

→ Scanned FYI
Return to Platt

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Golda Meir, former Prime Minister of Israel
 Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
 Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel

President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National Security
 Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 18, 1974
3:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted for photographs. There was small talk about Mrs. Meir's U.S. trip, how good she looks, etc. The press was then dismissed.]

President: Some of the press I don't recognize.

Dinitz: They are from our newspapers.

Meir: I never take such people with me.

Dinitz: We have two newspapers represented in Washington, and radio-TV.

Kissinger: I recognize most of them and avoid them, but there is one blonde with blue eyes.

Meir: It's surprising how many blondes there are in Israel.

President: It's good to have you here and to talk with you again. It is a fortuitous time -- potentially the most serious and volatile I have ever seen in my life. I have talked widely with your Government, with Arabs



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, SEC. 1.5
NSC MEMO, 11/19/74, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Declass 3/10/04
BY llh NARA DATE 5/10/04

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

and with others, and no one gives me a feeling the situation is good.

The prospects of another war are very very high. It is my obligation -- as well as others' -- to avoid and prevent such an eventuality and to bring a period of six months, and maybe longer, of peace and security.

My record of support for Israel is clear. But I think we must do something to move.

Meir: May I smoke? [There was light banter about smoking.]

President: It upsets me badly to see all the leaks which are coming out. It is not a healthy way to deal with such a sensitive issue. They happen almost before the word is transmitted. To have proposals in this sensitive time leaked is extremely serious.

Meir: I couldn't agree more. It is not decent, fair or moral. I have always felt this way. A newsman once said to me that if they depended on me for news, they would be out of a job. It is an honor to be in public service, and then there are these leaks -- sometimes from Washington and sometimes from Jerusalem. That is one problem.

President: It is one which has to be dealt with.

Meir: The problem is how do you prove it?

President: I read what comes from Israel, what comes from the Arabs, and it destroys what we are trying to accomplish.

Meir: I agree. I will tell my friends in the Cabinet. I know they are unhappy about it.

President: Ever since I got into office we have been working for movement. I think it is tragic that there was no movement before Rabat. I think it would have avoided Rabat.

Meir: Movement where?

President: The West Bank, and with Egypt. I fear Israel is getting more and more isolated. Much as I love Israel, I must say I think we must have movement now. If that is not possible, then I am afraid we just ought to go to Geneva, and I don't want that. The first argument would be about the PLO and getting them in.



Meir: Not with our agreement.

Kissinger: I supported that.

President: Brezhnev says the 1967 borders. That is impossible. But what can we do?

Kissinger: Dobrynin told me yesterday Moscow is convinced we had a deal with Egypt to make an agreement just before Brezhnev went, to embarrass Brezhnev. We would get an agreement and he could only give a few arms. He asked for a guarantee that we wouldn't. I said I would give him an answer next week.

Meir: I speak with you frankly, Mr. President. I want to divide the subject into two parts. There may be a difference of opinion about what would be done. But for West Bank movement, I bear full responsibility. There was not a suggestion that went with Cabinet approval, but I am responsible. Before me, in the Eshkol Government, we began to meet with Hussein. I think Hussein wants peace. But we could have made peace with him only on the basis of the '67 war plus Jerusalem. I don't say he will hold out until the end on this, but I think it unfair to force him to be the first Arab head of state to sign an agreement with a territorial compromise. After Syria, Hussein said he would agree to a disengagement. This was unacceptable because there are no forces facing each other -- we are two friendly states practically. He proposed moving back 10-15 kilometers.

President: He mentioned it last summer, didn't he?

Kissinger: Yes, but also he was suggesting about half of the Allon plan.

Meir: I didn't report to my Government my Hussein meetings, for fear of leaks. We had maybe 30 meetings -- very friendly. I should wish every Prime Minister such friends as Hussein. I put before him all kinds of proposals: a peace treaty; non-belligerency; no foreign forces on your territory. Rifai said no to that. The last proposal was the 10-15 kilometers pullback. I asked about our settlements; Rifai said, "Take them out." I suggested corridors and Rifai said, "You are still proposing the Allon plan." He said that was a monster. I said that would give him contact with his people; that we don't want all the West Bank. Neither of these proposals was accepted.



Hussein wouldn't have met with us if he didn't think we were sincere. We had a close and almost touching relationship. During the Yom Kippur war we had close exchanges. He told me he was sending tanks to Syria and I said that if they fire at us, we couldn't ask for their identity cards.

When I was in London I met with Wilson and Schmidt. I was angry with them for their UN abstentions on the PLO. He (Schmidt) said, "We voted that way for EC unity, and otherwise France would have been more extreme." I said that was unity at the lowest common denominator. He also said there was a feeling we didn't move as we could have. I said, "Look at our record." As far as I am concerned we have done everything possible except accept Hussein's plan for the '67 borders with adjustments. On no other condition was he prepared. Maybe after Sadat he could have done something. But not before.

On the PLO, Rifai asked if we would sit with the PLO. I said no. Arafat, if we put him on the West Bank, would have two guns, not one. With his olive branch at the UN, he'd have one gun pointed against us and one against Hussein.

In the Sinai, I don't think there were too many differences; the problems were with Syria. Asad wants to annihilate us. So we have to be cautious.

Kissinger: I have never said Israel was unreasonable after we first figured out what we could do.

President: I understand the Golan, and I told Rabin. I only know about this since August. I feel the situation now is more serious -- not only in the Middle East but in America. Rightly or wrongly. I feel the situation in Congress is not what it was when I was there. Congress has been strong in support of Israel, but I know politics and I detect undercurrents, of a kind I don't like. I have always supported high defense budgets. I think the U.S. has to stand up. But I detect now this undercurrent that, if something broke out in the Middle East -- an oil embargo, a confrontation with the Soviet Union -- the situation will not be the same. It won't be my weakness here, but with this Government, divided as it is and with the undercurrents I see, it is vital to avoid the worst of all worlds, an adverse reaction. I think there has to be some give. We have to make some movement. Henry will participate, in what will be some of the most difficult negotiations, and I will support him. We must find something good for Israel, for one or more of the Arabs, and for the



world. Henry and I judged that Allon's proposal was unattainable. There has to be more than that. And it has already been released to the press.

Meir: That is very bad. In 1969, shortly after I took office, I told Barbour we were not interested in most of the Sinai. We don't want more sand. But there are strategic points. If there is anything we all want, it's peace. If all he wants is pull back, that is not a great achievement. We did it without asking much. I think the Government is willing to do more, but isn't it fair to ask Sadat what he is prepared to do? If we are going to '67, why not do it all at once? Why build defense lines and a few months later move back again? I will never agree to '67. If they were so good, why were we attacked over them? If all Sadat will say is for the Israelis to move, that is not much.

I am not surprised at Rabat. I don't believe there is or ever has been Arab unity. But they contrived a facade of unity at the expense of Israel.

President: There was a strong show of unity in 1973 with the oil embargo.

Meir: At somebody's expense.

President: Yes. But Europe was burnt.

Meir: If Europe had stuck, it might not have worked.

President: But will they again? We can talk about all the things we would propose, but we must deal with reality.

Dinitz: Mr. President, if we move back without Arab concessions, they will just ask for more and more.

Meir: The press says I have complexes, of this kind or that kind. I do, if that means I remember things. But for the life I have left, I will fight to not give complexes to my children. I will fight not to have Israel sacrificed to the good of mankind. Because it wouldn't be for the good of mankind, and I don't want to be sacrificed. Next time the embargo would be for something else.



Kissinger: The President has always told the Arabs that the next embargo would mean military action. No one asks for a withdrawal without a return, but what are the returns we get? Time, to keep the Arabs split, an opportunity to get Europe and Japan in line, to keep the Soviet Union off balance....

Dobrynin's conversation is interesting. I know you think it's a put-up game.

Meir: What is Sadat prepared to give?

Kissinger: We have asked Sadat that. No one wants Israeli withdrawal without compensation.

Meir: Let me say just two things, Mr. President. I want to thank you for what you have done in this short time. There is not a person in Israel who doubts in the U.S., in the President, the Secretary of State, the Administration. I am convinced the Europeans will come around out of shame and practical interest. It speaks much for Israel the little line in the press that the U.S. didn't stand up for that butcher Arafat. There is nothing our Government is not prepared to discuss with you, but you should understand when the Government says this for our security is as far as we can go.

President: Our experiences in the UN in the last session are very disappointing. We were the first to stand up, to speak out; we refused to participate in this UN fund. It is time the Third World understands we won't stand there and be castigated all the time. What I am saying is that the U.S. stands with Israel, but we must be practical. Our support has never been less than what we have said, and with that assurance I would hope your people would cooperate. If we don't, it won't be good for Israel, for the United States and the world. Others can work out details. I am speaking as a deeply concerned person.

Meir: There is one thing we really agree on -- there can be no Soviet state in the Middle East. A Soviet satellite on the West Bank would be just that.

[The meeting ended with warm handshakes and farewells.]



63, 30

P/ Weir / Divitz / Shaker / R

18 Dec

✓

12

Persian

(Talk about her US trip, how good she looks, etc)

Press out

P Some press I don't recognize

D They are from our newspapers.

M I would like to see people off - me

D We have 2 newspapers in Wash + Radio-TV.

K I keep most of them & avoid them but there is one about blue eyes

M Surprising how many brands there are in I

P Good to have you here & to talk w/ you again. It's a particular time - potentially great services & available in my life, I have. At the moment - your heart, chills, intense & no one gives me feeling yet is good.

Respects of another war is very very high. It's my, & others, obligation to avoid & prevent such opportunity & to bring a period of 6 months & longer of peace & service.

My record of support is clear, but I think

M we must do something to work.

(Beats about smoking)

P It upsets me badly to see a car & horse which are carrying out. It is not a healthy way to deal w/ such a sensitive issue. They happen almost every word is transmitted. To have proposals in this sensitive time included is extremely serious.

M I couldn't agree more. It's not decent, fair or moral. A museum found if they depended on me for news they would be out of jobs. It's our honor to be in public service &

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.5

NOVEMBER 11, 2009, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY , NARA, DATE 5/12/04



There are three books - sometimes from Wash & sometimes from you. That is one job.

P ~~That~~ It is one which has to be dealt w/.

M Perhaps how do you process it?

P I read what comes from I, what comes from Harb & it obstructs what we trying to accomplish

M Okay, I will tell my friends in Cabinet. I know they unhappy about it.

P ~~As you know~~ From since I got back office we have working for movement. I think it tragic that no movement before Robert - I think it would have avoided Robert

M Movement where?

P W. Bank & W/E. I fear I is getting worse & more isolated. Much as I love I, I want say I think we must have movement now. If that not possible, then I expect we just ought to go to Geneva & I don't want that. First argument would be PAI & getting them in.


M Inter/er

K I supported that.

P Boy top of leaders. That together but what can we do...

K Day said we've convinced we had deal w/ to make agreement just before they to bank - ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~we~~ would get agreement & be ~~surely~~ ~~give~~ ~~some~~ ~~cases~~. It asked guarantee we would do. I said I would answer ~~with~~ ~~well~~

M I speak frankly. I want to divide subject into 2 parts. May be diff opinion about



what could be done. But for W Bank movement
 I was full stop. There was not a suggestion
 that we'd w/ ^{Commit} approval, but I say. Before me,
 in Eshel govt, we met w/ Hussein. I think
 Hussein wants peace. But we could have much
 peace only on basis of $\frac{1}{2}$ was plus June. I don't
 say he would hold out to end on this, but I think
 it is fair to force him to let that body
 start to sign agreement w/ Am. Congress.

After Syria Hussein would be invited during
~~Refin. process~~ ^{to handle}
 But there are no faces facing each other - we
 are 2 friendly states practically. He proposed having
 bank 10-15 bn.

- P He mentioned that someone didn't do?
 R Yes, but also was suggesting about 1/2 Allen plan
 M I didn't report to Govt my Hussein notes for
 fear of leaks. Maybe in notes - very friendly.
 I don't wish ~~to say~~ I'd such friends as
 Hussein. I put before him all kinds of prop.
 A peace treaty. Or non-alignment, it was
 foreign press on your treaty. Rifa'i said not that
 last prop was a 10-15 bn. I asked about our
 settlements. Rifa'i said take them out. I suggested
 corridors + Rifa'i said you still proposing Allen
 plan. ~~The fact~~ He said that was a narrative
 I said that would give him contact w/ his people; that
 we don't want all the W Bank. Do you suggested as
 his own that ~~is~~ Hussein found address in
 W. Bank. Wishes of them was accepted. Hussein
 wouldn't have met w/ us if he didn't think
 we were sincere. We had a short touching
 relationship. During Y.K. was very bad.



Chase & changes. He told me something tanks to Cyprus & I said if they fire, we couldn't ask for admission cards. When I in London I met Wilton & Schmidt. I was angry for them for UN obstruction. ~~The~~ ^(Schmidt) ~~He~~ ^{is} ~~was~~ ^{is} are worried that any for E.C. unity & otherwise E.C. would have been ruined.

I said that unity at lowest minimum character. He also said there feeling are shut more as we could have. I said look at some mind. As far as I concerned we have done everything possible except accept Hession's plan for 67 weeks of adjustments. One no other condition was to be prepared. Maybe after Sadat he could have done something, but not before.

(Lohman)

On P.H.O., Kipari asked if we would sit w/ P.H.O. I said no. August, if we put him on W. Bank, would have 2 games, not 1 + olive branch like U.N., one against west one against Hession.

In Sinai, I don't think there were too many diff; the presence of Suez. Assad wants to annihilate us.

R Is we have to be cautious.

K I know never said I was unreasonable after we first proposed what we could do.

P I understand Golan & Golan. I only know since August. I feel sit issue is more serious not only in M.E. but in U.S. Rightly or wrongly, I feel sit in long not what it was when was there. Long has been strong in support of I, but I know politics & I detect maneuverings, of a kind I don't like. I have always supported high def. I think U.S. has to stand up. But I detect now this



understand that, if something happens in ME -
 oil embargo, Conf. w/SD, a sit will not be
 a case. It will be my weakness here, but
 the Govt, should as it is + w/o commitments
 I see, it is noted to avoid a worst of all worlds,
 an abuse election. I think there has to be
 some guidelines to make some movement.
 I will, perhaps, in some of a most brief report +
 I will support him. We must find something
 good for I, for 12 case of Arabs, + for world.
~~What is~~ I judged Alman proposal unattainable.
 There has to be hard than that - which has been
 referred to a press.

In that to my talk on 6/9, shortly after I took
 office, I told Barbara we do not intend to
 meet of Simon. We don't want more scandal.
 But there are great points. If anything are all (5)
 want is peace. If all he wants is pull back
 that not great achievement. We did it all asking
 much. I think we are willing to do more, but
 don't it fair to ask Sadat what he prepared
 to do. If we going to 67, why not do it all at
 once. Why build up lines + a few more letters
 come back again. I will never agree to 67,
 if they were so good, why were we attacked over
 them. If all Sadat will give is for I to
 move, that is not much.

I am surprised at Robert. I don't believe there
 is a man has been Arab unity. But they control
 a fraction of unity at expense of I
 There was strong show of unity in 23 w/ oil
 embargo



But E was not built

M at Kennedy's expense

P Yes ~~but~~ E was shut down, it might not have worked.

P But will stay again. We can talk about all things we would prefer, but we must deal w/ reality.

D If we move back w/o Arab concessions, they will just not make sense.


M Puro says I have complex. I do, if that means I remember things. But for life I have left I will fight to not give anything to my children. I will fight not to have I sacrificed a goal of mankind. Because it would be for good of mankind, & I don't want to be sacrificed next time & sacrifices would be for something else.

H P has always told Arabs w/o concessions would be wrong but action. We are w/ demand w/o return, but what are returns? I think,

to keep Arabs split, offer to get E in & pay in kind, keep S U off balance. . . . Dohy movement is important. I know you think it a bit of game. What is Sabat prepared to give

H We have asked Sabat that. No one wants E w/ demand w/o compensation

M 2 things. I want to thank you for what you have done in that time. Not a person in I who'd write in US, Arab, Sec State, Admin. I convinced E was will come around w/ of shame & pact, interests. It gives much part & little part here. That US didn't get my part but between Arab. There is nothing on Arab is not prepared to discuss w/ you, but you should understand when Arab says this



for our country is as far as we can go
 P. Our experience in UK in last session
 are very disappointing, UK was not a stand up
 to speak out, we refused to participate in this
 UK fund. It time for world understand we
 want stand up & be criticized. What a
 trying to UK stand up to, but we must be
 practical. Our support has more than
 less than what we have said, & at that moment
 would hope you people would cooperate if
 we don't it will be good for I, O, & world.
 Others can work out details. I speaking as
 a deeply concerned person
 In case that we really agree on - no low
 state in UK. Our A Sw Satellite on UK Bank
 would be just that.

