

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0

SECRET / NODIS / XGDS

MR 01-125, #5: pt. 2, 2/15/02

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

del NARA, Date 3/11/02

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, January 21, 1975  
9:33 - 10:18 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I am testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Humphrey thinks it is a mistake to have an Executive session.

The President: Is that your request?

Kissinger: I can talk more frankly and get better support in the private sessions, but I could manage public sessions well.

I would like to bring up some more esoteric subjects -- like Law of the Sea.

President: Fine, can you give me some background?

Kissinger: We need a new negotiator for Law of the Sea. I suggest (?Paul Katz. Or Jack Irwin.

The President: Irwin is not forceful. Let's go with Katz.

Kissinger: We need to move on the Indochina supplemental.

The President: Let's have a Leadership meeting next Tuesday or Wednesday. Shouldn't we have Schlesinger and Brown too?



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SECRET - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: Of course. Brown could brief on the military situation and I could go over the political situation.

We have an MBFR meeting Thursday. There is no fundamental decision to make. We'll have you a book by tomorrow night. Our original decision was insane. There is no chance of Soviet acceptance. We have now proposed a nuclear package sweetener. The significance of the sweetener is not the withdrawal but that it results in a de facto ceiling -- that may be attractive to the Soviets.

The President: What about the second stage?

Kissinger: The present position is we do this in exchange for a common ceiling at the end of the second stage. We should hang with it but we may have to give way on getting the Soviet approval. Our big problem is the Soviet-perceived weakness of our government.

We gave Dobrynin the letter from you.

The Syrians now are becoming more moderate and saying five-to-ten kilometers would be fine. But we can't mention that to Israel right now.

The President: Max Fisher is coming in later this week.

Kissinger: Dobrynin asked whether you thought you should ask for the removal of Section IV of the Trade Bill. I think it is premature.

The President: I really think so.

Kissinger: I could say to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee let's wait a bit and see the developments.

The President: If we ask for removal of Section IV and EXIM, that will divert Congress from the energy and tax programs. Let's focus on one thing at a time.

Kissinger: I think your speech is coming out well.

The President: If they don't have a program, they at least shouldn't try to stop ours.



Kissinger: Dobrynin said the collapse of authority here is most worrisome. He says the Select Committee on Intelligence will not be understood by the Politburo.

The President: Did you see that McClellan and Stennis opposed it?

Kissinger: On SALT, there are no major differences. We can't afford a blowup on Vladivostok.

The President: What things are there?

Kissinger: There is the cruise missile. Vladivostok is ambiguous on it, but there is a loophole in the Aide Memoire. We are going to try a formula, but we may have to come back to you on it.

We have the problem of Minuteman III at Malmstrom. We may want to hold up on that.

The President: Is Colby still talking collateral constraints?

Kissinger: No, we are in good shape on that. We have a list of must issues and another of desirable ones.

There is a problem on telemetry. If we ask them about that, we may push them further than they now propose.

Kissinger: There is a new Chinese constitution, that even codifies the anti-Soviet line.

The President: How about Cyprus?

Kissinger: The last meeting was bad. The Turks are like the dumb Israelis. They are not helpful at all right now.



X. Bez letter ✓ P/K 21 Jan 75

Tuesday  
9:33-10:18 AM

K I am testifying to SERC. Humphrey thinks it a mistake to have this session.

P Is that your request?

K I can talk more privately & get better support in private sessions, but I could manage public sessions well.

I would like to bring up some more economic subjects - like the Gulf Sea.

P Fine, can you give me some background.

K We need a new negotiator for LUS. I suggest Paul Katz. Or Jack Durin.

P Durin not feasible, best go w/ Katz

K We need to move on Indochina Supplemental

\* P Let's have leadership mtg w/pt Tues or Wed.

Shouldn't we have Schillo & Brown too?

\* K Of course. Brown could help on that sit & I could

go on pol. sit.

We have MBFR mtg Thurs. No fundamental decisions - have a look by tomorrow night. Our original decision was modest - no chance of Sov acceptance. We have now proposed a moderate package structure.

The sig. of ~~the~~ structure is not a w/charal but that it results in a de facto ceiling - that may be attractive to Sov.

P What about 2nd stage

K Present position is we do this in exchange for common ceiling at end 2nd stage. We should hang w/it but we may have to give way on getting Sov approval.

Our big prob is Sov financial constraints from part.

\* We gave Deby letter from you.

Syrians now are becoming more moderate & saying

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AUTHORITY per ml 01-126 #5; 5th US. 2/12/02

BY W NLF, DATE 5/25/04



Washington - budget

5-10 pm would be fine. But we can't mention that to I just now.

P Max Fisher coming in later this week

K Dohy asked whether you that you should ask for removal of Section IV. I think it premature.

P I surely think so.

K I could say ASERC lets wait a bit & see developments. It's

P If we ask for removal of Section IV & XI, that will divert Congress from energy & tax prog. Lets pass on as thing at a time.

K I think your speech is coming out well.

P If they don't have a prog, they at least should try to stop ~~the~~ course.

K Dohy said ~~the~~ collapse of authority here is not everyone says the Select Committee on Intel will not be conducted by Pelotonis

P Did you see that here Latham & Stennis opposed it.

K On Salt, there are no major differences. We can't afford a blunder on Vlad.

P What things are there?

K There is a crime missile. Vlad is unambiguous on it, but there is a loophole in Aids - Medicare.

We are going to try a formula, but we may have to come back to you on it.

We have a prob of M M III at Washington. We may want to hold up on that.

P Is Colby still talking collateral constraints.

K No, we're in good shape on that. We have a list of must issues & another of desirable ones.

There is a prob on telemetry. If we ask them about that, we may push them further than they now propose.



K Constitution of PRC even cyclical anti-SC.

P How about Gypus

K last meeting was bad. Tanks are like drunk I.  
They are not helpful at all right now. But  
we are still

