MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Golda Meir, former Prime Minister of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, December 18, 1974
3:30 p.m.

PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted for photographs. There was small talk about Mrs. Meir's U.S. trip, how good she looks, etc. The press was then dismissed.

President: Some of the press I don't recognize.

Dinitz: They are from our newspapers.

Meir: I never take such people with me.

Dinitz: We have two newspapers represented in Washington, and radio-TV.

Kissinger: I recognize most of them and avoid them, but there is one blonde with blue eyes.

Meir: It's surprising how many blondes there are in Israel.

President: It's good to have you here and to talk with you again. It is a fortuitous time -- potentially the most serious and volatile I have ever seen in my life. I have talked widely with your Government, with Arabs...
and with others, and no one gives me a feeling the situation is good.

The prospects of another war are very, very high. It is my obligation -- as well as others' -- to avoid and prevent such an eventuality and to bring a period of six months, and maybe longer, of peace and security.

My record of support for Israel is clear. But I think we must do something to move.

Meir: May I smoke? [There was light banter about smoking.]

President: It upsets me badly to see all the leaks which are coming out. It is not a healthy way to deal with such a sensitive issue. They happen almost before the word is transmitted. To have proposals in this sensitive time leaked is extremely serious.

Meir: I couldn't agree more. It is not decent, fair or moral. I have always felt this way. A newsman once said to me that if they depended on me for news, they would be out of a job. It is an honor to be in public service, and then there are these leaks -- sometimes from Washington and sometimes from Jerusalem. That is one problem.

President: It is one which has to be dealt with.

Meir: The problem is how do you prove it?

President: I read what comes from Israel, what comes from the Arabs, and it destroys what we are trying to accomplish.

Meir: I agree. I will tell my friends in the Cabinet. I know they are unhappy about it.

President: Ever since I got into office we have been working for movement. I think it is tragic that there was no movement before Rabat. I think it would have avoided Rabat.

Meir: Movement where?

President: The West Bank, and with Egypt. I fear Israel is getting more and more isolated. Much as I love Israel, I must say I think we must have movement now. If that is not possible, then I am afraid we just ought to go to Geneva, and I don't want that. The first argument would be about the PLO and getting them in.
Meir: Not with our agreement.

Kissinger: I supported that.

President: Brezhnev says the 1967 borders. That is impossible. But what can we do?

Kissinger: Dobrynin told me yesterday Moscow is convinced we had a deal with Egypt to make an agreement just before Brezhnev went, to embarrass Brezhnev. We would get an agreement and he could only give a few arms. He asked for a guarantee that we wouldn't. I said I would give him an answer next week.

Meir: I speak with you frankly, Mr. President. I want to divide the subject into two parts. There may be a difference of opinion about what would be done. But for West Bank movement, I bear full responsibility. There was not a suggestion that went with Cabinet approval, but I am responsible. Before me, in the Eshkol Government, we began to meet with Hussein. I think Hussein wants peace. But we could have made peace with him only on the basis of the '67 war plus Jerusalem. I don't say he will hold out until the end on this, but I think it unfair to force him to be the first Arab head of state to sign an agreement with a territorial compromise. After Syria, Hussein said he would agree to a disengagement. This was unacceptable because there are no forces facing each other -- we are two friendly states practically. He proposed moving back 10-15 kilometers.

President: He mentioned it last summer, didn't he?

Kissinger: Yes, but also he was suggesting about half of the Allon plan.

Meir: I didn't report to my Government my Hussein meetings, for fear of leaks. We had maybe 30 meetings -- very friendly. I should wish every Prime Minister such friends as Hussein. I put before him all kinds of proposals: a peace treaty; non-belligerency; no foreign forces on your territory. Rifai said no to that. The last proposal was the 10-15 kilometers pullback. I asked about our settlements; Rifai said, "Take them out." I suggested corridors and Rifai said, "You are still proposing the Allon plan." He said that was a monster. I said that would give him contact with his people; that we don't want all the West Bank. Neither of these proposals was accepted.
Hussein wouldn't have met with us if he didn't think we were sincere. We had a close and almost touching relationship. During the Yom Kippur war we had close exchanges. He told me he was sending tanks to Syria and I said that if they fire at us, we couldn't ask for their identity cards.

When I was in London I met with Wilson and Schmidt. I was angry with them for their UN abstentions on the PLO. He (Schmidt) said, "We voted that way for EC unity, and otherwise France would have been more extreme." I said that was unity at the lowest common denominator. He also said there was a feeling we didn't move as we could have. I said, "Look at our record." As far as I am concerned we have done everything possible except accept Hussein's plan for the '67 borders with adjustments. On no other condition was he prepared. Maybe after Sadat he could have done something. But not before.

On the PLO, Rifai asked if we would sit with the PLO. I said no. Arafat, if we put him on the West Bank, would have two guns, not one. With his olive branch at the UN, he'd have one gun pointed against us and one against Hussein.

In the Sinai, I don't think there were too many differences; the problems were with Syria. Asad wants to annihilate us. So we have to be cautious.

**Kissinger:** I have never said Israel was unreasonable after we first figured out what we could do.

**President:** I understand the Golan, and I told Rabin. I only know about this since August. I feel the situation now is more serious -- not only in the Middle East but in America. Rightly or wrongly. I feel the situation in Congress is not what it was when I was there. Congress has been strong in support of Israel, but I know politics and I detect undercurrents, of a kind I don't like. I have always supported high defense budgets. I think the U.S. has to stand up. But I detect now this undercurrent that, if something broke out in the Middle East -- an oil embargo, a confrontation with the Soviet Union -- the situation will not be the same. It won't be my weakness here, but with this Government, divided as it is and with the undercurrents I see, it is vital to avoid the worst of all worlds, an adverse reaction. I think there has to be some give. We have to make some movement. Henry will participate, in what will be some of the most difficult negotiations, and I will support him. We must find something good for Israel, for one or more of the Arabs, and for the
world. Henry and I judged that Allon's proposal was unattainable. There has to be more than that. And it has already been released to the press.

Meir: That is very bad. In 1964, shortly after I took office, I told Barbour we were not interested in most of the Sinai. We don't want more sand. But there are strategic points. If there is anything we all want, it's peace. If all he wants is pull back, that is not a great achievement. We did it without asking much. I think the Government is willing to do more, but isn't it fair to ask Sadat what he is prepared to do? If we are going to '67, why not do it all at once? Why build defense lines and a few months later move back again? I will never agree to '67. If they were so good, why were we attacked over them? If all Sadat will say is for the Israelis to move, that is not much.

I am not surprised at Rabat. I don't believe there is or ever has been Arab unity. But they contrived a facade of unity at the expense of Israel.

President: There was a strong show of unity in 1973 with the oil embargo.

Meir: At somebody's expense.

President: Yes. But Europe was burnt.

Meir: If Europe had stuck, it might not have worked.

President: But will they again? We can talk about all the things we would propose, but we must deal with reality.

Dinitz: Mr. President, if we move back without Arab concessions, they will just ask for more and more.

Meir: The press says I have complexes, of this kind or that kind. I do, if that means I remember things. But for the life I have left, I will fight to not give complexes to my children. I will fight not to have Israel sacrificed to the good of mankind. Because it wouldn't be for the good of mankind, and I don't want to be sacrificed. Next time the embargo would be for something else.
Kissinger: The President has always told the Arabs that the next embargo would mean military action. No one asks for a withdrawal without a return, but what are the returns we get? Time, to keep the Arabs split, an opportunity to get Europe and Japan in line, to keep the Soviet Union off balance...

Dobrynin's conversation is interesting. I know you think it's a put-up game.

Meir: What is Sadat prepared to give?

Kissinger: We have asked Sadat that. No one wants Israeli withdrawal without compensation.

Meir: Let me say just two things, Mr. President. I want to thank you for what you have done in this short time. There is not a person in Israel who doubts in the U.S., in the President, the Secretary of State, the Administration. I am convinced the Europeans will come around out of shame and practical interest. It speaks much for Israel the little line in the press that the U.S. didn't stand up for that butcher Arafat. There is nothing our Government is not prepared to discuss with you, but you should understand when the Government says this for our security is as far as we can go.

President: Our experiences in the UN in the last session are very disappointing. We were the first to stand up, to speak out; we refused to participate in this UN fund. It is time the Third World understands we won't stand there and be castigated all the time. What I am saying is that the U.S. stands with Israel, but we must be practical. Our support has never been less than what we have said, and with that assurance I would hope your people would cooperate. If we don't, it won't be good for Israel, for the United States and the world. Others can work out details. I am speaking as a deeply concerned person.

Meir: There is one thing we really agree on -- there can be no Soviet state in the Middle East. A Soviet satellite on the West Bank would be just that.

[The meeting ended with warm handshakes and farewells.]
Purin

(Thames & Bank It's big, have good ale lots, etc.)

Put out

P. Some poor student anywhere.

D. They are poor, you know.

W. Some take about the people of us.

D. We have 2 students in Westgate.

K. Happy, mot of them I earned. They, but this

so you can't break

H. Scoping it hard and you have to see this again. It

a future, time - probably not time -

state in my life. I have. Which

you don't have. Where are you give me fully.

it is good.

P. Last night, the man is very high. It

no, - other. Student is bad. Present such

one. But to be a part of a complete

large of your success.

W. My friend I suggest to go to, but I think.

in there must be something I found.

(Continued on next)

P. I suggest to me badly. He can call a house

with some coming out. So next a healthy

way is dealing with such an individual. They

happen amount if you were is connected to

have purpose in this situation. Time should

is definitely serious.

W. I couldn't see range. It not clear for a

reason. A reason. Kind of getting anybody

one. If the news they could to out if gets.

It so, can break it is in public service.
Then we have two outcomes from Washougal: one from you. That is my job.

P: What is one which has to be dealt with?

M: Let's move you person it?

P: I mean what means from ? What means from?

M: It depends what we try to accomplish at the end, I will tell my friend can submit. I have this unhappy about it.

P: Because it is more I get back. Mix it up, making its popular. It think it makes it grow it hope. Altogether St. Thaddeus, it would have cared about.


P: We have a file. I mean I go getting more and more. There is D and F, I want to think we may have something more. That not worth, then I agree we just caught up to what. I don't want that I want argument would be that by getting them.

W: What's going on?

K: I have had goes.

P: By six foreign. That suggestion get

K: It's said. I am not certain and hard that it to make argument just. Before they really,

W: I can make get things.

K: It's really quite same. However permanent we are. That I wish computers made work.

W: I speak friendly, I want to discuss subject

P: It's quite. May be different point
...
Dear X,

to change the title, renumber, and correct.

I said if they fire in Cannot make [Deed] contact.

When I'm done, I must William Schmid for

some quick fix of [Deed] for UN attention. They [Deed]

and without that every [Deed] to him in a

there have been some things.

I said that at least some things [Deed]

He also said [Deed] and didn't mean we

could change. I said both at our wrap. As far

so I understand we have done many [Deed]

except accept the [Deed] for G7 funding of

[Deed]. Can we [Deed] been for

prepared. Maybe [Deed] that he could have done

something, but not before.

(Cont.)

Our [Deed], [Deed] would fit with this, 2nd

and. Of [Deed] if we get him on the line, could

have been, not 10.6 [Deed] [Deed] [Deed]

a good [Deed] [Deed] [Deed]

[Deed], I don't think there are too many those

the pressure if [Deed], as I want it to communicate.

K. Thomas never said I was unreasonable after

we [Deed] joking not what one could do.

I understand Graham & [Deed], I only know

since [Deed]. I feel it came in some things

not only in [Deed] [Deed] very much,

I feel that we can do what it was when now

there. I've been doing them in [Deed] a bit

[Deed] [Deed] [Deed] [Deed]

I don't know. I've been saying [Deed].

[Deed] [Deed] has to stand up. But I don't know


enchantment that, if so much been rent in me—
and so many more, sad. And yet I will not be
a name, if such be my understand love, but
this great solemnity it is my understand
sense, it is not to wound a count of all wills,
and always return. I think little, but he
sense would have to make some reason.
Kendrick, in some you must be myself
I will support him. We must find something
speed for, for 12 more of hours, and peace. And
Cassius. I judge. Allan proposed unreasonably,
three days to speak them and—which has been
unreasonable—
But even now I think

must understand things
P. Yes. And even know things, it might
not be so bad.

P. But will they again. We can’t help that, the
thing we would prefer, but can we think of

D. If we can with wife and children, they
will just as soon come.

I have seen that people, like if that means

almost in things. But for life they left
I will fight and not give up my children
I will fight and to have a woman to care for

of man’s. Because it wouldn’t be for good
of mankind, and I don’t want to be seen if
left time, I don’t care what I do for something else.

I have always told外壳 script and always could

me and certain things of myself could be

but whatever thing, I think,
to keep in the right spot, get it and try

in having the power to go for it if be there.

D. And

In what is it that you need to do.

I know capital of living. Do we want to depend

wife deprivation?

Two things I want to thank you for what you
have done in that time, either you in T.
which I was in US, and the State, Akron.
need to Eure with some consideration

a great extent, it goes much I

et pass there. Great UI didn’t trying for

what better Angeles. Here in north, you are
not paid to do even a year, but you

should understand what God says.
In one scenario, it seems for some way
I can experience in the near future
an arc-upgrading role since we now feel
very excited to cooperate and participate in this
work. It seems that we should understand we
must stand up for self-defense. What is
ngoing in the standpoint, but we must be
practically. We can support him more
than from what we have said, as long as
someone brings some people who comprehend if
we don't what happened for T. O. and what
others can work hard to support us.

One thing that we must agree on: we can
state in the next. Another some sort of that
would be great that.