MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 8, 1974
9:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: On SALT, if you proposed offsetting asymmetries, you
would be in a bad position. Yesterday, you were told: (1) We'll be
in a better situation after 1976; (2) with time you could educated the
public about strategic stability; and (3) your options are a quick fix now
or a careful deal later. It is absurd to say that anything above
700 MIRV is useless but the difference between 2,000 and 2,200 is
decisive.

When you say one megaton is more useful than 40 kilotons, it's true but
that depends for what?

The arguments were shoddy, but they have put you in a box. You
will be accused of moving under pressure at my advice, misusing the
NSC system, and that you could have had a better deal by waiting six
months. I think we should stick with equal aggregates at 2,200 with
a 60 percent MIRV limitation. I don't know what the Soviets will think.

President: At 2,200, won't we be accused of no arms control at all?
Kissinger: Yes. But the USSR would have to cut back. If all restraints were off, the Soviet Union could build new holes and go up in their totals very rapidly.

President: I was mad. They were totally inflexible.

Kissinger: The real problem is they have a united bureaucratic front.

President: I don't like it but go ahead. Give me a comparative chart of this versus balanced asymmetries.

I thought Jim was inflexible, Clements was better and Brown was embarrassed.

Kissinger: On the Middle East, I can get a new line in the Sinai. I will go two times to Syria and Egypt. The trouble is Syria. They won't hold still unless you can give them assurance you will support another move on the Golan. But there are those Israeli settlements there.

President: How many are there?

Kissinger: That is not the point. Moving one of them would be a massive problem. You would have to threaten an aid cutoff. If we don't do this, we could trigger a war with an Egyptian disengagement. But Israel has no intention of making another move on the Golan. We may have another war anyway. What Israel asks for, Egypt can't give. But it is hard to show the American people that it isn't fair to ask for moves for peace in return for territory.

President: Would that move on the Golan break our commitment to Israel?

Kissinger: No, but you can't get this by negotiations -- only through brute force.
President: If we got Egypt, Jordan and Syria along attainable lines, does that give us a higher probability of peace over five-to-ten years, or is it just another step?

Kissinger: I think you could have five years before the Arabs try again for the 1967 borders, but without moves there will be war next year.

Israel is moving to vote no on the PLO, but will lay the groundwork with the Arabs.

Another issue on which State opposes me. The Africans are trying to expel South Africa from the UN on apartheid and humanitarian reasons. I think we should veto, but there will be an explosion. If we let South Africa be expelled on this, we are opening a Pandora's box. It is a bad precedent to expel a country because they have a bad policy. We will try to organize enough abstentions so they can't get the votes.

President: Why does State take this attitude? I thought they took the position this was an internal matter.

Kissinger: The Department is Kennedy-liberal. I am trying to weat them out.

President: I think we have to veto, but abstention would be better.

Kissinger: On Gierek, he is a national Communist. He has to maneuver between the Communists and Catholics.

You have to expect everything will get back to the Soviet Union, so don't take cracks at them, but any suggestions that you will deal separately with them would be welcomed.

Gierek wants you to meet with him a half hour before the dinner.

President: Fine, Upstairs. Should I ask him about Church?

Kissinger: No. He will want to talk CSCE and MBFR and relief on PL-480. Don't get into details.

President: Basket III is a problem?
Kissinger: III is human contacts. I say we can't jeopardize our relations with Western Europe over Basket III but we will use our influence. Another issue is confidence-building measures (CBM's)--maneuvers, etc. The Europeans want notification of division-size movements; the Soviets want a corps. The Europeans want observers, the Soviets agree to it on an ad hoc basis, but not regular. I think CSCE will be resolved next spring. Either Schmidt or Giscard will sell out.
On Salt. If you prepared for a meeting or argument, you
would be too late. The one you wanted
1. Better submission after 0.5
2. Software you could download on a laptop. It took
3. Optimize a quick fix now, or a careful deal later.
For example, a quick fix takes 200 hours or weeks,
but a full 200+200 initials.
When you only count these weeks, 404.4, but
that depends on what.
The arguments were studdy, but they have just gone
in a few. You will be accurately many under
pressure at my advice, missing 10% system,
but you could have had better deal by twenty 4ms.
Yet, we started with expedite for 2200 to
60% human limitation. Don't know what sense
with this.
P At 2200 expect we should be successful if none own control.
A, but VIKS would have cut back.
If whatever was VIKS could build now back
I go up for top as quickly.
P I know now. They were totally infallible.
K The next part is they have a mental instrument.
Next,
This program would be cut next in one month. It
would have to prepare of VIKS. Not use. You
would have to learn it down 100 staff. If they
wanted your TOS they would work on this again.
The argument was premature. (Hisdraft at 5/10)
If Sam don't accept this, we could fall back to
abnormal arguments.
P I don't like it, but possibly this was a reasonable
course. This one we got in a reasonable
next. Sam is very unflinching, Clements.
and Brown concur.

K. On ME, I can get a wire line in here– will go to S & S. The finish is done. They want will hold smaller then give them assurance you will stop over on your next on Cen.

P. When was that?

Q. That vote point. Hearing one thing and then another.

R. Yes, but before, you can't get that by negotiation only

S. Your point, I am always advocating this line that gives us a place to get it. Are you so far it just another step. I am sure, where is it?

T. I think you could have 5 yes, but 4 others.

U. Talking of, we have 5 yes, but 4 others.

V. Meaning to get over on the, but will say

W. 20%. Could we agree to 20%.

X. They are trying to deal

Y. S. A. in a partnership and business. I think we should cut, but will be explained. If we see

Z. We will apply to this, same opening. Proceed.

A. It is quite evident to effect a change in

B. Local policy. We will be at all

c. They can't get in.

D. When State take this attitude? I think they took position this continued matter.
K. The dog is kinda blind. I try to wait

them out.

P. I think we have to make long statement

K: Our (word?) is right now. He has a

ment + (word?)

(Stared at me in surprised, asked)

You don't report anything will get left as

don't take events at their face, just get your

your dad separately at there would be

Caused me to get to next if there be a

P. Finn Upshur, should I ask him about?

K. No, he will want to talk CSS + MFR +

or H + 40, don't get into detail

P. Basket II is good.

K. II is Siemens contact. I say we want property

some relation of W/E some word II but we

will never influence. Another word is pay

manpower, size etc. E use word division

management satisfaction, some sort large. E cannot

affirm, we agree to not here, but not regularly.

K. Think CSS will be hardened next going;

E. The Schmidt + coursework with relevant.