MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

DATE & TIME: Sunday - November 24, 1974
1:40 - 2:05 p.m.

PLACE: Okeanskaya Sanatorium
Near Vladivostok

SUBJECT: Nuclear War

President: Shortly after I became President, Dr. Kissinger briefed me on some of what you and President Nixon discussed. I would like to know more about what you told President Nixon, and then I would like to ask some questions. There are some things I have to get straight in my mind. Then we could go to negotiations, or whatever. But first I need to know more about what you discussed.
Brezhnev: This was in the Crimea. As I am at all times, I was guided by the basic principle that there would be no nuclear war between us or nuclear war in the world in general. I told President Nixon that there are some countries which had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not observe it. Therefore a situation could arise where you or we could be threatened with a nuclear attack. I thought it might be good for us to conclude a treaty dealing only with a nuclear attack on one of our countries. In the event of a nuclear attack on one, the other would come to its aid with all the resources at its disposal.

President Nixon, I recall, said that this was interesting and that he would look further into it. I had some further talks with Dr. Kissinger on this [in Moscow on October 26], but for various reasons nothing came of it. That is where we stand.

In the preamble we could say something like: we are aware of what a nuclear war would mean in such circumstances and, desirous to avoid such an event, the two sides, etcetera. We could do it so as to avoid giving offense to allies -- and in fact it would give a reassurance of protection to our allies.

President: As I told you, I was briefed on this in general terms. I want to ask a couple of questions, and then Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko can discuss it further.

I agree with President Nixon; it is an interesting idea. One question is, does it mean strategic nuclear attack, tactical nuclear attack, or any nuclear attack?

Brezhnev: Under the treaty we would each agree not to use nuclear weapons against anyone.

President: They would be defensive only?

Brezhnev: Yes.

I agree to Dr. Kissinger continuing with subsequent discussions. My concept is related to any use of nuclear weapons. What is the difference whether they are tactical or strategic? Because in either case there would be a nuclear war, and we want to prevent that.
President: I asked because I wanted to know if it were a tactical nuclear attack whether it would be an "all-force reaction," and I wondered whether the response to different kinds of attack should be different. That is of some importance.

Brezhnev: The important thing is not to have a nuclear attack on us or our allies. If we entered this kind of an arrangement, nuclear war would be impossible for decades to come. The basic thing is to talk the general concept. We can then work on the details and go into it deeper.

President: Let me ask: what about an attack by a nuclear power on a third party that is not an ally? What would be the situation?

Brezhnev: It is hard to give a precise answer. Perhaps we could agree to enter consultations as the best course. A lot would depend on who attacked whom. This proposal hasn't been elaborated in detail. But since the United States and the Soviet Union are the most important powers, an agreement like this between us would eliminate nuclear war for many years to come.

President: We do want to prevent nuclear war, and your country and mine have a great responsibility. We should talk further. Meanwhile, I think we should make a major effort to get the laggards to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are some laggards.

Brezhnev: I fully agree.

President: Let's have it between Dr. Kissinger and your Ambassador to work on that.

Brezhnev: We are putting the Non-Proliferation Treaty into the communique. Let's think about it little by little. It should be discussed energetically.

[The private conversation ended and the principals rejoined the larger meeting.]
Return to Scancaft files
(Uladiostok Summit Notes)
Transcribed + held in sensitive files
I think I did not ask you to do this.

P.S. I should have asked you a long time ago, but I did not.

By the way, I want to remind you that we discussed these issues during our last meeting. If you have any questions or need further clarification, please feel free to contact me. Thank you for your cooperation.

Best regards,

[Signature]

[Date]
Don't ship. We haven't accused you of anything.

But are you aware you are concurring in measures to handle unlisted herbs that you are entitled to do.

We are living at an agreement.

I don't have to give you any assurance. As for you, I don't know what you are doing.

But we know we must do something, something, something, but not now.

But, you know, an agreement would not build any more doing housekeeping. This whole thing is very expensive in terms of our costs, it is being criticized in our reports. You must admit that you have spent that US$150,000 for the 275-450 prep would have been.

Any prep has a practical significance for the US$5-6 year to build mine, but there is one which goes. Thus, the prep stop to mine prep in 1972.

We can all come in a week.

Of course. The prep were multi-pass options in terms. It just dabs on any prep in which we can begin. I mean you are about to begin another US$100,000 Chalmers to catch up.

Under our proposal, it was the unit to be used to build-then-block, even the prep could test various improvements, these and so build 850 living units.

That was not even underwriting planning with any of us. We agree we would have to put any new system into 50% hubs, so in fact we couldn't have a very considerable.

When a decision was permitted for 1% multiple.
1. We may put a supersonic band.

2. In the case that we were calling the availability and were the US position is getting weak.

3. I think we are close to Moscow. My instinctive line is to be very moderate. Moscow is in fact only 800 km from here, some 400. The question is what to them.

4. You did not mention geographic factors. You mentioned we are a missile from US without it would not be worth. You said we have 5, yet 5 would not change.

5. Once it is there we don't see any need to go. We have one here now. We don't see any need to go. We have one here now. We don't see any need to go.

6. The basic role is to be defensive and not to go. We haven't changed that one. No change.

7. OK.

8. You have said you not watching us here.

9. The actual US/SSR conflict, 14M is too much longer than the missile. So if it were MiG-23 is 120 times when you consider that it's 35 times, so it is a new missile.

10. For missiles engaged US don't come US. Also your have not accounted for F-85. Why 1983 - why not 1984?

11. We are given SS-20 longer possible differential engine used US almost all. The option is Russian and from Western Europe.
And in exchange or make mine apparent.
B. This was in Cannes. As I was leaving I joined
by waves people that at noon came out and
were going in and in good. I took a train carri-
which had not joined until I left Cannes. It
as it was mine when you were could be
continued w/-care attack. It would be
would be

I would make a treaty during only w/

some attack in one of the matters. In event

some attack in and nothing would come

it wih w/old enemies at original.

A point interesting would both further with

in. I took some further with w/ which for business

nothing came but that is when we tried.

In principle he would say something like

of which would mean in each case

4. He would try to avoid always to avoid

2 ends – etc. We would do it to as to avoid

effort to avoid. It would put


DECLASSE
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/2/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINE?
BY: 4/2/94
I regard it to be a matter of great importance that the concept of a joint attack be considered carefully. The essential thing is the good concept. We can then work our detail requirements down.

Let me offer an attack by a new form on a 3rd party, not an ally. What would be a joint attack involving?

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B. Hard stuff prevents us. Perhaps we could agree to some concentrations on hot frames. A hot could
degree in what should occur. This proposal would
then elaborate in detail. Best thing we must
cope frames agree we will eliminate some con
be very good a way.

P. We do not agree once over to good eye trim
bone great wing. We should try further
memorizing and should make some effort to
got layout to pay it up. It takes some layout.
B. I fully agree
P. I disagree it and look and work a while
B. In putting NPT into communication
I hate think about it. Not likely will. Should be done.
B. Open an action, continue current exchange of
   and information on that
   American source from tomorrow, as exchange.
   C. What shall we do next?
   D. Can we catch the congress if there is time to say get it
typed?

   A joint statement relating to the subject of control
   seems advisable to bring together separably.
   E.g. "...and make every effort in that
   direction..."

K 9:30 a.m. /r/lunch at 11:00. Dean
   brief IPv4 agreement lunch.
B. Sign congress agreement lunch
P. Then go to Vlad before lunch.
D. Yes, after Vlad we will go directly there.