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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, November 15, 1974
12:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

The President: How are we doing on Brown? [Referring to fallout from reports of General George Brown's remarks about "Jewish influence."]

Secretary Schlesinger: We held a meeting with the Jewish leaders. They say they aren't after Brown, but I'm not so sure. Also there were some mumbles.

General Scowcroft: Did you read Alsop?

The President: We should talk SALT before I go to Vladivostok.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think the Soviets are eager for an agreement and we can get one if we hang hard on equal aggregates. Maybe we should link the reduction of tac-nukes in Europe to removal of a tank army. I doubt we will get movement on MBFR until there is SALT movement, but if we can get equal aggregates we can show interest in the FBS issue.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree we should hold out on equal aggregates. It may be a face-saver to say we will reduce tac-nukes, but I don't think...
we will get a tank army. But they are talking FBS now not in terms of arms, but the British and French forces.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would emphasize that the Soviet peripheral forces are targeted against the British and French forces so the logic doesn't follow.

Secretary Kissinger: It's silly anyway. There are more warheads on one Poseidon than all the British and French forces put together.

Secretary Schlesinger: Another issue is the attempt to treat the B-1 weapons each as a delivery vehicle. That probably is a negotiating gambit.

Secretary Kissinger: I talked to Dobrynin. He talked SRAM versus their ALCM's. He is not concerned about SRAM but would be willing to count only ALCM's.

The President: What is it?

Secretary Schlesinger: An Air-Launched Cruise Missile. It would force them to recast their air defense.

The President: How far along are they?

Secretary Schlesinger: Not very far. This is an area where you will have negotiating room.

You'll be going to Korea. They are most interested in continued U.S. support. We told them we were withdrawing the Hercules and offered them it. They were interested but contended that the Hercules is dangerous to the user.

General Scowcroft: And worthless with a conventional warhead.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are reviewing our overseas nuclear deployments. We plan to thin out the ADM's and Hercules. There is no need for them.

In the Middle East, there may be a problem while you are away.
The President: What is the normal setup?

Secretary Kissinger: Normally we would call a WSAG. I don't think the Soviet Union will permit the Syrians to move while we're at a summit. We can keep Israel quiet. The Syrians may not renew the UNDOF and they may fear a preemptive attack.

It is a massive problem for Asad to lose 15,000 men in a war and get only a few kilometers.

The President: But if something happens, what is the mechanism?

Secretary Kissinger: We would call an urgent WSAG and get the options to you.

Secretary Schlesinger: The only other issue is Diego Garcia in connection with military construction on Symington/Mansfield. The Senate version has you making a statement which then the Congress must approve. I think you should take Diego out.

The President: What is so important about the military construction authorization?

Secretary Schlesinger: Lots of things we need.

Secretary Kissinger: If we don't get it this year, we won't.

The President: Mansfield will be away. Can't we win it in the Senate? I think we should stick with Hebert and hang tough. It is a hard knockout.

Secretary Schlesinger: On the '75-'76 budget we have to make reviews in 1975 of what the impact will be on 1976. I've got to take it from the procurement for operations. In '76 we have an agreement with OMB to build in the inflation on procurement. That gives us $107-108 billion in the budget and $95.1 billion in outlays. Since we have to take it from the procurement for operations, we should put it back in in '76.

The President: Does the $95.1 include everything?

Secretary Schlesinger: It is just a continuation of the present program.

The President: What would $94 billion do?
Secretary Schlesinger: I'll get you a readout. We can manipulate expenditures. The problem is in the TOA area. The budget savings is in the process which will reduce the Services by $3 billion to get to $95.1.

The President: What would they add?

Secretary Schlesinger: It would not be a precise add-on, more a chipping away.

The President: Roy says you don't want to stall promotions.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'd be happy to go on a government-wide basis, but not on DOD alone. Otherwise I would rather get the savings elsewhere. Across the government, it would be okay.

The President: How would you save it?

Secretary Schlesinger: In the personnel account, PCS, etcetera. I worry about the discriminatory aspect.

The President: If you can give Roy the $27 million from elsewhere, okay. Do I have to make a decision on the $95.1 today?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. I just want you to know I must take it out of procurement for operations and that has implications for '76. I wanted to get your views on the supplemental versus transfer authority.

The President: How big a supplemental would it be?

Secretary Schlesinger: About $700 million.

The President: Which is best?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think it is best not to go for the supplemental.

The President: I would save up the good will for next year. I would not go the supplemental route. My inclination would be to go for bigger than Roy. His is $94 billion?

Secretary Schlesinger: It may have slipped to $93.

The President: Does the unemployment situation help the recruiting?
Secretary Schlesinger: It is making the All Volunteer Force. It will get harder as the war baby generation thins out.

The President: I lean to a higher figure, but don't know how much higher at the moment.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think Roy is prepared to be reasonable.

On the base closings, we are thinking of closing Loring AFB. Muskie will be the head of the budget committee -- they will be organized in one year. Muskie is not in a good position to complain.

The President: What was its mission?

Secretary Schlesinger: It's marginal SAC base. We are moving them inland.

The President: How many SAC bases would you close?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think five. We would also close Frankford and Pueblo arsenals. We would close Rome, N.Y.

The President: I want to reemphasize that no closing should result in a transfer which Congress could claim we are bowing to Hebert, etc. That can't be done.

Secretary Schlesinger: One has to watch the Services on this. It will not happen.

The President: I will study up on SALT.

Secretary Schlesinger: They will size you up. Show them they can work with you.
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