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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, October 18, 1974
9:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: On every option we will end up with two times as many warheads as the Soviet Union. Against hard targets, a megaton is obviously better, as for large cities. For 200,000 and less, it makes little difference.

The President: Isn't 40 kilotons more effective if it's more accurate?

Kissinger: Yes. But with equal accuracy, a megaton is obviously better. Brown knows the JCS position is a fraud.

On Portugal, the situation we may face is a Kerensky-type situation.

The President: Have we invited Vanick?

Scowcroft: Yes.

Kissinger: The Communists are the only well-organized party. They learned from Chile to move fast so we don't have time to interfere. The Portuguese military is not typically rightist; there is much leftist influence. Soares is weak and Goncalves is probably a Communist.

We don't know just what to do, and in this atmosphere I was afraid anyway to take strong action. In Greece, the Karamanlis party is splitting and we probably will end up with a weak coalition.
The President: Can we do something through

Kissinger: Maybe.

Coasta Gomes will ask for help. Under Spinola I was on the verge of asking for a program like the Greek-Turkish aid. Now it is so touchy, we could give him a package, or tell him we are willing to ask for a program but only if he stops the slide. That may leak and get out. But if you give him something now, they can say, "Yes. See, we can do whatever you wish and the United States will still go along." Also the effect on Italy. We told them no Communists in the government. If we go along, we will undercut the moderate Italians.

(Phone call from Senator Javits.)

Kissinger: You should tell Jackson not to go out and say this shows this is the way to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

The President: I agree. I will give Javits a pat on the back. In talking with Gurney.

Kissinger: I would say we have a traditional friendship with Portugal. We want to help, but only if they don't slide.

The President: What do they get?

Scowcroft: $30 million.

The President: What can we give?

Kissinger: Technical assistance, and ask for an emergency aid package of $30-50 million, or a PL 480 increase.

The President: Is the economy in bad shape?

Kissinger: Yes. Their economy was geared to the colonies. You could also say you would encourage a consortium for aid.

The President: The Azores?

Kissinger: They are up now. You could say negotiating is a measure of their good faith, but that is dangerous. The Communists may want to prove they are responsible and can even be in NATO.
The President: How seriously do Great Britain, the Germans and others take this?

Kissinger: You have to operate on the assumption that Great Britain is through. Soares is typical of the type who has brought disaster in Europe -- well meaning, nice, ineffectual. He has arranged a visit with Brandt -- but they don't have the balls for a fight. The Germans are the only ones -- you need a talk with Schmidt. Walters says France is Portugal five years away.

The President: What is the alternative to him?

Kissinger: None at all. On his right are the wild Gaullists. On the left is Mitterand.

The President: Europe is in a helluva mess.

Kissinger: Schmidt is the only stable leader left. He is aggressive, nationalistic. He's a socialist by accident.

The President: Economically, he is a hard liner?

Kissinger: Yes. Pompidou would have worked with us in Portugal. We must see whether the Germans will cooperate. You could stress to Costa Gomez that we hope the elections will take place. There is a possibility that the Communists may move even earlier.

The President: Are the Socialists helping? Spanish?

Kissinger: Not directly, but through France. The Spanish are willing but are not too good at this.

Helms was a good Director. Schlesinger was too brutal and was producing a rebellion; Colby is too mild -- he's a bureaucrat.
The President: Could we replace him? Is there anyone else out there?

Kissinger: No. You can live with Colby. He won't do any harm. Our Portuguese Embassy is a disaster. Scott just got there. He was Legal Adviser just before I came to State, and I wanted someone else. It would be unjust to remove him but we really have no choice.

Frank Carlucci would be great.

The President: I was thinking of him for OMB. But if we need him there, let's do it. We can get someone else for OMB.

Kissinger: Okay, I will talk to him then.

The President: Let's go ahead.

Kissinger: I don't know what you want to do about Flanigan.

The President: It is unjust and unkind. The odds are they will make a symbol of him. I haven't talked to him. He would step down if I asked. But I will talk to him, reaffirm my willingness to fight it through, and leave it up to him.

That goddamned Eagleton.

Kissinger: He is such a crazy bastard. He doesn't really deal on substance.

I will have a number of Ambassadorial changes to discuss with you.

The President: Okay on Wiley Buchanan to Austria?

Kissinger: I would like to delay. I wouldn't have lived in his house if I thought he wanted a post.

The President: How about Great Britain? I don't object to Anderson.

Kissinger: I thought of Dean Rusk, but I don't think he would take it.

The President: Would the Democrats kill him?

Kissinger: No. It was Vietnam which was the problem.
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