MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, January 6, 1975
9:34 - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

The President: Here is a letter which emerged from the meeting with the Jewish leaders. [The President hands the letter to Secretary Kissinger.]

Kissinger: In retrospect, I am sorry we ever negotiated with Jackson.

Domestically, we would be better off if the Soviet Union rejects it than if it accepts, because there is no way the Soviet Union can live up to the two letters. If it doesn't work out, Jackson will say "I told you so"; if it does work, he will say that shows what you can get with toughness. You have seen the change in the Soviet press accounts of the U.S. Something is happening.

Here is my analysis: We have made foreign policy look so easy that the American people think you just go to Vladivostok and make a deal. They don't know the work behind it, the precariousness of it. Of course, the Democrats would like both detente and anti-Communism.

From the Soviet standpoint: we bombed one of their allies to smithereens and they did nothing; we quieted Europe; they have been quiet in the Middle East -- not cooperative, but quiet. We rebuffed the Soviets in the 1973 summit on the Middle East.
What have we gotten out of detente? We have de-fanged the left in Europe and their argument that friendship with the U.S. jeopardized the relaxation of tensions. The same in the U.S. The left is belligerent now, but let detente fail and they will swing to the Left again.

What have the Soviets received? In SALT I they got only ratification of existing situation. We stopped their programs. In Vladivostok they fell off FBS, and they have to give up 100 systems to get down to 2,400. We have no restrictions on our programs.

They are now facing the prospect of some dramatic haggling on SALT as they had on trade. They wanted Vladivostok to be a big achievement to bolster you and they were taken aback. We have to defend Vladivostok by showing what the Soviets gave up, and that's bad. In 1972 we were talking about large scale economic cooperation. We were thinking that Ex-Im was too small and maybe a special bank would be set up. Now the Trade Bill and the Ex-Im legislation is an insult to them. The authority to go back to Congress is a joke -- you can always do that. So they are worse off in credits and only marginally better in trade.

The Politburo people are ambitious like anyone. They will tell Brezhnev, "Look what you told us would happen and look what happened."

There are two things which have to happen: the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union cutting the length of the trade agreement. There is only a 50-50 chance they will agree to that. Then you must submit a letter assuring that the purposes of Vanik will be met. I doubt that the Soviets will let us say there are assurances.

In the State of the Union, you should talk about Congressional intrusion into foreign policy and go for relief from the OPEC and Ex-Im ceiling. I can give Dobrynin two choices: give up on trade or try to make it work. But honestly, I think we are better off if it fails than if it succeeds. Let the Jewish emigration get cut off. If they hit me with letters, I will say I fought for a year and then went to what I thought were the outer limits. It may have worked if Jackson hadn't gloated; then with the Ex-Im piled on top, it is just too much.

Each time some Soviet Jew protests, you will get pressure to cut off trade. I don't think it will work and I regret having gotten into negotiations with Jackson. If Jackson would have let it go without gloating, it may
have worked. With your permission, I think this should be my strategy with the Soviet Union. But we may be in for a tough time with the Soviet Union. On the Middle East, they are now offering a joint guarantee of the '67 borders. That means we push Israel to the '67 borders. A U.S.-Soviet guarantee means Israel would have to want Soviet troops in; they could paralyze a joint action.

The President: I see Allon is coming.

Kissinger: He is going to Palm Springs. I said I don't want any proposals from them because they will leak. He will stop to see me unofficially on his way back. I am not even sure you should see him. I told Dinitz the only issue is to negotiate or to go to Geneva.

Israel has asked for some Egyptian gestures. What they have offered is as ridiculous as the Israeli concessions. But Sadat's position is now weaker. I don't see how to move it forward unless Sadat sends Fahmy or I see Sadat. Only Sadat can make the concessions and he will do it only to you or me. That raises all sorts of problems.

The President: Could we get Allon and Fahmy together here?

Kissinger: If Sadat were in full control . . . he told me in June that I should get what I could and he would accept it. I couldn't accept that responsibility. [Story about Gamasy]

I am not eager to do it -- if I am selfish I would prefer it to fail because if it succeeds there will be problems and we would be set up for another crisis next year. But it will help our friends to give us a chance to get our energy house in order.

The President: If we don't move, what do we do with long-range assistance? Hold it in abeyance?

Kissinger: The only way you can go with $4.5 billion is with a settlement. Otherwise you may as well shoot Sadat.

The President: If there is a stalemate, I don't see how I can move on long-range aid for Israel.
Kissinger: No matter what, I think the American Jews will oppose you in 1976, because they will think you would move in 1977 and with a new party they would have a crack at a better deal.

Here is a scenario: an agreement in March, which would take six-nine months for implementation. Then we would agree in May to go to Geneva in June or July. That will get the UNDOF renewal. We should be able to confine Geneva to boredom then. But in 1976 we will have trouble again, but in a better environment.

If there is no agreement, Sadat will move fast. We will go to Geneva under a stress situation, and it will be highly inflammatory. By the summer we will be in a real bind on the PLO, and so on, with the U.S. and Israel isolated.

Even with an agreement, Israel will be sitting here just like this next year. Both alternatives are troublesome.

The President: But by next year energy and the economy will be in better shape. It is a responsible course. The other way it is very risky at a time when energy and the economy are weak.

Kissinger: But we could go to Geneva and then claim that Jackson and Israel had screwed it up so we had to impose a solution. But that is very brutal.

But an Egyptian settlement will be attacked as forcing Israel to an illusory peace without real gains for Israel.

The President: If we don't even try the step-by-step...

Kissinger: The Soviets would be restrained for three months, but by the summer we would be up to our ass in alligators.

The President: I want to move step by step.

Kissinger: Then I will draft letters to Sadat saying you are willing to meet with him somewhere. Here, or in Cairo, or in Europe. [There was a discussion of where and how.]

I have to go out there sometime, but I thought I would go only in the last week of negotiations. It is too risky to send a proposal through diplomatic
channels. We need to get one or the other signed up. Previously, I never made a proposal I didn't know was acceptable to at least one of the parties.

I could meet Sadat in Paris under an excuse of a trip to see Schmidt or the Shah. We must get something by the first of March.

On oil, my weak sisters in State think my inadvertent remark in Business Week is one of the best things ever done.

The President: I like your term "strangulation."

Kissinger: If we play it boldly, I think we have a fifty percent chance that if there is war there might be no embargo.

If there is a war, we must keep the Soviets out at all costs and it is probably in our favor to have Israel win. But afterwards, we would have to impose ruthlessly a peace.

The President: Will the WSAG lay out contingency plans?

Kissinger: The purpose is to see if we have any plans and if they make sense.

On energy, I am for a floor price, to put us in a stronger position.
The document appears to be handwritten and contains the following content:

"Perry, a determination made from a military point of view."

"I'm trying to make some decisions on security measures for Jackson."

"Economically, we would be better off if SC objects, rather than accept, because we're saving some money on a few dollars on the 2.5 billion. If it doesn't work out, we will say "Let's see, if it does not work out, we will say it doesn't work out, if Congress is not to support the joint conference agreement with Congress."

"You have some change in some press accounts. Something is happening."

"The Army and Navy: We have made F-102, a huge thing. We have got a joint problem: we need to have a joint problem. This is a joint problem. People want to have both joint and anti-air.""

"From a political standpoint, we have launched an attack on NATO's southern wing did nothing on the front line. Europeans say they have been given in NATO's anti-air."

What have we gained? We have distinguished in the sense that this is a joint attack on NATO's southern wing did nothing on the front line. Europeans say they have been given in NATO's anti-air."

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"In summary, we have a problem. We have to get out of the situation and try to see if we can talk again."

"2/15/75 - Military Point of View."
We had to be a bit as ambitious to hold your attention. We have a definite belief in showing what is good and what is bad.

As I was walking about large scale con

cepts, we were trying not too small a nuance or a special locale setting. Using a tool like

is an attempt to become a authority in public

Speaking. A joke - yes can change a bit. So

they start wars off in India a very unsurely

little in trial. There are the little people on

government the company. They will tell by what

you told us could happen + what a lot

happened.

Changing the which which happen: A change of

the existing length of terms agreement. Only what

Charm they will agree with. Then you must

consider with assuring that purpose of finish will

be made. I don't know. I will it too by themselves.

I don't you should talk about Camp minimum

with E.A. go for relief from 26 ES X M ending.

I can give 1 or 2 chances. Put on the test or try
to make it work. But honestly, I think we are both

off if it yields less 12 M. undoubt, but finish

Argentina puts cut off. If they had many better.

I will say I forget for years + then want to

instruct that we are into limits. They have worked

in Pakistan, brought glory, then work NA pitch

on top, as just too much.

Each time read Sun jar protocol + they one

sharing - you will get practice to cut off talk.

I don't think it will work & I regret charging them

with nothing. Golden. Must of Jackson could have
It is going to be difficult, it may have worked
6/w your permission, I think this should be
pointed out, but we may be in for tough
times of 60. On RE they are now offering
a joint guarantee of 60 dollars. That means
we push 16.5 dollars. A US guarantee the
I would have to wait 5-10 years, they could
be handled just certain.

I see Allen coming.

If she go to Lab in Eng. I said I don't want people
be present, they will think, he will stop writing
on too many times. I don't know sure you should do
him. I told Sherry the only thing is to
negotiate on it to Allen.

I have asked for 6.5 letters. What they have
affairs to an end as I expected. But Sallot
get this week. When I don't see him a move
of 1 1/2 million, I cannot do Sallot send to Fokon in S 64
Sallot. Only Sallot can make a movement +
he will do it? Only 3 you in this. That means all
P. Could he get Allon + Fokon? together here?

If Sallot wants full control... told me in
Pun to be sure but that I could be wrong except
it I could not except that step. (Stay and Sherry)
I regret to do it - if I failed I would regret it.
I fear because if it failed there will be just 2 not
my for another three next year. That it will help
some financial banks to get own every

I ask you don't want what do not ask of any
associate? What in other words?

Okay say you can you our 45 in 1 1/4 without
Of course, you may go with the new one. I mean, it's not a big deal.

K: We need to talk. I think you will give me a wrap-up by 26. Since this will be a wrap-up, I'll be prepared to talk about it.

How was the weekend? I think you will give me a wrap-up by 26. Since this will be a wrap-up, I'll be prepared to talk about it.
I then I would draft letter to Salat resign as 
well. I met someone here, have some ideas. 
(Description of event here)

I have the chance, but I feel like it may not be 
right. I think it's better to resign than to be 
asked. We need to get out of this position. Finally, I 
never asked about this. We need to accept this 
and move on.

I could meet Salat in Paris under the guise of 
travelling to Schindler's Sheep. We cannot get something 
by first.

On this, my state week notices that my 
individual work is one of the best things ever done.

I agree with your time allocation.

I hope you will still get the chance. If 
we don't, we will take the first 
place. I agree to have it win. But after, we will 
move on and go for my next goal.

I will try to resign soon.

Prepares to see if we have any plans. If they 
make sense.

Sincerely,
Tom

Stark/Scranton

On Monday, work for more places in France.