

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 8, 1974
9:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: On SALT, if you proposed offsetting asymmetries, you would be in a bad position. Yesterday, you were told: (1) We'll be in a better situation after 1976; (2) with time you could educated the public about strategic stability; and (3) your options are a quick fix now or a careful deal later. It is absurd to say that anything above 700 MIRV is useless but the difference between 2,000 and 2,200 is decisive.

When you say one megaton is more useful than 40 kilotons, it's true but that depends for what?

The arguments were shoddy, but they have put you in a box. You will be accused of moving under pressure at my advice, misusing the NSC system, and that you could have had a better deal by waiting six months. I think we should stick with equal aggregates at 2,200 with a 60 percent MIRV limitation. I don't know what the Soviets will think.

President: At 2,200, won't we be accused of no arms control at all?

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 3/10/04
BY Ma, NARA, DATE 5/4/04



Kissinger: Yes. But the USSR would have to cut back. If all restraints were off, the Soviet Union could build new holes and go up in their totals very rapidly.

President: I was mad. They were totally inflexible.

Kissinger: The real problem is they have a united bureaucratic front.

This proposal would at best not be an insult. It would have to emerge out of Vladivostok, not before. You would have to ram it down DOD's throat. If they wanted more throw weight, they could come in with a program. The arguments were fraudulent. (Poseidon at 5 MIRV). If the Soviets don't accept this, we could fall back to balanced asymmetries.

President: I don't like it but go ahead. Give me a comparative chart of this versus balanced asymmetries.

I thought Jim was inflexible, Clements was better and Brown was embarrassed.

Kissinger: On the Middle East, I can get a new line in the Sinai. I will go two times to Syria and Egypt. The trouble is Syria. They won't hold still unless you can give them assurance you will support another move on the Golan. But there are those Israeli settlements there.

President: How many are there?

Kissinger: That is not the point. Moving one of them would be a massive problem. You would have to threaten an aid cutoff. If we don't do this, we could trigger a war with an Egyptian disengagement. But Israel has no intention of making another move on the Golan. We may have another war anyway. What Israel asks for, Egypt can't give. But it is hard to show the American people that it isn't fair to ask for moves for peace in return for territory.

President: Would that move on the Golan break our commitment to Israel?

Kissinger: No, but you can't get this by negotiations -- only through brute force.



President: If we got Egypt, Jordan and Syria along attainable lines, does that give us a higher probability of peace over five-to-ten years, or is it just another step?

Kissinger: I think you could have five years before the Arabs try again for the 1967 borders, but without moves there will be war next year.

Israel is moving to vote no on the PLO, but will lay the groundwork with the Arabs.

Another issue on which State opposes me. The Africans are trying to expel South Africa from the UN on apartheid and humanitarian reasons. I think we should veto, but there will be an explosion. If we let South Africa be expelled on this, we are opening a Pandora's box. It is a bad precedent to expel a country because they have a bad policy. We will try to organize enough abstentions so they can't get the votes.

President: Why does State take this attitude? I thought they took the position this was an internal matter.

Kissinger: The Department is Kennedy-liberal. I am trying to week them out.

President: I think we have to veto, but abstention would be better.

Kissinger: On Gierek, he is a national Communist. He has to maneuver between the Communists and Catholics.

You have to expect everything will get back to the Soviet Union, so don't take cracks at them, but any suggestions that you will deal separately with them would be welcomed.

Gierek wants you to meet with him a half hour before the dinner.

President: Fine, Upstairs. Should I ask him about Church?

Kissinger: No. He will want to talk CSCE and MBFR and relief on PL-480. Don't get into details.

President: Basket III is a problem?



Kissinger: III is human contacts. I say we can't jeopardize our relations with Western Europe over Basket III but we will use our influence. Another issue is confidence-building measures (CBM's)--maneuvers, etc. The Europeans want notification of division-size movements; the Soviets want a corps. The Europeans want observers, the Soviets agree to it on an ad hoc basis, but not regular. I think CSCE will be resolved next spring. Either Schmidt or Giscard will sell out.



© R record for yesterday - who stood w/us (69)
For Pico.

✓ PIR 805, 1974
Tuesday - 9:00 am

K On Salt, if you proposed of getting agreements you would be in bad faith. Yesterday you were not

- (1) Better situation after 875
 - (2) w/ time you could educate on ~~benefits~~ stability
 - (3) Options are a quick fix now; or a careful deal later
- ~~The absurd to say anything above 200 million is useless~~
but by bet 2000 + 2200 is decisive.

When you say ~~more~~ ^{that} more useful than 40 bt, but that depends for what.

The arguments were shoddy, but they have put you in a box. You will be accused of making wrong decision at my advice, missing NSC system, & that you could have had better deal by waiting 6 mos.
I think we struck w/ equal agreement at 2200 w/ 60% Miro limitation. Don't know what Sars will think

P At 2200 wasn't we be a cess of no arms control.

K Yes. But USSR would have to cut back.

If all ~~restrictions~~ were off, CSU would build more holes & go up in total very quickly.

P Devas read. They were totally implausible

K The real part is they have a limited incentive front.

This proposal would at best not be an insight. It would have to emerge out of Vlad. not before. You would have to have it down DOD threats. If they wanted more Tos they could come in w/a prog.

The arguments were franchises. (Pardon at 5 Miro)
If Sars don't accept this, we could fall back to balanced agreements.

P I don't like it but go ahead. Give me a comparative chart of this vs balanced agreements.
I think Jim was implausible, Clements better

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BY WJ, NARA, DATE 5/6/04

and Brown embarrassed

K On ME, I can get a new line in Sinai. We'll go 2 times to S & E. The trouble is Syria. They won't hold still unless ^{you} I can give them assurance you will support another move on Golan

P How many are there?

K That's not a point. ~~It's~~ Having one of them would be a strategic point. You would have to threaten air cutoff. If we don't do this, we could trigger a war w/ E disengagement. But I have no intention of another move on Golan. We may have another war anyway. What I ask, I can't give. But hard to show US people it isn't fair to ask for moves for peace in return for territory.

P would that another Golan break our contract to E

K No, but you can't get this by negotiation - only through force.


P If we get E, J, S along attainable lines, does that give us higher prob of peace over 5-10 yrs or is it just another step.

K I think you could have 5 yrs⁺, but w/o moves there will be war next year.

I'm leaning to vote no on PLO, but will lay open book w/ Arabs.

Another issue - ^{on which state of pass had} Opinions are trying to expell S.A. on apartheid + hemibia. I think we should vote, but will be explosion. If we let SA be expelled on this, we're opening Pandora box. It's bad precedent to expell a country because of local policy. We will try to squeeze enough abstentions so they can't get 2/3 votes.

P Why State take this attitude? I think they took position this internal matter.



K The Dept is Kennedy liberal. I trying to weed
them out.

P I think we have to vote, least abstention on both

K Don't know, he with Court. He has to maneuver
bet Court & Catholics

(Stay about one in Poland + Haldé)

You have to report everything until get back to SU
don't take cracks at them, but suggestions that
~~you~~ you deal separately w/ them would be
welcome.

Bevise wants you to meet w/ him 1/2 hr before
a dinner

P Fine. Upstairs. Should I ask him about a
check?

K No. He will want to talk @ SSE + MEMBER + wing
on PL 450. Don't get into details

P Basket II is poor!

K III is human contacts. I say we want package
our relations w/ W/E our own basket III but we
will mean influence. Another issue is CBR,
manpower, ~~size~~ etc. E want division
movement multiplier, separate ways. E want
observers, SU agree to all this, but not regular.
I think C S E will be resolved next spring.
Either Schmitt + Giscard will sell out.

