MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Minister Mordechai Shalev,
Minister and Charge' of Israel
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, November 6, 1974
3:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: As you know, Secretary Kissinger is in the Middle East
and will visit with the Prime Minister tomorrow. The whole situation
is different from what we had expected and hoped. I am concerned that
we could be faced with a united position of the Arabs, the Soviet Union
and the Europeans against us. As you know from our talks, we had
hoped we could resume negotiations with Sadat, Hussein and eventually
with Syria. It is our judgment that if we had moved, that contingency
(the Rabat outcome) could have been avoided. We fear that unless
movement begins right away we will be in trouble.

As I look to October-November 1973, we had the embargo, a conflict
which was very tough for Israel and costly for us, and a fairly close
confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is not in your and our interest
to have that recur. From the viewpoint of the American people, there
were grave reservations at getting too close to the brink -- it was just
after Vietnam and the American people were fed up. I hope you can
communicate with the Prime Minister [to ensure] that there will be a
real exploration with Secretary Kissinger to move quickly and have some
substance. The potential danger of a united front is dangerous for both
of us.

My past record of support for Israel is well known. I think we could
have avoided Rabat, and I think we can avoid its consequences if the
Prime Minister and Secretary Kissinger will sit down and explore
all the options.
Shailev: The Prime Minister has said that Israel is ready to negotiate with Egypt and with Jordan, but not with the PLO. I believe it is in accordance with what you would want -- to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan. Prime Minister Rabin has said this in his speech to the Knesset. [He reads a page from it.] He made it clear that Israel is not prepared to negotiate with the PLO because they want to destroy Israel.

President: We understand you view of the PLO and we wish it were not so, but we need to move.

Shailev: I am not aware of any difference with the United States on steps toward a disengagement agreement. Rabat would have happened anyway.

President: My understanding is that we urged movement early, then Rabin came in and urged some delay. If there had been a negotiation underway, the Rabat outcome would have been different.

Shailev: We are on the receiving end. Our confidence in Sadat’s wishes for peace are shaken. We think he is keeping his options open.

Egypt is taking some steps building bunkers on the eastern side of the Canal for anti-aircraft, which is prohibited. We will submit this to the UN.

On the Secretary’s last visit with Sadat, he knew we would negotiate. I don’t think a couple of weeks would have made a difference.

President: I think we now must move, and I want you to communicate this to the Prime Minister. A repeat -- or something even worse -- of 1973 we must avoid.

Shailev: Nothing is further from our minds than a delay of the negotiation. But we must have our security.

President: I agree. We will maintain our guarantee for Israel’s security and existence.
P/Sherwin
6 Mar. 74

As you know, I'm in contact with the Truman family, and they've indicated they're interested in helping. I'm concerned that we could be found as a central part of SILENT S/CE instance. As you know from your talks, we need help to ensure a target of:
SILENT/Spies/Code

I'm just telling you what we have been told. We feel that somehow we have to move quickly; right away. We will be in touch.

As I look at it, we're being set against the conflict which we're just trying to work out, and I think there are repercussions of this. It will certainly be in conflict to have that one.

If even together of one thing, there may be more expedience. I'm going to see if we can contact to have that done.

If you want to get the other one up, I can do that, but there will be more expediency. It may require perhaps to have some reconsideration.

An additional charge of a central point is dangerous for both.

I will put together as well known to the other how this would have avoided that. I think we can avoid the consequences of.

To you and do such an effort, I will. You said really to want my E, and it

I believe it is an occurrence of what you would write to me at S(Elston)

(Hand from Robins)

The words I want you to knock off from the

because they aren't fully

I have understood you mean to PK S to ask with it write out and, but you have to mean...
5. I am sure in any age or US war stops ruins. Looking around Robert might have stopped rapidly by Robert came in very right away. If they had been right with every Robert continue heavily.

5. Can not deal with. Other suggestions in Salat with few as people. All tried to begin to explain again. It is taking some steps making benches on stage in front for A.A. which prohibits. We might permit this in TN.

Can Sing last week at Salat for how we would worship. I don't think Robert a complete measure would have been held quite.

Said. I think we have most want to present you to the community. This to me a great honor you have given - Q173 we must avoid.

3. Workout from 8 to 8 - than of weight. But we have our security.

1 day we will maintain in a grown for I need & that.