

Scowcroft file
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Harold Wilson, U.K.
James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet
President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, January 31, 1975
11:03 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

SUBJECTS: Middle East; Concorde; Law of the Sea; UK Defense
Review; Mildenhall Agreement; Nuclear Materials

President: We enjoyed having you last night.

Wilson: I woke up in the night singing Alleluia.

President: She [Beverly Sills] is a fine person, besides the marvelous
voice.

Wilson: She is a warm, friendly person, obviously intelligent.
[There was light discussion about government spending on the arts, and
about "open universities."]

President: Let me comment a bit on the matter we discussed before
dinner. I want to emphasize the importance we ascribe to the Middle
East. This trip of Henry's is the most important of this Administration
and maybe for some years. It is a gamble. If it succeeds, we have a
great success. If it fails, we have a serious problem -- with heavy
defense implications -- which I am prepared to face. Henry, will you
sum up where we stand?



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MARA, DATE 5/12/04

Kissinger: There are two possibilities: Either Israel wants progress, or Israel really wants a stalemate. We have been telling Israel that Egypt must have the passes and the oil fields in a new agreement to justify the risks he is taking. There will be a quid pro quo -- Israel will get something, but it can't compensate completely. What they will get besides what there is in writing is: that the policies of Egypt and Syria will not be synchronized; that at Geneva we will still have influence because we will be the only ones who have produced something; that we will have strengthened the moderate Arabs; that we will have preserved our influence with the Arabs. This benefit will last us a year or two, in which time our domestic situation -- our economic and energy situation -- will be much improved. The alternative is that we will be faced by a bloc of unified Arabs backed by the Soviet Union -- and probably with European support. You know that better than I.

Wilson: I'll say something on that.

Kissinger: And we would then be faced with a stalemate that we have no means to break. Otherwise we could sell it to the Arabs that this is the price of Israeli movement.

Wilson: What can you do with Syria?

Kissinger: I assume this discussion will be confined to this room. I think if we could get a few kilometers... The Syrians now, for the first time, have indicated willingness to move step-by-step. We have not discussed this with the Israelis -- it will be a massive problem. We would have to decide whether to move ourselves with Syria or go to Geneva. The problem is the settlements that Israel has built on the Golan right up to the line.

Wilson: Israel always makes a big thing out of how long the UN troops will be there.

Kissinger: But if Egypt brings pressure on the countries supplying the troops, I have no doubt they would remove them, whatever time period was agreed.

We can insure Israel against further pressures for another partial withdrawal, but not against a discussion of a final settlement.

Assuming an Egyptian settlement can be reached in March, it would be worked out and implemented over the rest of the year. If Geneva starts



in June, UNDOF could be renewed in May. We would use Geneva for that. Then we could see how it went at Geneva. If there is a total stalemate at Geneva, all of these pressures of course would build. We can't prevent that, but we would at least be in Geneva having achieved a success, not with the failure of American policy.

President: The practical point I face is that Israel is anxious for a \$2.6 billion program in aid.

Kissinger: Which they published in their own budget without telling us they were doing it.

President: If I do that, with no progress achieved except going to Geneva, -- how can I do it? I couldn't in good conscience ask for it.

Callaghan: Has it been made clear to the Israelis?

Kissinger: Not really.

Wilson: Who are the Israelis?

Kissinger: That is a good question. Allon is O.K. Rabin may be. Peres is against it. The others I don't know.

Wilson: Dayan has been cleared [by the Agranat Commission], so now he can start his games again.

Callaghan: Is it helpful if we point out the difficulties for your budget if there is no progress?

Kissinger: The problem we have is that the Israeli government leaks. We haven't told them the budget problem so it wouldn't leak and bring the Jewish community down on us. I plan to low-key the first trip -- to get the maximum concessions I can from Sadat and then tell Israel what the President just said.

Wilson: How much influence does the Soviet Union have in the area? I don't mean Iraq, but the others.

Kissinger: They have ties mostly with Syria. But even the Syrians don't like them. The last day of the Syrian disengagement negotiation in May, they kept Gromyko circling in the air until I was ready to leave, and they cancelled the dinner they had scheduled for Gromyko and served the same dinner to us.



Wilson: He is going on the swing again.

Kissinger: It's the same old tricks. He is just forcing another humiliation, because he can't do anything useful with our negotiation behind him.

Wilson: What can we do? Peres I don't consider a helpful figure -- I have known him since 1962 and haven't changed my mind.

President: I like Allon.

Wilson: I agree. He is a good friend of ours. He came from Washington in a state of euphoria.

Kissinger: I can't imagine why. But he will try.

Wilson: I don't know how successful he can be. It's an uneasy coalition and a difficult situation. I think Allon's euphoria is based on his feeling that he got a bit of a stalemate. He seemed relieved that he hadn't been asked for something.

Kissinger: We can get them some de-facto stalemate. But if we fail in this negotiation, Geneva will be a U.S.-baiting operation. You and France will be invited and pressured heavily to support a sweeping settlement and the '67 borders.

Wilson: Apart from Europe, what can we do?

Kissinger: Don't give them moral support on the passes and the oil -- if you agree with us. You have great moral standing with them.

Wilson: What will the Soviet Union say to us?

Kissinger: They will want to go to Geneva, although they have backed off a bit.

Wilson: Are they happy with Middle East developments, disturbed, fearful of war, or what?

Kissinger: I think they have lost their cool on it.

Wilson: I think they will try to tell us we are wrong about the Middle East, and try to get us to convince Israel they are wrong.



Kissinger: We wouldn't mind your telling them that if they want progress they should come up with ideas which don't just make them the lawyer of the Arabs.

President: And you can tell them we are not opposed to a Soviet role in the Middle East.

Callaghan: What sort of a role can they play?

Kissinger: On issues like Golan, they could weigh in with ideas for a solution that Israel could live with.

Wilson: At the summit of the EC -- this is just among us -- at a break Giscard said that Helmut wanted to raise the Middle East. Helmut was very tough -- he mentioned Israeli nuclear weapons and said, what can we do to hold them back? Schmidt is strongly pro-Arab but still he told Giscard that he was disappointed with the French position of obstruction. Then Schmidt fell asleep for the rest of the meeting. [Laughter] Then Giscard elegantly explained his position and there were murmurs of support. I said I wondered if it was useful if we all had an identical line -- wasn't it better to harmonize our respective views and use our different influences to solve the problem? The Dutch supported us, and also the Dane -- what a good man. Tindemans then supported my line. Then Giscard -- like a 17th century aristocrat -- said that Israel should remember that the Big Four set up Israel and we might have to reconvene that. I said we had tried resurrecting that before and it hadn't worked. But I don't know if he was proposing this or just saying Israel should be grateful. The Luxembourger said he felt physically sick when the EC abstained.

President: I think you were playing a most helpful role. You could express to them my deep concern that progress has to be made. We can't tolerate a stalemate. My record is pro-Israel, but I have to take a broader view. If there is no progress I can't, in good conscience, submit a request for \$2.6 billion. If it is introduced into Congress, I will not be sympathetic.

Kissinger: We think we are saying this as friends of the Jews. It would be a disaster for the Jews for us to get into a confrontation with the Jewish community on this.



If there is a war this year, coming from a stalemate in the negotiation, preceded by quarrels at Geneva, with the prospect of the Soviet adventurism -- this can't be in either our or Israel's interest. Furthermore, we can't single out Israel for attention which we don't give any other part of the world. To give them money for a stalemate which might lead to war, will in the long term hurt the Israelis and the Jews.

President: The American people are not prepared to enter a war for Israel.

Callaghan: We, of course, are vulnerable to withdrawal of Arab sterling reserves.

Wilson: A lot of our left wing is pro-Arab. It is extraordinary, because they -- the Arabs -- hardly represent a radical revolution or social revolution.

Kissinger: I think it is probably premature for the Prime Minister to bring pressure now. They could say they were being flexible. After I have come back, I would know what Israel has offered. I could stop through London on my way back.

Wilson: What we can do with Israel depends on who we would talk to. Their Ambassador no, but if Allon came, we could talk to him.

Kissinger: He will be in Germany on the 20th.

President: Henry has mentioned the leadership meeting here on the day of the October alert, when they all said they would give aid to Israel but only up to -- and not including -- sending American forces. Israel has had tremendous support in the United States, but I'm not sure it is as broad and deep as it was earlier.

Kissinger: I think your influence would be wasted with the Arabs.

Callaghan: I'd appreciate a word of guidance on briefing the EC. I'd give no details, of course.

Kissinger: I would give an air of guarded optimism. That is what we have done.

Wilson: I want to avoid the impression either that we are in a mediating or message-carrying role with the Soviet Union.



Miscellaneous Issues

President: Is there any other issue?

Wilson: I just want to raise Concorde so I can say I did it. What else is there?

Callaghan: Law of the Sea.

Wilson: Yes. I know nothing about it.

President: The problem is Congress is trying...

Callaghan: Our problem is the nature of the international regime -- should it be by joint licenses, or have joint ventures with private companies, or should it operate itself?

Wilson: On defense, we have nothing to raise, but we are grateful for the way you all accepted our defense review. I know you are feeling lonely in many parts of the world. We had a little trouble with Diego Garcia, and the Soviets will raise it.

The Mildenhall agreement....

President: We are happy to continue it.

Callaghan: The French have asked us for platinum supply -- I am happy to say we had none of that trade to give them.

President: We talked with the French about a nuclear suppliers conference.

Wilson: Were they responsive?

Kissinger: Mildly so.

Wilson: We mustn't keep you. You've been very good to talk to us.

[The meeting broke up into informal President/Wilson and Callaghan/Kissinger conversations. There was agreement and satisfaction with the closeness of our relations and the benefits of these personal discussions. The meeting then ended.]



✓ P/Wilson/Collaghan/Hunt/K
31 Jan 75 11⁰³ am - 12¹⁵ pm

P Was enjoyed being you last night
W I woke up in a night singing Adeline
P She is a fine person, braver than mammals were.
W She is a warm friendly person - obviously intelligent
(Some discussion on speaking in Arabic)
(Discussion of Syria movements)

P Let me comment a bit on a matter we discussed
before dinner & emphasize importance we ascribe
to ME. This trip of K is not important if this
decision & maybe for some years. It is possible -
if needed we have a great success. If it fails
we have a serious job w/ heavy day implications -
which I prepared to face. Okay, will you own up.

K There are 2 possibilities - I want progress, or
statements. We have been telling I that E must have
passed oil fields to justify his work. Quid - I will
get something but it can't be very big.
What they will get besides what we mean is:
E - Syria not synchronized; at Geneva, we will
still have influence & spirit good; strengthen
weaken Arabs; prevent US influence w/ Arabs.
This will last us a year or 2.

The alternative is useful Arabs backed by SU - &
part of E's report - you know that with them.

W I'll say something on that
K And we would then be faced w/ a statement we have
no means to back (otherwise we could tell Arabs that
this piece of E movement)

W What can you do w/ Syria
K I assume this discussion compared to this room.
I think if we could get a few lines. The Syrians
now - for a time - have indicated willingness to



never step by step. ~~What~~ We have not discussed
w/I - massive job. We would have to discuss
whether whether to move w/ Syria or go to Geneva. Part
is settlements I has built.

W I always makes a big thing and phone long UK talks
be there

K If E brings pressure on a committee supplying
things, I have no doubt they would have to recommend,
whatever was agreed.

We can increase I against further pressure for
another period of demand - but not against a
final settlement discussion

Assuming an E settlement in March to be
worked out on a rest of eye. If Geneva starts in
June, UK DAF could be renewed in May. Then
we could see how it went at Geneva. If total
statements at Geneva, progress of course would build.
We can't prevent that, but we would at least be in
Geneva w/a success, not w/a failure.

P The central point of a face is I anxious for 2.6
but prog.

K which they put in their budget w/d talking no

P If I do that w/ no progress except Geneva, as how
can I do it? I would in good conscience
ask for it.

C K Has it been made clear to I

K Not really

W Who are I?

K Good question. Allan is K. Roberts may be. Pires
is against it. The others I don't know.

W Doyon has been cleared, so now he can start his
games again.

C Is it helpful if we print out a dry figure budget if we pay?

K The problem we have is I just look. We haven't told them a budget yet so it wouldn't look like being

Start → Jewish community down on us. I plan to have key 12th trip - get many concessions from Salant + others. Tell it what I just said.

W How much influence does S have in a crisis? I don't know.

K Mostly w/ Syria. (Total stay of Georgios + last day of Sejm negot).

W He's going on a driving again

K Same old tricks. He's facing another humiliation cause he can't do anything w/out our negot. behind him

W What can we do? Please I don't consider a helpful figure. I have been similar + haven't changed to, since

P. I like Allen

W I agree. He's a good friend of us. He came from Wash in state of syria.

K Can't imagine why. But he will try

W I don't know how successful he can be - unless evolution + dip sit.

I think Allen syria based on his feeling he got a bit of statements. He seemed relieved he hadn't been asked for something.

K We can get them some de-facto statements. If we find, Amman will be a OS - baring you. You + for will be invited & pressured heavily to no support 67 books.

W Apart from Ems, what can we do?

K Don't give them moral support on press/oil - if you agree w/us. You have great moral standing w/ them.

W What will Soros say to us?

K They will want to go to Geneva although they have had a bit of a bit.

W Are they happy w/ M/E dispute, distorted, fearful of war, or what?

K I think they have lost their cool on it. Their ~~position~~
They

W I think they would try to tell us one way about M/E, and try to get us to examine it that way.

K Wx wouldn't mind you taking them if they want
prop they should come up w/ ideas which don't just
work them a language of a Arab.

P And you can tell them we can not appeal to a
Sec reform - M/E.

C What sort of roles can they play.

K On issues like Golan, they could weigh in w/
a rotation I could live w/.

W w/c ~~participation~~ of EC, (just among us), at Geneva
Gasior said Helmuth wanted to raise M/E. Helmut
was very tough - mentioned more eyes + said
what can we do to hold them back - strong PM - Arab
but still told Gasior he disappointed w/ Fr position
[of obstruction]. Then he fell asleep.

Then Gasior definitely explained his position +
there were numerous suggest David I wondered if
it was useful if we all had identical line - wasn't
it better to harass more and dig influences
to go some job. The Dutch suggested us + also
a Dave - who a good man. Frank then suggested
my line. Then Gasior - who a 17th cent aristocrat -
said that I should remember that big 4 set
up I + was might have to reconcile that.

^{Remembering that}
I said we had tried ~~that~~ before + it hadn't worked.
But I don't know if he was preparing this or just saying I should
have said he felt physically sick when it
obtained.

P I think you can play a most helpful role. How could
I put to them my deep conviction that prep has to be
made. We can't tolerate Stalinism. The word is
pre-I, but I have to take less in mind. If we prey
I can't in good conscience submit a request
for ret bill. If it is introduced into Cong, I
will not be sympathetic.

H We think we saying this as friends of Jews. It would
be a disaster for Jews to be in cooperation w/
Jewish community in this.

If we were this year coming from statements provided
by ~~for~~ General at Geneva, w/ prospect of SU administration.
This would be in either one or I suspect. Further,
we can't single out I for attention which we don't
give any other world. To give message for statements
which might lead to war with in long term but
a F. r Jews.

P The Am people are not prepared to enter a war for I.

C We of course are vulnerable to w/ demand of Arab
sticking essence. ~~That~~

W A lot of our left wing is pro-Arab. It is ultra-revolutionary
because they ^(could) hardly represent radical revolution or
social revolution.

A I think for promotion for P.M. to bring pressure now. They
could say they were being flexible. After I have come
back, I would know what I has offered. I would
stop them harder on my way back.

W What we can do w/ I depends on who we would

to do to. And us, if Allen comes, we could talk to him.

K He will be in Germany on 30th

P K mentioned leadership ^{on all day} ~~by~~ ~~them~~ they said they would aid I but only to say to (not including) sending for us.

I has had tremendous support in US, but I not sure it broad & deep as it was earlier.

R I think your influence would be wasted w/ Amst.

C Word of guidance on helping EC ^{in defense} ~~government~~

K I would give air of guarded optimism - That's what we had done.

W I want to avoid - impression either that we are in mediation, or message conveying role to US

P Any other issue

W Just want to raise Concord is can say 8/11 - Our experts can discuss. What else?

C LOS

W Yes. I have nothing about it.

P Int. is long trying

C One part is nature of with uprise - just transit, have joint ventures w/ private companies; or operate itself.

W On expense, we have nothing to raise, but we grateful for way you all accepted our dissemination. I know you feeling hard in many parts of world. We had a little talk w/ Diigo + Leo will raise it.

E by itself

E is happy & entire of the platinum supply - they try to say we had more of that made to your team

