MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Thursday - January 16, 1975
5:10 p.m. - 6:40 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted for photographs. There were a few minutes of light conversation about the President's State of the Union Message, the size of the Knesset, and a Presidential visit to Israel. The press then departed]

Allon: This is the room where the President works?

President: Yes, but I have one down the hall also. Every President has a separate working office. President Nixon's was across the street; mine is just 20 feet down the hall.

It's good to see you again. This must be the third or fourth time we've met. I have always thought that we could sit and talk frankly and in friendship. I hope we can talk about some headway we can make toward peace in the area.

I have been pushing Henry to some extent. I feel we have to make progress. I understand you were somewhat disturbed about my comment the other day. You shouldn't be -- our relationship is such that there is no reason why we should differ. I predicate everything on the basis that we can work together.
I want Henry to go to Egypt. But he has to have something more tangible to bring there than what came from our previous talk. I think we need another settlement by the end of February. We need stability for the next year and a half to two years, to recover our economy, our energy situation, and our position in the world. We need time, and a settlement will give that. But Henry has to have more for Sadat than you brought before.

Allon: First, Mr. President, I want to thank you for seeing me. I like the way we talk to each other. Dinitz said the Hebrew press says, when they heard I was seeing you and the Vice President, that Kissinger mobilized the heavy artillery of the Administration against me.

President: You have only friends here.

Allon: I told the [UJA] people on the West Coast that I heard you say a strong Israel is in the interest of the United States. I drew strength from your State of the Union speech.

Kissinger: Schmidt made a statement, Mr. President, that your speech was a great contribution to trans-Atlantic solidarity. That is very unusual.

Allon: I was very comfortable after hearing your speech. It was reassuring.

Kissinger: The European press reaction has been favorable.

Allon: We, in Israel, trust the intentions of the United States government, the President and Secretary Kissinger. We may sometimes disagree about points, but it is among friends. Let me say this: We want an agreement. We need it. We think Egypt needs it. It would be good for both parties. This is what I believe. Frankly, we have to face a bitter opposition in Israel.

Strategically, whoever controls the passes controls the Sinai. They are extremely important. The oil is not so much a matter of the money but mainly: First, once they get the oil back without important concessions they have no incentive for taking further steps. And second, the fields are so close to the straits that they are a strategic problem.

Kissinger: Since you don't want a third step, that is a small loss.

Allon: But because we are all mortal, things change and people change.
When I was here before, I said to you that the depth of our withdrawal will be highly influenced by what Egypt offers. I fear that once Egypt knows about the passes and the oil, it would be all over with Egypt.

I am glad we adopted a wait-and-see position on my last trip before the Brezhnev trip to Cairo. It was good for Brezhnev, too, because he knew we knew how to play our part.

We want to know with whom will we sign an agreement? With Egypt, or the United States? Will the land to be given up be turned over to Egypt, or will it be demilitarized? Fahmy commented on that.

Kissinger: Fahmy has made several statements which don't help. His problem is he is so pro-American that if this doesn't work out he will be out and maybe in prison. He therefore is compelled to make strong statements.

Allon: The question last is the stability of the peacekeeping force. Four of the contingents have left since the last agreements. Nepal, Panama....

Kissinger: That is a legitimate concern. We must look into it.

Allon: Sadat made a statement recently that any agreement should have an American guarantee. It was the first time he ever said that.

President: Did he say what he meant?

Kissinger: No. He said it. To President Nixon he said he wanted us to guarantee Israel. It solved his problem, and in that case he wanted Egypt to be guaranteed by the U.S. also.

Allon: I don't know how, but if we could get American troops in UNEF without the Soviets, that would be a tremendous contribution. I am trying to figure out how we can add to the stability of the peacekeeping force. I think Egypt would like it, and if so, what can the Soviets do?

Kissinger: They would veto it unless Soviet forces were included, and inclusion of Soviet forces I think would be a grave mistake.

Allon: So the problem is how to make UNEF more stable. This would give Sadat one excuse not to follow an adventurous policy. Sadat the other day said that the U.S. would not allow the Arabs to destroy Israel.

Now the most crucial problem -- the duration of the agreement. If it is short -- two to four years -- I don't think I could recommend it to the Knesset because this is just the time required to reorganize the Egyptian forces.
Sadat is probably planning for one or two years after the American elections. What is three or four years in return for the passes and the oil? Sadat knows he can get nothing by force; through negotiations he can get a lot. I gave Henry an idea which is a personal idea of mine, not the Cabinet's: Why not have an agreement that has no time limit, but to give Egypt an incentive we would agree that after a certain number of years we would negotiate a third step? The U.S. would have to agree not to pressure us to move earlier than that -- unless there is a good chance and then we would be happy to move.

I think Sadat accepted my earlier proposals better than Henry thinks.

Kissinger: He hid it well.

Allon: Except for the 10-year duration, what could he object to, except for the leaking to the press?

President: Those leaks are a deterrent to what we are trying to achieve. I know we ourselves are the leakiest government -- even my speech leaked out. But when we are talking peace and war, we just can't have it. I don't know how to stop it, but we must.

Allon: We both live in democracies. We just have to live with it and not to lose our tempers.

Kissinger: Leaking something against us is one thing; leaking something which has a tendency to make agreement more difficult can be disastrous.

Allon: And many times it is the wrong information. For example, about your pressuring us -- they don't believe you aren't doing it.

Kissinger: I don't believe it is possible to get a fixed term from Egypt. If Sadat were to agree in writing that a negotiation for a final peace wouldn't start for six years, he couldn't survive. You must at least address the contingency that he will reject it. It is not unreasonable, but we have to consider the consequences if this fails. Egypt could be driven into a war with Syria; people here are already saying we should settle it with the Soviet Union. You are better off, also, not linking any step to a final peace, but to focus on step-by-step.

There is no linkage between the Sinai and the Golan. If Sadat demands that, we will probably have to go to Geneva. Our fear is a massive blow-up caused by the frustration of the Arabs. What we want is that the Arabs see that they make progress only through us and that radical demands get nowhere.
Allon: We don't want a stalemate. But in addition to no fixed term, the UNEF mandate has to be given permanently. The Security Council should be able only to terminate, not to renew, the mandate.

President: We have never linked Egyptian and Syrian settlements. Do I understand that the passes and the oil fields can be settled if we can get something on time and UNEF?

Allon: That's a good question. I deliberately avoided a Cabinet debate. I felt the Cabinet was not well disposed when I left because of the Arab statements, so I have no authorization. But there is a direct relation between what we can give and what we can get.

Kissinger: If what you want can be achieved from Egypt, we are okay, but suppose we can't. Sadat has not been willing to talk frankly to Eilts. What we need to achieve is a concrete understanding on this trip, because if we keep talking along inconclusively, we may find one day that Sadat will blow up. We have to make a basic plan for contingencies. Even if his proposals are reasonable they may not be achievable. But all the problems must be weighed against the alternatives we will face.

Allon: But remember Damascus in May. You went to tell them you were breaking off and I said you would come back with something.

Kissinger: Just because you win a few times at roulette, you can't turn it into an assumption of your policy that you will win every time. If Sadat accepts, fine, but if I go there and fail, we have a monumental problem.

President: If Henry goes there with an inadequate package which is rejected, there will be an adverse impact in the United States. Under these conditions, it would be a terrible jolt in this country.

Kissinger: Also, thus far we have had no adverse European reaction. We would get a bad one and the Soviet Union would profit.

Allon: I suggested to Henry that he take a quick trip -- spend one day in each place. He should call it exploratory. That way it is riskless.

Kissinger: Sadat can't see me before the 3rd of February. If I got there on the 10th, I would have to promise a settlement within two weeks. Nothing new will be learned after I have left, through diplomatic channels. So unless I can give him a firm assurance that I will be back with an agreement in two weeks, it won't work.
Allan: We want to know what he is willing to give.

Kissinger: I proposed this to Sadat -- a meeting in Europe. He rejected it and said "Come when you can settle."

Dinitz: What concerns us is if you give him ten days or so, you give him leverage.

President: Can Henry go to Egypt and talk in terms of the passes and the oil fields and see what he can get on time and UNEF?

Allan: I think he should come to Israel first.

Kissinger: Tactically, if I know that the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Peres will back me, I would rather go with that than have a Cabinet meeting. If it leaks, the Egyptians are likely to quit. I would rather take my chances on the top two or three leaders.

President: So you would go to Israel first and then.....

Kissinger: I'd have to go to Amman, to Damascus, and to Riyadh also. I could do it in 3-4 days. I only need three hours in the other capitals.

Allan: Let me make one point. To concede more than the last time requires a Cabinet meeting. I think we should start out without knowing where we end up.

Kissinger: We must face the fact we can't have an endless delay. We have to move.

Allan: I said yesterday the time had come.

President: I have read the letter from Prime Minister Rabin on the arms. [Tab A]. I can assure you that the commitment for April I will be adhered to. On MATMON-B, you can send people here....

Kissinger: Better not send too many.

Dinitz: The Pentagon needs to talk with us on availability and delivery times.

President: On the LGB, the LANCE, and the emergency list -- it will be delivered.

Dinitz: On LANCE there is no real problem. On LGB....
President: We will deliver. On MATMON-B, I said I couldn't go to the Congress without results. If I can go to the Congress with results in Egypt, I can do better. That is not pressure, just the facts of the situation today.

Allon: But MATMON-B was promised at the end of the last disengagement.

Kissinger: A long-term relationship, not a plan.

Allon: Okay, but I was pleased when I read the record of Rabin's meeting with you [the President], and the reaffirmation of it. But if the Pentagon can't get our orders, the deliveries get later and later.

President: But the can't order without the money.

Allon: So until the climate gets better, let's go with the first year.

President: But at a time when I am telling the American people there are no new domestic programs, if I go to Congress for money, I have to be able to justify it.

Allon: But I fear that delay will be interpreted by Israel as indirect pressure. I know it isn't, but if I could go to Rabin and say we can start working out the techniques so that we don't lose time when the proper time comes.

Dinitz: We need delivery times, costs, and so forth.

President: I will talk to Henry tonight and we will figure out how we can start the process. It is a delicate situation -- how to proceed in a technical way to protect us and you. Henry can tell you tomorrow.

Allon: When Simon visited Israel, we agreed on setting up joint committees. Last month I thought everything was okay. Now I feel everything is not right.

President: I am not familiar with it.

Allon: We gave a paper on this to the State Department. If I can go back with some good news... If we could take back that you are considering our FY-76 requests favorably....

I am afraid that as a result of the Trade Bill, the Soviet Union will punish the Jews there. We can't take it -- nor the Jews elsewhere. We know you will know how to pass the word.
President: We will do what we can. That would be the worst that could happen.

Kissinger: But you shouldn't get statements out about fear of a holocaust before something happens.

Allon: Whenever you want to visit the Middle East, you are most welcome.

President: I would like to whenever I have the opportunity. I think this meeting was very useful.

Allon: What should we tell the press?

Kissinger: We can say we continued detailed discussions in a friendly atmosphere.

[The statement issued to the press after the meeting is at Tab B]
My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

Pursuant to our conversation in Washington in September, may I address myself to the matter of U.S. military supplies to Israel.

I should like to refer first to the priority items list and to express my appreciation to you on the progress of its implementation. In this connection, may I draw your attention to two items which were specially appended to the list and concerning which problems of supply do persist.

(A) Laser Guided Weapons. Two months ago our representatives were told that the question of the types and quantities had been satisfactorily settled and that deliveries could immediately begin. Recently, however, we were informed by the Department of Defense that it still lacks specific directives on this matter. I would appreciate, therefore, early instructions to permit supplies to be delivered as soon as possible.

(B) The Lance Missiles. The Department of Defense has, as yet, not set any date for delivery. We consider it of great importance to assure the early arrival of one battalion and would be grateful if a date as close as possible to April 1, 1975, could be set. We note that the training of the Israeli crews on the Lance could be arranged to begin early in February 1975, as already approved."
With regard to the matter of Israel's long-range supply program ("Matmon 81"), you will recall, Mr. President, that this too was discussed during my visit. It was again taken up with Secretary of State Kissinger during his last two visits to Jerusalem in October and November 1975. We were encouraged when told in the course of these and other contacts, that even prior to the resolution of the financial aspect, which was, of course, a matter on which the U.S. Government would have to seek congressional authority, Israel would soon receive detailed replies on an item-by-item basis (quantities and types). We had, indeed, been given to understand that the "Matmon 8" talks would be resumed in December/January. We have now been informed by the Department of Defense that it still has no instructions to deal with the Israeli requests under this program. As you will no doubt appreciate, the lack of such instructions could cause a delay in Israel's timetable for the staged implementation of her defense program. The matter has become most urgent, for already the placing of long-lead orders for 1975 has been regrettably held up.

If, Mr. President, I voice these requests before you in the manner that I do, it is because they are of great concern and urgency.

Foreign Minister Yigal Allon will be in Washington this week and will refer to these matters in the course of his discussions.

May I say that I thank you in advance for your kind consideration.

"With warm personal regards,

Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister"
NOTICE TO THE PRESS

President Ford and Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon met in the Oval Office for one hour and twenty minutes. Secretary Kissinger and General Scowcroft were present on the American side, and Israel's Ambassador Simcha Dinitz on the Israeli side.

The President and Deputy Prime Minister had a full exchange of views of the situation in the Middle East. The President stressed the seriousness of that situation and repeated his commitment to assisting the parties to move forward toward a negotiated peace settlement. Minister Allon once again assured the President that the Israeli government shares this desire for a negotiated settlement. The meeting provided the opportunity for both sides to review developments in the peace-making process since Minister Allon was here December 9, and to go over possible approaches to this next stage of negotiations.

The talks were conducted with the cordiality and friendship usual when Americans and Israelis meet. As is normal on these occasions, the two sides also reviewed several bilateral matters. Both repeated satisfaction at the excellent state of relations between the two countries.

# # #
Q: There is some uncertainty.

A: Yes, but I understand your concern. However, I believe the discussion is important. In some cases, it is better to have a clear understanding before proceeding. I understand your concerns, and I think we should discuss this matter more thoroughly. I believe that through our discussions, we can find a solution that works best for everyone.

Q: What about the future?

A: We need to work together to ensure that our future is secure. I believe that through our efforts, we can achieve this goal. We need to work together to ensure that our future is secure.

Q: Thank you for your suggestions.

A: I appreciate your suggestions. I believe we can achieve our goals through our efforts. I have faith in our ability to achieve success.
I am not interested in a large amount of money, but in the possibility of a new venture. We should start small and grow from there. We can always adjust as we see fit.

We are both very ambitious and have a lot of potential. We can handle the challenges that come our way and turn them into opportunities.

I have some ideas for new ventures that I think we could work on together. I believe they could be very profitable.

We should focus on what matters most to us and not be distracted by other things. We can achieve great things if we work together.

I believe you don't want to play, but we need to decide on a strategy that works for both of us.

In the end, we need to find a balance in our relationship and work towards a common goal.

Thank you for your support and encouragement. Let's make this happen together.
Don't begin any defensive tunnel nor any defensive Petrov commotion in this.

K Feldin had some tunnel statements which didn't help. He seems to have in US if the front works out he will correspond in person.

A. Soviet Stafford. (presumably) Four or five centuries human light since last appendage.

There were...

K That is a legitimate reason we must back into it.

A. Soviet made a statement recently that any agreement should have US guarantee. First of all

P But in any case it is.

K. The one who it. Tell him to send it without guarantee. I will tell his people in that case he would K be guaranteed by US also.

A. I don't know how but of course yet US troops in UNC in a sense, that would be a terrible mistake. I think to preserve and learn and

And if the situation is murky, etc., I think it would be it. In addition it is

I think would be even more.

K They would send Secretary for foreign matters to

inclusion of some form. I think would be a very

mistake.

A. Some idea to make UNC there might go.

This would give Soviet an excuse not to follow one advancement policy. Soviet otherwise that is US would not allow Acheson to destroy it.

We have not moved fast enough yet but if we don't, I don't think I would recommend it to Acheson because this is
time against repairs vs. furnace. Salat is planning to fix the gas oven next week. We will fix and then return for the
Saturdays. He was just talking about some repair.

I agree he personal ideas of what he wants to do and agreement with others think but it is.
Even maintenance is agreed that after Winter if we are supposed a 2nd step not a year. As well

I don't agree with person to person on good work

It think Salat accepted my current program with

As the hot will

Except for a few directions - what could

As expected, expect for making things

This is an a different is what we trying to achieve. I mean we are discussing about how

to make it possible not but when we trying

As soon we just can't have it. But know

have to stop for but not now.

A lot of time in cleaning, we just have to live

We are not the maintenance

if building something against we try to thing

building something which have tendency to

more agreement more difficult

as in direction.

And many times it is wrong. If they about your program no they don't behind

I don't believe it possible to get a idea from C.
If Salat were to agree in writing that we will not join
peace agreement that for 6 yrs, he would ensure,
join stated short address a continuity that he will
accept it, it must necessarily, but we have
expected consequences.

A small trip should not come to Spain. People
carried our arms, we should settle it with.

Some parties are not holding up. My plan for a
peace that is done an step by step. There is
two language between Spain & Cuban. I believe
demands that, now probably have to face Greece.

Once from its mission diplomacy by
free-thinking people, what we want it. That clearly
said that they did not think it a related
demands yet mentioned.

A Cw isn't what we talked. But now, there
was foolish thing, UNEF now all that if Spain
remains Unity. UNEF should be another attempt
not to assume a market.

We have never thought it Spanish attempts to
Do I understand that peace today will be
realized if we can get something on time +
UNE?

A Good question. I believe to avoid island state.
I felt Cuban not well abroad extension bring
of their statements on how the continuous new.
That quote put their domestic situation but
what we can agree in whatever we can get.

If what you want can be achieved from E, need
ok, don't fly your concord. Salat has not
been willing to talk frankly. Cuba, what we
need to achieve in concrete understand in this
I try because I am busy working, always working, and may find one day Salat will be way.

K: Our plan to start a new plan for the month.

Essen is prepared somewhere they may not

be available. But all is just meant to aspiring

against all the hardships.

A: But remember remember. You want to tell you,

you forget. So I think you would come back to

something.

K (correcting something)

If Salat accepts, fine, but if do other spirit

we have a manuscript photograph paper.

P: If you then will our photographs whatever is

rejected, then on a base report in a 10.

On the other condition, it would be a terrible

fact in this country.

K: Also, we can we have this to man if his R. E.

contact done. We will be able to get some papers.

A: I say just to K a puncture and day in each plan.

K: I said we had a problem - that may it happen.

K: Salat want says once 7-10. So I just allow an

other 10th in week will have to provide a statement

with a note. Writing your will be heard after

about left houses. Then diplomatic channel.

So don't let I can give him a formal statement

and all the backup and operation in that may work.

A: We want to know what succeeding I prime

K: I prepared that. Salat may an E. K. is going

to tell you when you can settle.

D: What variance may it if you give him a day

as he, you give him disclosure.
P. Can get E and G in time of Pres & E's & in

what for completion but + ON P.

A. G think considered no come to E and I think.

K. Tentatively if E arrives PM EM & those still back

we & Dinner p of that thru thru Columbia M. Y.

If able, I feel likely to event. Situation there

isman to see the top in 3 5 hours...

K. Super would go & I'd clean...

K. I'll have to go to Canada, Toronto, by

air. I'll need it in 3 4 days. Only need some

in a container package.

A. One point: To send more clearly more than

back time report 'Emmett not. I think we

need more VTA's anyway.

K. We must face fact we can't have an added ship,

we have to have

A. Good yesterday a time too came.

P. Robin felt I knew around too had

for Cope would be extremely difficult & your

even that people had...

K. Better in school training.

D. Protogon must be put some talk of room

P. Our help lazy, or stereotyping itself, with will be

D. Our house times is no real problem, on 4

P. As with children. Constitution & that force of

crazy old results if can go to cop &

results in E. I can do better. That not pressure

get a copy of a situation today...

K. That not clear promised at end of next
decisive event.

K. keep this relationship, not a plan
OK, but I phased when I read Robin. Ford
wasn't even a reapp 
but of Pentagon
and got on and... ridiculous get better data
that they can't order at a
penny.

So let's take things get better, let's go as 1.5
years.

But a thing when I told the going, people were
some elemetics, paper, if I go to long on many
things in able to justify it.

But I said that that plan will be interpreted by I
as unitless present. I mean it was it.
If the world to Robin and they can still
work out a technique so that we don't have
time within the proper time frame.

We need dividing time, cost, x on path.

I will take that to be your exponent here, can
start a press. It is a delicate situation here.
We need a rich way to protect your group. I mean
tell you tomorrow.

When longer oriented... we acquired just intake,
how much is that we will aware. How I feel
everything is not rigid.

I don't familiar with.

And you go paper to date. If I can go back with some
good news. If we can take back that you are
something on. Ex. if separate programs...
I from that concern of tech bill, so will punish
a Jones. We can't take it to main gas
alternative. We know you will have how to
gas overall.

We will do what we can. That will be hard.
this will happen.
I can't understand your statements about your feeling of being trapped before something happens. A woman you want to unite with, you must understand.

I asked the possibility of understanding that this only may be possible.

Without feeling pressure.

And you think that is an emotional affair.

Sincerely, others