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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 10-112, #19

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*By del NARA, Date 5/18/10 guidelines*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, January 23, 1975  
9:35 - 10:18 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

The President: I think you should have examples in the speech. It will be meaningless to most without it.

Kissinger: Okay.

I mentioned earlier the Treasury tendency to vote against World Bank loans -- hard and soft -- to our friends, like Nigeria and Indonesia. Simon's idea of economic warfare against Iran, Nigeria, and others like that is bad. If we could take on just Libya, Iraq, Algeria. I think we should have a meeting so each could present his views and you could decide.

The President: Set one up.

Kissinger: We are in a position of leadership on world food issues. The question is, who here does it? There are no differences between me and Butz on substance, but if he leads it, no one will pay any attention. It's not an acute issue, but it may come to you next week.

Sadat, after urging from Fahmy, has come back with a hesitating answer. I think you should write a fairly firm, but friendly, letter to him saying you are way out on a limb.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

I think Fahmy is trying to prove he can get his way by psychological warfare. He is trying to prove how tough he is. I think I would be trapped out there -- the U. S. can't get involved in a shuttle.

If this blows up, we must realize the letter might be published.

We had a 40 Committee meeting. We can't conduct covert operations. Colby is a disaster and really should be replaced. Colby is shellshocked -- he wanted to testify on Azorian because it was a domestic operation. He said he would work it out with the VP -- I said it was none of the VP's business.

The President: That's stupid.

Kissinger: There are now so many people who have to be briefed on covert operations, it is bound to leak.

There is no one with guts left. All of yesterday they were making a record to protect themselves about Azorian. It was a discouraging meeting. I wonder if we shouldn't get the leadership in and discuss it. Maybe there should be a Joint Committee.

The President: I have always fought that, but maybe we have to. It would have to be a tight group, not a big broad one.

Kissinger: I am really worried. We are paralyzed. We have delayed a long time [redacted] even though our capacity may not be too great.

The President: Maybe we'll have a breakfast in the residence.

Kissinger: On the NSC meeting on MBFR, the only issue is when to play the nuclear option -- all at once or piddling it out.

The President: Timewise, when should we move?

Kissinger: I wouldn't decide it at the meeting -- just to preserve some flexibility. I would tell Resor he could give to NATO in February and present it at Geneva in March.

The President: Is there a chance we could have something by the summit?



Kissinger: If there is, it won't happen at Geneva. If we were willing to agree to equal cuts, we could get one.

The President: It would help with the Congress.

Kissinger: Our original proposal was ridiculous. The problem with cuts is that it indirectly introduces a ceiling. That is significant to the Soviets.

If we get serious about MBFR, we should do it like SALT -- give them proposals through your channel before surfacing them.

The President: Schlesinger isn't a problem on this, is he?

Kissinger: Not at all. [redacted]  
[redacted] That would look very bad to the Greeks and Turks. That won't come up.

