MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 5, 1975
10:30 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted briefly for photographs]

President: I can remember when I first met Ambassador Byroade in 1953. I was on a subcommittee on foreign aid.

Byroade: I was Assistant Secretary for NEA.

President: You had just gotten out of the military.

I am pleased to have you here, Mr. Prime Minister, as well as your wife and your two children.

My whole career I have felt that American foreign policy has to look at the whole world and not just in its narrow interests. For us to lapse into the policy of the 1920's and 30's would be disaster. So we want to work with you and other countries for stability and progress. Our efforts -- and those of all the departments of our Government -- will aim at that.
You have traveled recently. I would appreciate hearing your observations.

Bhutto: I wish to thank you for your hospitable welcome. I am sorry to impose on the American taxpayers. I was here just last year, but there are so many complex issues I thought we needed this opportunity to exchange views. Thank you for asking about my children. Ahmed thinks undergraduates should study at home and go abroad afterward. I disagree -- I went to Berkeley in 1947 and I learned much and I admire the vitality and strength of the United States.

For two decades, to those of us who live in the Middle East and South Asia, the American presence was thought to be omnipresent. Now the view is that the American presence is weakening. I think now this view is accurate. But if the pendulum swings too far, it is bad. We don't think the U.S. is exhausted and that after Vietnam, the U.S. wants to withdraw into a shell. We welcome your statements that the U.S. must play a strong role in the world. There are some basic factors on which we rely. For us -- especially after 1971 when we broke up. I was in New York and met Kissinger there.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister took over under very tragic conditions and behaved magnificently.

Bhutto: It was a painful experience, but the U.S. behaved very responsibly in stabilizing the situation and not letting it fall to pieces.

We don't understand India's objections to the relative stability of Pakistan. India's idea seems to be total security for India and total insecurity for Pakistan. We can understand her wanting to be recognized as the most powerful and most important power in South Asia, but she abuses that. It was India which previously dismembered us, with Soviet help. In Kashmir also, India behaved badly and now is maneuvering again.

India is not our only neighbor. We have good relations with all of them and are working to improve those with Afghanistan.

For the last three years -- and really since 1965 -- we have been discussing this [arms embargo] matter. We have not tried to add to your complications. Our attitude is of patience and understanding. But the international situation has become more complex and a policy change is now more imperative. If it is a matter of timing, I would like to give a thought or two. The situation may get more complex. With Congress, the Turkey matter is a tragedy. Congressmen think when they are elected they become foreign policy experts.
President: The Congress have put us in a very difficult situation with Turkey.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister knows Turkey well through his CENTO associations.

President: Congress is now very defensive on it. It is a matter of how they can extricate themselves and save face. We are working on it.

Bhutto: Ecevit had to take the action he did. His position was so tenuous, with the military, he had to do that. An embargo on allies, one after another, is not the best way to run a good alliance. So we think the passage of time may complicate this. Basically, the position of Turkey and Pakistan is the same. As time passes, the disenchantment between Pakistan and Congress increases.

As far as India is concerned, we have taken the Simla route. Now India, if the embargo is not lifted, will say she has won; if it is, she will say it is a slap in the face.

If on the merits -- the substance -- there is agreement, I am ready to talk about the timing.

Putting myself in your shoes, which I try to do, I think with the Congressional situation, the Simla process maturing, the Middle East, and so on, that now is the most valuable time to come. Chavan is coming next month. There will be much speculation. If it happens after that, India will be more aggrieved.

President: It is obvious that Henry and I have worked together very closely. Our views are identical. When he speaks, he speaks for me. Our views have matched. On the substance, you are correct -- we have decided to go along with the matter of sales. It is a matter of timing, so let's forget the substance.

I understand your interest in the revised announcement. We have some problems. Henry, why don't you explain.

Kissinger: We promised India we would give them a chance to comment before making a decision. That will take a few days, and we have to do it.
Next week, I and all my people will be out of the country if there is a Congressional uproar. If Chavan cancels his trip, that would compound the problem. So we have two options: To announce it in two weeks and take our chances on Chavan, or hold until after his visit. In either case, the decision won't change. We have created a climate for the change and we can probably manage. The choice is to do it the end of this month or in early April. The decision won't change. The question is how to proceed and what to say now.

President: Let me give you something which might be helpful in a decision. I decided Saturday on the PL 480 allotments. You know we promised you 100,000 tons; my decision allows us to provide you 300,000 more tons. We have not yet announced it, but we can do that any time.

Henry, do you want to say something on the Middle East?

Kissinger: Our plan is as follows: I don't plan to settle anything on this trip, but to tell Israel some facts of life. The chances of another settlement are about 60-40 by the middle of March. That will create a good climate for April, but we want your views.

Bhutto: I want to be candid and speak our point of view. With all due respect to Moynihan, he made a tempest in a teacup by agreeing with the Indian position. In the Algerian war, the French were doing barbaric things but always defended their position. They never flinched. To hear Moynihan support India -- which is music to their ears -- is an act of a simpleton. He has a simple face -- I didn't know his mind matched.

It is not a matter of an arms race. We can't match India. We didn't take exception to Kissinger's statement about India's being the principal state in the subcontinent -- though we don't agree. We kept quiet. The U.S. has chosen in the past to spoil India. But now, her position is so precarious -- there may be a few speeches in Parliament, and a few articles, but weighted in the balance it will be a tempest in a teacup. So I think it is better to do it before Chavan comes, so you don't have to argue it out with him and he goes back to say he failed. Putting it off I think makes it more complicated.

Kissinger: It shouldn't be before I return.

Bhutto: I accept that. But before Chavan.
Ahmed: I agree. But I am baffled by the limitation of $25 million. Weapons are expensive. That is a slap in the face.

Kissinger: That was your figure. We wouldn't announce a figure, just cash sales. The important thing is the principle -- this would allow third-country sales. You must permit us to manage it here -- we will stress the defensiveness of your needs. We say it is not right to embargo a friend, and it's strengthening your defensive capability. Once it is lifted, the Congress would need an act to change it. We will emphasize the small size and the defensive character at first to minimize the reaction. If the weapons would be TOW rather than attack aircraft, that would help. We can work out a schedule.

Bhutto: I agree entirely. It should be defended on the basis of principle. An evolutionary process which starts the ball rolling is fine. We don't want to characterize it. We understand. But there is no limit in principle.

Kissinger: Your press will have to handle it so it doesn't sound like hundreds of millions.

Bhutto: I will do it so it doesn't upset the applecart. But if it is a fait accompli before Chavan comes, the storm will be over.

President: Let me discuss it with Kissinger.

Bhutto: You have other things to take up with him -- commercial credits, fertilizer, etcetera.

Second, on PL 480: We are very grateful. But I came all this way for scotch and soda and got a Coca Cola. The PL 480 is now more important than the arms, but it is a matter of presentation. We will have to make adjustments. So if you could announce it by the end of February, we would appreciate it.

President: I am not clear how you want the PL 480.

Bhutto: In low key.

Kissinger: We could put it in a joint statement.

If we could say to the Congress that we had discussed your nuclear program, that would help much. If we could say we achieved some nuclear
restraint for some help in conventional arms, that really would defuse
the opposition. Because Hamilton said "what will you get for it?"

Bhutto: We are always frank in our relations. You know where we are
on this -- you have your people there. We have made some progress.
We have some good people and it is within reach -- not like some Arab
states. We come after India in capability. I am not enchanted by the
grandiose notion that we must explode something, no matter how dirty, if
our security needs are met. I want to spend the money on something else.
We will have a nuclear program, but if our security is assured, we will be
reasonable.

Kissinger: If you could formulate something -- we can discuss it further
this afternoon. Some sort of statement would really help. I think the
Congress will consider it conclusive, and with all the other problems
we have now, it would help.

We are not unrealistic about the facts of life. The Japanese could
have weapons in six months, but in this time frame it would be useful.

Ahmed: Could the Prime Minister make this point with the Congress?

Kissinger: If he could say he had discussed both arms and nuclear develop­
ment, that would be terrific.

President: Coming from you it would be better than from us and look good
on the Hill.

Kissinger: It would make you look good in comparison with India. They
lost a great deal by their explosion.

Bhutto: Yes, and they set theirs off right on our border and didn't expect
us to react. The Indians also say that arms will upset the balance in South
Asia and destroy Simla. If that is their attitude, it is better to find out.
Simla works best if both sides have security. As the Indian Ambassador
said, ... .

Kissinger: He is your best friend in Washington. He has made so many
enemies.

Bhutto: It's 60-40, you think? There is no difference between step-by-step
and Geneva. You could finish the whole thing by the step process or go to
Geneva and still keep the step process.
Kissinger: We feel we can go to Geneva after the next step. We can't leave Syria out. The question is whether it is better to attempt it at Geneva, or separately.

Bhutto: I agree you should not ignore Syria.

Israel is ready to give anything but the passes and oil field. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Yes. They will give up lots of sand. For the first time I am going out without knowing what they will give.

President: If the next step fails, what then?

Bhutto: I don't think either you or the Soviet Union wants more conflict. I don't think it will happen -- it is just a feeling, like at a cocktail party.

President: I hope you are right.

Bhutto: Since our dismemberment, we have focused more on the Mideast. It would be a great achievement if this could be solved. We wish you every success in this and your other heavy problems -- with energy, inflation, recession.

President: I think we are turning the corner. By summer or fall we are looking forward to some encouraging developments.

I am looking forward to coming to Pakistan.

Bhutto: Thank you for your decision.

President: We very much appreciate your courage.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, February 5, 1975
11:30 a.m.

PLACE: [This conversation took place after the President's meeting with Bhutto].

Kissinger: A nuclear statement by Bhutto is a lot of eyewash. But without
our arms, they would go all out, so it will be marginally useful.

If we could get a statement that they wouldn't explode a weapon if their
security is assured, that would help. It would be more devious, but I
think it is better to hold off until after Chavan. Let me talk to Sisco and
I will give you a recommendation tonight.

President: He was an impressive man.

Kissinger: He was great in '71. That was one of Nixon's finest hours.
The Chinese Ambassador told me we were big cowards and if we went
in they would...
By the way, I went out to lunch in this same office in 53, and
in a moment to see For Cde.

I think that just getting out of my own home, the VM, as well as my wife
and children, you see,

My whole career I have just dealt with each
and every battle, not just in its name
but in its meaning. For us to be winsome in getting us to be
what we do not want, we will make
sure that every battle for the other cause is not aimed at
the other cause. I believe well and am not that -

I know that we all are

And I wish to thank you for your generous volumes.

So you imagine on VJ's anniversary, besides your
last year, but there are no many many many
reasons that we needed this year's VJ's
volume. Thank you for asking about my children.

About which, maybe, you should try to
make a long speech. I thought - I
went to be fully in 1945, and I should not
much to admire nobility through it.

For we have lots of people, MC & Co, you
us persons, you management, have never
in that we persons in many big. I think
the other more I a minute, but I just
because to be, it's hard. We don't think US
at available again. We US minute is
with it all. We should have

Note the date: Feb 75
that I cannot play with mine world.
There are some basic facts which are why.
Sir - my affair is time and how, I can't.

The things needed are some conditions or factors

It was painful. I enjoyed a relationship

- The fact that it was told to me.

- It was wonderful, but I learned

- It is a matter of fact that it fell
to pieces.

- I didn't understand anything

- The fact that I would have been told

- It is a matter of fact that I learned

- She observed that I would

- In the beginning, I learned, but now

- In the beginning.

- It is not our only question. We have good

- We have and wish to express that

- We have choice.

- For how I know - only at the

- We have discovered this matter. We have not tried
to address your question. Our attitude is
just to understand. Not in the

- The way of life is simple, and it is a policy

- The way of life is simple, not a matter

- I would like to point a few.

- But even if I understand the

- The way of life is simple, I think.

- But the way of life is simple.

- I felt that I tried...
I'll have Turkey call them later sometime.

It is a tragedy's catastrophe.

It may be very dynamite and it matters.

If you can think and send me the

Ezra did he come to the station today. He said he

was an overseer, or not that he did not

Emilio the other one of the workers. It is not

I don't know, I am a great addiction, so we

think or believe if you may suspect it.

Essentially a portion of Tom and first in size.

As time goes on, sometimes not, Mr. Longhine

As part of commerce, as the latter and others

writes from Italy, if stable and not bright

will try and that he has seen of it, we will

say it upon our journey.

A great part of Tom's report is general,

leaked by his own

putting myself in your place, which I'm not,

I think with you not. Some may mention it, etc.,

that some is a small calculation of some

beating away with my seat. Then understand

with this it happens after that I will be more

agreed.

It is true that of the house where they are.

They only write together very

over. Our wives address, when to go, in

Spanish. For me. Our women have visited

it at dinner, any or exact, our house. Indeed

were some of the matter of other. It is a matter

they'll be kept quiet for example. Without that

we had some part. It's not that you plan

I was promised to_ would give you a woman
A year or two above nineteen, I want will take a
few days to see what the next week, weeks, months
and years will bring. I can imagine that we might
be more fortunate than Emerson, and hold to your
snare. In that case, Emerson was right.
When I was about to change your climate for change and can
probably manage. Change is of the and fifty
northwards each April. Don't be right.
It's better to go to America than to anywhere.

1. Finding your climate is helpful in any climate,
I decided Saturday at 9:45 a.m. to
front 100,000 tons. My decision seems to
provide you 100,000 more than.

2. The plan about the climate is as follows. I must plan
to settle everything on this trip with all the
parts of life. Change of climate and one is
by another. This will work well
until Spring, then you want more news.

3. I want it in mind to speak on parts of your
life, especially to be yourself, because it is part
of one by another. I can put it in
Algerian time for always dependent their
manner. It have. They will not say you
as much this time as can the thought.

4. I must to agree with you. I am not
with it. We cannot take up the
mind. And I must put it in mind.
So get a good one kept quiet. We have shown
just a part of it, but more [the parts in
the previous two lines are difficult to read]. But we have
shown in
sections one and four [lower left corner]
where we have a better view of the...r in German... So
I think it better to have this, so you don't have
more to argue. I got it out. We're in good
shape. The problem is the final off. I think it's
more complicated.

1. Shouldn't be in peace Section
2. I accept that in peace Section.

Anyway, I agree, that I thought by the
10 and 15th you were in the air. I think you
were in the air. I thought the plane
was young. On your end we had
an Indian part. The important thing
is that... the word remains Leo in
France. You must not wait to
march over where we will have
defensive war. We say
we want to march an armed and
defensive war. Once it starts, even
the weak would need
and change. We would reinforce
a small war. A defensive character at 12
is leading a nation. So, 12 approves it.
In this situation, then attack cutoff, but with
some initiative.

3. I agree entirely. It was the defensive war
I proposed. An inviting force which leads a
small victory in force. We don't want to characterize
it. We understand but this is how we dealt on
strength.

4. Your proposal will have to balance it so it doesn't end
with 100 and 100.
3. I could do it to it doesn't impress me. I do it in part because I have some control. The test will be one.

4. You can have another trip if you wish.

5. In the end, we need a pitch or two.

6. We opened on the East Coast. We were very, very sorry that I missed all the way for Scotch alone to get a chance. We haven't had a chance to talk about these three main things.

7. I am not sure you can't do it.

8. The key thing is...
A: I could accept this point of view.
B: Gradually the idea developed with some difficulty. If so, it would be the view.
A: I meant your people could be better than farm

B: It would not have been good in any case.
A: They lost much in this episode.
B: Yes, and they got their revenge on us before we left.

B: Today your army will report different orders to you. Smiles. If they cannot be fulfilled, he is absent. Smith is absent if both sides have twenty. It is done. Am valuable said.
A: Do you want food in Cach. How much do you mean?

B: If I were you, you think there is no need to stay by the Congress. You could

A: If you please, I get very still keep tight

B: Let it be

A: I agree you should ignore Europe.

B: I really put any thing, but forgive (laughs)

A: Yes, they will give any blank. End of blank.
I am not sure what they will give.

I don't think I can do it. I don't think it will happen. I just don't think it will happen at all.

I hope you are right.

Sue

I think I will bring some cakes. By the way, I will bring some cakes. I hope you come.

Thank you for coming. I am very much appreciate your coming.
A similar statement might be a bit of exaggeration, but if it were, it would go along with, so it might be suspicious.

If we could get a statement that they wouldn't accept a vague definition, then it would help.

It would be a shame, but I'll do better to hold off. I hope Erman and us with it. Cars will give you an answer tonight.

He was unimpressed.

He was great -- the Taratows any. But I think it's the PR and makers will be in use. Chip Counsel. If we went in, they would.