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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, February 5, 1975
3:55 - 4:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Secretary's Office
The White House

[There was an extended conversation about Danny Kaye and the Bradens' dinner Saturday night which the Secretary missed because he was working on his National Press Club speech.]

Kissinger: I can see you got something.

Dinitz: No, I've got one thing: We got word from the Department of Defense the day before yesterday that the letter of offer for the F-15 is being held up because there is a Congressional committee looking into the Iranian-US deal and therefore we will have to wait. I got this from General Sumner -- so I immediately called Brent.

Scowcroft: It's true. Congress is questioning the R&D cost allocation for foreign sales and specifically the Iranian deal, and also generally how you allocate the costs. So the Department of Defense isn't in a position to say what it will be.

Dinitz: In Israel they think it is a trick. But can't they give us a letter now anyway?
Kissinger: I never knew the status of the letter. For weeks it was supposed to be in the State Department, which turned out to be not true.

Scowcroft: It must lie before Congress 21 days if it's over a certain amount.

Dinitz: Can't we get a letter saying "pending the determination of the R&D allocation"? Because we can't put in orders and specifications without a letter. We can't send our technical people, and can't place our orders.

Kissinger: Let me look into the question of whether it is possible to send technical people without the letter of offer.

Scowcroft: I'll check.

Dinitz: That will ease things.

Kissinger: But that means it will be in the papers.

Dinitz: It was in the papers because the Pentagon put it out. You know it was not in Israel.

Kissinger: I know nothing of the sort.

Dinitz: On military things there is censorship.

Kissinger: Yes. But everything else . . .

Dinitz: With all this in the papers about the millions in arms going to Saudi Arabia . . .

Kissinger: Most of it isn't true. And it is F-5E's, which you wouldn't take.

Dinitz: We have the reports. With the Maverick, the laser-designator, according to the papers. There is not a single item that some Americans in the Pentagon aren't worried about this equipment going -- getting into the hands of the Russians.

Kissinger: "Some Americans!" They are the ones who made the decision. It was never checked over here in detail. F-5E's aren't even considered sophisticated weapons.
Brent, get me the Saudi list, so I'll have it on the trip.

Dinitz: We learn that the French are sending at least 48 of their most advanced Mirages. You don't think I don't have a case.

Kissinger: You have a case, but it is not something I have any knowledge of in particular.

Dinitz: The Foreign Minister didn't imply this.

Shalev [to Dinitz]: Nor you.

Dinitz: Neither did I. We need your help. But with these Saudi deals and Mirages, for us to be kept waiting for weeks .... Schlesinger kept telling us it would come within weeks.

Kissinger: He said it was in State, which I didn't know.

Dinitz: The fact is it was promised us by President Nixon and also by President Ford. It was in a letter by President Nixon -- "the most advanced planes."

Kissinger: That doesn't mean you can expect to come in and get it the next day. But let's see whether the technical teams can come. We will check.

Dinitz: I know you get upset.

Kissinger: I get upset because whenever I want to talk about the negotiations, to get you in a good mood you want weapons. And I know Rabin's strategy!

Dinitz: From our point of view, whenever there are negotiations, something is withheld.

Kissinger: Because whenever you get something you come in with new items, so there is something always outstanding.

Dinitz: But the decision on the F-15 was made. First there was a delay in the pricing data, then a requirement of a letter of offer was invented.

Kissinger: Look into this, Brent. And tell him [Dinitz] 15 minutes before he leaves [for Israel], otherwise he'll find out some other item.
Dinitz: If you want, I'll document how long it takes for us to get stuff compared to what the Saudis get. And we feel, frankly, that you are doing too much, with no guarantees, they won't go to the Egyptians.

Scowcroft: They have to learn to fly them first.

Dinitz: But you're training them. It's a great concern to us, I have to say.

Kissinger: I call you in for a half hour, and within minutes I am on the defensive. [He shows Dinitz a press summary of an item in the Jerusalem Post.]

Dinitz: [Reads it] Blitzer. This isn't true, most of it.

Kissinger: It is true that Sadat pressed me to allot as much time as possible to the Middle East and that I told you.

[Kissinger leaves the office for a moment to take a call.]

Shalev: [to Scowcroft] Is there anything on the Kurds?

Scowcroft: I was going to call you. I'm afraid there is no better way to handle it than to add it on to the regular requests.

Shalev: But it depends on Congressional approval.

Scowcroft: Congress's record in responsiveness to Israel's requests is not bad.

[Kissinger returns. Scowcroft and Dinitz resumed their discussion of the Kurdish problem at the end of the meeting when the Secretary left. See at end.]

Dinitz: This leak is a month old.

Scowcroft: The backlog of leaks is so great that there's a lag!

Shalev: It's not from us.

Dinitz: It must be someone in Washington. I found out the system: American correspondents meet often with Israeli press here and they are a great source of information. They hear it in the Department and report to the Israelis.

I heard you had a good meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday.
Kissinger: Everyone tells me it was a good meeting. I don't know.

Dinitz: To go back to the F-15, I have to read this message from the Foreign Minister: "Even if I believe the delay is purely bureaucratic, it will be misread in Israel."

Kissinger: When he was here he said we had to take care of what was on his mind then. Now it is something else.

Dinitz: The F-15 wasn't a problem then.

Kissinger: I haven't heard there was a F-15 problem until two days ago. If there is a problem with the technical team, I never heard there was any problem.

Dinitz: The second message is that Allon is happy to learn that your trip in Israel will be longer. The third point...

Kissinger: But I need my sleep. That's nice. What is the third point? If must be a lulu if you're saving it.

Dinitz: The third point is to reemphasize again how seriously we view the situation of the Jews in Syria, and while we understand the need for $25 million [for Syria], we hope you will raise it in Damascus.

Because -- don't write this -- the decision in Israel was to fight the $25 million, but I'm not doing it.

Kissinger: You want to start anti-Semitism here?

Dinitz: So you will raise it with Asad.

Kissinger: And the answer will certainly be negative.

Dinitz: In Congress they think you just want a free hand.

Kissinger: That's not the issue. I'd be willing to work out with the Congress some sensible arrangements which work. But what I really worry about is the Turkey cutoff, the Chile cutoff, this systematic campaign to cut off allies.

Dinitz: I know that. I've been working my heart off telling people you weren't behind the Percy statements.

Kissinger: You know what I think about Percy. If he does it, it must be because he thinks it's popular.
Dinitz: Percy ties it in with your efforts.

Kissinger: He can tie it in; I've made my view clear at the Press Club on the PLO. There has never been any ambiguity. If I want to be flexible, I don't send Percy into the Middle East.

Dinitz: I answer them that if the Secretary wants to be flexible on the Middle East, he wouldn't send Percy making statements on this just before the trip there.

Kissinger: Jackson, Perle, and company are trying to separate me from the Jewish community.

Dinitz: They are saying that if you knew of Gromyko's letter of October 26, you should have told them.

Kissinger: I testified on December 3 before the Senate Finance Committee that the Russians would say there was no commitment. I had said it for a year. If my predictions come true, I can't be blamed. If they put out stories that they forced us to change "informed" to "assured," and cite the Jackson letter -- which has no standing as a legal document -- and add the EX-IM bill on, and go on Face the Nation, which brought a formal protest, and go around saying it shows how tough we can be ... I told the Jewish leaders for two years what would happen. They didn't stand up to Jackson.

Dinitz: In Congress, I'm trying to maintain the position of Israel.

Kissinger: I welcome it. But many people are trying to turn the Jewish community into distrust here, and to return to Geneva.

Dinitz: By the way, I don't think the Geneva talk comes from Israel. It comes from the misguided George Balls. If you read what Peres said closely, he's saying that only if the negotiations fail, etc.

Kissinger: One other matter. In the category of the negotiations with Jordan, Allon and Peres approached Schmidt to establish contact with the Soviet Union. Of course, Schmidt checked with us. I didn't tell the President, but unfortunately, Schmidt talked to the President on the phone and mentioned it. You can have all the contact you want with the Soviet Union.

Dinitz: I told you about it in full.
Kissinger: Right. But it's not confidence-inspiring. In the previous government, you told us about these minor contacts, which weren't important but it was confidence-inspiring.

Dinitz: I'll check in Israel.

Kissinger: It's from Schmidt. Maybe it isn't true. There were two messages -- one, to keep Genscher out of it, and two, the message was passed in Berlin. We encouraged them to do it -- so it isn't that we object.

Dinitz: It doesn't make sense.

Kissinger: Because there was nothing in it for you. And they passed the message on Saturday, in case you don't know. Don't put it in writing.

Dinitz: No. I'll raise it in Israel.

Kissinger: I'm seeing Gromyko. It's the stupidest time for him to go to the Middle East.

We got a letter from Brezhnev. Did we tell you?

Dinitz: No.

Kissinger: Then we failed on that. The letter was filled with detail; so maybe, it was not him. They proposed a meeting before I go to the Middle East. We proposed that we meet afterward. But I'll talk to Allon and Rabin first, and I'll stick scrupulously to what we discuss so we'll have a common position.

Dinitz: Dobrynin has had meetings with the Washington Post, and meetings with individual Congressmen. Did you know this?

Kissinger: No.

Dinitz: To undermine step-by-step, and saying Geneva is the only solution. And he is very careful not to attack you: He talks about "my good friend, Henry. He says, "We are peaceloving, why not let us sit in?" and "Why not have us in UNEF?"
Kissinger: Which will be very popular here among your stupid liberal friends. Even Jackson, the way he's evolving.

Dinitz: You'll be happy to know he [Jackson] is against Geneva and supports your step-by-step. He thinks well of you. He says Sadat is good but it may not last, and who'll come afterward?

Kissinger: If he'd stuck to his position of three years ago, which wasn't the same position as the Administration, I'd be supporting him as the best Democrat to be President.

Dinitz: On [his criticism of the Kissinger interview in] Business Week, his explanation is that he meant it's unwise to say it publicly but not to say it privately.

Kissinger: You know we have been saying it privately to every Arab Foreign Minister. And you see not a peep out of the Syrians since then. The ones who are screaming -- it's in their interest. It allows the Saudis to say they won't be part of another embargo. It helps in the second stage of negotiations. It turned out to be very helpful.

Dinitz: And very popular, if Lou Harris had told you. There is growing identification with the tough line.

You wanted to say something about your trip.

Kissinger: On the trip, I've nothing to add to what I've told you about the trip previously.

Dinitz: Is there nothing from the Egyptians?

Kissinger: No, and I don't expect much.

Shalev: We have a report here on Sadat's visit to Paris. It's in Hebrew, but I can give you the points. [He reads:]

"This is based on talks with Fahmy and on a dinner that the two Presidents had together and on some reports we had on Giscard's impressions.

"(a) Giscard was very much impressed by Sadat, his moderation, and his desire to solve Egypt's problems.
"(b) Contrary to impressions gained by Sauvagnargues during his visit to Cairo, Sadat and Fahmy this time displayed much optimism with respect to prospects of achieving concrete results by March of a step-by-step approach. This optimism was based on their appreciation that the United States Government is in need of achievements in order to strengthen its image, which has been weakened, and one of the areas in which President Ford and Secretary Kissinger can hope for achievements is the Middle East.

"(c) Egypt does not see what concessions it can make to Israel. Fahmy hinted that Egypt might be ready for some compromise in this respect, provided it would not require an express Egyptian statement. Asked by Sauvagnargues about Israeli cargoes through the Canal, Fahmy said that the cargoes should not bear Israeli labels. For example, cargoes on their way to Israel should be F.O.B., not C.I.F. Haifa. (Which implies that cargoes from Israel would have to be C.I.F. Port of destination.) [F.O.B. means still property of sender; C.I.F. means property of recipient.]

"(d) Fahmy emphasized that real Egyptian concessions will be made only in Geneva. In a new disengagement, Egypt will not be able to agree to an extension of the UNEF mandate beyond the existing one.

"(e) Egypt does not link a new Egyptian disengagement agreement with Syria. The Egyptians think the United States will take care of that on its own and there is no need for Egyptian pressure or for making this an Egyptian precondition. Apparently Syria understands this Egyptian attitude and there is today relative flexibility in Damascus compared to in the past.

"(f) As soon as the next step is done, Egypt will require a reconvening of the Geneva Conference. Egypt accepts that in the first stage the PLO will not be taking part but this will be necessary as the Conference goes on. The Syrians accept this attitude. With respect to the Geneva Conference, Fahmy also said: "It will be on our
terms and not on the Israeli terms."  The French evaluation of this is: Under these conditions, if Egypt is prepared to make concessions only at Geneva, the French ask themselves why there is any need for a new disengagement now, and why not go straight to Geneva, provided that Geneva would be properly prepared by Kissinger to prevent its breaking up right after its renewal?

"(g) Sadat was very outspoken against the Soviet Union but he doesn't want to bring about any break. Fahmy didn't say anything about Brezhnev's health but did say opponents of Brezhnev's line in the Politburo have gained additional strength and they can now make their points with greater force. Fahmy also believes detente has been dealt a greater blow than the Soviets and Americans are prepared to admit publicly.

"(h) Gromyko's visit to Damascus and Cairo, according to Fahmy, is supposed to show that the Soviet Union knew all about Kissinger's political steps. Cairo agreed to Gromyko's proposal to have the visit before Kissinger's visit also in order to prevent the impression being gained that there is any break between the two countries, especially since Brezhnev's visit was postponed. The French assume Gromyko also wants to make sure in Damascus that the Syrian position has not become too soft.

"(i) Giscard agreed to provide Sadat with 45 to 50 Mirage F-1's. Sadat didn't say who would be paying for it but the French assume it will be Saudi Arabia. The deal will take several years. Sauvagnargues asked Fahmy about reports in the papers that Iran agreed to provide Israel with oil if she will return Abu Rudeis. Fahmy said he had also read about it and said "it is none of my business." The French think there must be something to it."

[The Secretary conferred with Dinitz alone for 10 minutes, and then departed.]

Percy: Minister Shalev read to Mr. Rodman the following items about Senator Percy:
An aide to a senior senator on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was told by a reliable source on the committee staff that both Senators Sparkman and Percy's recent remarks on the Middle East were "programmed" by Kissinger.

"The committee source referred to the senators as Kissinger's "point men." Apparently, the staff of the two senators were not informed or consulted prior to the release of the statements and, according to this source, we can expect further fall-out."

To show that Percy himself is partly responsible for these misleading impressions, Shalev provided this Percy quote: "I think Israel missed some opportunities in the past to negotiate with Hussein, a moderate, a man highly regarded by Israel and its leaders. Now we have Arafat, behind whom every Arab Government has united. Relative to others, Arafat is more moderate than the other extremists. If he fails, those who succeed him will be more extremist. So, I fully support what Secretary Kissinger is doing now, and I hope in a step-by-step approach Israel will find the opportunity to negotiate and use diplomacy towards peace and not make a preemptive strike."

Kurds

After the Secretary's departure, General Scowcroft discussed further with Ambassador Dinitz and Minister Shalev the problem of aiding the Kurds. General Scowcroft repeated that the only feasible method was to add the $28 million to the next year's budget. The White House would add $28 million to whatever aid figure came out of the bureaucracies. To try to add it on now in a supplemental would call attention to it and require a justification for the $28 million.

As for the requirement of cash payment, which the Israelis would use to make purchases in Europe, the only solution seemed to be to ask the Shah. This would take care of part of the $28 million.