

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, February 8, 1975
8:00 - Breakfast

PLACE: Department of State

[There was a discussion of Colson's statement on leaving prison, about Kissinger's cables to Nixon in December 1972 allegedly urging a resumption of the bombing.]

Kissinger: At Martinique, Giscard and the President talked about some resumption of cooperation. The French said they would send someone over. They want to keep it secret.

Schlesinger: I see no problem with the computer.

Kissinger: How did you get the list of what they want?

Wickham: Delpêche.

Scowcroft: He and Barse had a very close relationship.

Kissinger: That can't happen. You and I have to control it.

Scowcroft: That is hard.

Kissinger: We have to dribble this out so we look forthcoming but maintain control and leverage.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # 01-55 - CIA 221 9/13/04
OSD 221 2/13/04; a/c to LR 8/24/04
By dal NARA, Date 7/7/05

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Schlesinger: We will have to let the Joint Committee in on some of it. Maybe we should get Johnny Foster back into this.

Kissinger: What do I tell Giscard?

Schlesinger: We agree in principle. That there are legal problems in the warhead area, but aside from that we can have a low-key relationship.

Kissinger: Can you space it out at least over a year?

Schlesinger: Sure.

Kissinger: Delpeche said the French want the MRV but not MIRV. They want spacing information to avoid fratricide.

We would like the requests to come into the NSC and we will pass it to you. We will do nothing except transmit it to you -- unless there is a political hold.

Schlesinger: That is fine. I don't much like the French.

Kissinger: Why are they building the fixed sites in the Massif?

Schlesinger: It forces the Soviet Union to attack, thus triggering a response by French subs.

Kissinger: Okay. I will talk to Giscard.

Schlesinger: The Shah indicates that the Iraqis are wheeling two divisions into place against Iran. We should have the intelligence community check this out. The argument is that this is the only way Iraq can get Arab support against the Kurd revolt.

The Shah will help the Turks, but he is miffed at them because of the Kurds -- they would have to open the border.

Sadat told the Shah his intelligence people could look at any Soviet equipment.

Kissinger: I think we should take them up.

Schlesinger: We would have to get a small group to list our needs.



The Shah said Sadat also wanted American arms.

[There was a discussion of the effects of the Turkish aid cutoff and national politics, etc.]

Kissinger: Rhodes and Albert wouldn't even discuss with us the composition of a team. Laird says Defense is not helping on Vietnam.

Schlesinger: That is not so. But Passman says he needs to hear from you. Mahon and Stennis say to wait a month on Vietnam.

Kissinger: Wouldn't they have then to expend ammo at the 700 rate?

Schlesinger: Mahon doesn't think he can even get a favorable committee vote right now. We think you should agree to reducing people in Phnom Penh.

Kissinger: I didn't know about it. I have no objection as long as they don't reduce the working people at the Embassy.

Dean is a pluperfect fool. He wants us to negotiate but there is no reason the Khmer Communists should negotiate while they are winning. If they last the dry season, we have a chance.

Schlesinger: But we have to get the money and get the Mekong open.

Scowcroft: Dean is down.

Schlesinger: That will give them an excuse not to give the 200.

Can you get to the liberals (Kennedy) on the DOD budget?

Kissinger: Absolutely. I will do anything. We are going down the tube. The Chinese don't like what we are doing in Cambodia, but they respect us. If we pull out, then they will like us but despise us.

Chou, when I talk to him, goes around the world verbally, cautioning us about socialists and urging us to support countries like Iran, Turkey, etc.

We can hold Taiwan for fifty years if we hold the ring against the Soviet Union.



The world balance of power is highly unfavorable. I may just barely have enough prestige left to get another disengagement in the Middle East.

Schlesinger: The IDF is trying to establish an independent channel to me. It shows the restlessness in IDF and with Allon.

Can Sadat deliver on getting the Soviets out of Aden for five million?

Kissinger: I will talk to him. But the weaker we look, the harder it gets. In this period of disintegration, they will all come at us to separate you, me and Simon. We must stick together.

Schlesinger: Simon is cutting up my budget on the Hill. Don't include him.

Kissinger: Simon was fighting the floor price idea.

If we don't get floor prices, either all energy prices will eventually be high or our dependence will be worse, or we break the price alone and Europe and Japan will get the benefit of lower prices and we will alone be stuck with the high prices.

Schlesinger: Why doesn't the President fire him? It is the worst case of undercutting the President I have ever seen.

Will you mention to Faisal the Clements trip?

Kissinger: I will, but let Clements do the talking.

Schlesinger: We have to keep Clements from naming the Shah as a bogeyman.

Kissinger: I can mention F-4 squadrons training there.

Schlesinger: On Morocco -- there is no reason to pick up the base offer.

Kissinger: Not while Spain is in turmoil.

Schlesinger: Lajes -- did you mention it to the President?

Kissinger: I did mention it. The weaker we look the more drastic action we need to restore our strength.



Schlesinger: Can we get the European countries to get Trudeau to spend more on defense? Should I mention Option 3 to Leber and Mason?

Kissinger: If we are serious we must handle it through the White House channel.

Schlesinger: Why don't we?

Kissinger: I will mention it to Gromyko.

Can we keep Colby from testifying about NSA?

Schlesinger: I told Colby not to talk about DOD assets.

Kissinger: I don't want anyone talking crypto.

Schlesinger: That's tough.

Kissinger: Claim executive privilege.

Schlesinger: We'd better talk to Buchen.

Kissinger: Bismark said people are born revolutionaries. Whether they are white or red revolutionaries is an accident.

Schlesinger: Are you prepared to move on Lajes?

Kissinger: I view sympathetically the idea of strong U.S. action to the Portuguese going Communist. I would lean toward getting NATO to do it. I think we will need something so brutal or unexpected that we bring people up short.

Look at Latin America. It isn't OPEC; it's that it no longer is glamorous to be with us. So they are they are turning to Algiers for their kicks.

[There was a discussion about President Nixon.]

Kissinger: On Middle East strategy. We are at a fork. We will eventually go to Geneva. But it is crucial how we go there. If we fail to push Israel back, Sadat will be discredited, Faisal also, and the radicals will be vindicated in their view that only pressure on the United States works.



Geneva will force us into total support of Israel and Europe and Japan will leave us. If we succeed, we will go to Geneva under conditions that only the United States has produced progress. While the structure of the debate will be the same, they won't be too tough because they will know that they need us to move further.

So we think we must bring Israel to move by whatever means necessary.

If Sadat agrees on paper to no more moves, then progress for the Arabs is only possible through Soviet pressure.

What do you think?

Schlesinger: I am staying out of it. Just tell me what to do.

Kissinger: I want to hold the LGB and F-15 for a settlement. Then it won't blow the Arabs. But if Israel refuses, we need a NSC meeting to decide what to do.

[There was discussion of the B-1. There was agreement that we needed a penetrating bomber.]



Schlesinger
4/8/75

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By dal NARA, Date 7/7/05



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(Discussion of Colson ^{statement} ~~statement~~)

K At Washington, G & P talked about some resumption of ~~work~~, Fx said they would find someone over. They want to keep it secret.

S I see no papers/computer.

K How did you get a list of what they want

W Delpesh

S C H & B have had a very close relationship

K That can't happen. You & I have to control it.

S That hard.

K We have to ~~not~~ handle this so we look forthcoming but maintain control & leverage.

S We will have to let - joint create in on some of it.

S Maybe we should get Foster back into this

K What do I tell unusual?

S We agree in principle it has an legal prob in work and area, but as a point we can have a low-key relationship

K Can you spin it out at least over a year?

S Sure.

K Delpesh said Fx want MRU but not 1/1/20. They want spinning info to avoid frustration.

We would like requests to come into NSC & pass it to you.

We will do nothing except announce it to you - unless there is political hold

S That fine. I don't much like

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the French.

K Why the fixed sites in Massif?

S It forces SO to attack, thus
triggering resp. by Fr subs.

K O.K. I will talk to General.

S Shuk indicates Iraqis are

* withdrawing 2 divisions into place
against Iran. We should have
most countries back this out.

Argument is that this early on
they can get Arab support ~~from~~
out and about.

Shah will help c. Turks, but is
tripped at that because of Kurds -
they would have to open borders.

Sednt told Shuk his intel people
could look at any Sov equip.

K I think we should take them
up

S We would have to get a small

George Conway
Cowanay Message

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group to test our needs.
Shuk said Sednt also wanted US arms.

(Discussion of Turk aid
effects, intl politics, etc)

K R Broder & Albert wouldn't even discuss
w/ies composition of a team
found says def not helping on V14

S Not so. But Passmore says he
wants to hear from you

Wahon/Steiner say to wait a
month on V14.

K Would they have them to spend arms
at a 700 rate

S Wahon doesn't think he can have
get ^{some} definite info right now.

We think you should agree to
advising people in Pakistan, etc.

K I didn't know about it. I have
no objection at being as they don't
reduce the work, people or cost.

* Read article in Commentary

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K Dean is a phony perfect fool. He wants us to negotiate but no room K C should negotiate while they are missing. If they last a dry season, we have a chance

S But we have to get a money & get a meeting open.

S - Dearden

S That will give them excuse not to give a 200.

Can you get to a lib (Kennedy) on a O&D budget

K Absolutely. I will do anything. We are going down a tube.

Chinese don't like ~~us~~ what we doing in Cambodia but they respect us. If we pull out, they will like us best drop us.

Tamim's announcement in 2/1/78

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There ~~go~~ goes around the world verbally continuing us about something + to suggest mutations like Iran, Turkey, etc.

We can hold onto Tamim for 50 yrs if we ~~of~~ hold a ring against a S.U.

The world of P. is brightly uninformative. I may just barely have any prestige left to get another dining in N.E.

S IDF trying to start indirect channel to me. It shows bitterness in IDF + us/Allen.

Can Sadat deliver on getting 500 out of Allen for 5 mil.

* K I will talk to him. But the weaker we look the harder it gets.

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See this period of chintipactin, they will all come at us to separate you, me + Simon. We must stick together.

S Simon is cutting up my budget on a Hill. Don't include him

K (Simon on floor prices)

If we don't get floor price, either all energy prices eventually high or demand will rise, or we break a price above and

Europe + Japan will get a benefit of lower prices and we will have to stick w/c high prices.

S Why doesn't P fire him, it is a worst case of indirectly CP I have ever seen.

Will you mention to ~~the~~ Faisal Clements trip?

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K I will, but let Clements do a talking.

S Home to keep Clements from warning Shaker as boyzoman.

K I can mention F4 + get us training ~~at~~ there

S Unesco - no reason to pick up a base offer

K Not while Spain in turmoil

S Hayes - did you mention it to Pres.

K I did mention. The water we look the more chaotic a train we need to restore our strength.

S Can we get Euro countries to get Truman to fund more on defense



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S * Should I mention Option 3 to
Lester & Mason.

K If you are serious we must
handle it thru WH channel

S why don't we

*K I will mention it to ~~Benjamin~~
Can we keep ~~ASA~~ Colby from
testifying about NSA.

S I told Colby not to talk about DOD
assets.

K I don't want anyone talking cryptic.

S That tough,

K Executive privilege

S Better talk to Benjamin.

K Brennan said people are being
evolutionaries. Whether they are
white or red revolutionaries is an

We have send 10 Cys of Sch. 2/24/68.

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accident.

S Are you prepared to move on
Lafayette?

R I view strong US activity Post
going best sympathetically. I would
lean toward getting NATO to do it
I think we will need something
so brutal or unexpected that
we ~~can~~ ~~be~~ bring people up
short.

Look at D.A. It isn't OPEC,
it is that it no longer glamorous
to be w/no. So they turning to
Algeria & other banks.

(Nixon discussion)

R ME strategy. We are at a peak. We
eventually will go to Geneva. But
crucial now. If we fail to push
I back, Soviet discredited, Soviet

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also, radicals indicated that
only presence on US works.

Comma will proceed with total
support of I and Euro pay
will be easier.

If we succeed - we will go to work
under conditions that only US has
produced prog. - while structure of a
debate will be a same, they
won't be too tough because they
will know that they need
us to move further.

So we think we must bring
I to mind by whatever means
necessary.

If Sadat agrees and goes to
no more moves, then progress
for Arabs only possible then

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Saw passage.

What do you think?

S I staying out of it, just tell
me what to do.

K I want to hold LGB + F-15

~~to~~ for a settlement.

Then it won't be a cross.

But if I refuse, we need a
NSC meeting to decide what to do.

(B-1) discussion. Agreement
we need a penetrating broker)

