

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, December 9, 1974

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: [Discussed Ray Cline piece on the October war.]

On Allon: At the dinner on the last night it should be only Max Fisher from the Jewish community and no trained seals from the press.

You got a letter from Sadat.

President: I thought it a statesmanlike letter.


Kissinger: He followed it up with an oral message.

President: What does Sadat need?

Kissinger: Israel has to give up the passes. Maybe just give Egypt a Western toehold and put the passes themselves under the UN. Israel is willing to give up the northern oil field, but I think they would give up the southern field too. If they gave up all the oilfields and maybe 50 kilometers in the north, we could play around with the passes.

A quick agreement carried out over nine months with a one-year extension of UNEF should take Egypt out of it.

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If we get an agreement, I think we should give military aid to Egypt. The Egyptian military establishment can't run down without the Egyptian military doing something about it.

President: I have an open mind about it.

Kissinger: It would be useful to tell Sadat we are turning in that direction.

President: How about covert aid?

Kissinger: That is not worth the risk. Three years ago it would have been easy -- not now.

President: Do we need Congressional approval for cash subsidies?

Scowcroft: Only if there is some prohibition on Egyptian aid.

Kissinger: If not, I would just announce it. You need some foreign policy battles with Congress. I think Congress is going to give on the Turks. Makarios is playing into our hands -- he's basing himself on leftist support. Clerides is O.K. to Karamanlis. But Karamanlis wants Makarios in Cyprus because otherwise he is a Greek politician. Makarios wants enough chaos -- I think he wants to trigger the Turks to another retaliation so he can get Soviet support and take it to the UN.

The reason the whole thing started in '67 was that Makarios abrogated the Constitution of 1960 and Turkish rights. It was unworkable, but Makarios agreed to it.

The French -- you will have a difficult time in Martinique. Giscard will be charming and go all out to have a visible success. But look at what he did on CSCE with Brezhnev. They said things on the Middle East without consultation; they agreed to all the things on Cyprus we knocked out of our communique.

We must show Europe that we can't be at the mercy of any European who sells us out at will. Tell Giscard he can be an ally or neutral but not both. I would be noticeably cooler to Giscard than to Schmidt. I thought I would be tough at NATO. The others don't want to have to choose between France and us. I think we have to make them choose. I think the problem is endemic -- three French Presidents have now done the same -- and we have to show the Europeans they can't get away with it.



President: Will Schmidt raise hell about CSCE?

Kissinger: The German nightmare is to have to choose between France and us.

[Discussed the internal French political system.]

The French have either been governed by kings or anarchy since the French Revolution. Giscard's inherent political position is weak.

For 15 years the French have systematically undermined us.

Back to Allon --

If he has reasonable proposals, you can be conciliatory. If not, say we can't underwrite them under these conditions. If there is no settlement, there will be a war and I don't know how we would conduct ourselves in that situation.

[There was a discussion of laser-guided bombs.]

President: I told Jim I recognize the April 1st target but I had to be recognizant of our own units and we wouldn't strip our units until we had full cooperation from Israel.

Kissinger: I think it is dangerous to put them in that strong a military position; then they are sorely tempted to tell us to go to hell.

A confrontation sometime down the road is inevitable. If they had moved on the West Bank, we could have avoided Rabat. Now Hussein is knocked out. If we can get something on Egypt, we can go to Geneva -- Syria wants to -- and let it get stalemated there. If there is another war I think -- cost what may -- you have to get a final settlement.

President: How shortsighted they are!

Kissinger: Three million people can't stand against 120 million with unlimited resources. With Soviet backing. Winning is as dangerous as losing.

If the Israelis march on Damascus and the Soviets put in two divisions and announce they are just going to the '67 borders, and call on us and the Europeans and Japanese to join in guaranteeing the '67 borders....

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DATE & TIME: Monday - December 9, 1974

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECT: Meeting with Allon

Kissinger: They have a package which would be a disaster. It's two-thirds domestic politics. For example, they want ships with all- Israeli crews to get through the Suez. They know he can't accept it; must be intended to be humiliating.

Basically, they won't give up the oil fields and they don't want to give up the passes. They would do it for a ten-year agreement. Short of that, they will back off 30-50 kilometers but not from the oil fields or passes. The net result is they will turn over part of the Sinai to the UN, but not to Egypt.

They would sign now, but it would not be implemented for one year. They would begin to move only in the thirteenth month and then the time starts running.


President: What is our tactic?

Kissinger: I would tell them that all these theories about winning a war presuppose the Soviet Union is not engaged. In the absence of some justification, we can't go to the American people in the face of Soviet confrontation, European and Japanese opposition, and another oil embargo.

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
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President: I will say you delivered the proposal and said it is not attainable.

[At 12:57 p.m., the President met with Allon.]



✓ P/K 9 Dec (Pre-Allen)


12:35 pm Fri
12:57 = Allen, Skales, Deane, & Hastings join

K They have a package which would be drawn 43 domestic policies - for example ships of all domestic crews than Sea. Must be introduced to be immediately. Basically, they want gain up oil fields & limit want to gain up a press. They would do it for 10 yr experiment. Short of that, they will back off 30-50 from last out oil fields or press. Net is they will turn over part of Sinai to UK, not E. They would sign now, but not implemented for 1 yr. Move in 13th month & then time starts running.

P What is our tactic?

K I would tell them all these theories about winning a war presuppose SU not engaged. In absence of firm justification, can't ~~sell~~^{go} to Am people in face of Sov cooperation, Evr - Jap opposition, oil embargo.

P I say you retained a prop. & find it not otherwise



→ Transcript of meeting - ~~has~~ P/K 9 Dec 74 ✓

K (Roy Chivale piece on Oct war)

On allow. At dinner last night, ~~was~~ only Fisher from Jewish community + no trained seeds from press. You got letter from Salat

P I thought it a statesmanlike letter.

K He followed it up w/ an oral msg. (Dec intro)

P What does Salat need.

K Has to give up a pass. Maybe give E west toehold + put pass themselves under UN. I willing to give up N. oilfield, but I think they would give up ~~some~~ fields too. If gave up all oilfields + maybe 50 km in N, we could play around w/ a pass.

Q such agreement carried out over 9 mos w/ 1 eye extension of UNEF should take E out of it.

If we get an agreement, I think we should give mil. aid to E. The E mil estab can't run down w/o E mil. do something about it.

P I have your mind about it.

K It would be useful to tell Salat we turning in that direction.

P How about extent?

K That not worth risk. 3 yrs ago it would have been easy - not now.

P Do we need Cong approval for cash sub?

S. only if there is some prohibition on E oil.

K If not, I would just announce ^{it} you need some FP battle w/ Cong. ~~Go~~ I think Cong going to give on Turks. Makarios is playing with one hand - leftist support. Christos is OK + Kara. But Kara wants Makarios in Cyprus because otherwise he is a Greek pretender.

*

Makarios wants more chaos - & think he
wants to trigger Turks to another intervention - to
? he can get more support & take it to UK.
Reason the whole thing started in '62 was that
Makarios negotiated const. of '60 & Turkish rights.
It was unavoidable, but Makarios agreed to it.
French - You will have a diff. time in Montenegro.
He will be charming & go all out to have a visible
success. But look what he did on CSE w/
Baz. They said things on ME w/o consultation,
they agreed to all the things on Cyprus we bashed
out of our communication.

US - must show Eur that we can't be at mercy
of any Eur who sells us out at will. Tell Giscard
he can be ally or neutral but not both. I would
be noticeably cooler to Giscard than to Schmidt
& that I would be tough at NATO. The others don't
want to have a choice bet Fr + us, I think we
have to make them choose. I think a part is
undermined - 3 Pres now a same - and we have
to show a Eur ~~that~~ they can't get away w/ it.

P. Will Schmidt raise hell about CSE?

R. The German nightmare is to have to choose bet
Fr + us.

(Decisional internal Fr. part system)

The Fr have ~~never~~ been governed by kings or
anarchy since a Fr revolution. Giscard's inherent
pol. position is weak.

For 15 yrs a Fr based syst. undermined us.

Back to Allan -

If he has reasonable proposals, you can be



coinciding. If not, they are not evenhanded
them under these conditions. If not no settlement,
there will be a war & I don't know how we
would conduct themselves (L.A.B. chairman)

P. I told him I was - April 1st but had to
be away from some units & we wouldn't
strip our units until we had full copy from
I.

K. I think it dangerous to put them in that strong
a moral position. They surely attempted to tell us to
go to hell.

Cooperation sometime down a road is inevitable.
If they had moved on W. Bank... If we can get
something as/E, we can get to Geneva - Synovants
to - & let it get stalled there. If there is another
war I think - but what may you have to get
a final settlement -

P. How straightforward they are.

K. I wish we could stand against 120 mil w/
unlimited resources. w/S as backing, mining
is as dangerous as living.

If they mention Damascus & Saw put in
2 divisions. otherwise they are just going to
67 tracks, call on us & Euro guys to
join us in guaranteeing 60 tracks.