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Folder Title: October 22, 1974 - Kissinger, Schlesinger

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: 
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Maj. General John A. Wickham, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: 
Tuesday, October 22, 1974
7:25 - 8:22 p.m. (cocktails)

PLACE: 
The Secretary's Office
Department of State

Schlesinger: If we back down on the NPG now, we will look ineffectually punitive.

Kissinger: My worry is now excluding them. But if we don't the Italians will think we are bluffing. Arthur Schlesinger forcing a center-left coalition in Italy in 1962 was a disaster. It was designed to isolate the Communists, but in fact it swallowed up the right socialists and the free left ones joined the Communists. So the situation remained the same. I guess we should get a postponement of the NPG.

Schlesinger: How about the press line?

Kissinger: We could say we will hold it in connection with the Defense Planning Group.

Schlesinger: ISA is concerned that NATO is disintegrating.

Kissinger: That's true, but that is nothing compared to what will happen when the oil money gets going.
Schlesinger: The press line will be that it is okay for fascist govern­ments, but not for leftists.

Kissinger: Let's say it was postponed because of the elections in Greece and Italy and the Communists in Portugal are a problem.

Schlesinger: How about the Aviation Week leak? I would like to string him up.

Kissinger: The Soviets will try now to find out how we know about the SA-5.

Schlesinger: Shall I stop in France? We are getting friendly signals now from the Minister of Defense. I think they think they are losing the F-104 contract and want to cozy up.

Kissinger: You could go, but it would be better after the President meets with Giscard.

Schlesinger: Will Schmidt do something in Moscow that I shouldn't visit Germany?

Kissinger: No. He will put on an economic deal -- a commercial deal on concessional terms. But you should go. He wants German industry on his side and wants to cozy up to the Soviet Union while being tough. They want a nuclear power plant and that is worrisome, because that must mean it is more advanced than they have.

Schlesinger: I will make a speech Saturday at the B-1 rollout.

Kissinger: Don't be threatening while I am in Moscow. We have to consider that our foreign policy is in the worst shape ever. The spectacle of this country is appalling. Sadat says what does he have to show for his relationship with us? No $250 million, no arms. Military people around the world have to conclude it is too dangerous now to tie up with the U.S.

On SALT, the President is lugging around the options. He said he would call you. I think the only consensus is on A. I am totally opposed to B intellectually because you can't get there without creating massive instability.
Schlesinger: The trouble is it is non-negotiable.

Kissinger: Totally, except when we undertake a massive program of large missiles and accurate warheads. You would have a merry 3-4 years. You would get their attention.

Schlesinger: You are for option B intellectually?

Kissinger: I am for the objective of Option B. It is where you would like to come out.

Schlesinger: I have given you a respectable option with our analytical base. If it is not negotiable, and we have no political base, so be it.

Kissinger: He will call you.

Schlesinger: The Chiefs' option gives you a balance.

Kissinger: The Chiefs option is a fraud.

Schlesinger: It is thin. Your interest in equal aggregates should be greater than the Chiefs'. A treaty without them would be difficult to defend.

Kissinger: Not if you could show twice as many warheads.

Schlesinger: That is now, not out to 1985. It would be hard to stretch it that far. The argument gets thin by 1985 when they have big throwweight and advanced technology.

Option B is basically in the Soviet interest. Too bad it is not negotiable.

Kissinger: I thought we could get an agreement in 1975 with a new President and a reactionary. Now I think they may sit back and wait.

You will never get a bigger DOD budget.

Schlesinger: Ash is a friend.

Kissinger: He is dead now. I will support you, but it will be tough. I have a Spenglerian view. The Soviet leaders are still afraid of World War II, but let a 50-year-old in and watch out.
Schlesinger: The Army is in good shape, the Air Force is okay, and the Navy is in terrible shape.

Kissinger: Six to nine more months of the current trends and we will be in for a serious foreign policy challenge.

Schlesinger: How about the Middle East?

Kissinger: I had an Egypt-Israeli negotiation set up for after the Summit, but Sadat is now worrying. Israel agreed to work with Hussein six months too late. Sadat is getting cold feet.

We will have a massive problem with Israel. If it works out I may get a negotiation. It would have to work within 3-4 months. They should not feel secure during that period -- most of the stuff should go after that. That may make you the fall guy, but if it is a political hold-up the Jews will put pressure on. If it is the Army screwing up, it is explainable.

Schlesinger: I think Option IC, augmented to ID, was too much.

Kissinger: I think the Jews will try to have Congress pass the authorization bill. I think the President will resist MATMON-B. We will soon find out because we won't get a negotiation without a brawl.

Schlesinger: We can scrape through with 7,000 million. We would love to get $30 million, but if we get into a bruising fight or lose it would hurt.

Kissinger: Maybe we need some bruising fights we win.

Schlesinger: We told them they would have our support and they haven't gotten it. We can get by.

Kissinger: How can they, without cutting back?

Schlesinger: The question is, do we have a better chance in 1975 or in 1976 in Congress?

Scowcroft: Also MASF.
Kissinger: We will talk to the President about talking to Stennis on MASF.

Schlesinger: Iran. We are prepared to go on TOW, Maverick... but they can't digest all of them because they don't have the technical manpower.

Kissinger: Then they will be dependent on us.

Schlesinger: If you want a country in a mess in 3-4 years, Iran will be it.
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