip. Somewhat is funny. I think Cory has seized it + it was a reaction here to Vlad which did it. They had thought they were doing some favor. Wilson said they said they wonder whether there is anyone in US who can make a friendly contact (wanted to talk)

P I appreciate being kept up to date.

K It is almost as much - I destruction, Syria, Saudi, SO as well.

Everybody ahead appreciates what you said in your speech. You are coming over as a strong courageous leader.


I talked to Giscard about it. He started high, fell off + now is recovering (to 50% was) same. He is tremendous supporter of yours - or is Wilson. Seno. said after dinner "This is a spirit of Mauthausen". The tunnel for Giscard comes at Mauthausen. They are really strong now face new spirit.

My traveling pros are scared to death about what is happening to US. They have said Andrus should be replaced - that shows they are worried.

We have to be careful what I tell - because some this could blow up.

I Gort is weak. Robin is OK but ~~was~~ afraid to move + afraid of Press. Allen wants to move in right direction.

I had 2 hr lunch w/ Golder. She a peasant + wants give up a hand. I could get her tho if she was 11/1. The Cabinet is unhelpful. Robin wishes show



by fact that I had lunch as / Cabinet to win them over.

Salat is a big man. If we pull this off, we should get him right over here. He is very worried - didn't complain about his troubles.

We had a 2 hr talk about & said we had to have some thing for I.

If we will give them a letter that I won't attack Syria + that we will discuss or any of its requests, he won't attack I.

P Would that include Lebanon

K That a job - hard to think of that.

One time he will visit UNEF a year & a year before hand to our extension. SO might could meet.

They will agree to joint E-I inspection terms.

~~It~~ I have agreed to oil fields but not yet a pass.

P Do they expect unanimity?

K It will cost us.

You can't imagine a neurotic, hysteric in I. No sense of gratitude. They demand we put our job in back to them.

P Did they raise Mother B

K I said ~~we~~ I wouldn't discuss until we saw what happened.

I said if we would go to Geneva but we would have to make proposals - that would them.

If we go to Geneva w/ factors we must consider whether not to make an end of it.

P Did you see Dagan they are willing

K ^{no} I think Cabinet agreed. You have to say that, tho, because they have seen their world position deteriorate to just us.

Sadat pleaded for some sort of arms just so he could show his might.

(Talk of hist + c-130's)

P Asad?

K If Asad could get something on Golan, you would never hear of Geneva again.

You would like Asad. Syria + I are much alike. Asad's basic job is he has lost 15000 + hasn't gotten an inch. If E makes big pay, he will work like a snake to his people.

(Asad - Nixon conversation & Nixon finally agreed to 67 borders)

I asked Asad what he needed - Everything. For what good will. I said you don't get good will for semi-regularly. It's about impossible to move because of F villages but if we could, we would have Geneva of our back for a year. That's what I fear. I made words about a serious step but Asad knew.

Faisal also suggested a serious step. If he sticks to it, we can't pull it off. We may have to promise Sadat to a follow on step w/ Syria.

If I had a great leader they would man jointly w/ E + S + get PhO off their back. Syria didn't mention cPhO.

If Faisal gets special, we have a job. At a minimum he would write letters that you would make an effort w/ Syria. As a duplicitous move, we could go to Geneva for a Syrian move + have it fail.

P You had better consider whether E was setting us up.

K I changed my mind. I think Robin wants a move. Our made a good statement that I security didn't

depend on any particular typography.

But they are in such a bad domestic situation they could even prefer to go to Geneva & be raped.

P How about Leland?

K They just want us to be tough. This is where Jewish leaders are beating us. They are leaning to anti-semitism.

P Janis told me we should make some statement about discrimination in banking.

K That we should do.

The Leland is sort of Fascist. Like Perle. Trent reminds me - Jackson is making an issue about Romania. He is insisting for a specific #. I think we should hit him - let him add hell it

If I told you we favored a step w/ both E & S, but would only do E separately - do Syria at Geneva. That would get Fared off our back. To do it ourselves would be a horrible negotiation & a reputation w/T.

P I don't think we can divert you that long.

K Schmitt said he could not have a depression & if a ME war which threatened it, he would have to oppose us. He (when he returns) will make a speech of support for your energy policy. Also a

(Janis calls. I promise a statement against banking discrimination).

statement of support for ^{your} strong leadership.

(Discussion of tilt toward gasoline)

P Janis asked for a little more tilt than was talked about last night. We can go to 6.5 or 6.6. Make a note of this. Kent. I have a feeling we will be Spakman.

K Maybe not on nets

P They told me Pastore had a party & Wright had a party. They don't - it's a mishmash & the House & Senate version don't match.

K The Senate is preoccupied around a world as a menace. We look like a 4th Republic. The legs can't even start policy.

* P You remember Case saying he would switch if NYT did. I ~~was~~ he hadn't seen it. I ~~found~~ it I went it sent him & Sparkman.

K On 1000. They have noticeably cooled. Didn't give us a date for the visit. We gave a little on CSE & they merchandised it in their trendy way. We have hooks to buy them on a reservation of CSE & summit, but the Europeans are going to make to feel up of them. Wilson was floating an air - a pale. They giving 2.5 bil, Ex are - not tied up.

* P In your mention in transition

K They are worried about PRC. Gromyko asked if we would sign a security treaty w/ the Chinese.

The change in our relations is just a nuance - they are still good.

We could have gotten 35,000, but now Gromyko won't promise any figures at all.

On what we still do. I also gave him Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only 1 plane removed.

I think maybe we could should avoid 2 visits close together & have CSE in July & summit in Sept.



~~Energy~~ Irving Kristol - first

P That may give us more time on NBSK

K We can work that out as ~~the~~ thing along
On energy, I wasn't aware of Treasury objections.
Anyway, I don't care about floor price - just
protected prices however it done.

I talked w/ Yonamine. The Saudis suggested
a ~~low~~ basket deal - oil for agpt so there is no
overt decrease in price. He said if you go to
c-p conf w/ a deal w/ a producer, you don't
care if Enns double cross, cause you will have
a deal.

P How about Enns reaction.

K But he has really already done some. The Enns
will not just like at Wash Energy Conf.

We will be making a deal, aside from oil, of
about 10 bil of Iran. We could make a basket
deal w/ him. Treasury would be a prob. They
oppose it. ~~But~~

This is playing it rough. But if we aren't
tough, we will be paying for all sources +
Enns & guys get a benefit.

Elements + Brun to S.A. Schles will ~~be~~ kept
but he not trustworthy.

P Won't Schles talk explicit interest

K Schmidt is furious about Schles talking to CDU
parliamentarians. He's sending you a letter

P This oil arrangement. I will do it but don't you
think we should go to Passman & say he has to
along on Indochina.

If this comes down w/ I + not VN, I will not.

K What shall I do at breakfast

P I would just give a new review



* Selection of Tank cables
- letters P + K start Calvary Tanks
- E unit within to meet.
- They are to be changed.

Office
Draw
been

K I will also hit a Tank thing.
~~I must~~ we shouldn't mention oil leak. That

get Passover done here after
Lamberting city.

