

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
 the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, October 21, 1974

PLACE: The White House
 The Oval Office

Kissinger: It was an amazing SALT meeting. Colby's was a cover-your-ass performance. Carl Duckett was as surprised as anyone else. But that is not a big problem -- it will be during the negotiation.


Schlesinger is the big problem. He has put you in a corner. If there is an agreement now, it will be that you have decided on a quick fix. If you want stability, you would wait -- by his chart. That is phony. To get them to change to his "stable" force, we would have to build up so as to produce a massive threat to them -- \$30-35 billion. If we started that, would we stop after 4-5 years? Besides, the Soviet Union has already paid for its progress. We haven't.

You would build yourself massive domestic problems building a force to threaten the Soviet Union -- how would you justify it? And how would you justify tearing it down after five years? Option B, while theoretically logical, is practically impossible.

President: Suppose we use the other Option B. We go to Vladivostok and it breaks up on this. I would have to come back and tell the American people that we couldn't negotiate and point out we must scare them by a build-up. I don't think the American people would buy it, and then we would be a paper tiger.

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 DATE 4/2/07
 NLF, DATE 3/10/04

Kissinger: The press would then swing back to the left. The Democrats also. Of course they could get Jackson that way. How could you argue that 15,000 warheads were not enough?

President: But if we didn't get the money, we could not then go back and negotiate again with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: And within two years, we will be fighting the JCS to keep from scrapping the B-52.

President: The fact that we might not get the funds is what scares me.

Kissinger: The Soviets are already perceiving the Congressional problems. They are toughening their stand now. I think you have no choice but to call Schlesinger either tomorrow or Wednesday. Maybe Wednesday, so he can't appeal.

[He described the note to Dobrynin.] [Passed the talker to the President.]

President: Do you think with this proposal Jim will walk out?

Kissinger: Never. Not a chance.

President: How about the JCS?

Kissinger: They will regret not being able to MIRV the other 450 Minuteman II.

What you do not have in your Cabinet now is people who work for you, not for themselves. McNamara had no judgment but he protected his President. Jim is in business for himself.

The press is no longer playing him against me. You have two problems with him. One, he is playing the Jewish community.

President: But even he, Clements, and Jones said Israel had too much.

Kissinger: He won't take the heat, Mr. President. Clements is okay.

President: If he won't be a team player, I don't want him.



We are thinking of making an announcement of the Vladivostok trip on Saturday.

President: Good.

Kissinger: I think we will get an Israeli/Egyptian negotiation, but I would like to stay out of the first phase and let a stalemate develop.

The problem is Egypt doesn't even have anything I want.



P/K 21 OCT 1974 ✓

K I was an amazing SALT meeting. Both were a QYA performance. Carl Denhart was as surprised as anyone else. But that's not a big part - will be during a negotiation.

I believe in a big push. He has put you in a corner. If agreement now, it will be that you have given him a quick fix - if you want stability, you would wait - by his chart.

That is phony. To get them to change to his "stable" face, we would have to build up to 20 to produce a massive thrust to them of 30-35 but. If we started that, would we stop after 4-5 yrs? Besides, S U has already paid for its prep. We haven't.

You would build yourself massive parametric push building a force to threaten S U - how justify it? And how justify taking it down after 5 yrs? Option B, while theoretically logical, is practically impossible.

P Suppose we take option B. We go to U.S. & it backs up on this. I would have to come back & go to our people that we couldn't negotiate & then print out we must scare them by breaking. I don't think U.S. would buy it, & then we would be paper tigers.

K The press would then swing back left. The Demos also, cause they could get Jackson that way. How could you negotiate & see ourselves and not enough.


P But if we didn't get a majority, we could not then go back & negotiate again w/ S U.

K And w/in 2 yrs, we will be fighting S U & S U

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY see RLC review 12/6/04; state visit 3/10/04

BY lala NLF, DATE 4/13/07



keep from sleeping B-52

P. B. Fact that we might not get - funds is what scares me

K Says are already pricing the Congo problems. They are toughening their stand now.

I think you have no choice but to call S. either tomorrow or Wed. Maybe Wed, so he can't appeal.

(Described a note to D. S. G.) (Passed a letter to P)

P Do you think w/ this proposal Jim will walk out.

K Never. Not a chance

P How about JCS

K They will regret not doing about M. 100 other 450
M. M. II.

What you do not have in your cabinet now is people who work for you, not for themselves. M. has had some judgement but he protected his P. firm is in business for himself.

Pres no longer playing him against me. You have 2 problems w/ him.

(1) He playing a Jewish community

P Best known he, Clements, James said I had too much

K He won't take a heat, Mr. P. Clements to K

P If he won't be a team player, I don't want him.

K He will never get out in front. (incl. hand)

Clements isn't as bright as heel but has some qualities
has G. already getting it out.

ME - E says Fabiani made no deal w/ S. U. maybe yes, maybe no. S. did write to you at time to put our relationship on public basis - meaning incl. aid. How can you before another deal? But problem if you don't.

Shaw P 2 reports of what Sidde (R) I in July.
→ Clements report of what being better arrived now - art.

Also he now wants to negotiate in Wash, not
Sinnai. That has 3 parts: Press here, no say for
Egypt; US involvement.

Iran afraid S. Lat is getting cold feet.
I will ask ^{at least} for non-billig, 5-yr agreement - totally
maintainable.

P How do you get E + I to open on negot.

R I would go from Food Conf. Sinnai easy, in Wash
~~too~~ it would slip cause of pay cutting.

I foresee 2 months of bargaining before we move
massively. You may have to cut off aid.

P Your judgment on this is superior to major Jewish
Community will not dictate what to us on right thing to
do.

H They should give up 1/2 army to 67 - incl oil fields.
We would have to guarantee ~~that~~ that amount of oil. They
can't get non-billig for that. Some specifics of non-billig.

P a UN zone?

H A hot thing. E could advance to prevent I line.
There would then be 60 km buffer. Before E could
cross that, Syria would be defeated.

I is obstructing & has been squirreling away.

~~For~~ I were terrible on Turkey. I don't want let Syria
go down in another war. If Turkey isn't
immediately neutral, we don't have a chance.

I don't want to go back to ME unless I see some success.

I could come back w/ Turkish concessions & a big
of negotiations bet I + E.

* We thinking of announcement of a had trip on Saturday

P Good.

R I think we will get I-E negotiation, but I would
like to stay out of 1st phase - let it alternate steps!

Perk is I don't even ~~have~~ have anything I want
* I will want to make

