MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Bipartisan Leadership (List Attached)
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Tuesday - December 17, 1974
9:00 - 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Cabinet Room
The White House

SUBJECT: Martinique; NATO & Cyprus; Foreign Aid

President: Thanks for coming. I know you all have a tight schedule.

Let me give you some of the atmosphere at Martinique, and what was achieved.

The last ten years, you know, U.S.-French relations have been cool historically. Giscard I found extremely able and well-informed; he was willing to discuss all topics frankly and amicably.

[The press was admitted briefly for photographs, and then departed.]

Our position on energy was we had to get consumer solidarity before we could meet with the producers. The French thought a consumer-producer meeting was of primary importance, but we felt the producers could pick us off one-by-one if there was no prior unity among the consumers. There were substantial negotiations on this question before we reached the announced positions. I would like to point out that we had consultations before with the Germans and Japanese. So all were on board.
We agreed to approach energy cooperation in four steps: First, there would be intensified efforts at further cooperation among the consumers, in areas such as conservation and financial solidarity. Second, if there is progress in that area, there will be a preliminary meeting between consumers and producers to prepare for a consumer-producers conference. The target date for the preparatory meeting would be March 1975. Third, there will be intensive consultations among the consumer nations to prepare for the conference. Fourth, there will be a consumer-producers conference.

The press is saying that we won, the French lost, etc. We reject that categorization. It was a good negotiation. Our view is that both sides achieved results which are to the benefit of both parties and indeed of all the industrial nations. It went extremely well for everyone.

It may have looked like we spent most of the time on non-business. That's not so. We added it up, and if you figure the three two-hour formal meetings and the working lunch and two dinners, it came to 16-18 hours or so.

We took up some other matters. FRELOC was settled at $100 million.

The French, you know, are not a party to the NPT, but we are concerned about nuclear safeguards and the lowering of standards in the push to sell nuclear reactors. We are trying to get the exporters to agree on safeguards, and the French attitude appears helpful.

We discussed CSCE and agreed generally on the timing of mid-1975 for a conclusion.

We discussed the Middle East. France, you know, supports the 1967 borders, which Israel bitterly opposes. More and more states are going with the French position.

Secretary Kissinger has a comment on his Brussels meeting at NATO and on Cyprus.

Kissinger: First let me add a word on Martinique. In an uncoordinated producer meeting, we would be beaten to death and we would be better off dealing with them bilaterally. We wanted a solution broader than energy. The civil war in the Atlantic community, where each has to choose between the U.S. and France, should be moderated if France carries out its
declarations. Also, France has now agreed to consult and cooperate on economic policies. Of course, it all depends on how these are carried out, but if they are, we have made a big step toward the cohesion of the industrial countries.

In Brussels we covered two principal topics: First, I briefed the allies on Vladivostok. We assured them that no side deals were made. We also discussed energy, East-West relations, and MBFR, now that FBS is not a part of SALT.

I also had very extensive talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on the Cyprus issue. I was struck by the fact — I saw each of them about five times — that each one of them saw that we faced two choices: Either to dig in for a long confrontation, trying to get the U.S. involved, or to move for a rapid settlement. I think they decided on the latter, and there will be moves very soon. I will provide the documents to the Foreign Affairs committees. With some luck, and our influence, we may see some real progress in the early months of the year and visible progress over the coming weeks. We have been discussing with Congressional leaders in getting the foreign aid bill in shape to support this, and great credit is due to the Congressional leaders.

President: Let me thank everyone in the Conference and who worked on the floor. The bill as I understand it will be helpful not only in Turkey but in other areas. It is not just the way we would have written it and the dollar amounts are not all we would want, but it is a good bill and I thank you all.

I want you to know that Secretary Kissinger and I won't come to you except in cases of high national interest. We are grateful for your help and will keep the arm-twisting to a minimum. We will consult closely on policy, and when we come to you it will be primarily a matter of tactics, which I think only one man is in a position really to determine.

Are there any questions? I would like to make this a real give-and-take.

Senator Fulbright: Let me ask, Mr. President, what you see as the prospects in the Middle East? The papers are all talking about war in the Middle East.

President: I have talked to many of them and all agree that unless progress is made, the chance of war there is very high. No one thinks otherwise. Each war gets more costly in men and armaments. There is also the possibility that a war would renew the oil embargo. Also, a U.S.-Soviet
confrontation is likely. We came close to it in 1973. The Rabat conference was unfortunate -- I believe it could have been avoided if there had been more movement. We are working with both sides to try to move. We are not opposed to resumption of Geneva but we fear that at this point it would only lead to a stalemate.

Representative O'Neill: How about the PLO?

President: Israel refuses to negotiate with them.

Kissinger: This is not a fruitful area right now. They don't recognize Israel's right to exist.

Representative O'Neill: I recall there are four issues: Sinai, the Golan, the Palestinians and Jerusalem.

Kissinger: We have moved in the first two, but the Syrians just got back what they lost in 1973. If Israel had moved -- this should be kept just in this room -- with Hussein, the most moderate Arab of them all, there would have been no Rabat decision. That stymied them now. Only the Egyptian front is now open. But Sadat is becoming isolated, and if the Israeli offer is not sufficient to justify his going it alone, he may not be willing to try.

The friends of Israel should urge it to be flexible. If Egypt fails -- with Jordan failing and the Syrians being told every day that nothing more is possible -- we will be in bad shape.

Representative McFall: Has anyone suggested something which might be acceptable to both?

Kissinger: The PLO issue could wait a bit if we had other movement going on. But they will have to recognize the right of Israel's existence.

We believe in the step-by-step approach because a global approach would only lead to stalemate, and the step-by-step approach would make possible things which now seem inconceivable. We are working, but quietly, so radicals can't roadblock anything prior to completion.

Representative Bray: I am worried about the recent Iranian statement. That probably would include Turkey too.

President: This illustrates the degree to which Israel is being isolated.
Kissinger: This also points out especially why we shouldn't push Turkey in this direction.

Representative Cederberg: Does Israel realize this erosion in its position? I am not sure the Congress is that strong for Israel.

Kissinger: They may confuse willingness to vote money with willingness to go to war.

Senator Humphrey: They are not confused. They will make concessions but not before the Brezhnev visit to Cairo. They don't want to honor him.

Kissinger: We agree on that. But there is also a problem with Israel's internal politics.

Senator Humphrey: I spoke at length with them. I told them they had to trust us and trust Secretary Kissinger. I don't think they are trigger happy. I told them that a preemptive war would be a major blunder. Israel has a parliamentary democracy -- they don't have someone who can call the shots. I get discouraged with Arafat and all the extreme statements.

President: I have a meeting this week with a group of Jewish leaders. I will tell them the same, but they have to be reasonable. They must trust us. But they must know that if there is a war, there could be an anti-Israel surge in the U.S.

Senator Fulbright: The Secretary said earlier that the Soviet Union would have to be brought in. It looks less and less likely now, even with detente. Dobrynin says they are willing to join in a guarantee of Israel's existence. I think if we would go to Geneva, the Soviets would help.

Kissinger: We agree on Geneva. It is a matter of timing. We are thinking of reconvening Geneva after a second Sinai agreement.

If the Soviet Union would agree to some compromise position between Israel and the Arabs, we could work it out -- but if all they do is just support the Arabs' extreme positions, there is no reason to get them involved.

Senator Stennis: We have helped Israel greatly, but it should be clear we can't support them with manpower.

President: We have made no commitment of that kind and have made that clear to them.
Representative Mahon: There is a limit on the money the Congress is willing to give. There is more and more reluctance.

Representative Bray: Not only money. We are giving them tanks in excess of our own production.

President: How about the Continuing Resolution on aid? Where do we stand?

Representative Morgan: We have worked out the Turkish language with February 5th as the cutoff date. The conference report should be to you by tomorrow night.

Representative Mahon: We agreed there would be no Continuing Resolution prior to the Authorization bill. There will be no appropriation -- just a single resolution extending the date -- with something for Cyprus refugees. Something also for jobs.

Kissinger: My understanding was that the Continuing Resolution would appropriate a part of the authorization. Egypt has gotten zero after a year of association with us. We had hoped that the Continuing Resolution would make available part of that authorization.

Representative Cederberg: What date? It is not practical to make it short of March 1.

President: Plan the Continuing Resolution language on the basis of the authorization.

Representative Mahon: Give the whole amount?

Representative Cederberg: At the same rate.

Representative Mahon: We can't settle that here.

Representative Morgan: Maybe we could add the Middle East package.

President: Let me turn to a couple of other things. Rockefeller is to be sworn in in the Senate?

Senator Scott/Representative O'Neill: Yes.

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Senator McClellan: There will be an amendment on the Continuing Resolution to cut $3.5 billion from outlays and $10 billion from obligational authority. It will be a battle.

Senator Humphrey: What can we say on the Aid Bill on the floor?

Kissinger: I understand that Brademas and his colleagues will support the report but don't want it said that it came out of a talk with us.

President: What estimate do you have on the trade bill?

President: Russell said he would get it down this week.

President: We will plan the swearing in for Thursday.
PARTICIPANTS

EXECUTIVE
The President
The Secretary of State

SENATE
Hugh Scott (R-Pa)
Robert Griffin (R-Mich)
Frank Moss (D-Utah)
William Fulbright (D-Ark)
George Aiken (R-Vt)
John McClellan (D-Ark)
Milton Young (R-ND)
John Stennis (D-Miss)
Strom Thurmond (R-SC)
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn)

HOUSE
John Rhodes (R-Ariz) Note: He is unable to speak due to recent surgery.
John McFall (D-Cal)
Leslie Arends (R-Ill)
Olin Teague (D-Tex)
John Anderson (R-Ill)
Thomas Morgan (D-Pa)
Peter Frelinghuysen (R-NJ)
George Mahon (D-Tex)
Al Cederberg (D-Mich)
William Bray (R-Ind)

STAFF
Anne Armstrong
Phil Buchen
Robert Hartmann
John Marsh
Donald Rumsfeld
Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Bill Timmons
Ron Nessen
Tom Korologos
Max Friedersdorf

REGRETS
Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont)
Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WVa)
Sen. Norris Cotton (R-NH)
Rep. Carl Albert (D-Okla)
Rep. F. Edward Hébert (D-La)
Rep. Thomas O'Neill (D-Mass)
P. Thanks for coming up today. Let me bring your attention to Binkley. We've already heard from him and we've reviewed the comments. We've agreed in principle with his proposals. We've agreed to discuss all topics further and have a meeting.

11.0.12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC Memo NSC 11124/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 5/1/98

K. Kristo and I discussed the issue. We're in agreement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NNS Memo 11124/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 5/1/98

By: NARA DATE 5/1/98
June 16, 1909

Dear Mr. Smith,

We would be honored to have you join us in our

[Handwritten text is difficult to read and will not be transcribed.]
ou young that when we land again it will be a prerosie matter of tactics which I think only one can in a position from to determine.

Any questions - well, I'd like to make this point clear -

Except what are NC projects? Piggy talk of war

in NC

I had talked to many of them and

they made, drowning from the high. No

one thinks it anymore. Food was near

empty in some - some counties. There is also

popularity among conservers and businessmen. Also

US-SR suggestion is likely. Some think in 23, Robert

and I were patients could have known about it

had been some movement. It's hard to make side

to side move, but if I were to move, but from that

of the point it would lead to trouble.

Oh well, in short, 1-5

If I were to go west

K. This is not a pointed area west now. They don't

need I must be split.

Try 1 Joel D. return - Sue, Clay Roby, Jim

K. Have moved in 15-2, but again just not

day that later. After I had moved in the

area or because a mistreatment, would he

been to both, Stephen. The more? Only

Expect game, but I don't know where he is.

If I went not say to justify him going it

alone, he may not be willing to.

The facts of I should take it & be there.

Expect another meeting. I have been told

every day nothing possible, we in bad shape.

Don't Fall. Here are suggested something which might
be acceptable to both.

Pf we were ever a bit of our hesitation
nowhere. They will have to say right at
out.

We both in step by step because global
repeated 1 statement - day by day would make
impossible thing which even even now minutes.

We come walking, hard quickly, so travel and we
resemble anything just to everything.

Sure I wouldn't want to see statement. First
would introduce Turkey for.

P. This is the last step to which I being isolated.

K. First we paint by why should price Turkey
in the chart.

Can I realize this erron? I not same why
that story for I

K. They many surface conclusion for finite many
just my years to past year.

Anyhow they not proposed. They could make reasons.
not see they want - don't want to turn
here.

K. Hungary on that (I thought gold) -

Hungary, Egypt at length of Iran. I told Iran they had
to travel so K. I don't think they help anyway.
Told them that would be longer elsewhere.

I have basic discussion - they didn't have permission
can sell it to. I get discouraged with Arabic
Koran statements.

P. [Anti] is Jewish leader. Will tell them it true
but they have to be reasonable. They must take
more. But they must show that if a war taking
could be an axis. I unsure in MC.
Everhart: Hours may be quite a surprise if I say and
rather I will doubt to be learned in books
there less likely nor sounder advice. Day after
today willing to gain a guarantee I think if
we will go to know, since would help.

R. Weagley: At a matter of timing. We think of
coming after a couple.

If all would agree to compromise but I feel we
will work with us - but if they just suggest
and there besides, then we wouldn't get them
involved.

Stirring: We have helped I greatly, but it should be clear
we can't support them in manpower.

P: I can't really see a reason to make
that clear to them.

B. There is a limit on money only worthy to
give. more reasonable.

They have money here going from trucks in
Kings of Kids.

I thought of K. E.

May we have contact Tracs June 4th &
confidential should be left by tomorrow night.

When we speak no K. E. prior to death will he suggest
just a simple item after his death with something
for Coopers support. Something else for job
K. E. eventually was the K. E. would pay a
part of another. E. was going to go over a
year of operation. We felt that
I would write and just that with

C. We're just laid out personal to make it about 1\2
of April. Please, shouldn't K. E.
Please C. long years can bring of each.
Whether would the whole cost?

Ending at same rate.

Mahan will it still do that two.

We agree, maybe we can still take package.

But now time to end job.

Remember.

So will yes.

The skill there will be one around on 3.6. 7.5 et from.

(Some description of this)

Things. What can weogn a dry talk on plan.

If understand, reasonable task will meet your but

don't want it said. It seems out of both of us.

What got inside bill.

He said he would get it down the week.

We will plan starting in.