MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Walter Judd
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday - January 23, 1975
1:05 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Judd: I appreciate your seeing me. I was never able to meet with your predecessor. I see you have a very busy schedule.

President: A delegation of Soviet journalists is coming in. Then the Northeastern Governors to talk about energy.

Judd: I want to mention three things about China and the Middle East. The rumors are that you will agree to establish full diplomatic relations with Peking on your trip there this year. I hope not, for three reasons: One, there is no need to. There are no advantages to gain that we don't already have. The Liaison Offices can do everything that is needed. I agree with the improvement of relations so far as it can be done while maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In Peking they need us now more than we need them. While Chou is on top, it is not a real victory for them yet, because there has been no purge of their opponents. I think a major reason he prevailed to the extent he did was because he established relations with the United States. They won't break relations with us, because that would weaken them against the Soviet Union. So I think let's keep things just as they are.

Teng is the best administrator they have. Chou is as tough as they come. He's clever; I think his illness is mostly practical. Diplomatic relations are not really necessary, because we have now what we need from them.
President: I have not focused on this yet. I've been too busy with the economy and energy. I respect your views and I will consider them carefully.

Judd: We have leverage now and we should keep it that way. Taiwan is a showcase for us, and it keeps the people on the Mainland in trouble for that reason. It is a model for an underdeveloped country. If we could have full relations with both -- fine. But they won't permit that. Secretary Kissinger has said that we won't improve relations with our enemies at the expense of our friends. If we give up Taiwan, it would hurt our policy all over Asia -- especially in Korea.

Let me go to the second point. When Secretary Kissinger went to Peking and came back, that's okay. But if he stops in other places, that is bad if it doesn't include Taiwan -- that's a signal. When he goes and you go -- don't visit other countries and exclude Taiwan.

The third point is this: I think you and Secretary Kissinger should tell Japan and the others strongly that we may have to use force, but don't do it publicly. Public threats are the worst possible thing for the Arabs. They would kill themselves for face and to avoid embarrassment. Samson is a good case. Do it privately, not publicly.

President: I assume you read what Secretary Kissinger actually said in the Business Week interview.

Judd: Sure, they pressed him into a corner.

President: And the press keeps at it.

Judd: But you, too, said something.

President: Mine was in the context of food versus oil.

Judd: I thought you used the word "weapon."

President: Only in that sense. We are working very hard on the Middle East; I hope both sides can be realistic, and we have a chance to see some progress.

Judd: It is a terrible problem because both sides are right. It has to be raised above the level of justice to that of wisdom. It is better for both.

[The conversation ended.]
I oppose your doing one. I am not sure where much is. In your judgment. I have been very mixed.

I fear such a meeting. 

I think this. 

Rumors are speculating about a full settlement of your way. I have told the

Francois: (1) He said to us advantage we lost None. French can be anything valid.

I agree with you. As matters so far as can be seen consistent with your view.

We should. They did not serve more than an hour. While Guma is on top. I see a real victory, because now arise. I think a major reason is that the situation is bad. In consequence the situation relations if S.S. They may break relations if we ensure that with whom see them against S.S. I see any thing just not anything. They are out of admiration.

There is time to make one clear. His being mostly political. Diplomatic not military. We have not what we need from them.

I don't know what else. Some too many reason. I respect your views and counsel them carefully.

We have always more to do. We should try it that way. 


declared

E.O. 13688, Sec. 3.5

MCR Memo, Turin, N. State Dept, Guidelines. Date: 3/10/84

By: 

Date: 3/10/84
anything

If we give definitions, it would hard to follo

a certain number in which

the point about doing it is that you

must be there. A certain phrase that is kind of

doesn't include Torrance that in original. When

the game was for a certain area of the book

Torrance,

the point about your K should tell don't a

another strongly was away look to ever face, but

don't do it publicly. To be able to there are

a lot of possibilities for that. They would

build themselves for that to avoid involvement.

Sawson in a good case. Don't presently not

publicity

P. I answered upon asked what K said.

T. Said, they pressed him into a corner.

P. And they kept at it.

T. But your too hard something.

P. Nine once in a contact of hard over.

T. But your word would stand up.

P. Only in that sense. We are going to bond

in this, they both could be total.

T. In a instance just because both words are

right. It was to be used some much

of greatest that I was done. Better for

both