

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, January 13, 1975  
9:25 - 10:20 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

Kissinger: I still think the moves in Southeast Asia are right, but Defense is so opposed to them that they would leak them and cause us an enormous problem with the Hill. Then you would have to say a thousand ways what you would not do. This is the worst way to deal with the North Vietnamese.

President: Who in Defense is opposed?

Kissinger: There was no opposition by Defense at the WSAG. It is at the top and designed to put some space between Schlesinger and Vietnam and put the heat on you and me.

The best way to make these moves is quietly.

President: Could we just leave out the F-4s?

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

mc 01-125 #4: 02 22 2/12/82

By dsc NARA, Date 3/1/02



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: I think any of these moves would give us the same problem. The softest would be the F-4s to the Philippines as a training exercise.

Scowcroft: Or the B-52s to Guam.

President: Why don't we move the B-52s to Guam?

Kissinger: And the F-4 to the Philippines. Make sure Defense says it is a training exercise.

On the Vietnam supplemental. There are several options: One is the \$300 million; Martin wants to go back to the original request.

The Cambodia economic aid we can do by just renewing the PL-480 from the ceiling. There are two ways to go on Cambodia military.

President: If you can avoid going to the Foreign Relations Committees right away, it would help.

Kissinger: You are the best judge of that. I would like \$700, but would rather have \$300 now than \$700 in June.

[Some more discussion]

Could we discuss Allon?

If you accept my recommendation, it will be the toughest meeting with an Israeli and it could result in a blowup. If we fail with Egypt, Sadat would either be forced out or turn increasingly anti-American. We must consider how to get maximum intimidation.

Rockefeller has the reputation of being pro-Jewish. He should either be there, or we should give him your talking points and have Brent there.

President: I like the latter idea.

Kissinger: You should say you are extremely dissatisfied with the nature of the relationship which has developed. It is impossible if everything leaks. Second, there must be a settlement by the end of February including the oil fields and the passes. Only then will Kissinger come to the Middle East. We will get the maximum concessions we can get from Egypt but they will have to trust us.



Three, you can't approve the next tranche before then and you will veto it if the Congress passes it. Fourth, you hope they will keep this quiet because it is not in either side's interest for there to be public confrontation. But that will be their choice.

Rabin has said he would like answers on the military supply. I suggest Brent say the President will discuss it with Allon.

President: There is no other way to go. I think the Shah and Faisal going to Egypt is just holding Sadat up until we can move.

Kissinger: Absolutely. But you must know that if we succeed, we still next year will be sitting here doing this same thing. But in a year a lot of things could have changed.

President: I read yesterday the Israeli oil workers said they would only be there a short time.

Kissinger: I am afraid the Israeli Cabinet will say we are blackmailing them. They will say Egypt hasn't promised anything. The fact is Egypt can't promise much. I have carried them for six years. I think we have no choice. Brent?


Scowcroft: Absolutely. You have bent over backwards -- at some cost to our diplomacy.

Kissinger: Israel is happy with Rabat now because it gives them an excuse. Even with an agreement, Egypt will still move toward the Soviet Union and you will be accused of selling out to Sadat who is turning traitor. Maybe you should call Max Fisher in and talk turkey. You are doing this because you think you are saving Israel this way. Another war would be disastrous.

Let me get it written up in the NSC office. Maybe Fisher could come in on Friday.

President: He is leaving soon for the Middle East.

Kissinger: Israel may use your pressure to get military supply, or they may decided that if they give now there is no stopping and they will go public.



President: Will I commit myself to MATMON-B if they agree?


Kissinger: No. But we should pour in supplies after the agreement. Then we have an excuse. We may have to give more economic aid too.

President: As compensation for losing the oil?

Kissinger: Yes.

On PL-480, I would go to the high side and move Vietnam and Cambodia to the Military Sales Act.

I talked to Burns -- Schmidt will go ahead with the facility. I talked to Healey, who wants 10-12 billion. I told him 3 billion. I would start at 3 and grudgingly go to 5 or 6. If we go higher, that facility will be the governing one.



\* Check the line between in 72 - just wanted to get focus out, but want to get it to 1. com and

✓ P/K Jan 13 '75 Monday  
9:25 - 10:20 AM

K I still think a move in SEA an option, but Def is so opposed to them that they would back them and cause ~~the~~ no on enormous problems w/c all. Then you would have to put a ~~case~~ case, what you would not do. That is worst way to deal w/c NVN.

P Who in Def is opposed.

K There was no opposition by Def or CWSA. It is at the top & designed to put some space bet Schles & VN & put a heat on you & me.

Best way to make these moves is probably jointly

P Could we just land out a F-4's?

K I think any of these moves would give us some problems. Scept would be F-4 to Phil as long as exercise Sc \* O-52's to Guam.

P Why don't we move 52's to Guam

\* K And F-4 to Phil. Make sure Def say it is a training exercise

O on the US supplemental. There are several options: 200 mil; Martin wants to go back to original request. Combrobid & we can do just retraining. PK 450. from cycling. Two ways to go on Combrobid visibility.

P If you can avoid going to FR creates right away, it would help.

K You are best judge of that. I would like 200, but would rather have 300 now than 200 in future. (Some more discussion.)


Could we discuss all this?

If you accept my reason it will be a tough nut - early w/ on I think & it could result

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY per ml 01-125 #4, stat. 7/12/02

BY ll NLF, DATE 5/25/04



- Inty Thurs 3 pm - May

in a blammy. If we find w/E, Salaf would  
either be forced out or turn viciously anti-American.  
We must consider how to get max international  
to Rockefeller has reputation of being pro-Jewish.  
He should either be there, or we should give him  
your talking points + have Brent there.

P I like the latter.

K You should say you are extremely dissatisfied  
w/ nature of relationship which has developed. In spite  
if everything looks (true)

(2) There must be settlement by end Feb incl  
oil + passes. Only then will we come to N.E. We  
will get some concession but they want  
that us

(3) Can't approve next tranche before + will  
vote if Congress passes.


(4) Hope they will keep this quiet because not  
in either interest for public reputation, but  
that their choice.

Rubin has said would like answers on oil  
supply. I suggest Brent say P will discuss  
w/ Allen.

P No other way to go. I think Shoh + Faisal going  
to E case is just holding Salaf up til  
we can move

K Absolutely. But you must know that if we  
succeed we still next year will be sitting  
here doing this same thing. But in a year  
a lot of things could have changed.

P I read yesterday a I oil workers said they  
would only be there a short time.



K I fear I cannot avoid any more blackmarking  
them. They will say E hasn't provided  
anything. Fact is E can't provide much.  
I have carried them for a year. I think we have  
no choice. Best

S Absolutely. You have lost our documents - at  
some cost to our diplomacy.

K I'm happy w/ Robert now cause it gives them an  
expense. E now w/ an agreement, E will <sup>still</sup> move  
toward ~~settling~~ S & you will be accused  
of selling out to Sabot who is a traitor.  
Maybe you should call Max Fisher in & talk  
Turkey. You are doing this because you think  
you are saving I this way. Another way would  
be disastrous.

Let me get it written up in NSC office  
Wesley Fisher in on Friday.

\*\*

P He's coming soon for ME.

K I may use your pressure to get mid supply,  
or they may decide if they find now there is  
no stopping they will go public.

P Will I commit to Matron B if they agree

K No. Best we should <sup>force</sup> in supplies  
after agreement - we have an oil deal. They  
have to give more economic aid too.

P As compensation for losing oil?

K Yes.

On Ph 480, I would go to the high side and  
make UNCT Contribution for USA.

I talked to Burns - Schmidt will go ahead w/ facilities.  
I talked to Healey, who wants to 10-12 bil.



I could have 3 but I would ~~go to~~ start at 3+  
and probably go to 5 or 6. If we go higher, that  
facility will be growing out.

