MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CABINET MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, January 29, 1975 - 4:30 p.m.
PLACE: The Cabinet Room, The White House

President: First, I have two comments: Yesterday I sent up an Indochina supplemental. I want it clearly understood that this Administration is clearly, firmly, unequivocally behind that. We want it, we are going to fight for it and I want everyone behind it. I think it is vital and right, and I want no misunderstanding about that.

Second, we are in a delicate situation on energy. We are going to put it all in one bill to show we have a plan. And I want no talk about compromise.

Morton: Can we get a talking paper on Vietnam? It would help in talking to the issue.

President: There is a good article in the Christian Science Monitor by Goodwin about the consequences of a collapse in Southeast Asia. If they go down the drain, there will be a strong guilt feeling in the American public.

Morton: A question that was put to me was, would $300 million do any good?

Schlesinger: In Cambodia we are asking only what we requested before. Phnom Penh will fall this spring without this aid. In South Vietnam, the decline is slower. They are having to ration down to hand grenades.

Kissinger: We asked for $1.4 billion in authorization. They gave us $7 billion in appropriations. So we are asking for almost half of it again. To agonize about each $100 million is ridiculous, since if it is not enough, it might as well be nothing. The Administration's Vietnam policy was ratified in 1972 by a 62 percent vote. Now the McGovern philosophy is being put in retroactively by those who lost in 1972.
The Vietnamese are below the level at which they can effectively operate. Then their casualties go up. When their casualties go up their morale goes down. Then they lose more, then our opponents say they said so.

**President:** At the time of the Paris Accords, many people said, "Just get the troops out and we will give aid." Now they are backing off that. We have a commitment and we are doing it because it is right. We believe in it.

**Vice President:** Your negotiating authority and your ability to settle the Middle East will be seriously weakened if the President is not seen to be able to deliver on his commitments.

**President:** We can't be aggressive in one area and isolationist in another. The Middle East is no more important than Southeast Asia. We have to have global policy and we are going to push this through.

While we are here I want to extend my thanks to Claude Brinegar, Bill Saxbe, and Roy Ash for the fine work they have done. I am deeply grateful.

[There was then a budget discussion led by Roy Ash, and some discussion of deferrals and excisions.]
P. First I have 2 comments: Yesterday I sent your

definition script. I want it clearly understand

that this Action is clearly going to go. And that, if we want it, we have to focus

on it and we want consensus behind it.

I think it is vital and right that we

continue working on that.

K. Would you consider a working group of

some sort in order to

move forward?

I. Good article in NYT by Gordon Chang on

how China is pushing a new

positive policy in the

region. Question is we have worked on all our good

skeleton for China and we've only what we've agreed

to.

I believe we will look to China in the future,

in order to

confirm the positions.

K. We asked for 1.4. Their going to be 1.5.

I think that's

more than enough. The question is:

what's the timeline?

I. We have

hoped to get a new agreement on

the

UN

issue.

I. Would that help in talking to their

positions?
FY 77 Foreign Aid

I'm sure it is meant right and whole in it.

If you want something else to write with, I will
be happy to work with you in spite of it. It seems to
be very different on its own.

I was not very impressed with your text and
didn't write much about it.

We have had global policy and are ready
and prepared for it.

Thanks to Morgan, Sophie, etc.
Decision of complex discussion.

[Signature]