MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday - January 17, 1975
10:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Vice President’s Office
Old Executive Office Building

[The press was admitted for photographs. There was light conversation about their meeting the previous Tuesday night at the concert and reception given by the Israelis at the Kennedy Center. The Vice President and Minister Allon recalled their meeting during the Minister’s previous visit to Washington. There was light banter about Amb. Dinitz. All agreed he was a good Ambassador. Minister Allon noted that he was one of the youngest. The press departed].

Allon: When I saw President Ford as Vice President [in early August] was it here?

Scowcroft: Yes, it was.

Dinitz: Dayan saw him on his first day as Vice President and you saw him on his last day.

Allon: We have in a way similar positions.

Vice President: Except that you have an operating responsibility. As a matter of fact, I ran a study for Ike on how to utilize the Vice President, when I was his assistant. Our study decided there was no way to do it!
Allon: When I met Vice President Ford last summer, to my surprise he was well briefed on the Middle East. It was not just a courtesy call. I felt already I was speaking to a President.

I spoke to him again last month -- it was pleasant, but it was a little tough because he thought our proposals were slim. Yesterday not only was he briefed beyond what a President should be expected to be, but his mind was working and he was dealing with issues he didn't know beforehand would come up.

I feel now that we should move with a visit by Henry to the area. Without that, the negotiation will be sterile. Each side will just stick to his position. I know there is some risk to Henry's prestige and America's prestige when he comes out, but it is the only way.

Vice President: It's beyond prestige. We are down to the wire now, here and in the world. You saw the Broder article in the paper [Tab A] on power and the use of power. We have a situation of virtual anarchy here and even the liberals are beginning to realize that. So prestige isn't the issue. You know how devoted I am to Henry. Everyone here is. Arthur Burns said he's a genius. Henry's great ability is his strategic grasp and his ability to go to the heart of the problem.

Allon: If he had been Secretary of State during World War II, the world would be very different now.

Vice President: I mention prestige only because I think Henry is for all of us. I am impressed by the way you described President Ford. I do not know him well, but I am terribly impressed with his group, his willingness to listen, his perception. I am proud to be a silent partner.

Allon: Don't underestimate yourself. I remember your remarks a while back on energy and how to respond. I reported back to Israel your deep grasp of the issues. So was President Ford's State of the Union speech; I was very impressed by it.

Vice President: But unless we can get hold of the situation, we will fall into the anarchy that Broder described. I sat through Roy Ash's briefing on the budget and the social programs. We always thought we had money for everything. But we face bankruptcy. This is the most serious problem at home. We are in a critical wartime situation and we need the powers a President needs in a war. I say this because the issues are beyond prestige.
If we are very good we may be able to pull through. If not, the democracies may not be able to survive. The speed of changes, the discontinuities are unprecedented today. This is a new situation. That's why I wanted to come down here to help the President and help Henry as a junior partner. I hope to help on the domestic side without creating problems.

What you have done at home is good.

Allon: We have a tough economic situation.

Vice President: But you have taken courageous steps.

Dinitz: In the coming years domestic and foreign policies will become closer together. You will either master the situation or become the dependency of Abu Dhabi. The U.S. is a superpower, but we are as vulnerable as we never anticipated.

Allon: I think you are getting hold of it, as the President's speech indicated.

Vice President: George Woods said that crises always have to get serious for democracies to act. It is a crisis for the executive now, but I am not sure it is yet for Congress. What they have been doing in foreign policy is unbelievable. But back to Henry.....

Allon: The rising oil prices have nothing to do with Arab-Israeli conflict. It is an economic issue.

Vice President: I would agree partly. Iran had its own development program and Venezuela and we may have benefited unfairly from cheap oil. But the October war solidified OPEC.

Allon: But when the Shah was asked about it, he said oil is business, not politics. The embargo did harm, but the prices did not. Italy, who goes out of its way to please the Arabs, is weak. Germany, which is tougher, gets the petrodollars. It's economic, not political.

Vice President: But we can't kid ourselves. The use of oil can be politicized just as the embargo was. This crisis can give them control not just over oil, but finance.

Allon: But when they make a long-term investment, they have to be careful or they will jeopardize their own economic position.
Vice President: They don't think in such long-range terms. And there's another thing: We don't control the seas everywhere. The Soviet Union is now in a position to interdict the essential supplies we need. The supertankers are sitting ducks for attack from hundreds of miles away.

Allan: The Soviet Union knows the balance of terror paralyzes strategic war; so they have gone back to the concept of control of the seas as a way to extend their influence.

Vice President: I completely agree.

Allan: They have an advantage now because their navy is new, but when you get going, yours, in time, will far outclass them.

Dinitz: And I think the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will be critical and therefore you shouldn't want us to leave Sharm el-Sheikh.

Allan: There are two strategic straits controlling the Red Sea. Sharm el-Sheikh and Bab el-Mandeb. If we control Sharm el-Sheikh we can interfere with their routes if they try to close off Bab el-Mandeb.

Vice President: But we can't force new realities from the status quo and that is why Kissinger is so important. I know the turmoil your government is going through. As a politician I understand it.

Allan: We listen politely to Americans. In '49 we were forced back from the Northern Sinai in exchange for vague assurances which led to war in 1956. In '56 we left the Sinai in exchange for nothing, on U.S. advice. The Russians got the credit because Egypt thought the U.S. acted because of Soviet pressure. Kissinger and Ford are different [from Eisenhower], but this fear is deep within us. We trust all three of you.

I think we know the Arabs better, and I think it's possible to get more than can be judged from the first reaction. It's good Semetic bargaining tactics.

We may not get all we want, but we need to get things moving.

Vice President: I think that is essential.

Allan: But Israel must get in return for a withdrawal something which will satisfy its people. Israel must not look as if she is being pushed into a corner.
Vice President: We are partners in this and partners don't pressure each other. Our only concern is that the partnership may not remain close enough to generate common positions and common understandings.

Allon: I told Henry that once I feel under pressure, I cease to negotiate.

Dinitz: We know it isn't so, but it must not appear so.

[Dr. Kissinger arrives]

Vice President: What worries me about the U.S. is that we will get in some abstract professorial types who will mean well in the abstract sense, but will be disastrous in the real world.

Allon: I don't feel pressure. We know what you want. Once Henry begins to move, it will work out. It is impossible to know beforehand what is obtainable. It is time to move to the practical phase. He should come to the area, first to Jerusalem, then to Cairo....

Vice President: If you can get unofficially the support of you and the other important people [Rabin and Peres] that is the thing.

Kissinger: But if we can get what you want, then it is easy. But you must think about the alternatives if we can't get what you want.

Allon: Before saying goodbye, let me mention the Chase-Manhattan Bank matter.

Vice President: My brother says he doesn't see how, with the number of loans domestically under water, that he can extend more credit.

Allon: It would be nice if he could arrange $150 million when he visits Israel, because the other banks are waiting to see what Chase does.

Vice President: I can't really get into the family business. We have a banking liquidity problem here. If they call some of the loans, we would have a collapse.

Allon: What should we say now to the press? I'm having a press conference before I go.

Kissinger: You can say you have invited me, that I have accepted in principle, with the date to be worked out.
Vice President: Without Henry here, the possibility of developing cohesiveness in the West would be very small.

Allon: Henry told me all about you in 1957, when I was at Harvard in his Seminar. Why don't you come to Israel?
The Flight From Power

As the work of the year begins in Washington, the most self-evident and the most significant fact about the national government is the weakness of its leadership. What is not so well understood is that this weakness—with all its latent implications for the ability of the government to cope with the challenges facing this society—is not simply the result of historical accident. It is the direct byproduct of the negative attitudes toward the exercise of power that now dominate American thinking.

It is not just coincidence—a quirk of history—that neither the President nor the Vice President can claim a popular mandate and that the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate are so bitterly negative about exercising the mandate voted them by their fellow-legislators.

That Gerald Ford rejects comparisons with Franklin Roosevelt, despite Monday's "fireside chat," that Carl Albert says he will never become another Joe Cannon, and that Mike Mansfield refuses to run the Senate as his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, did—all this says something, not just about those men, but about the times.

What it says is that the dominant ethic in American politics has been outdated. Most of us have concluded that the only way to "keep the big boys honest" is to chop down their power. And, as a result, we have produced a set of leaders whose common characteristic seems to be a deadly aversion to the risks and responsibilities of wielding power.

In this, they are true representatives of the American people. For as long as we have come to feel over that strong leadership is likely to be wrong leadership. What we are getting from our last two powerful Chief Executives is a swelling government, inflation, Vietnam and Watergate—and we want no more of that.

So, we have by our votes divided power and responsibility between a Congress of one party and an executive of the opposite party, and then given to each branch a political mandate to diffuse and subordinate its own quotient of that government power.

What we have not yet done is to recognize how effective that new mandate has been—and what its consequences are likely to entail. Mr. Ford's reaction to the excesses of his predecessor's concentration of power is to decentralize decision-making in his administration, to downgrade the size and role of the White House staff, and to delegate decision-making to the departments and agencies. Whether that helps or hinders effective policymaking remains to be seen.

The Senate is what it has been for 14 years under the benign stewardship of Mike Mansfield, a body where every subcommittee chairman is a king, a place which encourages political dismantlement and the philosophy of "do your own thing." The cost in legislative productivity is high.

The House, which chafed under the control of Sam Rayburn and of the committee barons who divided power after his death, now is in full rebellion against its remaining power wielders—

The entire thrust of the reform-efforts in the House (as in the Democratic Party from which its majority is drawn) is to diffuse power as equally as possible among the newcomers and the veterans in the legislative-political game.

All of this has happened so quietly that the literature and rhetoric of American politics has been outdated by events. In the public mind, the "enemy" is still the political boss, the arbitrary chairman, the iron-willed leader, the imperial President—all of whom have either vanished from the scene or are being given the boot's rush out the front door.

The real enemy in Washington today is not arbitrary power but anarchy. The real question is whether there is sufficient leverage left for anyone to lead; whether anybody can truthfully be said to be minding the store.

Washington today is dominated by its freshmen—the new President and Vice President, the 103 first-term representatives and senators. They are a talented group, but they will need all of their talent—and some luck— to meet the challenge ahead.

Beginning this week, they will be measured, not against the failing public memory of the "tyrants" they replaced, but against the urgent public concern with the problems that remain. Those problems—the economy, energy squeeze, and the shifting international balance—require powerful remedies. And the freshmen who affect America's flight from power now must find the means to harness power for the work that is at hand.
Papa-in

Smell with - Park at Kennedy airport  
- went there to meet  
- dinner with ambassador - mornorn

Please:
A - Wrong room - End of U.P. went to bed.

B - Dogma and brain - (verb) and reader to walk.

U.P - Wrote a long letter further.

2 - how to add up - U.P. Can study whatever wants to do it.

A - when I met U.P. And left tomorrow. Tomorrow.

Fellow was well helped on me - not just meeting call.

I felt already knew people at a place.

Soon enough, last moment - it pleasant - though
discuss sure that everyone else.

Yesterday, not only was he helped. I don't think it should
be expected to be fact that his work was

earned to be seen. I don't know before.

Small country.

I feel now we should more often visit by K. K/S.

That might until be still - last until third.

Fellow, with the K/US.

But it why

Is it? And prestige. We should get some

More later in world. But don't understand.

Some power. We have to make some

Fellow the beginning - write that. So

Premier - you know have directed from K -

(Believe that about K's beginning)

DECLARIFIED
D.O. 39688, SEC. 3.5
KBC MEMO, 1234/54, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, 3456/78/90/12
By: 12/3/84 NARA DATE a/b/c/d
My great ability is that I am very studious and hard-working.

It was hard work that led to my success. I worked hard from an early age, and my efforts paid off.

I am not just a hard worker, but I am also quite good at my job. I never miss a deadline, and I always deliver on time.

A great mindset is to always see the bigger picture, even when things seem difficult. I never give up, and I always work hard to achieve my goals.

I believe that success is not just about hard work, but it is also about having a clear vision and the ability to execute it.

A great mindset is to always see the bigger picture, even when things seem difficult. I never give up, and I always work hard to achieve my goals.

I am not just a hard worker, but I am also quite good at my job. I never miss a deadline, and I always deliver on time.

A great mindset is to always see the bigger picture, even when things seem difficult. I never give up, and I always work hard to achieve my goals.
A. The rising oil prices have nothing to do with Arab-Iraqi conflict. It is an economic issue.

R. I understand you just bought a new desk for your office to accommodate everything from paperwork, but it cannot be used for

Q. But when stock prices rise, he said, it is

R. But we can be sure that we can be

Q. But when they are along time incorrect, they

R. They don’t think in such long range time, rather they will consider it as they will forget it even now even future...

Q. They don’t think in such long range time, rather they will consider it as they will forget it even now even future.

R. Our men are the best trained and essential to give us new support and getting more for attack from 106% of men.
A They have an advantage now because the way
in which, but when you get 100 years 3600
are 100000 times
B I thought again
A They have an advantage now because this way
is now, but when you get 100 years in 3600
will be far outclass them.
B And 1 think because 0 cannot cancel 4 and both
will be emptied to
A There are 2 strict limits in Red Sea, Suez and
Western Desert. If we control Suez, we can enter for
as certain events if they try to close off Red Sea
B But we cannot force non-violation from Egyptians
that namely it is our important. Because Egypt is point
4 and part of them as problem is understand.
A Like Russia pointed to American, so if we may hold
back from N, then we exchange for repeat
a means while better come in 3600 and
may help come for nothing on US advice, because it
is clear because ES and will increase if opportuni-
By Russian, K + French, denij; but this can do
as deep as it 200 miles
A I think we have a large letter + at problem to get
more than can be judged from 10000
B Legal something
A US may not get all we want, but we need
to get they money
B I think that is essential.
A But I must get a letter from 12/13 not seven
date will specify. I cannot wait two
B very frustrating to a loan.
R: Embracing isn't present. One only can see that partnership may not remain. The unified
R: He can't decide if he wants to remain, and thus:
A: I felt that I had some presence, since
R: We're moving into the next stage.
A: We believe it isn't so that it must fit
A: The entities.
R: What concerns me about us is that we will put
in some abstract, pressured type acts which will
demand a lot of abstract senses and tone to
transformation and world

(Description of R. training)

(Entire story)

A: I don't feel presence. I also know that you want
once R begins to move, it will not
be. It is possible to learn to understand what is
what. This is time to move the practical phase.
First impression, then change.
R: If you can get unofficially a support from the
other important people, that is okay.
A: But if you want what you want, then it easy. But
you must think about alternatives if there were.
A: Before trying anything, let me turn the China debate
over.

R: Any mission was done: not the box, only the
bureaucrats really make their mind. I can't
stand someone argue.
A: It would be nice if she could manage 150 miles
when she wants it, because other banks are
willing to see what China does.
R: I can't really put into a family business. We have
A bombing dignity just too. By the call, some of
closes, we could have a collapse.
A: What says it pays.
R: We cannot, even when I believe, unless accepted
the principle of death in war itself.
R: With K line, a possibility of being extraneous in a war
would be very small.
A: K till nicest time in 197 when I was in
in this mission.
R: Why don't you come out.