MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel

DATE AND TIME: Monday, December 9, 1974
12:57 - 2:15 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted for photographs. The President and Minister Allon chatted about the redecoration of the Oval Office.]

Kissinger: Johnson had three tickers in here.

President: Also three telephones. He also had four TV sets in the bedroom.

Kissinger: He had some fascinating habits.

President: He was quite a guy. He would get mad and he said a lot of unkind things about me, but when he left office we had a very good rapport.

Kissinger: If he had forgotten the intellectuals and stuck with middle America, he could have won again.

Allon: Even over Bobby Kennedy.

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NSC MEMO, 11/6/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: __________ NARA, DATE: 5/21/09
Kissinger: Yes. Nixon beat down the demonstrators.

President: I agree. It would have been tough, but he could have won with the party regulars.

Keating: I think he felt he didn’t have the party with him.

Allon: It was the same with Golda. She had been very unpopular at times, but now she is a national hero. You can’t be concerned with the ups and downs.

President: Panic in public life loses more than anything. Calm and consistency are what counts.

Let me welcome you. I’m glad to have you here. I remember our conversation when I was Vice President [August 1, 1974]. I am glad to talk with you now because we are faced with some tough decisions.

Secretary Kissinger has just described your conversation with him. He told me that your proposals were unattainable. I don’t know the details, but I agree. I will take time going over them because of their importance and because the commitment to Israel’s security is of utmost importance to me. I have spent a great deal of time on this since I came into office. We have worked hard to keep things moving, because momentum is vital. I have talked to no one who doesn’t think the prospects of war are high if something is not done -- and most of these are people who are friendly to Israel.

I think it is wise to look at what happens if we don’t have results. We always used to do this on the Hill. “Think of the worst. The best will take care of itself.” A potential confrontation in the Middle East -- I don’t know where that would go with the Soviet Union. We made headway at Vladivostok, but we had a potential confrontation last October. If there is a war, there will be another oil embargo. Last year we were in fairly good economic shape -- today, it could have dire consequences. Israel and the U.S. would be pretty well isolated as far as Europe and the rest of the world are concerned. No one helped us in ’73. And Japan also would be the same. I’m just pointing to alternatives which could happen.

We want Israel to be strong, and we have done a good economic and military job on that. Supposing the worst happens -- a war -- and Israel is successful. The odds are you would be. Suppose the Soviet Union goes
further and doesn't back down as they did under President Nixon. It would be a tough decision for the President to go to the people for military action in the Middle East. Attitudes are different than, for example, in 1950. I don't like it. I want Americans to think they have a role and a strong role. But look at the last years of Vietnam. The aftermath of that doesn't indicate that a President would get public support. I want to say as a friend -- and my record supports I am a friend -- that the consequences of the worst lead me to the hope that we can change things somehow so we can say it is attainable. That is the way it is.

Kissinger: We have the problem of what is realistic and the problem of what do we tell Egypt. We haven't discussed it yet, and we will this afternoon. I am grateful to Allon for getting me out of the House hearing meeting.

Allon: Thank you for the way you introduced your views. First I want to convey the greetings of Yitzhak Rabin.

President: Please reciprocate for me.

Allon: He is making a good Prime Minister. We are a highly political people. There is no doubt the United States and Israel have common interests in the Middle East. We may appear to disagree tactically, but basically we agree. I am glad of that. We come to you frequently for military and economic support, but in the last analysis I think we are an asset, not a liability. It would be different if we were weak. Looking at a wider prospective -- at the soft underbelly of Europe -- we can be useful if we coordinate together more.

The last thing we want is another war -- although we would win it quickly, because we are better prepared. And we won't get caught again. We learned bitter lessons and the morale is high.

We would have preferred an overall settlement which would have brought peace to the area. Secretary Kissinger said that it is not possible and we accepted the necessity of interim agreements, over serious domestic opposition. We are determined to overcome the opposition and to sign an interim agreement. We understand that Egypt is the only chance, that Jordan is out for now, but we hope not forever. Syria wants an overall agreement, and if we do that we don't need interim measures.
Dr. Kissinger always used to stress on principle -- never negotiate while under a threat. If the Arabs realize -- and the Soviet Union -- that they can get what they want by threat of war on an oil embargo, there is no limit to what they will go after. If they know there is a logical limit that is different. If they know you can be backed into a corner.....

Kissinger: The President has said, with the Arabs he has talked to, that if there is a new embargo we would not accept it. He is talking to you about.....

Allon: But any war would be over in days, and most of the West has enough oil for months, so this threat doesn't hold. The West can get through the winter. So we shouldn't overestimate the immediate effect of an oil embargo.

We are prepared to take substantial territorial steps in return for an end to acts of belligerency. It can be an end to acts of belligerency, not to the state of belligerency.

The next question is, what should be the duration of an agreement? In 1949 it was unlimited. It didn't work. We had another war. If there is a time limit it must be longer than what they need to get ready for another war. If only a few years, that is just what they need to prepare for war. The Arabs are good on defense, bad on offense. They are not rushing into war, but the situation could be created where they would have to -- even against their wishes. If it could be a longer-term agreement, and a longer-term for UNEF, we could give more. Egypt says everything must be kept secret. But we have our problems, too.

I think Secretary Kissinger can tell Egypt we are prepared for a considerable withdrawal, to negotiate after -- not before -- the Brezhnev visit to Egypt. If we do it before, it will look like we did it because of Brezhnev's visit.

So the matter is how deep the withdrawal, how solid the observers, and how long the agreement.

I am thinking of a decade -- Kissinger thinks it is too long. We could give more for that. At a minimum it should be five years, plus one year for the redeployment of our line. Then we can go to the Knesset with something.
DINITZ: We have spent a billion and a half dollars fortifying this line.

ALLON: Kissinger can say to Sadat that we are well disposed.

KISSINGER: I have done that too much. I have to show him some specifics -- at least orders of magnitude of kilometers, and so on.

ALLON: Can't you say I am thinking of a 30-to-50 kilometer withdrawal? In certain areas 30, in others, 50.

KISSINGER: There are some principal points -- the passes and the oil fields. He doesn't care about lines in the sand.

ALLON: What is his alternative? To stay where he is?

PRESIDENT: One is the resumption of Soviet supplies to Egypt. That is not good for either.

ALLON: I agree, but he will do it any way.

KISSINGER: He hasn't yet.

ALLON: It is not possible to reach a point where he will cut off relations with the Soviet Union.

KISSINGER: One alternative is heating up the international situation to bring pressure on us. If he needs two or three years, he can use that to escalate an anti-American crusade.

ALLON: We are offering something substantial.

PRESIDENT: Dr. Kissinger says it is unattainable. I haven't looked at the details. But if that is true it means we are therefore risking disaster.

Maybe Europe is fixed for an oil embargo, but here, while we have plans for belt-tightening, the impact would be serious. Also, on the PLO resolution you saw the United States and four others were the only ones against it. We were glad to stand on that, but that ought to be a signal that it is not the most wholesome situation in the UN. Every head of state I talked to told that we were pursuing a step-by-step process. I think it is therefore essential that we move and get something of substance. You and Dr. Kissinger are experts, and I give it my personal attention. But I have said frankly what we might face if there is no movement.
Allon: It we give up the passes and the oil field -- which give us half of all our oil -- we will take away all the Egyptian incentive to take another step and will encourage them to begin agitating. It could prove to be a mistake, and then it would be too late. They could agitate with the Soviet Union, get the UNEF withdrawal, and then we will be in the same war situation.

I don't think Egypt wants subjugation by the Soviet Union. Why not give my proposal a chance? Why not? Henry can find the right words to make it sound good. Why give up beforehand? If we have to fight, we are better off on this line. Why do you want it today? Why not talk the oil field and passes after Brezhnev has departed? If we give him everything at first, they will ask for more.

The last thing we want is a misunderstanding between Israel and the United States. Let's be patient.

Dinitz: Egypt will have to think carefully about going back to the Soviet Union, because only the United States can help them.

Allon: They know only the United States can give them territory.

Kissinger: They can get 90% of their economic needs from Europe, and from Europe with the Soviet Union on the character of peace. We are holding Europe off by saying "Give your efforts a chance." If we visibly fail, there will be no holding them back. The Europeans can give economic help and can add political pressure to the Arabs.

We don't have to have your final concessions today, and I am not saying we can't turn these into something. We need to discuss how to approach the Egyptians. We need a strategy which includes a concept including the oil fields and the passes.

There are two problems -- to see where this can go, and how should it be presented to the Egyptians. How to give Sadat enough to support him for the Brezhnev visit. To give him courage.

Allon: How about the length?

Kissinger: There is only one issue on duration. The disengagement has no time limit. Why not assume it is unlimited?

Allon: Is it true that Fahmy said one more disengagement would take Egypt out of the war?
Kissinger: Fahmy said it. Sadat maybe said it. We will check. *
Fahmy said the next step had to be in the context of taking Egypt out of the war.

Allon: Can U.S. troops be in the UNEF? I don't trust these small countries. That, I guess, would permit Soviet forces.

Kissinger: Never do you want to legitimate Soviet presence.

Allon: You can't rely on these little countries.

President: What about Canada?

Allon: Canada is fine.

Kissinger: We could examine the question of Soviet forces. They would jump at the chance, but I don't think Sadat would like it and I doubt the Congress would.

Allon: But we need to find some stability for the UNEF forces.

Kissinger: All the Egyptians now tell me of the error Nassar made in 1967. The Egyptian appetite is not as great as the Syrian appetite.

Allon: If we have no time limit for the agreement, except for the UNEF....

President: Let me say I appreciate the opportunity to meet again. We have the same objective. We want Israel secure and its integrity maintained. That is what we both want.

Allon: Thank you very much, Mr. President. May I raise one other thing?

President: Sure.

Allon: We raised the question last summer of a long-term authorization. We mentioned $4.5 billion for an unspecified period. You said maybe the most important complication would be with the Congress. But the Congressional people I speak to are ready to consider it if the Administration proposes it.

* Fahmy said it to President Ford on October 5, 1974.
President: When your Prime Minister was here, we discussed the immediate and the long-range military programs. I went farther than my advisers wanted on the short-range program. We now are in the throes of a bitter fight in the Congress on foreign aid. We barely won in the Senate on a crucial vote, by 46-45. Even that bill is not all good. The House debate starts tomorrow. Rosenthal has been very difficult. He has collaborated with the Greeks.

Allon: I thought he had changed. He promised.

President: He hasn't gotten the word. The House vote seems to have gone down about 20 votes — from a combination of right-wing Republicans and liberal Democrats. This is the background. I can't go for long-term authorization for Israel if we don't get support for our foreign policy as a whole. That is asking too much.

Allon: If you don't get a majority for the aid in the Congress, maybe you can get a Middle East package.

President: We need a world program.

Dinitz: In the Senate, we were as helpful as possible. We got some votes changed -- as Dr. Kissinger knows. We believe in the foreign aid program and we will continue. What we have in mind with long-range economic aid -- we may need a specific bill, because the amounts are out of proportion to the rest of the aid.

President: I don't rule that out, but I have to take one step at a time. I can't look down the road if we don't get the tools we need now. There are several -- Rosenthal, Dupont, Fraser -- who have to get the word. It doesn't do any good to get the Middle East package if we lose our whole foreign policy.

[After warm farewells the conservation concluded. Minister Allon, Secretary Kissinger, Ambassadors Dinitz and Keating, General Scowcroft and Minister Shalev proceeded to the State Department for the luncheon hosted by the Secretary.]
P/ Allen (Walter Shavel)
K/ Keating
7 Dec 1974

P: Johnson had 2 talks in Sec...
K: He had some preparing ahead.
P: He was quite a guy. He would put much into and a lot of important things. And when he left, there had been very good support.
K: Of the had Japanese intelligence... was w/ Middle American, he could have done anything.
K: Yes, Watanabe had done a demonstration.
P: Forrest. It would have been tough, but he could have done a /c party anywhere.

K: We think he felt he didn't have a party of his.
P: Some of/Goebbels. She had been very sympathetic times, but now a wait here. You can't be removed w/ e.g., a damn.

K: Same in public life. He's been more than anything. Right emoting or what needs.
P: Glad to have you here. Remember our conversation when I was in Sec.
K: Glad to talk of you for never before and feel w/ some tough children.

K: Acknowledged your conversation. He had done some protests and demonstrations. Didn't../../four, but I agree, I will take you... more because of their insensitivity to... etc. etc. I think it's more than just normal reactions to... I think much more in the same sense into this - we have missed /ard and /ard.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6
NSC MEMO, 11/24/80, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES; SUBSTATE 3/10/89
BR __________, NARA DATE ___________
This money cause momentum is with
I have talked to no one who doesn’t think war
peace to high if something was done- we need
of those were people friendly I
I think it wise to look at what happens if we don’t
a new world- always was 16 this was 20
"Thinks I want- but will take on my stuff"
Potential catastrophe in the- Don’t know when
would go off- it’s really leaking at this-
but yet can last & if ever, will be
another unfortunate result
I mean we were
a fairly good size single- today, I will
know the consequences. It US would be pretty
well isolated & you are in command. I can
subject in it—- you also can be in it
A sort from the alternative which must happen.
We went I in any to have done good clean
I will put in that. Some just must happen
now & I in some supply- soldiers etc you would
do. Suppose I can just practice on them because
when we expect. It would be time enough
for it to go people for what a time in 45
At this dig them, for example, in 1960, I know
like at- I want to make think they have such
thing said but date at least years of it. Otherwise
that doesn’t indicate, I would put public object.
I want them as prudent- to any record anyone
One more- the consequence I mentioned
were to hope that we can change numbers
we can try it so attainable. That is
It is very it is.
If we have part of what we realistic
Dear Mr. E.

We haven't discussed this case to a sufficient and adequate level.

A. Thank you for your very open and thoughtful approach. I will return with any further thoughts.

Please recognize.

A. It is a complex and difficult issue. We are therefore cautious. I hope our common interest in the case may appear to the Press in light of our agreement. I find your thought. We want to keep the public informed. This will be difficult. We need to decide if we are willing to provide further information. Even so, we can be very careful with our comments.

As they were not in another case, they could win it quickly. Some of the important aspects we don't want to repeat again. We learned the lessons and moved on.

We would have preferred a small settlement which would have been fair to us, but we could not accept it. The majority wanted agreement on some of the important points. We attempted to express a position on the independent agreement.

We understand the early chance. Settlement for more but we hope for less. Again would have agreed, if we did. That was the independent issue.

If we had these same findings, we might agree on a different level without changing this.
they can get what they want by that means or any other means, there is no limit to what they can do or go after. If they know there is a big ship that will be used, they know you can be killed with a cannon.

16) First makes true wind if in advance, we would not accept it. He is talking about something.

2. But my own would be to come in early to start if we were not long for nothing, so the threat doesn't hold. The threat is, we cannot come to support the ship in advance.

Tentative
We are prepared to take such steps in return for such a threat of hostility. We need to come and act if that's what they want. We want to stop if that's what they want. We would be restrained. If we didn't want to be restrained, we had another plan. If there is a time limit on our action, then what they would get may be another action. If only a few years, then what they would get might be another action. If longer, then we would have to be prepared to resist.

And the same applies to others, both north and south. They want nothing more, but will work to prevent what they would have to do against them.

It is not a question of magnitude, it is a question of what the enemy wants. E verything must be kept secret - we have our own facts.

I think it was till E was once prepared for us. It was made a secret of the worst before they did it. Before it, it will look like we did not know F. Being secret.
them back. The Spaniards were very free, and felt pressed to action. We don't have to vary your point of view. I just can't understand time these into something. We tried to arrive from among the E - used existing which in [date] a concept underlying and filled in. E.g.,

2 problems - see where this can go. How to prevent E. How might Saddam [your?] to support us? If they want - your how long or what?

A. How about length?
K. And I don't see any limit. Currency has no time limit. Why can't we stamp.
A. Isn't true? Firing instead more curing would take E. out of use?
K. Firing, round it. A. Saddam pointed - with it. We will check. Firing and must stay had to be in context of taking E. out of use.
A. Can't things be in UNF? I don't trust their several countries. That I gave and permit for peace.

K. How do you want to legitimate for pressure?
A. You can't rely on their little countries.
K. Canada?

A. Canada is fine.
K. We couldn't finance question of as pressure. They would go at a chance, but I don't think we would vote it. I doubt even until.
A. But we need to find some stability for
K. And E. How many? (date, discard in weak)
The E attitude is not as quiet as you think.
Q. If nothing had been agreed, right for ONEF.
I. I appreciate your trying to meet your case. I have some objections. We would remove + its integrity.
Q. Frankly, you may wish. May I come on this?
I. Sure.
Q. We are of not from a long time maintaining 0.5 but for image of E plant. Your view maybe some discussion would be of any. May I speak to are ready to consider of Admin.
I. Perhaps this time, we changed several.
Q. And you know, I thought that some may be not sure if we debate starts tomorrow. Result of this been very difficult. He has collaborated of Greek.
I. That he had changed. He passed.
Q. Haven't gotten and. Norman vote some been about to vote. Combination of RV Rupke.
I. He had been. This background 0.5 can't go for being informed that if not been.
Q. I would think from France. This is that asking too much.
I. If you don't yet a majority go and in this way, may you can get a 3 to package.
Q. We need it would be.
I'm sending out one letter as possible. We got some more changes - no truck. We'll have the form and proxy we will continue. What we have in mind is long range - can only we are really going to be hit because we can't see out of fog. Why not fund.

I know this is a lot, but I have to take one step at a time. I can't look down a road of can't get to. To do we need more. These are needed - Ron, Doug, Ettie, who have to get a word. I don't do any good to get