MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, December 9, 1974

PLACE:
The Oval Office

Kissinger: [Discussed Ray Cline piece on the October war.]

On Allon: At the dinner on the last night it should be only Max Fisher from the Jewish community and no trained seals from the press.

You got a letter from Sadat.

President: I thought it a statesmanlike letter.

Kissinger: He followed it up with an oral message.

President: What does Sadat need?

Kissinger: Israel has to give up the passes. Maybe just give Egypt a Western foothold and put the passes themselves under the UN. Israel is willing to give up the northern oil field, but I think they would give up the southern field too. If they gave up all the oilfields and maybe 50 kilometers in the north, we could play around with the passes.

A quick agreement carried out over nine months with a one-year extension of UNEF should take Egypt out of it.
If we get an agreement, I think we should give military aid to Egypt. The Egyptian military establishment can't run down without the Egyptian military doing something about it.

President: I have an open mind about it.

Kissinger: It would be useful to tell Sadat we are turning in that direction.

President: How about covert aid?

Kissinger: That is not worth the risk. Three years ago it would have been easy -- not now.

President: Do we need Congressional approval for cash subsidies?

Scowcroft: Only if there is some prohibition on Egyptian aid.

Kissinger: If not, I would just announce it. You need some foreign policy battles with Congress. I think Congress is going to give on the Turks. Makarios is playing into our hands -- he's basing himself on leftist support. Clerides is O.K. to Karamanlis. But Karamanlis wants Makarios in Cyprus because otherwise he is a Greek politician. Makarios wants enough chaos -- I think he wants to trigger the Turks to another retaliation so he can get Soviet support and take it to the UN.

The reason the whole thing started in '67 was that Makarios abrogated the Constitution of 1960 and Turkish rights. It was unworkable, but Makarios agreed to it.

The French -- you will have a difficult time in Martinique. Giscard will be charming and go all out to have a visible success. But look at what he did on CSCE with Brezhnev. They said things on the Middle East without consultation; they agreed to all the things on Cyprus we knocked out of our communique.

We must show Europe that we can't be at the mercy of any European who sells us out at will. Tell Giscard he can be an ally or neutral but not both. I would be noticeably cooler to Giscard than to Schmidt. I thought I would be tough at NATO. The others don't want to have to choose between France and us. I think we have to make them choose. I think the problem is endemic -- three French Presidents have now done the same -- and we have to show the Europeans they can't get away with it.
President: Will Schmidt raise hell about CSCE?

Kissinger: The German nightmare is to have to choose between France and us.

[Discussed the internal French political system.]

The French have either been governed by kings or anarchy since the French Revolution. Giscard's inherent political position is weak.

For 15 years the French have systematically undermined us.

Back to Allon --

If he has reasonable proposals, you can be conciliatory. If not, say we can't underwrite them under these conditions. If there is no settlement, there will be a war and I don't know how we would conduct ourselves in that situation.

[There was a discussion of laser-guided bombs.]

President: I told Jim I recognize the April 1st target but I had to be recognizant of our own units and we wouldn't strip our units until we had full cooperation from Israel.

Kissinger: I think it is dangerous to put them in that strong a military position; then they are sorely tempted to tell us to go to hell.

A confrontation sometime down the road is inevitable. If they had moved on the West Bank, we could have avoided Rabat. Now Hussein is knocked out. If we can get something on Egypt, we can go to Geneva -- Syria wants to -- and let it get stalemated there. If there is another war I think -- cost what may -- you have to get a final settlement.

President: How shortsighted they are!

Kissinger: Three million people can't stand against 120 million with unlimited resources. With Soviet backing. Winning is as dangerous as losing.

If the Israelis march on Damascus and the Soviets put in two divisions and announce they are just going to the '67 borders, and call on us and the Europeans and Japanese to join in guaranteeing the '67 borders....
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SUBJECT: Meeting with Allon

Kissinger: They have a package which would be a disaster. It's two-thirds domestic politics. For example, they want ships with all-Israeli crews to get through the Suez. They know he can't accept it; must be intended to be humiliating.

Basically, they won't give up the oil fields and they don't want to give up the passes. They would do it for a ten-year agreement. Short of that, they will back off 30-50 kilometers but not from the oil fields or passes. The net result is they will turn over part of the Sinai to the UN, but not to Egypt.

They would sign now, but it would not be implemented for one year. They would begin to move only in the thirteenth month and then the time starts running.

President: What is our tactic?

Kissinger: I would tell them that all these theories about winning a war presuppose the Soviet Union is not engaged. In the absence of some justification, we can't go to the American people in the face of Soviet confrontation, European and Japanese opposition, and another oil embargo.
President: I will say you delivered the proposal and said it is not attainable.

[At 12:57 p.m., the President met with Allon.]
To them, learn a package which was to contain
73 characterized policies—policies which could have been
learned there. Must be made a bit humble.
Realistically, they cannot give you all the facts, and they
will give you a prayer. They should do it for rape
compensation. Start of that, they will talk of 50 to
100, but not very well. Then, if they will,
then, own part of Simin in OK, not E.
They will sign now, but not implemented for this.
More in 10th month times time starts running.

Q. What is our tactics?
K. I would tell them all these things about winning or war
properly is not only legal but also science of peace
justification. And they have people in face of war
confrontation, Fair—just opposition, set changes.

P. They have learned a lot. I think it not necessary
K. (Ray thinks we'll get 1 Oct 66)

On Mon 2/12 we must be aware of the possibility of X-11 losing contact with us.

P. Note that a statement on this...

K. He followed up your call yesterday.

K. Do you think that I should tell...

P. What does Salat need,

K. How to gain my respect. Maybe give us a year tohall

and put pressure themselves with us. I'm willing to give

up my 1/2 and I think you should give up your interest

file too. If you give up all our fields & money $8k in

2/12, we can play around $13 a pass.

P. On which agreement will it be paid in

2/13, and the 2/12, if there is one

then we're at it. The 2/13 and the 2/12, we

can't get along with each other.

P. If you mind about it.

K. It would be useful to tell Salat a Tigerfin

that situation.

P. How about it?

K. That we would risk $8k this year or $8k in

1972.

P. Do we need any appraisal for each site?

K. Only if there is some potential in E site.

P. If not, I would just announce you need

some FPR bottle $1,000. I think we're
gonna give to you before Turkey. Makarios is playing

with more hands - bilateral support. Clinton is

OK & Karen. But Karen wants Makarios in

Egypt because of otherwise he is a Greek politician.
McKinley wants every chance - he thinks he wants to trigger Turks to another declaration - so he can get more support & take it &UK.

Because the whole thing started in 60 was that Turkey is clearly weak, if 60 & Turkish rights, it was immediate, but McKinley agreed that.

French now will have a big test in Manchuria. He will be choosing yes or no to have a trade success. But look what he did on CSE: with them. They said thing on MC or negotiation, they agreed to take thing on Egypt as divided out of one communiqué.

We must that Emir that we don't do at many if any can who sells in debt at will. If the bond becomes in only as reported but not held, I would be particularly careful to recommend them to Schmidt that he should be tough at NATO. The others don't want to have those but I think we have to note them there. I think this isn't like nuclear - I like more a zone - and we have to there a line with they can't put away w/it.

Will Schmidt raise ball about CSE?

The German nightmare is to have to choose but

If I use,

(Declassified internal F.D. memos)

The F.D have not been joined by Egypt as, nearly time for excellent, sources indicates pol. position is weak.

For 15 yrs c F.D been very underminded us.

Rt to Allen -

If he has necessary support gone on in
equilibrium. If not, say we can't eliminate them under these conditions. If need be settlement, 
came to be we will be 7 dollar hours here. 
would contact themselfs (KCB chanein)
P, I told firm I would - quick 1st, but need to 
but many from own units, we wouldn't 
trip our units until we had firm 1st pay per

K. I think it dangerous to put them in that thing 
or raid position. They really tempted to tell me to go to hell.

Surrogate takeover done. Soil is inevitable.
If they had more on E Bank... If we can put 
nothing as if, we can get some. It's impossible 
to 4 k. Let it get real close.

If there is another 
way I think - can we make any known fork 
at first settlement.

K. Hard高新技术 

K. We will on overall stand against 150 mil/yr
environmental reserves. AS/S are kicking, mining is one campaign at least.

K. They maintain Domains on Sea port in 
2 chambers. Otherwise they are just going 
6-7 depend, call on as and E want pay to

K. They also some guarantees 68 depend.