MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense  
Major General John Wickham, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:  
Saturday, February 8, 1975  
8:00 - Breakfast

PLACE:  
Department of State

[There was a discussion of Colson's statement on leaving prison, about Kissinger's cables to Nixon in December 1972 allegedly urging a resumption of the bombing.]

Kissinger: At Martinique, Giscard and the President talked about some resumption of cooperation. The French said they would send someone over. They want to keep it secret.

Schlesinger: I see no problem with the computer.

Kissinger: How did you get the list of what they want?

Wickham: Delpeche.

Scowcroft: He and Barse had a very close relationship.

Kissinger: That can't happen. You and I have to control it.

Scowcroft: That is hard.

Kissinger: We have to dribble this out so we look forthcoming but maintain control and leverage.
Schlesinger: We will have to let the Joint Committee in on some of it. Maybe we should get Johnny Foster back into this.

Kissinger: What do I tell Giscard?

Schlesinger: We agree in principle. That there are legal problems in the warhead area, but aside from that we can have a low-key relationship.

Kissinger: Can you space it out at least over a year?

Schlesinger: Sure.

Kissinger: Delpeche said the French want the MRV but not MIRV. They want spacing information to avoid fratricide.

We would like the requests to come into the NSC and we will pass it to you. We will do nothing except transmit it to you unless there is a political hold.

Schlesinger: That is fine. I don't much like the French.

Kissinger: Why are they building the fixed sites in the Massif?

Schlesinger: It forces the Soviet Union to attack, thus triggering a response by French subs.

Kissinger: Okay. I will talk to Giscard.

Schlesinger: The Shah indicates that the Iraqis are wheeling two divisions into place against Iran. We should have the intelligence community check this out. The argument is that this is the only way Iraq can get Arab support against the Kurd revolt.

The Shah will help the Turks, but he is miffed at them because of the Kurds -- they would have to open the border.

Sadat told the Shah his intelligence people could look at any Soviet equipment.

Kissinger: I think we should take them up.

Schlesinger: We would have to get a small group to list our needs.
The Shah said Sadat also wanted American arms.

[There was a discussion of the effects of the Turkish aid cutoff and national politics, etc.]

**Kissinger:** Rhodes and Albert wouldn't even discuss with us the composition of a team. Laird says Defense is not helping on Vietnam.

**Schlesinger:** That is not so. But Passman says he needs to hear from you, Mahon and Stennis say to wait a month on Vietnam.

**Kissinger:** Wouldn't they have then to expend ammo at the 700 rate?

**Schlesinger:** Mahon doesn't think he can even get a favorable committee vote right now. We think you should agree to reducing people in Phnom Penh.

**Kissinger:** I didn't know about it. I have no objection as long as they don't reduce the working people at the Embassy.

Dean is a pluperfect fool. He wants us to negotiate but there is no reason the Khmer Communists should negotiate while they are winning. If they last the dry season, we have a chance.

**Schlesinger:** But we have to get the money and get the Mekong open.

**Scowcroft:** Dean is down.

**Schlesinger:** That will give them an excuse not to give the 200.

Can you get to the liberals (Kennedy) on the DOD budget?

**Kissinger:** Absolutely. I will do anything. We are going down the tube. The Chinese don't like what we are doing in Cambodia, but they respect us. If we pull out, then they will like us but despise us.

Chou, when I talk to him, goes around the world verbally, cautioning us about socialists and urging us to support countries like Iran, Turkey, etc.

We can hold Taiwan for fifty years if we hold the ring against the Soviet Union.
The world balance of power is highly unfavorable. I may just barely have enough prestige left to get another disengagement in the Middle East.

**Schlesinger:** The IDF is trying to establish an independent channel to me. It shows the restlessness in IDF and with Allon.

Can Sadat deliver on getting the Soviets out of Aden for five million?

**Kissinger:** I will talk to him. But the weaker we look, the harder it gets. In this period of disintegration, they will all come at us to separate you, me and Simon. We must stick together.

**Schlesinger:** Simon is cutting up my budget on the Hill. Don't include him.

**Kissinger:** Simon was fighting the floor price idea.

If we don't get floor prices, either all energy prices will eventually be high or our dependence will be worse, or we break the price alone and Europe and Japan will get the benefit of lower prices and we will alone be stuck with the high prices.

**Schlesinger:** Why doesn't the President fire him? It is the worst case of undercutting the President I have ever seen.

Will you mention to Faisal the Clements trip?

**Kissinger:** I will, but let Clements do the talking.

**Schlesinger:** We have to keep Clements from naming the Shah as a bogeyman.

**Kissinger:** I can mention F-4 squadrons training there.

**Schlesinger:** On Morocco -- there is no reason to pick up the base offer.

**Kissinger:** Not while Spain is in turmoil.

**Schlesinger:** Lajes -- did you mention it to the President?

**Kissinger:** I did mention it. The weaker we look the more drastic action we need to restore our strength.
Schlesinger: Can we get the European countries to get Trudeau to spend more on defense? Should I mention Option 3 to Leber and Mason?

Kissinger: If we are serious we must handle it through the White House channel.

Schlesinger: Why don't we?

Kissinger: I will mention it to Gromyko.

Can we keep Colby from testifying about NSA?

Schlesinger: I told Colby not to talk about DOD assets.

Kissinger: I don't want anyone talking crypto.

Schlesinger: That's tough.

Kissinger: Claim executive privilege.

Schlesinger: We'd better talk to Buchen.

Kissinger: Bismark said people are born revolutionaries. Whether they are white or red revolutionaries is an accident.

Schlesinger: Are you prepared to move on Lajes?

Kissinger: I view sympathetically the idea of strong U.S. action to the Portuguese govt Communist. I would lean toward getting NATO to do it. I think we will need something so brutal or unexpected that we bring people up short.

Look at Latin America. It isn't OPEC; it's that it no longer is glamorous to be with us. So they are they are turning to Algiers for their kicks.

[There was a discussion about President Nixon.]

Kissinger: On Middle East strategy. We are at a fork. We will eventually go to Geneva. But it is crucial how we go there. If we fail to push Israel back, Sadat will be discredited, Faisal also, and the radicals will be vindicated in their view that only pressure on the United States works.
Geneva will force us into total support of Israel and Europe and Japan will leave us. If we succeed, we will go to Geneva under conditions that only the United States has produced progress. While the structure of the debate will be the same, they won't be too tough because they will know that they need us to move further.

So we think we must bring Israel to move by whatever means necessary.

If Sadat agrees on paper to no more moves, then progress for the Arabs is only possible through Soviet pressure.

What do you think?

Schlesinger: I am staying out of it. Just tell me what to do.

Kissinger: I want to hold the LGB and F-15 for a settlement. Then it won't blow the Arabs. But if Israel refuses, we need a NSC meeting to decide what to do.

[There was discussion of the B-1. There was agreement that we needed a penetrating bomber.]
K at Washington, G and P talked about some restriction of 

Then we found some answers. 
They want to keep it secret. 
S I see two parts/segments. 
K How did you get a hint of what they want? 
W Ralph had some hints from us. 
S He had a very close relationship, 
K That's what happened. You're close. 
S That's right. 
K You were close, but not personal. 
S We will have to sit on some of it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the French.
K Why the fiddly bits in Moscow?
S It just feels US to attack, this
thingy thing, by & from.
K OK, Smith tells & General.
S Shirk indicates Singapore are
already 2 chomping into place
against them. We should have
most communists attack them.
Agreement is that this can be
ploy to get Chou support for
our end result.
Smith will help a tank but is
unified with our Secretary Marshall
they would have to jump onto.
Shirk tells there is such tough
work left at my own expense.
K S 2 think we should take them.
S We should have to get a small

group to last 14 weeks.
Smith says, fuel and armament 04
means.

(Debate of Tank and
effects, with plotter, etc)
K R Funky's Albert wouldn't even throw
after confusion of a tank
handicap 24 short before an 84
S Not so. But everyone says he
needs to learn from you
hurricane dinner. Only a month in
84.
K Woulid they have time to spend on
it? 2040 weeks.
S Nor can't because he can even,
yet demand both right issues.
We think your should agree to
attaining offset in step with.
K It's good known about it. I have
no objections thing as they down.
reduce the running, peep at least.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

N. Dean is a pleasant sort. He
wants us to negotiate but no
seem KC would negotiate while
they are winning. If they lost
next season, we have a chance
But we have to get a strong after
though season.

S. Deventer
S. That will give them chance next
not
to win 2-2 or 1-1.

I am going to Brussels (Kennedy)
next week.

K. Absolutely, I will do anything.
We are going through the
Church, don't like what we
doing in Parliament, but they
insist on us. If we pull out, they
will like no doubt.

Turner amendment in 2 weeks.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Three years around the world
rumbled, simmering, rehashing
and spread. Situation today, 32

We can hold onto Truman for
so long if we trouble with
against S.U.

The word Big three. In Europe.
I may just barely have any
pression left to put against them.

S. I don't think this subject should
be. At times Williams in
D.F. w/Allen.
Can scold Sullivan getting secret
of Allen for 4 mil.

K. I will talk to him. But the
weakness in both the hands it
gets.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For this period of chemotherapy, they will all come at me to separate you, me & Simon. We must stick together.

S Simon is putting up my budget once again. Don't include him.

K (Simon on floor pain)

S While we don't get floor pain, within our current prices significantly higher a good price margin, or we have a price above and from Japan will get a benefit of lower prices and we will above the shock of higher prices.

K While I don't see him, it's a matter of indifference.

S Have ever seen

Will you sign the contract?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S: Should I mention Option 5 to
helen Haarman.
K. open and foreign we must
make at Three WH channels.
S. why don't we
K. I think I would mention it to
K. Can we keep both Colly
in talking about NSA.
S: I think Colly not to talk about
assets.
K I don't want anyone talking about.
S: That tough.
K. Education privilege.
S. Better talk to Bankman.
K. Brunner andوفي have
been revolutionary. Whether they are
whether and revolutionary is an
accident.
S: Are you prepared to move on
K. I now strongly US admit that
going to get the US to do.
I think we will need seriously to
accept how we imagine that
are going people up.
Look at A. B and BPC, it
is that it. Are larger plannings
to be done. So they would be
all year three weeks.
(Peter Murphy)
K. We planing, we are at a lot. We
eventually will go to Canada. But
second time. If we find to pack
I don't, said accredited friend
also, neither indicates that only presence of US would cause a fratricidal war; as US has not checked on total support if I am. Even, Pope will check us.

If we succeed, we will go to known similar conditions that US has pursued from White Summer. In such a claim, they won't be tough because they would know that they need us to move further. So we think we must bring I to mind by whatever means.

If I doubt agrees we get me more moves, then perhaps for deals only possibly there.