MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, January 8, 1975
9:24 - 10:48 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: Clements is not an intellectual, but he is a square shooter. We used to have fights, but he never bore grudges or leaked. I like him.

President: Let's talk to Don about it.

Kissinger: I have drafted a letter to Brezhnev. I made it general so that if he refuses, he is not rejecting you. State can then tell Dobrynin what has to happen.

The more I think about it, the better I think a Soviet rejection would be good. Byrd thought that a rejection would hurt Jackson. I told him the consequences -- they'd get credits from the Europeans -- and he said, "if you can get that across to the public, many Senators will breathe a sigh of relief."

Perle is a psychopath. You know the emigration issue will be a running sore. Even if Brezhnev's intention is good, you know there will be discrimination.

President: If they reject it, what will Jackson do?

Kissinger: He will try to cut the unused credits and claim it is a gigantic swindle.
President: How about the Jewish Community?

Kissinger: They won't take the blame. They will be shocked and begin to blame us. The leaders who meet with you were already making demands on when the restriction would be lifted. It can't happen fast. If you had $2 billion in credits to offer them, the Soviets might push, but not for $300 million.

I said all along that the word "assurances" would get us into trouble. We will come under attack but I think we can easily turn it.

President: This is all involved in Democratic politics and personal ambitions.

Kissinger: I got the impression that Byrd is no great friend of Jackson. The letter to Brezhnev just restates the detente policy, really.

President: Go ahead and send it.

Kissinger: Jackson wants to have hearings on the Vladivostok agreement. He wants to cover... [reads from paper].

My point is, first, this is a total invasion of Executive authority. The Congressional function is to approve treaties, not to participate in their negotiation.

President: We can't do that. He would want the notes of the NSC meeting.

Kissinger: He wants to know every bureaucratic position and why you made the decisions you did.

President: I think our strategy should be -- if Jackson comes up with a renegotiated resolution we should get our friends to add a clause that if we tried and the Vladivostok agreement failed, the supporters would vote for additional funds for defense.

Kissinger: Mondale and Kennedy have a resolution that is good. It puts the additional negotiation after the agreement is signed. I think you should put out firm instructions to all witnesses as to what they can say.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
President: Would you draft them?

Kissinger: You may have to do it orally -- but maybe it should be in writing and confront the issue. If we don't do this, Jackson will unravel the whole thing. Jackson will rake us over the coals. [Described his experience.]

President: Let's do it by letter.

Kissinger: The witnesses shouldn't testify to anything but the final agreement, not internal positions or other options presented to the Soviets.

On air-to-surface missiles, I disagree with Schlesinger. You can't preempt Jackson this way. And if we try to change air-to-surface, the Soviets will ask for inclusion of subsonic cruise missiles. Maybe that is good, but my people think we are ahead in that.

President: I told Schlesinger that cruise missiles only survived because you insisted.

Kissinger: If we need cruise missiles for bomber penetration, they can be on ships and submarines timed to penetrate simultaneously. If we have to show how we screwed the Soviets, Jackson could sink the Vladivostok accord.

Now on the financial issue in the paper. This could be a disaster. Truman was dealing with a different generation with the Marshall Plan. This generation is a group of petty narrow politicians. The Europeans snipe at everything we try -- they object to being screwed.

The Europeans have now accepted Witteveen's second plan. We have resisted because it puts the Arabs in the driver's seat. IMF voting is proportional to the contribution. The Europeans like this because it relieves them of responsibility.

The Europeans will agree to our facility too. We have to keep the Witteveen fund small enough. It is useful only for small and medium countries who are moderately affected. If we could keep it at $5 billion, it would be useless for the industrial countries or the basket cases. We must keep it at 5-6 and conditional on acceptance of our fund.
President: What leverage do we have?

Kissinger: It can't happen without us. Also we can reject the consumer-producer meeting. Simon agrees, but he won't stick with it. You should meet with us and tell him he can't yield without your approval.

President: Who will meet with...

Kissinger: Five, ten, twenty -- a whole week. Simon agrees. But he talks tough before the meeting and caves in at the meetings.

President: The paper says this is a British [Healey] proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. The Brits need the money now. Britain is a tragedy -- it has sunk to begging, borrowing, stealing until North Sea oil comes in.

We gain nothing by this facility. It is only to give the West the feeling it can master its destiny. That Britain has become such a scrounger is a disgrace -- but Britain will support us.

President: All this argues why we must be tough in the energy program.

Kissinger: I agree. Incidentally, that alleged threat of famine -- the Saudis called their Ambassadors in to say that no European country would be cut off -- just maybe the U.S. No European has told us that. It is okay for us because it will get Europe off our back in a war.

President: Will you give me a talking paper to talk with Simon?

Kissinger: If he can say he has no authority to give, he will be okay.

Sadat says I should go out on 3 February and stay there until it is finished; in the meantime we should send him our proposal. I am reluctant to do that. He looks desperate -- we could wake up and find him overthrown. If we give him a paper, he may say it is insufficient and publish it or he may accept and we may not be able to sell it to Israel.

If I go to Cairo on the 3rd in this circumstance....

It also is a sign of the times that Fahmy can go to Moscow but not here. Allon will give us nothing new. But I think we must tell him the U.S.
relationship depends on making a deal with Egypt. I think we have to tell them we need a promise of the passes and oil fields and rely on me to get what I can.

We need an agreement so that when Geneva reconvenes it won't be a two-bloc situation. We must also back Sadat and let him show that his method gets results.

Third, if we get a deal, it will take six to nine months to implement. This gives us 1975 to build our energy and economy. It doesn't solve our problems, but it gives us time and shows that those who work with us can make progress.

If we could get five kilometers on the Golan, we could keep it going for five years.

President: Should you tell Allon that we cannot approve the long-term authority if they don't go along?

Kissinger: Absolutely. And if the leaking doesn't stop, we will have to adjust our foreign policy. Maybe you should do it as well as I, so they really know.

Good news -- the political talks have started on Cyprus.

President: One quick thing on Vietnam.

Kissinger: We had a WSAG. Here is the situation. The cuts last year put them on static defense. You know that the GVN needs mobility and firepower to survive. If we don't get a supplemental, the WSAG think it will unravel.

President: Let's ask for one.

Kissinger: And I would mention in the State of the Union that here is a people who agreed to peace on the assumption of our support.

The only thing North Vietnam knows is massive brutality. There are signals we can give, but all it would cause is a little hell here, B-52's to Guam or Thailand. The problem in Thailand is elections -- I don't agree. We could put a carrier into the Tonkin.
The Pentagon should stop signalling carrier moves. We could move F-4's to Clark.

Another problem is that South Vietnam doesn't have mines. They could mine if things get out of control. But the DOD lawyers oppose it on the basis of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. That is insane. North Vietnam hasn't obeyed Article 7 at all. My people want to be able to claim we have obeyed Article 7.

President: I think we should do it.

Kissinger: One other thing. State wants a contingency paper in case we don't get the Supplemental, and we will face negotiations. But negotiations are useful only if there is a real military stalemate. [He described the "Ducky" example.] They are the toughest in the world to deal with.
K: He was not one intelligent, but he is a genestot.

we used to know things, but now these people, those a... I like him.

I don't talk to him about it.

K: I have a chape, he isn't gay. I think it's good

If he agrees, do not reject again. Then come

then to try what their bringer.

What you think about it, better to think for rejection

not to reject. Indeed, that rejection would hurt

a person. I tell him, according to what if you

can get the area to a policy, many sanctions will

brake a style of belief.

Park is a professional. You know the enemy

will be looking for it. Even if they

will not be good, you know they will be discuss.

If they reject, what will happen to?

K: He will try to put another candidate against it.

another candidate.

I don't know. A Jewish community.

I thought other known. They will be stripped

began to become is. The likelihood, not if you

were already shining demands an urban restitution

would be better. It can't happen fast & if you

back in white, I might fast, but

not for 300 mile.

I said all day that a moral awareness would

put me into trouble. We will come under attack

that I think we can easily turn it.

I will come involved in those places in due course.

K: I got involve you took our great period of interest.

The latter part reflects distants physically.

K: I am involved.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY by 10/31/1922; 5/25/63; 5/21/64

BY NLF, DATE 2/1/64
Jackson wants to have having an agreement. He wants to swear... (Check page after)

My point is that this is total invasion of peace. We should not involve other countries and again invite... not to participate.

He can't affidavit. He wouldn't write for me.

He wants to know every document, position... anybody's made. Decision needed.

First, our strategy should be - if Jackson comes saying a, target resolution, we should yet an agreement to add clause that if wee think United against Soviet, support would vote for additional funds.

I wouldn't, basically - have a resolution is good to get additional support. An agreement would. It's more inclined just come from instructions to all witnesses on what they saw. May.

I would agree then.

You can't take it literally. But maybe it should be in writing - handwritten version. I don't.

As this Jackson will respond - whether this.

Jackson will call me some code. (unsigned) - Expires

It is 9:00, he little.

Witnesses shouldn't testify to any thing but the final agreement. Not without parties another option presented to hear.

All our five missiles. (Write) By 9:00.

Please don't forget Jackson this way. If we try to achieve A.S. soon will ask missing.

S.S. again, missiles, though they joint peace, but any people think are no afraid.
I feel Schlesinger's advice might be sound. The situation has changed during the past 6 months. The question of whether to finance a large part of the Marshall Plan is a serious one. Eamon de Valera's visit last week was an important step. The problem is complex and involves political considerations. The United States is expected to accept the plan, but we must act with caution. This is because it involves substantial financial assistance.

K: How will we get financing? We have to keep the plan viable. Without such support, some European countries will be seriously affected. If we could keep it at 3.5 billion dollars, it would be feasible for industrial countries to adopt it. We must stop at 3.5 billion dollars or a stepwise approach.

P: What about China?

K: China's cooperation is essential. However, we must be prudent. The situation is complex. We must proceed with caution.

P: What about K? 50, 20, 20 is a whole number. China agrees, but he won't vote without your support. You should meet with him to ensure that he will yield to your proposal.

K: Yes, I'll talk with him. Money now that is a question.
It has started to happen, however, something
and it isn't all clear.
We gave nothing by the periphery. It had a solid
at first, but it can maintain its destiny, that
the idea has some kind of resistance is not
insignificant, but it will support
P. All this, anyway, was not to stay in
a memory.

If I speak, incidentally, that alleged truth of mine
Sancho called the other in a way not Eurocentric
would be not a part any more. We Eurocentric
tell us that I will for us because it will put Eurocentric
sometime in a man.

We will give more such pages to talk of him.
If he can say, he has no authority to give, he will
Said as if the whole were in a place by in a
limited, permanent, and biographical.
I want to do that he looks strange we could
attempt a joint hand in a letter -- by no give him
a paper, some money sure it can not published as it
was accepted to want to continue to 5.

If I find Cameron is in the version...

Asking to the Fekin camp to know that the
problem will give us nothing now, but I think
we must tell him a relationship depends on
making a kind for W. If we had told
then we would a promise to promise and provide
only one man to get what I can.
We made appointment to a Fekin. It wants to
a 2. We situation. We must the balance
Said, but him while his method gets results.
If we get a deal, it will go 5 - 9 in %

implemented a Paris plan in 1975 to build our
debt economy. Despite our punishing, it
got on time - shows that those who work/see

even more progress.

Good and Ngiat Thun are gone, we will try

again for eyes.

P. Should it kill all our hopes, it gives us

time to ask if they don't perform

K. Absolutely! And if they improve, we will

have to adjust our E1. We know if we should

24. The willow & see they really know.

Good now - pd. Falls have started on May 17

P. Once quick through VN.

K. We had all 12, 420,000. Cuts last year don't, I am

sure 19 50 are much higher + compare to now.

+ put them on static 66. If we don't get a

very planned, we see that it will succeed. 19

It will have to come

K. and I would mention in 50 that he was in

a people who regard to find an agreement if

we can stop.

Only Thies NUN become a massive stupidity.
These can surprise us can gone, but all came.

Will tell him 6.52 is common to Vietnam.

Put in Vietnam in the time - I don't agree. We

could put easier onto Turan.

→ Pentagon should stay signing easier move

We could move 6.5 to Czech.

Another part is 50W doesn't have mines. They could

move anything get out of exists. But 24 hours

oppose on basis of article 7. True reason: NUN hasn't
Whew! I should've told 'em people want to be with union
not have layoffs!!
I think we should do it.

One option is the State would continue payments in
the amount of a supplemental, we would pay
negotiations.之能是our responsibility if we
and statements (Deborah Bundy example). They
are the toughest thing we would do.