<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Withdrawal</th>
<th>National security restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Material</td>
<td>Memorandum of Conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Ford, Kissinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation Date</td>
<td>11/11/1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>3 pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection/Series/Folder ID</td>
<td>031400283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection Title</td>
<td>National Security Adviser. Memoranda of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conversations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Number</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folder Title</td>
<td>November 11, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Withdrawn</td>
<td>05/11/2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawing Archivist</td>
<td>GG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 11, 1974
9:20 - 10:15 a.m.

Kissinger: [Discussion of Alsop party.] Joe Califano said no one is
in charge in the Democratic party. He did not think Nelson would be
confirmed.

The President: I am breakfasting with Albert tomorrow.

Kissinger: No one overseas would be able to understand that [if Rockefeller
is not confirmed].

We will have to slow George Bush down. We need to keep things
quiet there -- he is saying we have been neglecting the Chinese. There
was a ter Horst piece saying our Chinese relations are faltering.

I am holding the line in Quito [on the OAS vote on Cuba sanctions].
We would be better off failing than maneuvering.

The President: I agree completely.

Kissinger: We didn't want the meeting. We could even if necessary
vote for the resolution to leave it up to individual countries.

State also wants to prevent the South African CNO from coming
close. We shouldn't prevent it, but he shouldn't see anyone officially.
Helms said he talked to the Israelis and they took a tough line. Maybe they didn't have the line from Rabin. We should wait to see. But if Sadat won't move without Syria, we are in a tough spot. They won't move with Syria without an aid cutoff.

The President: What did you think of Arafat on TV?

Kissinger: He is being moderate. But we should hold off six to nine months and not force the Israelis now.

We can't do much business in Japan when you go. We should try to avoid head-to-head sessions. The Prime Minister is not your counterpart. He is more important than the Italian Prime Minister -- a sort of Chairman of the Board. They don't deal head-to-head anyway, but when they do, they tend to give away too much because of politeness, and then they can't deliver.

They make decisions by consensus, sort of by osmosis. It is hard to say just how a decision is reached. You can't insure that summit decisions will be implemented. The best way is to discuss things at the lower level and let them work up to the top.

The President: What will they want to discuss?

Kissinger: A lot of things -- and you can discuss usefully on a philosophical level.

Energy -- they have our energy ideas. I wouldn't argue with them because they will push with the consumer-producer conference.

We will write up the energy scheme in detail for you.

Economics -- They had been enjoying a big surplus. Now it is difficult because of oil. We should just urge against bilateral deals.

The President: One thing -- they have put an embargo on beef imports from us, Australia and Canada. Eberle said that is working out, but I don't know.

Kissinger: I am puzzled by that. Because they will probably urge preferential food treatment for Japan. I personally think we will have to go
this way for food. The free market nowadays just won't do it. You could say that legally you can't do it but personally you will see to it.

I think we should push the food planning group.

What we need is to get political control over the allotment.

Another issue is the fisheries. This is not a Presidential issue, but you could say if the Japanese don't do something, the Congress will. But you shouldn't make a big deal of it.

You must remember they will leak everything you say -- and a lot of what you don't say!

Defense cooperation -- DOD would like to reduce our forces in Japan and go more into co-production. We won't avoid demonstrations by reducing our forces.

The President: How about the nuclear issue?

Kissinger: I will discuss that with Kimura. You should say I will take it up. We would say we have nucs on ships but then end home-porting

•••••••••••••• We will get you the details of our rights for •••••••••

I would spend a fair amount of time briefing them on our perception of the world -- but nothing you don't want to get out.

One thing they are interested in is the trilateral deal we started last year with Europe. France killed it and proposed an EC-Japanese bilateral. I think all that is dead if we don't push the trilateral again.

The President: On this overview section, will you put it in my briefing material.
WITHDRAWAL ID 017755

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL: National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL: Memorandum of Conversation

TITLE: Ford, Kissinger

DESCRIPTION: Brent Scowcroft's handwritten version of memcon

CREATION DATE: 11/11/1974

VOLUME: 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID: 031400283

COLLECTION TITLE: National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations

BOX NUMBER: 7

FOLDER TITLE: November 11, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger

DATE WITHDRAWN: 05/11/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST: GG